CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITYCOM;ENG — 30 septembre 2025

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s2EF17D91 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s3AAE10DF { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s3CA22BA { font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .s3A692EA6 { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-align:center; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s9D48DD53 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s819344C9 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:18pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-18pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .s6C5BED22 { margin-left:25.5pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s5E8F5A28 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:25.5pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s2D9C6089 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s84651E4E { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:3pt; text-align:justify } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sC986E16F { font-family:Arial; color:#ffffff } .s5BC6EF75 { width:21.21pt; display:inline-block } .sE55E11EC { width:137.42pt; display:inline-block } .s100D1E5 { width:50.22pt; display:inline-block } .s2CF788F1 { width:132.09pt; display:inline-block }     THIRD SECTION DECISION Application no. 26267/22 SIP NEPREMIČNINE D.O.O. against Slovenia   The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 30   September 2025 as a Committee composed of:   Lətif Hüseynov , President ,   Canòlic Mingorance Cairat,   Vasilka Sancin , judges , and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   26267/22) against the Republic of Slovenia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 27 May 2022 by a Slovenian company, SIP Nepremičnine d.o.o. (“the applicant company”), which was established in 2004 and is registered in Ljubljana, and was represented by Ms N. Zidar Klemenčič, a lawyer practising in Ljubljana; the decision to give notice of the complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention concerning the requirement of an independent and impartial tribunal established by law to the Slovenian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mrs T. Mihelič Žitko, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated, decides as follows: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1.     The application concerns the applicant company’s complaint under Article 6   §   1 of the Convention   that the proceedings before the Ljubljana District Court had violated its right to an independent and impartial “tribunal established by law” because two sets of civil proceedings lodged against it had been merged into one and allocated to Judge V. 2 .     In November 2014 an insolvent company, K., sold certain property to the applicant company. On 3 December 2014 the Nova Ljubljanska Banka bank (“the NLB bank”) brought a civil action in the Ljubljana District Court against both companies to annul the sale contract between them and remove the land register entry of the applicant company’s ownership of the disputed property. The case was allocated to Judge K. 3 .     On 10 July 2018 a certain L. company lodged a similar civil action with the Ljubljana District Court against both the applicant company and the K.   company. The case was allocated to Judge V. 4.     On 10 September 2018 the applicant company submitted a request for the recusal of Judge V., claiming that she had had a friendly relationship with the L. company’s representative. On 17 September 2018 the president of the Ljubljana District Court dismissed the applicant company’s request as unfounded. 5 .     Following an application lodged by the K. company, on 4 October 2018 Judge V. merged together the two sets of civil proceedings, those initiated by the NLB bank in 2014 and those brought by the L. company in 2018 (see paragraphs 2 and 3 above). She designated the 2018 case as leading, whereby the merged case was allocated to her. Judge V. referred to section 300(1) of the Civil Procedure Act (see paragraph 16 below), noting that the claims by both plaintiffs against the applicant company had the same factual and legal basis and that it was thus in the interest of procedural economy to merge the two cases. 6.     On 12 July 2019 the Ljubljana District Court delivered a judgment granting the primary claim of the plaintiffs. On 18 September 2019 the court also delivered a rectification decision and a supplementary judgment. 7 .     The applicant company appealed against the judgment of 12 July 2019, complaining of, inter alia , a violation of the right to a tribunal, as established by law, on account of the decision of 4 October 2018 to merge the two sets of civil proceedings. While the applicant company had agreed with the decision to merge the cases, it nonetheless contested the designation of the 2018 case as leading and the resulting allocation of both cases to Judge V., arguing that this had had no basis in domestic law. The applicant company also reiterated that Judge V. was not impartial, alleging that this was demonstrated by her decision to assign the merged cases to herself and because she had already predetermined the outcome of the proceedings, as evidenced by certain phrases used in the judgment. 8 .     By a judgment of 17 February 2021, the Ljubljana Higher Court dismissed the applicant company’s appeal in part. As regards the merging of the cases, the Higher Court explained that under the statutory provisions, the judge assigned in accordance with domestic law could decide to merge the cases and that it had been undisputed that Judge V. had been lawfully assigned to the 2018 case. Moreover, the applicant company had agreed with the decision to merge the cases. Since Judge K. could not be allocated the merged case due to his imminent retirement, the merged case had been reasonably allocated to Judge V., who was familiar with it and could thus proceed without delay. No hearings had yet been scheduled and the merging of the cases served procedural economy and expediency in accordance with the Civil Procedure Act and the Judicial Order. As regards the applicant company’s allegations of bias on the part of Judge V., the Higher Court noted that they were based solely on its disagreement with the judge’s conduct and legal assessment of the case. Consequently, the Higher Court concluded that there had been no indication of bias. 9 .     The applicant company lodged an application for leave to appeal on points of law against the judgment of the Higher Court, which was rejected by the Supreme Court on 15 June 2021. 10.     On 31 January 2021 the Constitutional Court declared a subsequent constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant company inadmissible. 11.     The applicant company complained, in its application before the Court, that its right to be heard by a tribunal established by law and the right to an impartial tribunal as guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention had been violated, as Judge V. had been biased and had decided to merge the two cases and allocate them to herself contrary to the relevant legal framework. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK 12 .     Article 23 of the Constitution reads as follows: Right to judicial protection “Everyone has the right to have any decision regarding his rights, duties, and any charges brought against him delivered, without undue delay, by an independent, impartial court constituted by law. Only a judge duly appointed pursuant to rules previously established by a statute [ zakon ] and by the Judicial Order [ sodni red ] may judge such individual.” 13 .     The Courts Act (adopted on 24 March 1994, with relevant subsequent amendments) lays down the rules for the assignment of cases to judges. The relevant provisions read as follows: Section 17 “The Judicial Order lays down more detailed rules for the assignment of cases. The Judicial Order specifically prescribes in more detail the rules on the assignment of cases in situations where multiple initial procedural actions are brought against the same party ...” Section 71 “The annual distribution of judges [ letni razpored sodnikov ] in specific legal areas or sub-areas shall be decided by the president of the court. ... The annual distribution of judges shall be prepared and published by 15 December for the following calendar year.” 14.     The Judicial Order (adopted on 28 December 2016, with relevant subsequent amendments) governs the operations of the courts. It provides that judges must be organised in different divisions on the basis of the Annual Distribution of Judges, which should be set out in advance and published on the court’s notice board before 15   December for the following year. The relevant provision states as follows: Section 161 “(1) If multiple procedural actions have been brought against the same person and the judge handling the oldest case decides that the cases should be merged into joint proceedings, all cases shall be assigned to that judge.” 15.     The Annual Distribution of Judges of the Ljubljana District Court for 2018 (“the 2018 distribution plan”), published on the court’s notice board and its website on 15 December 2017, provided in its relevant part as follows: “Where several cases are brought against or by the same person and the court decides, in accordance with the provisions of procedural legislation to merge the cases for the purpose of joint consideration, the merged case shall be allocated to the judge to whom the first case was allocated according to the order of the day on which the procedural actions were brought. ... If the decision to merge several cases is taken after the individual cases have already been allocated to several judges, all the cases shall be reallocated to the judge who took the decision to merge the cases.” 16 .     The relevant part of the Civil Procedure Act provides as follows: Section 300 “If several [civil] cases ( pravd ) between the same persons, or in which the same person is the opponent of different plaintiffs or different defendants, are pending before the same court, the panel may merge by an order all such cases for the purpose of joint litigation if this would expediate the proceedings or reduce the costs. The court may deliver a joint judgment for all the merged cases.” THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT Alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention as regards the right to a tribunal established by law 17.     The relevant principles concerning the requirement of a “tribunal established by law” – including its close connection with the guarantees of “independence” and “impartiality” – have been set out in,   inter alia , Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland   ([GC], no. 26374/18, §§   211 ‑ 16, 233 ‑ 34 and 242, 1 December 2020), Miracle Europe Kft v.   Hungary (no.   57774/13, §§ 45-56, 12 January 2016) and   Pasquini v. San Marin o , (no.   50956/16, §§ 100-03, 2 May 2019 ). 18.     In view of the applicable principles and the issues raised in this case, the Court must determine whether the reallocation of the merged cases to Judge V. as a result of the decision to designate the 2018 case as the leading one was compatible with domestic law provisions relating to the establishment and competence of judicial organs and, if not, whether the irregularities were such as to amount to its flagrant violation (see Miracle Europe Kft , cited above, §§ 49-50). 19 .     The Court observes that the relevant rules on the appointment of judges and the allocation of cases in the event of their merging were laid down in advance and made public (see paragraphs 13-16 above; contrast X and Others v. Slovenia , no. 27746/22, § 124, 19 December 2024). Additionally, it is undisputed that Judge V. was assigned to the 2018 case in accordance with domestic law, thereby satisfying the requirement set out in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 20.     The Court notes that the applicant company’s principal argument lies in the interpretation of section 161 of the Judicial Order, pursuant to which only the older case could be designated as the leading one. 21.     The Court notes that both the Courts Act and the Judicial Order contain general provisions governing procedural matters and expressly permit certain procedural aspects to be regulated through the relevant Annual Distribution of Judges. While the Court acknowledges that the Judicial Order specifically and solely addresses the scenario in which a judge assigned to an older case decides to merge the cases, it nevertheless accepts the Government’s argument that that provision must be read and interpreted holistically, taking into account the 2018 distribution plan and the Civil Procedure Act. The latter sets out detailed procedural rules applicable to civil proceedings and it also governs the impugned domestic proceedings. In that connection, the Court notes that section 300 of the Civil Procedure Act only generally provides that a “panel may merge ... cases”, thereby not restricting that only the judge handling the older case could take such a decision. Moreover, the 2018 distribution plan details specific rules on the allocation of cases and the procedural handling of the merging of cases, thereby implementing the general framework established in the Judicial Order and the Civil Procedure Act. 22.     In the light of the foregoing and reiterating that it is primarily for the national authorities to interpret and assess compliance with domestic law (see Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsso n, cited above, § 250), the Court finds the reasoning provided by the domestic courts and the Government persuasive. It accepts that the 2018 distribution plan, which provided that a merged case should be assigned to the judge who took the decision to merge two or more cases together, was not contrary to section 161 of the Judicial Order but implemented and operationalised the provision contained therein. 23.     The Court further notes that it has in several cases recognised the importance of both the effective and expeditious administration of justice, and the need for flexibility in managing courts’ caseloads efficiently (see X   and Others v. Slovenia, cited above, § 126). In this connection, the Court notes that the Civil Procedure Act explicitly states that the cases should be merged if this would expedite the proceedings and reduce costs. In that light, the Court observes that the proposal to merge the cases was made by a party to the 2018 case (see paragraph 5 above), that the applicant company agreed with the decision to merge the cases (see paragraph 7 above) and that allocating the cases to Judge K., who was soon to retire, would have prolonged the proceedings, which would be contrary to the purpose of merging the cases in the first place (see paragraph 8 above). 24.     Lastly, the Court observes that the purpose of domestic rules governing the assignment of cases is to ensure its randomness (see X and Others v. Slovenia , cited above, § 126). Seeing that both sets of proceedings had from the very outset been allocated randomly to different judges in accordance with domestic provisions (see paragraphs 2, 3, 8 and 19 above), the Court considers that the subsequent merging of the cases by the decision of one such randomly assigned judge, in the light of all the circumstances of the case, did not contravene the above-mentioned purpose of the applicable national rules governing the assigning of cases. 25 .     Accordingly, this part of the application is manifestly ill ‑ founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. Alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention as regards the right to an impartial tribunal 26.     According to the Court’s settled case-law, the existence of impartiality for the purposes of Article 6 §   1 must be determined according to a subjective test where regard must be had to the personal conviction and behaviour of a particular judge, that is, whether the judge held any personal prejudice or bias in a given case; and also according to an objective test, that is to say by ascertaining whether the tribunal itself and, among other aspects, its composition, offered sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in respect of its impartiality (see, for example, Morice v. France [GC], no.   29369/10, §   73, ECHR 2015, and Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], nos.   10211/12   and   27505/14, §   287, 4   December 2018). 27.     As to the objective test, the Court notes that the applicant company relied on arguments already addressed by the Court in relation to the alleged violation of the right to a tribunal established by law and it sees no reasons to depart from its conclusions reached above (see paragraphs 19-25 above). 28.     As to the subjective test, the Court has previously held that the personal impartiality of a judge must be presumed until there is proof to the contrary (see Morice , cited above, § 74).   In the present case, the Court observes that the question of impartiality of Judge V. was examined by the Ljubljana Higher Court, which concluded that the applicant company’s allegations of bias were founded solely on its disagreement with the judge’s conduct and legal assessment of the case (see paragraph 8 above). The Court sees no reason to depart from this finding and the applicant company has not   submitted any material   capable of casting doubt on it. In this respect the Court notes that the passages highlighted by the applicant company in the judgment (see paragraph 7 above) do not indicate any bias on the part of Judge V., as they are linked to the factual findings and legal reasoning previously established in the judgment. 29.     Accordingly, the Court finds this complaint to be manifestly ill ‑ founded and rejects it in accordance with Article   35   §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Declares the application inadmissible. Done in English and notified in writing on 23 October 2025.     Olga Chernishova   Lətif Hüseynov   Deputy Registrar   President