CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 23 septembre 2025

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text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s7CB9076 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sC986E16F { font-family:Arial; color:#ffffff } .s4F597665 { width:33.22pt; display:inline-block } .sEEEC397 { width:146.09pt; display:inline-block } .s5A65B3DC { width:46.56pt; display:inline-block } .s44B8752F { width:177.11pt; display:inline-block } SECOND SECTION CASE OF HORA v. THE UNITED KINGDOM (Application no. 1048/20)   JUDGMENT   Art 3 P1 • Ineligibility of prisoner serving an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment to vote in 2019 general (parliamentary) election • Clear guidance in the Court’s case-law on whether the disenfranchisement of a prisoner serving an indeterminate sentence following conviction of a serious offence is compatible with Art   3 P1 • No general support domestically for enfranchisement of prisoners convicted of serious offences serving lengthy or indeterminate sentences • Unjustified to examine impugned provision in the abstract or to identify categories of prisoners whose disenfranchisement might be incompatible with Art   3 P1 • Disenfranchisement of applicant on account of the seriousness of offending, his conduct, his risk to the public and the imposition of a harsh sentence, not disproportionate • Continued disenfranchisement, despite expiry of minimum term of imprisonment, proportionate   Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.   STRASBOURG 23 September 2025   FINAL   09/02/2026   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Hora v. the United Kingdom, The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Arnfinn Bårdsen , President ,   Tim Eicke,   Jovan Ilievski,   Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir,   Gediminas Sagatys,   Stéphane Pisani,   Juha Lavapuro , judges , and Hasan Bakırcı, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   1048/20) against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland lodged with the Court under Article   34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a British national, Mr Michael Christopher Hora (“the applicant”), on 6   January 2020; the decision to give notice to the United Kingdom Government (“the Government”) of the complaint concerning the applicant’s ineligibility to vote in the general election of 12   December 2019 and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 2   September 2025, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The applicant was serving an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment when a general (parliamentary) election took place in the United Kingdom on 12   December 2019. Pursuant to section   3 of the Representation of the People Act 1983 (“the 1983 Act”), he was ineligible to vote in that election. He complains under Article   3 of Protocol No.   1 to the Convention. THE FACTS 2.     The applicant was born in 1966 and is detained in HMP Bure, Norwich. He was represented by Mr S. Humber of Leigh Day Solicitors, a law firm based in London. 3.     The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms K. Pleming, of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. 4.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. The facts concerning the applicant 5 .     The applicant was convicted on 10 October 2007 of two counts of rape and one count of sexual assault, perpetrated on the victim in her home. The applicant’s defence that sexual relations with the victim had been consensual was rejected by the jury. The applicant had previously been convicted of rape in similar circumstances in 2000 and had been sentenced in 2001 to a term of imprisonment of seven years, which had been reduced on appeal. Following his 2007 conviction, the court therefore sentenced him to an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment for the public protection (see paragraph 35 below) with a minimum term of four years, less 296 days spent in custody on remand. The minimum term expired in 2011 but the applicant remains in detention as the Parole Board has not yet recommended his release. 6.     A general election took place on 12   December 2019. Pursuant to section   3 of the 1983 Act, convicted prisoners are not allowed to vote in elections in the United Kingdom unless one of the exceptions in the legislation applies (see paragraphs 27-29 below).   The applicant was ineligible to vote in the 2019 general election. Domestic proceedings 7 .     The applicant did not bring any domestic proceedings concerning his ineligibility to vote. Although the courts in the United Kingdom may consider the Convention-compatibility of primary legislation, they are not able to disapply statutory provisions. A domestic court had previously made a declaration that section   3 of the 1983 Act was incompatible with a Convention right (see paragraphs 38-40 below). The applicant saw no value in seeking another such declaration. Political developments in the United Kingdom since the judgment in Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no.   2) in respect of the disenfranchisement of prisoners 8 .     In December 2006, in light of the Court’s finding of a violation of Article   3 of Protocol No.   1 in its judgment of 6   October 2005 in Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no.   2) ([GC], no.   74025/01, ECHR 2005 ‑ IX), the government launched the first stage of a consultation on prisoner voting, intended to ascertain views on the arguments for and against allowing prisoners to vote. 9.     In April 2009 the government published a second stage consultation paper indicating that there should be a limited enfranchisement of some prisoners but that the final decision was for Parliament. 10 .     On 6 May 2010, while the question of prisoner voting remained under consideration, a general election took place. A new government was subsequently formed. On 2 November 2010 there was a short debate in the House of Commons following a question to the new government regarding their plans to give prisoners the right to vote. In the course of that debate, the government emphasised that they were under a legal obligation to change the law following the judgment in Hirst (cited above) . They said that they were actively considering how to implement the judgment and that once decisions had been made, legislative proposals would be brought forward. The majority of those who intervened in the debate expressed disquiet at the prospect of extending the right to vote in light of the Hirst judgment. 11.     On 20 December 2010 the government, referring to Hirst (cited above) and the Court’s subsequent pilot judgment of Greens and M.T. v. the United Kingdom (nos.   60041/08 and 60054/08, ECHR 2010 (extracts)), said the following in a written statement to Parliament: “It is plain that there are strong views across Parliament and in the country on the question of whether convicted prisoners should be entitled to vote. However, this is not a choice: it is a legal obligation. So the Government are announcing today that we will act to implement the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights. In deciding how to proceed, we have been guided by three principles. First, that we should implement the Hirst judgment in a way that meets our legal obligations, but does not go further than that. Secondly, that the most serious offenders will not be given the right to vote. Thirdly, that we should seek to prevent the taxpayer having to face future claims for compensation. The Government will therefore bring forward legislation providing that the blanket ban in the existing law will be replaced. Offenders sentenced to a custodial sentence of four years or more will lose the right to vote in all circumstances, which reflects the Government’s clear view that more serious offenders should not retain the right to vote. Offenders sentenced to a custodial sentence of less than four years will retain the right to vote, but legislation will provide that the sentencing judge will be able to remove that right if they consider that appropriate. Four years has in the past been regarded as the distinction between short and long-term prisoners, and the Government consider that permitting prisoners sentenced to less than four years’ imprisonment to vote is sufficient to comply with the judgment. ... We believe that these proposals can meet the objectives that we have set out of implementing the judgment in a way that is proportionate; ensuring the most serious offenders will not be given the right to vote; and seeking to prevent future claims for compensation. We will bring forward legislation next year for Parliament to debate.” 12.     On 10 January 2011 a general debate on prisoners’ voting rights took place in the House of Commons. Most speakers did not express support for granting prisoners the right to vote. 13 .     On 10 February 2011 a backbench debate took place in the House of Commons on the subject of prisoner voting. Again, the majority of views expressed were opposed to giving prisoners the right to vote. At the end of the debate, the following non-binding motion was passed by a majority of 234 votes to 22: “That this House notes the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in Hirst v   the United Kingdom in which it held that there had been no substantive debate by members of the legislature on the continued justification for maintaining a general restriction on the right of prisoners to vote; acknowledges the treaty obligations of the UK; is of the opinion that legislative decisions of this nature should be a matter for democratically-elected lawmakers; and supports the current situation in which no prisoner is able to vote except those imprisoned for contempt, default or on remand.” 14.     On 23 May 2012, in response to a question in the House of Commons, the Prime Minister confirmed that he believed that the issue of whether prisoners were entitled to vote should be a matter for Parliament to decide and noted that Parliament had made its decision. 15.     On 24 October 2012, in response to a question in the House of Commons, the Prime Minister said: “The House of Commons has voted against prisoners having the vote. I do not want prisoners to have the vote, and they should not get the vote – I am very clear about that. If it helps to have another vote in Parliament on another resolution to make it absolutely clear and help put the legal position beyond doubt, I am happy to do that. But no one should be in any doubt: prisoners are not getting the vote under this Government.” 16 .     On 22 November 2012 the government published a draft bill on prisoners’ voting eligibility. The draft bill included three proposals: (1) to ban from voting those sentenced to four years or more; (2) to ban from voting those sentenced to more than six months; or (3) to ban from voting all prisoners. The proposals covered both local and parliamentary elections. 17 .     A Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament was established to conduct pre ‑ legislative scrutiny of the draft bill. The Joint Committee was composed of six members of the House of Commons and six members of the House of Lords. It received written evidence and heard oral evidence from, inter alia , non-governmental organisations, members of parliament, persons working with prisoners, academics, government ministers and officials, legal practitioners, and representatives of the Council of Europe. 18 .     On 18 December 2013 the Joint Committee published its report. It made, by majority vote (with three members of the House of Commons dissenting), the following recommendation: “We recommend that the Government bring forward a Bill, at the start of the 2014 ‑ 15 session of Parliament, to give legislative effect to the following conclusions: That all prisoners serving sentences of 12 months or less should be entitled to vote in all UK parliamentary, local and European elections; ... That prisoners should be entitled to apply, 6 months before their scheduled release date, to be registered to vote in the constituency into which they are due to be released.” 19.     In response to the report, the government indicated that the matter was under active consideration. 20.     A general election took place on 7   May 2015. On 2   December 2015 the Secretary of State for Justice appeared before the Constitution Committee of the House of Lords. In response to a question about when a substantive response to the Joint Committee’s report (see paragraph   18 above) might be expected, the Secretary of State replied that “whatever any of our individual views are about the judgment in Hirst , the last Parliament made its view very clear on the issue, and I cannot see, given the constitution of the new Parliament, that it would be likely to be dramatically different”. He continued: “... I would argue that whatever I, as a government Minister, or the whole of the Government, were to do, our Parliament would not accept a change to the law to grant prisoners the vote. In that sense, you have a clash between two principles: on the one hand, our desire to respect the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights but, on the other hand, our desire to recognise that, ultimately, as we touched on earlier, parliamentary sovereignty is the essence of our democracy. In having to choose between the two – it is always difficult and I would rather not – I err on the side of saying that we must respect the democratic principles of parliamentary sovereignty. I would argue that it is not letting the side down if Parliament decides that it does not wish to implement [the Hirst judgment] in this way.” 21 .     On 8 June 2017 a general election took place. On 2   November 2017 the Secretary of State for Justice made a statement to the House of Commons concerning the government’s response to the Court’s judgment in Hirst (cited above). He explained: “For many years, it has been a feature of United Kingdom law that when someone commits a crime that is sufficiently serious to receive a prison sentence they are deemed to have broken their contract with society to such an extent that they should not have the right to vote until they are ready to be back in the community. This prohibition is currently set out in the Representation of the People Act 1983, as amended, and the principle behind it has been reaffirmed by this House, most recently in 2011. ... We have decided to propose administrative changes to address the points raised in the 2005 judgment, while maintaining the bar on convicted prisoners in custody from voting. First, we will work with the judiciary to make it clear to criminals when they are sentenced that while they are in prison they will lose the right to vote. That directly addresses a specific concern of the Hirst judgment that there was not sufficient clarity in confirming to offenders that they cannot vote in prison. Secondly, we will amend guidance to address an anomaly in the current system, where offenders who are released back in the community on licence using an electronic tag under the home detention curfew scheme can vote, but those in the community on temporary licence cannot vote. Release on temporary licence is a tool typically used to allow offenders to commute to employment in the community and so prepare themselves for their return to society. Reinstating the civic right of voting at this point is consistent with that approach. Release on temporary licence is absolutely not an automatic entitlement and every case is subject to rigorous risk assessment. The measures I am announcing today do not involve any changes to the criteria for temporary release, and no offenders will be granted release in order to vote. We expect the change to temporary licence to affect up to 100 offenders at any one time and none of them will be able to vote from prison or to register a prison as a home address. The prisoner would have to have satisfied the conditions for registration at a genuine home address. This measure will require no changes to the Representation of the People Act 1983, but instead will entail a change to Prison Service guidance.” 22 .     The Secretary of State for Justice concluded that, in the government’s view, the changes addressed the points raised in the Hirst judgment in a way that respected the clear direction of successive Parliaments and the strong views of the British public. In the ensuing debate, the approach proposed was generally commended. 23.     On 4 July 2018 the Ministry of Justice confirmed in a written answer to Parliament that updated guidance had been provided to prison governors and that a leaflet had been produced informing prisoners of their rights. 24 .     On 12 December 2019 a general election took place. Political developments in devolved legislatures of the United Kingdom 25 .     In February 2020 the Scottish Parliament passed the Scottish Elections (Franchise and Representation) Act 2020. Pursuant to section   5 of that Act, which modified section   3 of the 1983 Act (see paragraph   27 below) in so far as it concerns local elections in Scotland, prisoners sentenced to a term of imprisonment not exceeding twelve months are eligible to vote in elections to the Scottish Parliament and in local elections in Scotland. 26 .     In February 2020 the Welsh Government published proposed amendments to the Local Government and Elections (Wales) Bill which would have extended the right to vote in local elections in Wales to prisoners sentenced to less than four years’ imprisonment. The intention was to introduce these amendments at the subsequent stage of the Bill’s passage through parliament. However, in April 2020, the responsible Minister informed the Welsh Parliament that “as part of the Welsh Government’s wider consideration of its legislative programme at the start of our planning for coping with the grave circumstances we are in” related to the Covid-19 pandemic, she had decided not to commit any future official resource to the proposed amendments. The relevant amendments to the Bill were accordingly not proposed. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE Electoral legislation and practice 27 .     At the relevant time, section   3 of the 1983 Act provided: “(1)     A convicted person during the time that he is detained in a penal institution in pursuance of his sentence or unlawfully at large when he would otherwise be so detained is legally incapable of voting at any parliamentary or local election.” 28.     As outlined above, the section has since been amended with respect to elections to the Scottish Parliament and local elections in Scotland to permit a prisoner who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment not exceeding twelve months to vote in such elections (see paragraph   25 above). 29 .     The disqualification from voting does not apply to persons imprisoned for contempt of court (section   3(2)(a)) or to those imprisoned only for default in, for example, paying a fine (section   3(2)(c)). 30.     Section 4 of the 1983 Act provides: “(1) A person is entitled to be registered in the register of parliamentary electors for any constituency or part of a constituency if on the relevant date he– (a) is resident in the constituency or that part of it; (b) is not subject to any legal incapacity to vote (age apart).” 31.     A person who is remanded in custody prior to being convicted of any offence is not disqualified from voting. Specific provision is made for the determination of the residence of such a person, for the purpose of registration, by section   7A of the 1983 Act. 32.     On 21 June 2018 HM Prison and Probation Service in England and Wales notified prison governors that prisoners released on temporary licence were no longer disqualified from voting. Prison governors in Northern Ireland were notified on 26 June 2018 and those in Scotland on 22   August 2018. On these same dates, prison governors in the three jurisdictions were notified that prisoners who were released early during the custodial element of their sentence on home detention curfew or equivalent schemes could also vote. 33.     The Warrant of Committal was amended in England and Wales on 21   July 2018 and in Northern Ireland on 5   July 2018 to make clear at the point of sentence that prisoners were disenfranchised, by the inclusion of the phrase “Convicted offenders sentenced to imprisonment lose the right to vote while they are detained in custody”. Taking into account the different legal and courts system in Scotland, from 22   August 2018 the information was made available in the areas where prisoners are first received into prisons in Scotland to ensure that they are notified of their disenfranchisement. Sentencing legislation 34 .     By section   230(2) of the Sentencing Act 2020 – which re-enacts previous provisions – Parliament has set the general principle in relation to custodial sentences as follows: “The court must not pass a custodial sentence unless it is of the opinion that— (a) the offence, or (b) the combination of the offence and one or more offences associated with it, was so serious that neither a fine alone nor a community sentence can be justified for the offence.” 35 .     At the time the applicant was sentenced, the Criminal Justice Act 2003 provided for the imposition of indeterminate sentences for the public protection. These sentences were imposed where the offender had committed a specified serious sexual offence, which included rape and sexual assault, and the sentencing court was of the opinion that there was a significant risk to members of the public of serious harm occasioned by the commission by him or her of further specified offences (section   225(1)(b), as originally enacted). Any pattern of offending which could be identified from the individual’s criminal record was a relevant factor in the assessment of whether the criteria for the imposition of an indeterminate sentence for the public protection were met. A prisoner sentenced to such a sentence can, after the expiry of his minimum term, apply to have his or her case referred to the Parole Board and will be released on licence if directed by the Parole Board. Release can only be directed if the Parole Board is satisfied that it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public that the prisoner be confined in prison. Further details of indeterminate sentences for the public protection are set out in James, Wells and Lee v. the United Kingdom (nos.   25119/09 and 2   others, §§   124-33, 18   September 2012). 36 .     The Sentencing Council for England and Wales recorded that in 2022 “around 68,000 defendants were given an immediate custodial sentence, representing 6 per cent of offenders sentenced that year”. The Human Rights Act 1998 37 .     Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (“the 1998 Act”) provides that in so far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with Convention rights. 38 .     Section 4(2) of the Human Rights Act 1998 provides that if a court is satisfied that a provision of primary legislation is incompatible with a Convention right, it may make a declaration of incompatibility. Relevant consideration of the prohibition on voting by prisoners by domestic courts Smith v. Scott (2007) 39 .     In Smith v. Scott (2007 SLT 137) the Registration Appeal Court in Scotland was asked to consider the application of section   3(1) of the 1983 Act (see paragraph 27 above) to a convicted prisoner serving a sentence of five years’ imprisonment, in light of the Court’s ruling in Hirst (cited above) and pursuant to sections   3 and 4 of the 1998 Act (see paragraphs   37 ‑ 38 above). It found that to read down, under section   3 of the 1998 Act, section   3(1) of the 1983 Act as providing for full or partial enfranchisement of convicted prisoners serving custodial sentences would be “to depart substantially from a fundamental feature of the legislation”. It observed: “27. ... Without the benefit of consultation or advice, this Court would, in a real sense, be legislating on its own account, especially in view of the wide range of policy alternatives from which a ‘possible’ solution would require to be selected ...” 40 .     The court noted that the Secretary of State accepted the Court’s decision in Hirst (cited above) and it observed, “[i]t follows that as regards convicted prisoners no election in the UK to any legislature would be compatible with the Convention”. The court also had regard to the history of what had taken place in the United Kingdom since the Court’s Hirst judgment, noting that an action plan had been produced setting out a timetable for consideration of policy, consultation and, if appropriate, the drafting and adoption of relevant amending legislation (see paragraph   8 above). It concluded that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, it was appropriate to make a declaration of incompatibility in respect of section   3(1) of the 1983 Act (see paragraph   38 above). R (Chester) v. Secretary of State for Justice (2013) 41 .     On 16 October 2013 the Supreme Court handed down judgment in R   (Chester) v. Secretary of State for Justice ; McGeoch v.   The Lord President of the Council and another ([2013] UKSC 63). Mr Chester was a prisoner serving a life sentence, with a minimum term of twenty years, for murder. He challenged his statutory disfranchisement from voting in elections, relying on the 1998 Act (see paragraphs 37-38 above) and Article   3 of Protocol   No. 1 to the Convention. Mr   McGeoch was also serving a life sentence for murder but he challenged his exclusion from voting exclusively on the basis of European Union law. In his pleadings in respect of Mr   Chester’s appeal, the Attorney General invited the Supreme Court not to follow the judgments of this Court in Hirst (cited above) and Scoppola v.   Italy (no.   3) ([GC], no.   126/05, 22   May   2012). 42 .     As far as the Convention argument was concerned, Lord Mance, giving the leading judgment (with which Lord Hope, Lord Hughes and Lord Kerr agreed), reiterated that the Supreme Court would only refuse to follow a clear and consistent line of Strasbourg decisions where the effect of such decisions was inconsistent with some fundamental substantive or procedural aspect of English law. He therefore declined to follow the Attorney General’s suggestion that Hirst and Scoppola be disavowed. He explained that even though prisoner voting was an area in which there was room for “deep philosophical differences of view between rational people”, it would exaggerate the importance of such differences to equate them with some fundamental aspect of English law. Moreover, it was difficult to see how prisoner disenfranchisement was fundamental to a stable democracy and legal system such as the United Kingdom enjoyed. Indeed, it was possible to argue that the objective of promoting civic responsibility and respect for the law might be undermined, rather than enhanced, by denying serving prisoners the right to vote. 43 .     The only question, then, was whether the Supreme Court should issue a declaration of incompatibility. Lord Mance noted, first, that the incompatibility of section   3 of the 1983 Act (see paragraph   27 above) with Article   3 of Protocol No.   1 had already been recognised in Smith v. Scott (see paragraphs   39-40 above), where a declaration of incompatibility had been made. The issue of prisoner voting was before Parliament and under active consideration in light of the decisions in Hirst, Greens and M.T. and Scoppola (all cited above). In these circumstances there was no point in making a further declaration of incompatibility.   Second, it could be said with “considerable confidence” by that time that the ban on Mr Chester’s voting was one Parliament could maintain without violating the Convention, even if some amendments might be required to allow any prisoners detained for different reasons or periods to vote. Lord Mance pointed out that the Court had accepted in Scoppola (cited above) that a lifelong ban on voting by prisoners sentenced to five or more years’ imprisonment was legitimate.     He concluded that it was therefore for Parliament to complete its consideration of the position. In these circumstances, there was no further current role for the Supreme Court. 44 .     Lady Hale, in her judgment (with which Lord Hope and Lord Kerr agreed) began by referring to public opinion polls from 2011 and 2012 showing that there was a substantial majority against relaxing the ban on prisoners voting. In these circumstances, she said, it was not surprising that in February 2011 elected parliamentarians had voted overwhelmingly against any relaxation of the law (see paragraph 13 above). It was therefore incumbent upon the courts to “tread delicately”. 45.     Lady Hale considered the Attorney General’s argument that by deciding an offence was so serious it merited a custodial penalty, the court was also deciding that the offence merited exclusion from the franchise. She observed that this argument did not explain the purpose of the exclusion; this could be, for example, an additional punishment, a mark of society’s disapproval of the criminal offence, or a measure to encourage a sense of civic responsibility and respect for democratic institutions. She noted that if it were the latter, it could well be argued that this was “more likely to be achieved by retaining the vote, as a badge of continuing citizenship, to encourage civic responsibility and reintegration in civil society in due course”. She observed that this was a matter on which thoughtful people could hold diametrically opposing views.     A more concrete objection to the Attorney General’s argument was that the custody threshold in the United Kingdom had never been particularly high. Deciding when an offence was so serious that only a custodial sentence could be justified (see paragraph   34 above) was “one of the most elusive problems of criminal sentencing”. Lady Hale further observed that the custody threshold had varied over time in accordance with changes in penal policy which had nothing to do with electoral policy; and that it had traditionally varied as between different parts of the United Kingdom. The sentencing regimes were different in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, but the exclusion from voting was the same. 46 .     Lady Hale therefore expressed some sympathy for the view that the current state of the law was arbitrary and indiscriminate. She pointed to the element of arbitrariness in selecting the custody threshold as a unique indicator of offending so serious as to justify exclusion from the democratic process, the random impact of happening to be in prison on polling day and the various reasons why someone who had been sentenced to a period of imprisonment might not in fact be in prison on that day. But she acknowledged how difficult it would be to devise any alternative scheme which would not also have some element of arbitrariness about it. 47 .     Lady Hale continued: “99.     However, I have no sympathy at all for either of these appellants. I cannot envisage any law which the United Kingdom Parliament might eventually pass on this subject which would grant either of them the right to vote. In Hirst ... , the Strasbourg court declined to conclude that applying the ban to post-tariff life prisoners would necessarily be compatible with article   3 of the First Protocol. But it seems clear from the decision in Scoppola v Italy (no. 3) that Strasbourg would now uphold a scheme which deprived murderers sentenced to life imprisonment of the right to vote, certainly while they remained in prison, and probably even after they were released on licence, as long as there was then a power of review.” 48 .     Lady Hale could, therefore, not see how Mr Chester could sensibly have a claim to a remedy under the 1998 Act (see paragraphs 37-38 above). In so far as he was a “victim”, this was only in the sense that he was directly affected by the law in question. The majority of the Grand Chamber in Hirst (cited above) had examined the compatibility of the law with the Convention, irrespective of whether the applicant there might justifiably have been deprived of the vote under some other law. However, the minority of the Grand Chamber had pointed out that the Court did not usually review the law in abstracto but rather determined whether the manner in which it had been applied to, or affected, the applicant gave rise to a violation of the Convention. Lady Hale considered it appropriate for courts in the United Kingdom to adopt the sensible practice, favoured by the minority in Hirst , of indicating in what way an individual’s rights had been violated by the impugned law when considering the application of the various remedies provided by the 1998 Act. 49.     Lady Hale said that there was no question of the court’s reading and giving effect to the 1983 Act in a way which was compatible with the Convention rights, in accordance with its duty under section   3(1) of the 1998 Act (see paragraph 37 above). She explained, “[i]t is obvious that any incompatibility can only be cured by legislation and the courts cannot legislate”. She added, “But even if we could, we would only seek to ‘read and give effect’ to the statute in a way which was compatible with the rights of the individual litigant before us”. In Lady Hale’s view, the ban on voting was not incompatible with the rights of Mr Chester. A reading which was compatible with the rights of a completely different litigant would therefore do him no good. 50 .     As to whether a declaration of incompatibility (see paragraph   38 above) ought to be made, she accepted that the legislation appeared to leave open the possibility of a declaration in abstracto , irrespective of whether the provision in question was incompatible with the rights of the individual litigant. However, she considered that the court should be “extremely slow to make a declaration of incompatibility at the instance of an individual litigant with whose own rights the provision in question is not incompatible”. She noted that any other approach was to invite a multitude of unmeritorious claims. For that reason, she indicated that she would also decline to make a declaration of incompatibility on the application of either Mr   Chester or (had he made one) Mr McGeoch. 51 .     Lord Sumption, in his judgment (with which Lord Hughes agreed), agreed with the orders proposed by Lord Mance, for all the reasons given in his judgment (see paragraphs 42-43 above) and in the judgment of Lady Hale (see paragraphs 44-50 above). He observed that there was “only negligible” support in the House of Commons, and very little among the public at large, for amending the 1983 Act to give at least some prisoners the right to vote. He further underlined that the relevant provisions were “entirely clear”: there was no way in which they could be read down (see paragraph 37 above) so as to allow voting rights to any category of convicted prisoners other than those falling within the specified exceptions (see paragraphs 27-29 above). 52.     Lord Sumption referred to the practice in other countries and commented as follows: “114. The exclusion of convicted prisoners from the franchise is not a universal principle among mature democracies, but neither is it uncommon. Information provided by the Foreign Office in answer to a parliamentary question (updated to July 2012) indicates that at least 18 European countries including Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland have no restrictions on voting by prisoners. Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Japan, Liechtenstein, Russia and the United States ban all convicted prisoners from voting, as do two of the seven Australian states. In some countries such as France disenfranchisement is reserved for those convicted of certain particularly serious offences, and in others such as Belgium for cases in which the prisoner is sentenced to a period of imprisonment exceeding a given threshold. In France, the Netherlands and Belgium disenfranchisement is an additional penalty imposed as a matter of judicial discretion. In other countries, such as Germany and Italy, it is automatic in specified cases. In Belgium, Italy and some jurisdictions of the United States, the loss of voting rights may continue even after a prisoner’s release. It is apparent that this is not a question on which there is any consensus.” 53.     Lord Sumption considered that from a prisoner’s point of view, the loss of the right to vote was likely to be a very minor deprivation by comparison with the loss of liberty. Undoubtably, there were prisoners whose interest in public affairs or strong views on particular issues were such that their disenfranchisement represented a serious loss, just as there were prisoners whose enthusiasm for active sports made imprisonment a special hardship. The severity of a sentence of imprisonment for the convicted person would always vary with a wide variety of factors whose impact on him or her would inevitably be arbitrary to some degree. He observed: “115. ... It has been said, for example, that disenfranchisement may bear hardly on someone sentenced to, say, a short period of imprisonment which happens to coincide with a general election. For some prisoners, this will no doubt be true. But I decline to regard it as any more significant than the fact that it may coincide with a special anniversary, a long anticipated holiday or the only period of fine weather all summer.” 54.     Lord Sumption discussed the United Kingdom’s response to the Court’s judgment in Hirst (cited above) and set out the history of the disenfranchisement of prisoners in the United Kingdom. He doubted whether the disenfranchisement of convicted prisoners could realistically be regarded as an additional punishment or a deterrent, and observed that it might at least arguably be said to work against the reform and rehabilitation of the offender. In his opinion, disenfranchisement had a more fundamental rationale, which he explained as follows: “... The sentencing of offenders, and imprisonment more than any other sentence, is a reassertion of the rule of law and of the fundamental collective values of society which the convicted person has violated. This does not mean that the offender is disenfranchised because he is unpopular. Nor does it mean that he is regarded as having lost all civil rights or all claims against society, which is why the expression ‘civil death’ is inappropriate. The present rule simply reflects the fact that imprisonment is more than a mere deprivation of liberty. It is a temporary reclusion of the prisoner from society, which carries with it the loss of the right to participate in society’s public, collective processes. Similar principles appear to underlie the exclusion of convicted offenders from the franchise in the many other jurisdictions which practise it, whether on an automatic or a discretionary basis, and in particular those in which the suspension or abrogation of voting rights may be imposed independently of a prison sentence or continue after a term of imprisonment has been served. 129. Fundamental to this approach, and to the automatic character of the exclusion of convicted prisoners from the franchise is the principle that sentences of imprisonment are imposed only for the more serious offences ...” 55.     Lord Sumption noted that only 8% of persons convicted of an offence in England and 15% in Scotland were sentenced to imprisonment. A statistical breakdown of the prison population as at 30   September   2010 suggested that 85% of prisoners serving sentences of less than five years were convicted of violent or sexual offences, robbery, burglary, theft, handling, fraud, forgery or drug offences. Lord Sumption observed that the threshold of seriousness for the passing of a sentence of imprisonment would undoubtedly vary in practice from one country to another. Although the United Kingdom was widely thought to have a relatively low threshold, Lord Sumption was not aware that any comprehensive comparative study had been carried out which took account of the underlying patterns of criminality. 56.     Having reviewed this Court’s judgments in Hirst and Scoppola (both cited above), Lord Sumption made the following observation: “Accordingly, the Strasbourg Court has arrived at a very curious position. It has held that it is open to a Convention state to fix a minimum threshold of gravity which warrants the disenfranchisement of a convicted person. It has held that the threshold beyond which he will be disenfranchised may be fixed by law by reference to the nature of the sentence. It has held that disenfranchisement may be automatic, once a sentence above that threshold has been imposed. But it has also held that even with the wide margin of appreciation allowed to Convention states in this area, it is not permissible for the threshold for disenfranchisement to correspond with the threshold for imprisonment. Wherever the threshold for imprisonment is placed, it seems to have been their view that there must always be some offences which are serious enough to warrant imprisonment but not serious enough to warrant disenfranchisement. Yet the basis of this view is nowhere articulated. It might perhaps have been justified by a careful examination of the principles of sentencing in the United Kingdom, with a view to demonstrating that they involve the imprisonment of some categories of people for offences so trivial that one could not rationally suppose them to warrant disenfranchisement. That would be an indictment not just of the principle of disenfranchisement but of the sentencing principles themselves. However, no such exercise appears to have been carried out. 136. I confess that I also find it surprising that the Strasbourg Court should have concluded in Hirst that the United Kingdom Parliament adopted the present rule per incuriam , so to speak, in 1969, without properly considering the justification for it as a matter of penal policy. The absence of debate to which the court referred reflects the attention which had already been given to the issue by the Speaker’s Conference, and the complete consensus on the appropriateness of the voting ban.” 57 .     He underlined that, had it not been for Hirst and Scoppola , he