CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 11 septembre 2025

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page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sC986E16F { font-family:Arial; color:#ffffff } .s9D025815 { width:20.21pt; display:inline-block } .s7C2BCC70 { width:136.09pt; display:inline-block } .s5A65B3DC { width:46.56pt; display:inline-block } .s44B8752F { width:177.11pt; display:inline-block } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s85226119 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 }   FIFTH SECTION CASE OF SUVERÉNNÍ ŘÁD MALTÉZSKÝCH RYTÍŘŮ - ČESKÉ VELKOPŘEVORSTVÍ v. THE CZECH REPUBLIC (Application no. 15440/22)     JUDGMENT   Art 6 (civil) • Fair hearing • Disregarding of a newly established development of constitutional case-law by a chamber of the Constitutional Court without reasons in proceedings concerning church property restitution • Relevant chamber’s failure to use domestic-law mechanism of submitting the matter to a plenary session of the Constitutional Court for ensuring consistency of practice between the different chambers • Principle of legal certainty breached   Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.   STRASBOURG 11 September 2025   FINAL   11/12/2025   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Suverénní řád Maltézských rytířů - České velkopřevorství v. the Czech Republic, The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   María Elósegui , President ,   Kateřina Šimáčková,   Georgios A. Serghides,   Andreas Zünd,   Diana Sârcu,   Mykola Gnatovskyy,   Vahe Grigoryan , judges , and Victor Soloveytchik, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   15440/22) against the Czech Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by Suverénní řád Maltézských rytířů - České velkopřevorství (“the applicant”), on 23   March   2022; the decision to give notice to the Czech Government (“the Government”) of the application; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 8 July 2025, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The application concerns the applicant’s complaints that in proceedings instituted under the Church Property Settlement Act (Law no. 428/2012), the domestic courts had interpreted domestic law contrary to the principle of fairness and had not respected previous judgments of the Constitutional Court in analogous cases. The applicant relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 thereto. THE FACTS 2.     The applicant is an ecclesiastical legal person forming an organisational unit of the Roman Catholic Church. It was represented by Mr   O.   Rathouský, a lawyer practising in Prague. 3.     The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr P. Konůpka, of the Ministry of Justice. 4.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. POST-WAR LEGISLATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA 5.     The occupation of Czechoslovakia during the Second World War prevented the State’s internationally recognised political authorities from exercising sovereign State power in Czechoslovak territory. The Government-in-exile based in London had to adapt to that situation. The exercise of legislative power was temporarily delegated, upon Constitutional Decree of the President of the Republic no. 2/1940 of 15 October 1940 on provisional exercise of legislative power ( ústavní dekret presidenta republiky o prozatímním výkonu moci zákonodárné ), to the President of the Republic, Mr Eduard Beneš, which resulted in the so called “Beneš Decrees”. After the Second World War, all Presidential Decrees issued under Constitutional Decree no. 2/1940 were endorsed ( ratihabice ) by the Provisional National Assembly ( Prozatímní Národní shromáždění ) and enacted as laws (Constitutional Law no. 57/1946 of 28 March 1946). 6.     On 21 June 1945 President Beneš signed Decree no. 12/1945 on the confiscation and expedited distribution of the agricultural property of Germans, Hungarians, and traitors and enemies of the Czech and Slovak nation ( Dekret č. 12/1945 o konfiskaci a urychleném rozdělení zemědělského ímajetku Němců, Maďarů, jakož i zrádců a nepřátel českého a slovenského národa ), which entered into force on 23 June 1945. The Decree confiscated, with immediate effect and without compensation, agricultural property owned, inter alia , by traitors and enemies of the Republic, irrespective of their nationality and citizenship, who had acted as such during the crisis and war between 1938 and 1945, or by public limited companies and other companies and corporations whose management had wilfully and intentionally served the German war machine or fascist or Nazi purposes. The Decree worked on the assumption that confiscation could be carried out even in the absence of a related administrative act because the Decree provided that the confiscation of property took place ex lege at its entry into force. 7.     Persons whose property was to be confiscated were designated as such by a confiscation notice ( konfiskační vyhláška ) usually issued by a district national committee ( okresní národní výbor ), which was posted on official notice boards of the relevant local national committees ( úřední desky příslušných místních národních výborů ) in whose district the property to be confiscated was located. Persons designated by State authorities as persons whose property was subject to confiscation, which is to say persons “categorised” under section 3(2) of Decree no. 12/1945 by a competent county national committee ( zemský národní výbor ), were to have all their property confiscated, even if such categorisation applied only to part of their property [1] . The owner of property that was set to be confiscated could apply for an exemption from confiscation, which was decided by a competent administrative authority; the Minister of Agriculture, in concert with the Minister of the Interior, decided on borderline cases. 8.     On 12 August 1947 the Revision of the First Land Reform Act ( zákon o revizi první pozemkové reformy ) (Law no. 142/1947) entered into force. The Act made it possible to review all property that, for any reason, had been excluded or kept from seizure, whose seizure had not been decided upon, or which had been allocated as a “residual estate” under the interwar land reform (the first land reform). BACKGROUND TO THE CASE 9.     The present case concerns immovable property located in Dívčí Hrad (Bruntál district) with a total area of 506,784 sq. m (hereinafter “the land in question”). 10 .     On different dates between September and October 1945 the applicant’s property located in area of Dívčí Hrad, Hlinka, Sádek and Pitárné, including the land in question, was the subject of several confiscation notices ( konfiskační vyhlášky ) issued under Presidential Decree no. 12/1945 by the former Krnov District Administrative Commission ( okresní správní komise ) and by the former Opava District National Committee ( okresní národní výbor ). 11.     On 11 October 1945 the former Česká Lípa District National Committee issued a confiscation notice indicating the names of various persons and entities as traitors and enemies of the Czech and Slovak nations; the notice included the applicant, whose property located in Horní Libchava was to be confiscated under Presidential Decree no. 12/1945. Several names, including that of the applicant, were crossed out. 12.     On 13 May 1946 the former Ostrava Moravian-Silesian County National Committee ( Moravskoslezský zemský národní výbor ), on foot of objections by the applicant’s legal predecessor, annulled the confiscation notices issued by the former Krnov District Administrative Commission and the former Opava District National Committee (see paragraph 10 above), having found them unlawful. 13 .     From an inventory of property compiled on 14 January 1948 pursuant to Law No. 142/1947, it appears that on 12 August 1947 the applicant’s predecessor owned four agricultural communes ( komendy ), including the agricultural commune in Dívčí Hrad. 14.     On 5 April 1948 the former Česká Lípa District National Committee issued a confiscation notice indicating the names of various persons and entities, including the applicant’s predecessor, whose property located in Horní Libchava was to be confiscated under Presidential Decree no. 12/1945. 15 .     On 1 October 1948 the Ministry of Agriculture ( ministerstvo zemědělství ) decided, under Law no. 142/1947, to assume ownership from the applicant’s predecessor of the forest and manor ( velkostatek ) of the Dívčí Hrad estate in the cadastral area of Dívčí Hrad and also other areas with all their fixtures, in accordance with a confiscation notice of 15 May 1948 issued by the Ministry under Law no. 142/1947. 16 .     On 23 March 1949 the Ministry of Agriculture decided to leave the applicant’s predecessor as owner of 50 hectares of each of the Dívčí Hrad, Hlinka, Vršovice and Malé Hostice estates (see also paragraph 13 above) pursuant to section 11 of Law no. 142/1947. 17.     The expropriated land was subsequently managed by the body State Forests and Estates ( Státní lesy a statky ), then by the State enterprises Státní   zemědělský podnik Jindřichov, s.p. , Státní statek Osoblaha, s.p. and Ústřední   dílny Bruntál , before being transferred to the Land Fund of the Czech Republic ( Pozemkový fond České republiky ), which was responsible for the management of State-owned immovable property from January 1991 to December 2012. 18 .     On 24 June 1991 the Land Ownership Act (Law no. 229/1991) entered into force. Section 29 of the Act, as in force until 31 December 2012, provided that property originally owned by churches, religious communities, orders or congregations could not be transferred to other persons until laws on church property were enacted (“the blocking provision” – see paragraph   39 below; it was repealed by the Church Property Settlement Act with effect on 1   January 2013 – see paragraph 21 below). 19.     On 25 May 1999 the Conditions for the Transfer of Agricultural and Forest Land Act (Law no. 95/1999) entered into force. Section   2(1)(c) provided that agricultural or forestry land that was prevented from transfer by “the blocking provision” could not be transferred (see paragraph 36 below). Subsequently, the Land Fund proceeded to check land under its management in order to determine which land was excluded from transfer (see paragraph 37 below). Thus, the transferability of the properties in the cadastral area of Dívčí Hrad, including the land in question, was examined. On 21 December 2000 the land registry reported that no documents from the land register or any previous records indicated that the land in question had been the property of a church, religious community, order or congregation as of 25 February 1948. 20.     Title to the land in question was transferred to a private farmer, P.Š., under purchase contracts concluded between the Land Fund and P.Š. on 22   November 2006 and 17 December 2007, and also under a contract of exchange concluded between a private farmer, J.B., and P.Š. on 17 May 2012 in respect of land acquired by J.B. under a purchase contract concluded with the Land Fund of the Czech Republic on 11 December 2006. Those purchase contracts explicitly declared that the Land Fund had checked the transferability of the land in question and that it was not “blocked” under the above-mentioned law from being transferred. 21 .     On 1 January 2013 the Church Property Settlement Act (Law no.   428/2012) entered into force, enabling, inter alia , restitution of property or parts of property that had originally belonged to certain churches, which had been unlawfully confiscated by the communist regime (see paragraphs   38-39 below). The law applied to property owned by the State but not to property owned by persons governed by private law. Churches also had standing under the Act to bring court proceedings for the restitution of property it had originally owned that had been transferred to private persons in breach of the blocking provision in the Land Ownership Act, given that the State was the actual owner of such property (see paragraph 45 above). However, property confiscated from churches on the basis of Presidential Decrees nos.   12/1945 and 108/1945 were excluded from restitution under the Act (see paragraph   44 below). RESTITUTION PROCEEDINGS INITIATED BY THE APPLICANT 22.     On 17 December 2013, on the basis of the Church Property Settlement Act, the applicant brought an action in the Bruntál District Court ( okresní soud ) against P.Š. and the State seeking a declaratory judgment that the State, rather than P.Š., was the owner of the land in question, given that the latter had acquired it in breach of the blocking provision (section   29 of the Land Ownership Act – see paragraphs 18 and 39 above). The applicant argued that the land in question had been subject to confiscation under Law no. 142/1947 and that P.Š. had acquired it in breach of the blocking provision. The applicant relied, inter alia , on the Ministry of Agriculture’s decisions of 15   May 1948 and 23   March 1949 (see paragraphs 15-16 above). Consequently, the transfer had been void ab initio . Were the transfer of the land in question to be declared null and void, that would mean that the owner thereof was the Czech Republic and that the land could be the subject of proceedings by which the applicant, as the original owner of the church property, could seek restitution under the Church Property Settlement Act. 23.     In a judgment of 20 December 2019, the District Court granted the applicant’s action and declared that the State was the owner of the land in question. The relevant parts of its judgment read as follows: “51.     ... the court found that the [applicant] ... is a legal person under section 3(b) of the Church Property Settlement Act ... 52.     The court also had to determine whether the [applicant] proved that it had suffered pecuniary loss during the relevant period as a result of circumstances referred to in section   5 of the Church Property Settlement Act, namely [that its property had been confiscated] without compensation [pursuant to] Law no. 142/1947. It appears from the Ministry of Agriculture’s decision ... of 15 May 1948 that the decision was issued on the basis of [Law no. 142/1947] to expropriate the [applicant]’s property, including the Dívčí Hrad communes. The fact that [the confiscation was based on] Law no. 142/1947 is further evidenced by a decision of the Ministry of Agriculture of 1   October 1948 on taking over the forestry and manor in the Dívčí Hrad estate ..., which had been based on the decision of 15 May 1948. ... Last but not least, [the fact that the confiscation occurred according to the] procedure [outlined in Law no.   142/1947] is also proved by documents submitted by the archives containing a list of [the plots of] land that were subject to the procedure under Law no. 142/1947, [including] all the land that [is] the subject of the present action. In the light of the foregoing, the court concludes that the [applicant], as a legal person fulfilling the conditions of section   3(b) of the Church Property Settlement Act, suffered pecuniary loss during the relevant period [falling under] section 1 of that Act (25 February 1948 to 1   January 1990), in that the [land in question] was taken from it without compensation [pursuant to] Law   no.   142/1947. That fact was recorded in the register on 16 June 1948 under entry no.   96 on the basis of a notification of the Ministry of Agriculture dated 31   May 1948. 53.     The court also examined whether the property of the [applicant] or its predecessor in title had been confiscated on the basis of Decree ... no. 12/1945 ... in the light of the existence of the [confiscation] notices of the Česká Lípa District National Committee of 11 October 1945 and 5 April 1948. ... Property [confiscated under the Decree] was transferred to the State on the date of entry into force of the Decree, namely 23   June 1945. ... The confiscation notice, as a declaratory act ... [merely] specified which property was affected by the Decree. ... 54.     It follows from the case-law of the Constitutional Court that the legal basis for [such a] confiscation was the [Presidential] Decree itself, but it is necessary to assess whether [the Decree] was abused in the relevant period. ... In order to establish [the existence of] material injustice in the ... relevant period, it is necessary to establish when the fulfilment of the conditions under the ... Presidential Decree was decided upon and whether they were [actually] fulfilled .... If the confiscation notice was issued in the relevant period, ... on the basis of the Presidential Decree, the court is obliged to examine whether that ... [notice] was issued in compliance with the law in force at the time, .... Administrative authorities and courts are not empowered to ... overturn final decisions taken in the [historical] past. With regard to administrative acts issued in the relevant period, [administrative authorities and courts] are entitled ... to assess the effects of such acts in the light of the restitution of titles governed by the restitution law ... 55.     According to the Constitutional Court’s judgment no. II. ÚS 405/98 of 20   October 1999, property confiscated under Decree no. 12/1945 passed [into the ownership] of the Czechoslovak State on the day of its entry into force. A confiscation notice [ výměr ], as a declaratory act, determined which properties were concerned by the Decree. It was only through the confiscation notice, as an administrative act, that the confiscation of property was completed. At the same time, it was possible for a competent authority to exclude part of the confiscated property [if doing so was justified]. If the property had been transferred to the State retroactively to the date on which Decree No. 12/1945 had entered into force, without ... the conditions for confiscating the property of the original owner having been met at that time, the administrative act (the confiscation notice) would be considered as an act of political persecution violating generally recognised human rights and freedoms and, as such, a legal act issued in violation of the regulations in force at the time. To hold otherwise would violate ... the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 36 § 1 of the [Czech] Charter. 56.     In order to prove their submission to the effect that the property in question had been confiscated pursuant to the Decree of the President of the Republic, the defendants submitted three confiscation notices [of the former district national committees dated 27   September 1945, 11   October 1945 and 5 April 1948]. The court does not consider that those three notices prove the confiscation of the [applicant]’s property: the confiscation could not have been effected by the confiscation notice of 11 October 1945, because although [the applicant] is indicated under no. 56, this number and this name are crossed out. The crossing-out leaves no doubt that it was made by the same district national committee. With regard to the confiscation notice of 5 April 1948, that notice was issued in the relevant period on the basis of Decree no. 12/1945 and lists the [applicant] as no. 15, but the document has no ... stamp and it is not clear whether it was signed by a competent authority .... Even the confiscation notice of 27 September 1945 did not prove that the confiscation process had been completed ..., since this notice ... was quashed by ... the Moravian-Silesian County National Committee in Ostrava on 13 May 1946. ... 57.     It must therefore be concluded that the confiscation of the [applicant]’s property was not completed by any confiscation notice referred to by the [defendants]. At the same time, there is no record in the available archives of the existence of an inventory that would define the list of properties affected by ... the ... Presidential Decrees. From this point of view, it is superfluous to deal with the [State]’s argument that even a single confiscation notice anywhere on the territory of the then Czechoslovakia acted in personam and meant a successful confiscation of the entire property of an individual [among the categories of the population] concerned (namely Germans, Hungarians, traitors, collaborators etc.), if the existence of any confiscation notice against the [applicant] has not been established. In the opinion of the court, the confiscation notice must always refer to the concrete property ... mentioned in the confiscation notice, as also follows from the above-mentioned decisions of the Constitutional Court, since [only] a specific confiscation measure relating to specific real estate can have the intended effects.” 24.     On 28 January 2021 the Ostrava Regional Court ( krajský soud ), upon appeals by both defendants, reversed the first-instance court’s judgment and rejected the action. The court found that the applicant’s property had been confiscated under Presidential Decree no. 12/1945, that the property-related injustice, if any, had been committed before the relevant period, and that the applicant therefore lacked standing to bring an action for a declaratory judgment under the Church Property Settlement Act: “12.     The [applicant’s] property was confiscated under Decree ... no. 12/1945, as is evident from the confiscation notices issued by the Česká Lípa District National Committee on 11 October 1945 and 5 April 1948 and by the Opava District National Committee on 27 September 1945. Confiscation under the Decree was effective ex lege as of the date on which the Decree took effect, i.e. 23 June 1945, since the legal basis for the confiscation was the decree itself. Subsequent confiscation decisions, i.e. the district national committee’s order and notice and the district administrative commission’s notice, were only declaratory in nature. Confiscation was a statutory act usually taking place without administrative proceedings where the owner was designated by the State authorities as a person whose property was subject to confiscation. Any line of argument claiming that the confiscation notice was defective, substantively incorrect, or null and void is not legally relevant. The substantive correctness of an administrative act cannot be reviewed by the court in these proceedings.” 25.     On 21 May 2021 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law ( dovolání ) against the Regional Court’s judgment. 26 .     On 20 July 2021 the Supreme Court ( Nejvyšší soud ) dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law in judgment no. 28 Cdo 1802/2021. Having summarised the settled findings of both the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court regarding the effects of confiscation under Presidential Decree no.   12/1945, the Supreme Court pointed out that civil courts could not review the substantive correctness of administrative acts. Specifically, it observed, inter alia , that: “In the case law of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court, there is no ... doubt that the legal basis for the confiscation of property under Decree no. 12/1945 was the decree itself; [the confiscation] therefore took place as of the date on which the Decree took effect (23 June 1945); as of that date, the confiscated items became the property of the State, as the subsequent confiscation decision (the notice or order issued by the district national committee or district administrative commission) was merely declaratory in nature (cf., for example, the opinion of the Constitutional Court sitting in plenary no. Pl. ÚS-st. 21/05 of 1 November 2005 ..., the Constitutional Court’s judgment no.   II. ÚS 317/96 of 17 December 1997, the Constitutional Court’s judgment no.   I. ÚS 129/99 of 13   June 2000, and the Supreme Court’s decisions nos.   22   Cdo   4716/2016 of 26 April 2017, 22 Cdo 5583/2016 of 27 June 2017, and 28   Cdo 4922/2016 of 9 May 2017). Therefore, the effects of confiscation cannot be challenged by claiming that there were defects in the confiscation procedure (notice). Another factor rendering irrelevant the line of argument essentially disputing the substantive correctness of the confiscation notice is that it is not the court’s task to review the substantive correctness of an administrative act (outside the framework of the administrative courts or, under prescribed conditions, now also in proceedings pursuant to Part Five of the Code of Civil Procedure) ... [I]t can thus assess a historical administrative decision only from the point of view of the possibility that such a decision might have been void (null), and even then only if the decision contains defects so serious as to constitute a ‘negative quality’ [meaning] that the presumption of the correctness of the decision cannot be relied upon (which also applies to an act that is substantively defective or unlawful; cf.   the Supreme Court’s decision no.   22 Cdo 1183/2000 of 24   April 2002) ... Where persons whose property was subject to confiscation were so designated by the State authorities – even if only in relation to part of their property – which is to say that they were so categorised for the purposes of Decree no. 12/1945, all of their property was confiscated (cf. the Constitutional Court’s decision no. IV. ÚS 89/94 of 10   November 1994, the Supreme Court’s decision no. 28 Cdo 1012/2020 of 28   April 2020, or the Supreme Court’s decision no. 28 Cdo 1754/2019 of 16   July 2019), the argument that confiscation would have applied only to property specified in the confiscation notice or to property situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the authority which issued the confiscation notice cannot be accepted. In fact, for confiscation to be effected pursuant to Decree no. 12/1945, it did not even have to be preceded by a declaratory decision stating that the conditions for such confiscation had been satisfied in a particular case ... These findings – which were fully respected by the court of appeal in its decision – were also upheld by the court hearing appeals on points of law in decisions rendered in similar cases brought by the applicant (see judgment of the Supreme Court no.   28   Cdo   2620/2019 of 7 January 2020, judgment of the Supreme Court no.   28   Cdo   1580/2020 of 7 July 2020, and decision of the Supreme Court no. 3087/2020 of 11 November 2020).” 27.     The Supreme Court further explained why the fact that the applicant’s property had been affected by legal acts carried out in favour of the German Reich during the Nazi occupation did not influence the passage of title as a result of confiscation pursuant to Presidential Decree no. 12/1945: “The finding that title to the property passed to the State as a result of confiscation pursuant to Decree no. 12/1945 is also justified, notwithstanding the fact that, at the time the Decree took effect, such property was still affected by legal acts, dating from the period of the Nazi occupation, in favour of the German Reich and the entities it established. [There is even] case-law [to the effect that] that confiscation pursuant to Decree   no.   12/1945 was also effected in respect of the property of persons aggrieved by the Nazi regime, [in cases where that property] had been transferred to the German Reich during the period of non-freedom (from 29 September 1938 to 8 May 1945), but had yet to be restituted to the entitled party within the meaning of post-war legislation ... ; the process of restoring the applicant’s title could not therefore be completed. This finding rests on the fundamental tenet that confiscation occurred ex lege as of the date on which the decree took effect and that confiscation notices were merely declaratory in nature; the court dealing with the appeal on points of law therefore finds that there is no leeway to depart from settled case-law ...” 28 .     Finally, the Supreme Court held that the fact that the applicant’s property had subsequently been subjected to the procedure under Law   no.   142/1947 could not nullify the effects of the earlier confiscation pursuant to Presidential Decree no. 12/1945: “In so far as the applicant’s property had already been confiscated pursuant to [Presidential] Decree no. 12/1945, it is irrelevant that the immovable property in question was subsequently also subjected to the procedure under Law no. 142/1947 ... Not even this circumstance alters the fact that the immovable property had been confiscated ex lege as of 23 June 1945 pursuant to the Presidential Decree. On the contrary, it is logical that even if there were two ‘concurring confiscations’, the later procedure would not have the effect of nullifying the earlier one. It is understandable that the incoming undemocratic regime wanted to ‘insure’ the passage of immovable property to the State. Although that approach might appear redundant in the context of the valid confiscation pursuant to the Presidential Decree, it cannot be regarded as precluding the 1945 confiscation ex lege or as meaning that the alleged property-related injustice occurred during the relevant period ...” 29.     On 30 September 2021 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint alleging, in particular, that the judgment of the Regional Court, which had overturned the judgment of the District Court, and the decision of the Supreme Court dismissing the applicant’s appeal on points of law against the Regional Court’s judgment, had violated its right to a fair trial and its property rights. It relied on judgments previously adopted by the Constitutional Court in similar restitution cases no. II. ÚS 1920/20 of 25   January 2021 and no.   I.   ÚS 1975/20 of 23 March 2021 (see paragraphs   50-51 below). 30 .     On 16 November 2021 the Constitutional Court, by judgment no.   IV.   ÚS 2662/21, dismissed the constitutional complaint as manifestly ill ‑ founded. It held that, in the present case, the ordinary courts had correctly examined the conditions under which the applicant’s property had been confiscated and had dealt with the case in a constitutionally compliant manner; it referred, in particular, to the detailed reasoning of the Supreme Court’s decision. Similarly, the Constitutional Court did not find any reason to depart from the settled findings concerning the effectiveness of confiscation pursuant to Presidential Decree no.   12/1945, and thus found no grounds to refer the case to the plenary court pursuant to section   23 of the Constitutional Court Act: “16.     ... The Constitutional Court holds that there is no reason to depart from the finding that the legal basis for the confiscation of property pursuant to [Presidential] Decree no. 12/1945 was the Decree itself, [and that] the confiscation thus took place as of the date on which the Decree took effect [which was the] date [on which] the confiscated assets became State property; hence, any subsequent confiscation decision was merely declaratory in nature (cf. opinion no. Pl. ÚS-st. 21/05 of 1   November 2005). This prompts other findings ([namely] the impossibility of challenging the effects of confiscation by claiming that there were defects in the confiscation proceedings, the fact that the scope of confiscation was not limited only to certain property, and the unfoundedness of the [notion that there was a] requirement for the State to physically take possession of the confiscated property in order to ‘execute the confiscation notice’ or to ‘give effect to the confiscation’). As the ordinary courts’ findings are consistent with the above-mentioned opinion, there is no reason to uphold the applicant’s petition to proceed in accordance with section 23 of the Constitutional Court Act.” PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT IN THE APPLICANT’S OTHER RESTITUTION CASES 31 .     On 30 November 2021 the Constitutional Court, by judgment no.   III.   ÚS 361/21, granted a second constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant. That appeal was directed against the ordinary courts’ decisions in another case in which the applicant was seeking, pursuant to section   18(1) of the Church Property Settlement Act, a declaratory judgment that land in the cadastral area of Pitárné [2] was owned by the Czech Republic. The Constitutional Court found that the Supreme Court in its decision no.   28   Cdo   3087/2020 of 11   November 2020 (see paragraph 26 above) had breached the applicant’s right to judicial protection under Article 36 § 1 of the Czech Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (see paragraph 52 below). 32.     On 14 February 2023 the Constitutional Court, by decision no.   IV.   ÚS 3238/22, dismissed a third constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant against the ordinary courts’ decisions on the determination of property title to other land in the cadastral area of Dívčí Hrad [3] . In that case the Constitutional Court held as follows: “15.     From the decision-making of the Constitutional Court ..., it appears that the Constitutional Court [repeatedly] ruled on the applicant’s constitutional complaints, which are identical in content and reasoning ... One of them was rejected as manifestly ill-founded by the Constitutional Court in its decision no. IV. ÚS 2662/21. That decision dealt with ... arguments which are identical to those in the constitutional complaint under consideration ..., and the Constitutional Court therefore refers to it, stating that there is no reason to depart from its conclusions. ... 16.     In the above-mentioned decision, the Constitutional Court expressly emphasised that the conclusions of the general courts are consistent with the plenary’s opinion no.   Pl.-st. 21/05, so that there is no reason to grant the applicant’s motion to proceed under section   23 of the Constitutional Court Act ... This conclusion is not altered by judgments nos.   III. ÚS 361/21 and I. ÚS 3918/19, since those judgments deviated from the previous case-law of the Constitutional Court and the above-mentioned [plenary] opinion, and thus the proceedings in those cases should have been conducted in accordance with section 23 of the Constitutional Court Act.” 33.     On 18 September 2024 the Constitutional Court, by decision no.   IV.   ÚS 1443/24, dismissed a constitutional complaint introduced by the State, challenging a decision of the Prague Regional Land Office ( krajský   pozemkový úřad pro hl.m. Prahu ) to return a plot of land located in Březiněves [4] to the applicant as a person entitled to restitution under the Church Property Settlement Act. The applicant joined the proceedings before the Constitutional Court as a third-party intervener ( vedlejší účastník ). The Constitutional Court held, in particular, that: “6.     The Constitutional Court recognises that, as a general rule, the confiscation of property took place at the moment of the entry into force of the Presidential Decree, ... (see judgment of the Constitutional Court no. Pl. ÚS 10/13 of 29 March 2013). However, as the ordinary courts correctly pointed out, with reference to the case-law of the Constitutional Court, it is necessary to assess whether there was actual confiscation before the relevant period. 7.     As the Supreme Court points out, even before the relevant period, the former courts had decided to restore the ownership of the disputed property to the [applicant]’s predecessor in title. The [applicant] had not lost the property as a result of confiscation under the Presidential Decree, but precisely as a result of the revision of the first land reform after the 1948 coup d’état. The first real attempt to confiscate the property of the [applicant] was linked to the revision of the land reform (compare judgment of the Constitutional Court no. I. ÚS 1975/20, point 30). The general courts concluded that the authorities of the Czechoslovak state had not taken any (significant) steps to confiscate the disputed property. ... Therefore, the [State] could not legally argue that the restitution was excluded ...” RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGAL PROVISIONS The Land Ownership Act (Law no. 229/1991 on the ownership of land and other agricultural property) 34.     Section 29 of the Act, as in effect until 31 December 2012, provided that property originally owned by churches, religious communities, orders or congregations could not be transferred to the ownership of other persons until laws regarding such property had been enacted. The Constitutional Court Act (Law no. 182/1993) 35 .     Section 23 provides that a panel which, in the course of its decision ‑ making, arrives at a legal opinion departing from a legal opinion of the Constitutional Court expressed in a judgment shall submit the matter to a plenary session of the Constitutional Court for consideration. Law no. 95/1999 on conditions for the transfer of ownership of agricultural and forest land from the State to other persons 36 .     Section 2(1)(c) provided that agricultural or forestry land whose transfer was prevented by special legislation could not be transferred. 37 .     Section 3(3) provided that the competent land registry, at the request of the Land Fund of the Czech Republic, was to check its records within thirty   days to verify that ownership of the land had not passed from nor had been transferred from a church or religious community, order or congregation to the State after 25 February 1948. The Church Property Settlement Act (Law no. 428/2012 on property settlements with churches and religious communities) 38 .     Section 1 provides that the aim of the Act is to redress certain property-related injustices perpetrated by the Communist regime against registered churches and religious communities in the period from 25   February   1948 to 1 January 1990 (“the relevant period”) and to settle property relations between the State and such legal persons. 39 .     Section 3(b) provides that a legal person established or constituted as part of a registered church or religious community is an entitled person, provided that, in the relevant period, that person or its legal predecessor sustained a property-related injustice as a result of one of the facts referred to in section 5. 40.     Section 4 provides that liable persons are the Land Fund of the Czech Republic, Lesy České republiky [Forests of the Czech Republic], the State, contributory State organisations, State funds, State enterprises, and other State organisations. 41 .     Section 5(a) provides that one of the facts leading to a property-related injustice is the deprivation of property without compensation by way of the procedure provided under Law no. 142/1947 on the revision of the First Land Reform. 42.     Section 7 provides that a liable person shall surrender to an entitled person a State-owned immovable property which was originally the property of a registered church or religious community and which was the object of a property-related injustice sustained by the entitled person or a legal predecessor thereof during the relevant period as a result of one of the facts referred to in section 5, provided that it was or is functionally linked to an immovable property which was owned by the entitled person or which is subject to surrender under the Act, or if it was used by the entitled person or a legal predecessor thereof during the relevant period for spiritual, pastoral, charitable, medical, educational or administrative purposes or as a dwelling for clergy. 43.     Section 8(1) enumerates cases in which a property cannot be surrendered to an entitled person, such as if it is a plot of land on which a   structure has been erected and is in use (section 8(1)(a)); or a part of a plot of land or a structure necessary for the realisation of a publicly beneficial structure within the scope of transport or technical infrastructure, as defined in the approved spatial planning documentation, for which rights to land and structures may be expropriated (section 8(1)(f)). 44 .     Section 8(1)(h) provides, further, that a property may not be surrendered if it is a property confiscated pursuant to Presidential Decrees nos.   12/1945 or 108/1945. 45 .     Section 18(1) provides that an entitled person may bring an action in a court seeking a declaration of State ownership on the grounds that an item originally the property of registered churches and religious communities had been transferred or passed from State ownership to the ownership of other persons in violation of the “blocking provision” provided for by the Land Ownership Act prior to the date on which the Church Property Settlement Act took effect. RELEVANT LEGAL PRACTICE 46 .     In its judgment no. III. ÚS 107/04 of 16 December 2004, the Constitutional Court made the following findings regarding the passing of title to confiscated property to the State and the nature of confiscation notices in the relevant period: “Confiscation or orders of forced administration under these regulations occurred ex ‑ lege at the moment they took effect. Confiscation orders or notices were usually issued later, if at all, and were only declaratory in nature; they merely corroborated the Czechoslovak State’s acquisition of ownership or the imposition of national administration. The Czechoslovak State therefore assumed ownership ... of the property ... on 23 June 1945 (in so far as it was confiscated pursuant to Decree of the President of the Republic no.   12/1945).” 47 .     In its opinion ( stanovisko ) no. Pl. ÚS-st. 21/05 of 1 November 2005, the Constitutional Court confirmed that restitution of property could be claimed when the property had been confiscated by the former communist regime within the period beginning on 25   February 1948. It also stated that confiscation under Presidential Decrees nos. 12/1945 and 108/1945 was a   legal act which could not be assessed in terms of defects of subsequent administrative (declaratory) decisions unless expressly provided for by law. The Constitutional Court held, inter alia : “Confiscation under Presidential Decrees nos. 12/1945 and 108/1945 was a legal act which [can]not be examined through [the prism of] possible defects of subsequent administrative (declaratory) decisions, unless expressly provided for by law. In fact, under Decree no.   12/1945, confiscation was generally effected directly by law ... if an owner of property had already been identified by the State authorities as a person whose property was subject to confiscation ... and if the owner himself had not proposed that a decision be taken in the administrative proceedings or if an administrative authority itself had not deemed it necessary to issue such a declaratory decision. A claim that a decision issued in confiscation proceedings was defective is not in itself capable of calling into question the effects of the confiscation, since the legal basis for the passage of title here is not the administrative act, but the Decree itself.” 48.     The Constitutional Court confirmed the threshold of 25 February 1948 also in its judgment ( nález ) Pl. ÚS 10/13 of 29 May 2013, in which it reiterated that confiscation under Presidential Decree no. 12/1945 had taken place with immediate effect, irrespective of subsequent administrative decisions. At the same time, however, in the case of a confiscation notice (administrative decision) issued in the relevant period, the Constitutional Court st