CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITYCOM;ENG — 23 septembre 2025

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Eatwell and then Mr   S.   Powles, a lawyer practising in London; the decision to give notice of the complaints under Article 6 § 1 and Article   8 of the Convention to the Albanian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr   O.   Moçka, General State Advocate, and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated, decides as follows: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1.     As of 2016 Albanian judges and prosecutors were subject to the transitional re ‑ evaluation process (“the   vetting   process”) before the Independent Qualification Commission (“the IQC”) at first instance and the Special Appeal Chamber (“the SAC”) (see Xhoxhaj v. Albania , no.   15227/19, 9   February 2021). The case concerns vetting proceedings resulting in the applicant’s dismissal from the judiciary. IQC’s judgment 2.     The applicant was a judge since 2002, most recently at the Tirana Administrative Court of Appeal. 3.     On 3 August 2018 the IQC confirmed him in office. It found that the minor issues with his assets were not significant enough to warrant his dismissal. Proceedings before the SAC Appeal 4 .     On 26 October 2018 the Public Commissioner (“the Commissioner”) who represented the public interest in the proceedings (see Xhoxhaj , cited above, §   106) lodged an appeal before the SAC. It argued that the applicant had failed to disclose in his 2017 vetting asset declaration a real estate reservation agreement dated 31 May 2005 (“Reservation Agreement”) and to show that he had sufficient savings at the time to down pay 15,130 euros (EUR) under that agreement. On 5 November 2018 the applicant responded that the agreement had been annulled by the parties on 22 July 2005 therefore he had no reason to declare it in his 2017 declaration. He added that he had not paid the said down payment either and appended a statement in this sense from the construction company that was party to the agreement. 5.     On 4 July 2019 the Commissioner submitted an addendum to its original appeal alleging that the applicant had not had sufficient lawful income to account for his expenses and assets between 2007 and 2011. The SAC forwarded the addendum to the applicant who denied the allegation. 6.     On 19 July 2019 the SAC heard the parties’ arguments in a public hearing. 7.     In the next hearing of 6 September 2019, the applicant made detailed submissions on, among others, the matter of his spouse, a notary, having benefited from a tax amnesty in 2011 (see paragraph 22 below). In this hearing, the SAC decided, as requested by the Commissioner, to carry out a fresh financial analysis of the applicant’s income and assets for the period of 2003-2016. 8 .     On 19 September 2019 the SAC forwarded its financial analysis (“SAC’s analysis”) to the parties. The analysis made specific reference, among other, to the applicant’s apparent inability to accumulate sufficient savings for the down payment in 2005. In addition, it pointed out the discrepancies between the applicant’s income and his expenses/assets for the years 2008, 2009 and 2011 (including the matter of the application of the tax amnesty to the earning of his spouse). 9 .     In the hearing of 3 October 2019, the applicant submitted an accounting expert report to counter the SAC’s analysis. He also submitted evidence supporting his explanations. His submissions, forty-seven pages in total, were admitted in the file by the SAC who at the same hearing rejected his request to commission another expert report. 10.     Two additional hearings were held on 11 and 16 October 2019. Judgment 11.     On 24 October 2019 the SAC dismissed the applicant from office on the grounds that he had made inaccurate and insufficient disclosure of assets within the meaning of Article D   §§   1 and 3 of the Annex to the Constitution and section   33(5)(b) of the Vetting Act (Law   no. 84/2016). (a)    Inaccurate disclosure of the 2005 Reservation Agreement 12.     The SAC found that the applicant had mentioned the agreement in his 2005 and 2006 yearly asset declarations but not in his 2017 vetting declaration. The vetting bodies had discovered the Reservation Agreement’s content only after inquiring with a local bank who had received a copy of it as part of the mortgage application submitted by the applicant in 2005. The IQC had admitted the applicant’s explanation that he had not fully disclosed this agreement because on 22 July 2005 the parties had rescinded it by a private deed and they had embarked in complex negotiations leading to another agreement in 2008 on the same apartment. 13.     The SAC rejected the possibility that the agreement had been rescinded, mainly on the grounds that even after the alleged rescission of 22   July 2005 the applicant had delivered a copy of the Reservation Agreement to a local bank in view of obtaining a mortgage for the purchase of the apartment. The SAC also noted that after the alleged rescission date of 22 July 2005, notably in asset declaration of December 2006, the applicant had continued to refer to the Reservation Agreement. He had also referred to it in a 2008 agreement with the same construction company. (b)    Discrepancy between the applicant’s household income and assets 14.     The SAC identified an overall negative balance of at least 5,804,318   Albanian lek (ALL) between the applicant’s household income and expenses for the years 2005, 2008, 2009 and 2011 (see paragraphs   15, 18, 21 and 24 below). (i)       Down payment under the 2005 Reservation Agreement 15 .     According to the provisions of the 2005 Reservation Agreement the applicant had down paid EUR 15,130 to the construction company. The applicant and the building company reiterated that that agreement had been rescinded and the down payment had not been paid. However, the SAC was not convinced by their arguments and went on to examine whether the applicant had sufficient income to save, by 31 May 2005, the amount of the down payment. The SAC concluded that the applicant could not save that amount and that he had a negative balance of ALL 1,641,109 (EUR 13,245 at the conversion rate of 31 May 2005). (ii)     Negative balance for 2008, 2009 and 2011 16.     The applicant submitted that during the reference period his spouse, a public notary exercising as an individual entrepreneur, had earned ALL   9,550,000   (approximately EUR 68,000) which was used to cover their living expenses. The SAC rejected this amount on the grounds that the spouse’s accounting records showed that this amount had been withdrawn from the cash register balance of the notary’s activity only in 2011 and could not have been used prior to that date. The SAC rejected the applicant’s explanation that there had been an accounting error, noting that the accountant had not corrected the alleged mistake immediately after making it. The applicant also submitted that the withdrawal of profit by a person exercising as an “individual entrepreneur” was fiscally neutral therefore his spouse had not paid too much attention to this aspect. 17.     In any case, the SAC also pursued a parallel line of reasoning where the applicant’s spouse had in fact withdrawn and used the aforementioned amount for their household expenses. Even in that case, the SAC found that in 2008, 2009 and 2011 the applicant’s household expenses/assets exceeded their income as detailed below. (α)      2008 18 .     The SAC found a discrepancy of ALL 440,782 (EUR   3,560 at the conversion rate of 31 December 2008). 19 .     It reviewed and dismissed the applicant’s plea that there had been a mistake in calculating his net wage and furniture expenses. In respect of the per diems received during this period, the SAC found that these had been awarded to the applicant to cover exceptional expenses and that it was not possible for him to have saved them. 20 .     However, the SAC admitted the applicant’s plea that some of his trips abroad were made for professional purposes and the expenses had been covered by the organizers, not the applicant. It accordingly reduced his expenses. (β)       2009 21 .     The SAC found a discrepancy ALL 2,911,206 (approximately EUR   21,102 at the conversion rate of 31 December 2009). 22 .     The bulk of this discrepancy related to the applicant’s spouse’s income which was subject to a tax amnesty. In July 2011, relying on a Tax Amnesty Act (Law no. 10418) the applicant’s spouse had declared for the first time to the tax authorities an amount of ALL 2,438,650 (EUR 17,670 at the conversion rate of 31 December 2009) as profit generated during 2009 and undeclared at the time due to an alleged mistake by her accountant. The SAC considered that the applicant’s spouse had benefited from the amnesty in violation of the law which obliged certain “persons” to declare their assets to the High Inspectorate for the Declaration and Audit of Assets and Conflicts of Interest (“HIDAACI” - see Xhoxhaj , cited above, §   202). The applicant’s spouse was a family member of a public official, and was obliged to declare her property to HIDAACI. Accordingly, she could not benefit from the amnesty and it is irrelevant that tax authorities had concluded otherwise in 2011. For that reason, the SAC excluded this amount from the lawful household’s income and rejected the applicant’s argument that the amnesty act excluded from its scope “officials” not “persons” who were obliged to declare their property to HIDAACI. 23 .     The applicant had also submitted that the SAC should take into account the wage that his spouse had paid to herself; however, the SAC dismissed this argument as her accounting records did not show any wage paid to herself for this year. In respect of the other expenses, the SAC adopted a similar approach as to those of the previous year (see paragraphs 19-20 above). (γ)       2011 24 .     Having reviewed the applicant’s arguments about his wage and per diems, the wage of his spouse, his travel and furniture expenses, the SAC found a discrepancy of ALL 811,221 ALL (EUR 5,839 at the conversion rate of 31 December 2011). THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT Scope of the case 25.     In February 2024 the applicant’s complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the proceedings against him were unfair as they were in breach of the principle of adversarial proceedings and the complaint under Article 8   were communicated to the respondent Government. The remaining complaints were declared inadmissible by the Vice-President of the Section, and the applicant was informed that that decision was final. 26.     In December 2024 in his observations in reply to the Government’s observations on the communicated complaints, the applicant (i) elaborated on the complaints that were substantially the same as the ones which had been declared inadmissible; and (ii) referred, for the first time, to other matters, which were not an elaboration of the communicated complaints. Accordingly, those submissions fall outside the scope of the present case as it stands now, and the Court will not examine them (see Fu Quan, s.r.o. v.   the Czech Republic [GC], no. 24827/14, §§ 137 and 144-48, 1 June 2023, and Gashi and Gina v.   Albania, no. 29943/18, §§ 75 and 79, 4 April 2023). Article 6 § 1 27.     The applicant complained that he did not have an adequate possibility to present his case before the SAC as required by the principle of adversarial   proceedings. 28.     The Government disagreed. 29.     The Court notes that the applicant was a party in proceedings which were disciplinary in nature and based on preliminary findings of fact and law initially made by way of an administrative investigation and – in the present case – on the IQC’s conclusions on the merits of the case and on the points of appeal raised by the PC before the SAC (compare   Thanza v. Albani a , no.   41047/19, § 97, 4 July 2023). Thus, the applicant had to be afforded an adequate opportunity to oppose those points of appeal and to plead his case in an effective manner (ibid., and Sevdari v. Albania , no.   40662/19, §   122, 13   December 2022). 30.     The allegation that the applicant had not properly disclosed the 2005 Reservation Agreement was made by the Commissioner in its initial appeal and the applicant responded to it (see paragraph 4 above). Similarly, the allegation that he did not have sufficient income to accumulate the assets/expenses for the years 2008, 2009 and 2011 was made out in the SAC’s financial analysis and the applicant countered those allegations both by written and oral submissions in the hearing of 3 October 2019 and the subsequent hearings (see paragraphs 8-9 above). 31.     The Court sees no reason to conclude, as invited by the applicant, that the SAC’s refusal to commission another expert report breached the principle of adversarial proceedings (see paragraph 9 above). 32.     As regards the applicant’s alleged inability to question the financial experts of the SAC and to dispose of sufficient time to prepare a defence in respect of the SAC’s analysis, the Court notes that the applicant had the opportunity to raise these matters with the SAC in the course of domestic proceedings and they were properly assessed. The financial assessment was based on the same evidence examined by the IQC, and the applicant was afforded an adequate opportunity to plead his case on the matter in an effective manner. The Court does not find any arbitrariness, therefore, this part of the complaints is inadmissible as manifestly ill founded. 33.     In conclusion, the applicant has not pointed out to any specific ground of dismissal which took him by surprise or in respect of which he did not enjoy the procedural possibility to refute it. 34.     It follows that the complaint concerning the alleged non-compliance with the   adversarial   principle is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected, in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. Article 8 35.     The applicant complained that his dismissal violated his right to private life. 36.     The Government disagreed. 37.     The applicant’s dismissal from office interfered with his right to respect for his private life and would violate Article 8 of the Convention unless it is justified as being in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society to achieve a legitimate aim (see Thanza , cited above, §   135). 38.     The applicant resubmitted under Article 8 a number of complaints that were previously submitted under Article 6 § 1, including the one regarding the impartiality of the SAC which in his view both identified the issues with his assets and then adjudicated them. Those complaints were already rejected at the communication phase and, contrary to the applicant’s submissions, do not make the interference with his private life unlawful. The applicant’s arguments regarding the absence of a “legitimate aim” of the interference are similar to those already rejected by the Court in a similar context (see Thanza , cited above, §§   141-47, with further references). It remains to be determined whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society and proportionate to achieve those aims. 39.     The applicant relied on Sevdari (cited above, §§ 88-97 ) and invited the Court to conclude that his dismissal was disproportionate. 40.     In Sevdari the applicant had been dismissed essentially on the grounds of issues with her spouse’s income. In the present case the applicant was dismissed in part due to the failure to disclose the 2005 Reservation Agreement and the lack of income to justify the down payment of EUR   15,130. These facts are attributable to the applicant, rather than his spouse. Furthermore, in addition to the issues with his spouse’s income, the SAC identified negative balances between the applicant’s household income and expenses/assets which did not relate exclusively to his spouse. 41.     Next, the applicant alleged that the SAC’s factual findings, interpretation of domestic law and conclusions, were incorrect. He stressed that he had not paid the down payment in 2005, that his spouse’s income as a notary was lawful and that the SAC had inflated his expenses. Having examined the parties’ submissions, the Court finds no reason to consider the SAC’s findings and conclusions arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable. The Court reiterates that, for vetting purposes, an individual’s income or revenue will only be considered lawful if it has been properly declared and tax was paid on it (see Sevdari , cited above, § 75). Where the domestic courts have carefully examined the facts, applied the relevant human-rights standards consistently with the Convention and its case-law, and adequately balanced the individual interests against the public interest in a case, the Court would require   strong reasons   to substitute its view for that of the domestic courts (see   Halet v.   Luxembourg   [GC], no.   21884/18, §   161, 14   February 2023, and Thanza , cited above, § 158). The applicant’s dismissal from office was therefore proportionate to the legitimate aims in the circumstances of the case. 42.     Accordingly, the complaint under Article 8 is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article   35 §§   3   (a) and   4 of the Convention. For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Declares the application inadmissible. Done in English and notified in writing on 16 October 2025.     Olga Chernishova   Úna Ní Raifeartaigh   Deputy Registrar   President