CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITYCOM;ENG — 11 septembre 2025

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s2EF17D91 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sD6845F38 { font-family:Arial; color:#0072bc } .s3AAE10DF { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s3CA22BA { font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .s819344C9 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:18pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-18pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt } .s2D9C6089 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s84651E4E { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:3pt; text-align:justify } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sC986E16F { font-family:Arial; color:#ffffff } .s68D1564D { width:34.89pt; display:inline-block } .s3FD9E4E3 { width:138.43pt; display:inline-block } .s5D826FD4 { width:25.88pt; display:inline-block } .s1B61D60 { width:156.43pt; display:inline-block }     FIRST SECTION DECISION Application no. 11843/16 Tadeush KOBETS against Latvia   The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 11   September 2025 as a Committee composed of:   Davor Derenčinović , President ,   Artūrs Kučs,   Anna Adamska-Gallant , judges , and Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   11843/16) against the Republic of Latvia lodged with the Court under Article   34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 25   February 2016 by a Russian national, Mr   Tadeush Olegovich Kobets (Tadeušs Kobecs) (“the applicant”), who was born in 1963, lives in Moscow and was represented by Mr   Ziedonis Ūdris, a lawyer practising in Riga; the decision to give notice of the application to the Latvian Government (“the Government”), represented by their successive Agents, Ms   K. Līce and Ms   E. L. Vītola; the Government’s observations; Having deliberated, decides as follows: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1.     In 2005, the applicant contacted J.F., a vice-president of a Latvian bank (“the bank”), seeking advice on opening accounts in the European Union. Acting upon J.F.’s recommendation, the applicant arranged for the transfer of 1,200,000   United States dollars (USD) from a company under his control to the account of an offshore company owned by J.F. Instead of crediting these funds to the applicant’s account, J.F. diverted them through various transfers to accounts of two companies under his control. 2.     On 28   August 2006 the applicant and his company reassigned all pecuniary claims against J.F. in the amount of USD 1,200,000 to a British entity, in exchange for USD 750,000. That sum was paid to the applicant in three instalments on 28 August and 9   November 2006 and 29   May 2007. On   1   June 2007 the claims against J.F. were further reassigned to a private individual who, on 12   December 2011, transferred them to a company registered in Panama (“the Panama company”). 3.     In parallel, the applicant lodged a complaint with the Latvian police concerning the disappearance of his funds, without mentioning the reassignment of the claims. On 17   October 2006 the police instituted criminal proceedings against J.F., ordered the attachment of funds held in accounts of his companies in the bank, and granted the status of injured party to the applicant and to another individual who had been similarly defrauded. 4.     In December 2006 the financial regulatory authority identified that the bank held insufficient assets and revoked its licence. On 25   January 2007 the bank went into liquidation. 5.     By judgment of 25   May 2010, the Riga Regional Court found J.F. guilty of aggravated fraud and laundering of criminal proceeds. On 29   October 2012 the Chamber of Criminal Cases of the Supreme Court upheld the conviction but amended the judgment in relation to the award of damages. It declared that the funds held in the bank accounts of companies controlled by J.F. constituted criminally acquired property and ordered that these funds be used as compensation for the applicant and the other victim in equal shares. The judgment became final on 21   February 2013. 6.     On 11   April 2013 a bailiff submitted a request to the bank’s liquidator seeking the transfer of the funds directly to the applicant. The liquidator refused the request and instead placed the applicant on the list of creditors. On 14   June 2013 the bailiff complained to the Riga Regional Court about the liquidator’s refusal to pay out the funds to the applicant in accordance with the 29   October 2012 judgment. 7.     On 6   May 2013 the Panama company, having discovered the outcome of the criminal proceedings, contacted the bank’s liquidator. It submitted copies of the assignment agreements and requested recognition as the rightful owner of the contested funds. The liquidator, having identified a legal dispute concerning ownership, declined to acknowledge the claim in the absence of a judicial determination. On 15   July 2013 the Panama company issued civil proceedings against the bank, the applicant and the other individual, claiming ownership of the contested funds based on the chain of assignments. On 6   August 2013, the Riga Regional Court granted the Panama company’s request for an interim injunction, preventing payment of the contested funds to the applicant. The court noted that, without such an injunction, the funds would be transferred to the applicant in enforcement of the criminal judgment, whilst there appeared to be a legitimate contractual dispute regarding their ownership. 8.     On 9   September 2013 the Riga Regional Court partially upheld a complaint lodged by the bailiff, finding that the liquidator’s refusal to transfer the funds was unlawful. It held that funds designated as criminally acquired property could not be used for the repayment of debts to creditors. However, it noted that it was precluded from ordering the transfer of the funds due to an injunction then in effect. 9.     On 10   November 2014 the bank’s remaining assets were declared insufficient, and insolvency proceedings were accordingly initiated. These proceedings concluded on 2   July 2015 and, on 9 July, the bank was removed from the Companies Register. By a decision of 13   October 2015, the Riga Regional Court lifted the injunction imposed on the funds, noting that the bank had ceased to exist. 10.     On 19   September 2016 the civil proceedings regarding the ownership of the funds were discontinued following the withdrawal of the claim by the Panama company. The court observed that, in the absence of a legal entity against which the claim had been initially lodged, the proceedings could no longer be pursued. It also noted that, given the termination of the civil proceedings, the question of ownership of the disputed funds should be regarded as having been resolved by the judgment of 29   October 2012. 11.     The applicant complained under Article   6 of the Convention that the domestic authorities failed to execute promptly the judgment of 29   October 2012 which entitled him to criminally acquired funds, allowing time for the Panama company to secure an interim injunction against payment. He further complained under Article   1 of Protocol No.   1 that the bank’s liquidator erroneously treated these funds as part of the bank’s general assets rather than paying them directly to him. Lastly, invoking Article   13 of the Convention, the applicant claimed that he did not have an effective remedy to challenge these actions, being forced to engage in protracted proceedings while the bank became insolvent and was liquidated. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT 12.     The Government argued that the applicant had abused the right of individual application by deliberately withholding significant information from both the domestic authorities and the Court, notably failing to disclose that he had reassigned his claims against J.F. to a private company in exchange for USD 750,000 prior to the institution of criminal proceedings. They further submitted that the case was inadmissible ratione personae ; that the application had been lodged outside the six-month time-limit, and that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies. As to the merits, the Government asserted that the domestic authorities had acted with due diligence throughout the enforcement process. Enforcement had been hindered solely by the bank’s insolvency rather than by any failure attributable to the authorities. Accordingly, the State could not be held responsible for the private debtor’s failure to pay. 13.     The applicant did not submit observations in reply to those of the Government. Through his representative, he nevertheless indicated that he wished to maintain his application and requested an award of just satisfaction. 14.     The Court reiterates at the outset that an application may be rejected as an abuse of the right of individual application within the meaning of Article   35 §   3 (a) of the Convention if, in particular, it is based on incomplete and thereby misleading information, particularly where such information concerns the very core of the case and no sufficient explanation has been offered for the failure to disclose it. Such abuse may also arise by omission, where the applicant fails to inform the Court of an element essential for the examination of the case (see Gross v.   Switzerland [GC], no.   67810/10, §   28, 30   September 2014, and Bencheref v.   Sweden (dec.), no.   9602/15, §   37, 5   December 2017). 15.     The Court notes that the present application concerns the non-enforcement of the judgment of 29   October 2012, whereby the Supreme Court designated certain funds as criminally acquired property and ordered them to be used as compensation for the applicant. However, the Court also observes that the applicant chose not to disclose a critical fact in his application: that prior to the institution of criminal proceedings, he had reassigned his pecuniary claims against J.F. in the amount of USD   1,200,000 to a third party, receiving USD 750,000 in return. 16.     This omission is particularly significant as the very funds that the applicant sought to have transferred to him pursuant to the criminal judgment were subsequently claimed by the Panama company on the basis of assignment agreements originating from the applicant himself. It could not reasonably be expected that the Court would infer the existence of these assignments without the applicant expressly disclosing them. The information which the applicant failed to disclose concerned a core aspect of the application, namely his entitlement to the funds in question. 17.     The Court observes that the applicant similarly omitted to disclose the reassignment of his claims to the domestic authorities during the criminal proceedings. This omission appears to have led to a situation where the domestic courts designated funds as compensation for the applicant without being informed that he had already received substantial compensation (USD   750,000) through the assignment of the very same claims. The Court notes that had the applicant acted with complete transparency, the outcome of the domestic proceedings, in particular the enforcement phase, might have been substantially different. 18.     While the above considerations could potentially lead to a finding of abuse of the right of individual application (compare Uzun and Others v.   Turkey (dec.) [Committee], nos.   6783/18 and 7 others, §§   15-16, 21   January 2025), the Court does not need to establish with certainty the applicant’s intention to mislead or consider the other preliminary objections raised by the Government, as it finds that the complaints must in any event be rejected as manifestly ill-founded for the following reasons. 19.     As regards Article   6 of the Convention, the Court reiterates that the State has a positive obligation to organise a system for enforcement of judgments that is effective both in law and in practice and ensures their enforcement without any undue delay. However, where the debtor is a private entity, the State’s responsibility is limited to providing the necessary assistance to the creditor and cannot be held responsible for a private debtor’s lack of funds or insolvency (see Sanglier v.   France , no.   50342/99, §   39, 27   May 2003; Fociac v.   Romania , no.   2577/02, §§   67-70, 3   February 2005; and Yershova v.   Russia , no.   1387/04, §   53, 8   April 2010). 20.     In the present case, the Court notes that the bailiff promptly initiated enforcement proceedings in April 2013, shortly after the judgment became final. When faced with the liquidator’s refusal, the bailiff diligently lodged a complaint with the Riga Regional Court, which partially upheld it in September 2013. The enforcement was ultimately prevented not by any lack of diligence on the part of the authorities, but by two independent factors: first, the interim injunction obtained by the Panama company (which derived its claim from the applicant’s own assignment); and second, the insolvency and subsequent dissolution of the bank. 21.     The Court reiterates that the question of whether the applicant’s own conduct contributed to delays in the enforcement proceedings, as well as whether an applicant alleging a violation of his property rights acted openly and honestly, are relevant elements in its assessment (see Camara v.   Belgium , no.   49255/22, §§   109 and 112, 18   July 2023, in relation to Article   6, and Beyeler v.   Italy [GC], no.   33202/96, §§   115 ‑ 16, ECHR 2000-I, in relation to Article   1 of Protocol No. 1). In this connection, the Court finds that the protracted enforcement proceedings were largely a predicament of the applicant’s own making. Had he not reassigned his claims against J.F., the Panama company would not have intervened in the proceedings to assert its rights. The applicant’s conduct moreover suggests an attempt to obtain a double recovery: in addition to the USD 750,000 he had already received through the reassignment, he sought to receive the full amount from the criminally acquired funds. 22.     As regards Article   1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court does not discern any arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable conduct on the part of the domestic authorities that would amount to an unjustified interference with the applicant’s property rights. The eventual impossibility of enforcement resulted from the bank’s insolvency rather than from any failure attributable to the State. 23.     As regards Article   13, the Court notes that the applicant had access to an effective enforcement mechanism through the bailiff service, as well as to judicial review of the liquidator’s actions. The Government has also pointed to the possibility of bringing a civil claim against the liquidator personally, which the applicant chose not to pursue. 24.     It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article   35 §§   3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Declares the application inadmissible. Done in English and notified in writing on 2 October 2025.     Liv Tigerstedt   Davor Derenčinović   Deputy Registrar   President