CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITYCOM;ENG — 7 octobre 2025

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s2EF17D91 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s3AAE10DF { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s3CA22BA { font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .s715E7C6D { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:25.5pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s2D9C6089 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s84651E4E { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:3pt; text-align:justify } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sC986E16F { font-family:Arial; color:#ffffff } .sB6A7F5BF { width:17.54pt; display:inline-block } .s3E8C34A1 { width:133.09pt; display:inline-block } .s5D826FD4 { width:25.88pt; display:inline-block } .s1B61D60 { width:156.43pt; display:inline-block }     SECOND SECTION DECISION Application no. 19198/19 Mitko PETREVSKI against North Macedonia   The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 7   October 2025 as a Committee composed of:   Péter Paczolay, President ,   Jovan Ilievski ,   Juha Lavapuro , judges , and Dorothee von Arnim, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   19198/19) against the Republic of North Macedonia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 2 April 2019 by a Macedonian/citizen of the Republic of North Macedonia, Mr Mitko Petrevski (“the applicant”), who was born in 1961 and lives in Ohrid; the decision to grant leave to the applicant, a lawyer practising in the respondent State, to represent himself in the proceedings before the Court (Rule 36 § 4 (a) of the Rules of Court), while also being represented by Mr   R.   Petrevski, a lawyer practising in Ohrid, and Ms L. Petrevska-Djamti; the decision to give notice of the complaints concerning the right to a fair hearing under Article 6 of the Convention relating to the applicant’s non ‑ participation in the proceedings before the Constitutional Court and the alleged lack of adversarial proceedings to the Government of the Republic of North Macedonia (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms   D.   Djonova, and to declare the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No.   1 to the Convention, as well as all complaints lodged with the applicant’s submissions of 16   June 2020 inadmissible; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated, decides as follows: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1.     The application concerns the applicant’s complaint that it was impossible for him to participate in proceedings before the Constitutional Court concerning the review of the constitutionality and legality of a detailed urban plan under which he was entitled to build on his plot of land. 2.     On 30 June 2014 the Municipality of Ohrid (“the Municipality”) adopted a new detailed urban plan for the part of the city in which the applicant’s plot of land was located (“the Detailed Urban Plan”). 3.     On 7 April 2017 T.D., the applicant’s neighbour, lodged an application with the Constitutional Court, seeking a review of the constitutionality and legality of the Detailed Urban Plan. 4.     On 15 May 2018 the applicant applied to the Ministry of Transport and Communications (“the Ministry”), under the applicable Law on Construction, for a permit to build a house on his plot of land. The process required compliance with several statutory conditions, including the provision of documentation and the completion of procedural steps. The applicant was allegedly unaware of the ongoing proceedings before the Constitutional Court when he applied for the building permit. 5.     On 27 June 2018, acting upon the application submitted by T.D., the Constitutional Court decided to open proceedings to review the constitutionality and legality of the Detailed Urban Plan. It also suspended the implementation of all individual acts or actions based on the plan. Consequently, on 30 July 2018 the Ministry suspended the proceedings concerning the applicant’s application for a building permit. The applicant submitted that he had become aware of the ongoing proceedings before the Constitutional Court by way of the Ministry’s decision. 6.     On 22 August 2018 the applicant made a written submission to the Constitutional Court, requesting, inter alia , to be heard at a public hearing. In his submission, the applicant argued that, as a person whose construction rights depended on the Detailed Urban Plan, he wished to participate in the hearing as an interested party in the proceedings. He submitted arguments and evidence which he considered capable of demonstrating that the Detailed Urban Plan had been adopted in accordance with the legally prescribed procedure. 7.     On 3 October 2018 the Constitutional Court, sitting in camera, quashed the Municipality’s decision to adopt the Detailed Urban Plan. It found that, among other things, the Municipality had not conducted archaeological examinations on the applicant’s plot prior to the adoption of the plan, as required by law. Instead, the archaeological examinations had been conducted three years after the plan had taken effect. The Constitutional Court adopted its decision without engaging with the applicant’s submissions, relying exclusively on the documentation furnished by the Municipality. 8.     On 5 November 2018 the Ministry dismissed the applicant’s application for a building permit on the grounds that the Detailed Urban Plan was no longer in effect. 9 .     Under domestic law, proceedings for the review of the constitutionality and legality of legal provisions, such as a detailed urban plan, may be initiated by any person, including a person who is not directly affected ( action   popularis ). In such proceedings, only the petitioner who brought the proceedings and the authority that adopted the detailed urban plan are recognised as parties (see sections 12 and 13 of the Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Court, Official Gazette no. 70/1992). 10.     The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, in particular, that he had not been given the opportunity to participate in the proceedings before the Constitutional Court and that those proceedings had not been of an adversarial nature. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT Alleged violation of Article 6 of the Convention 11.     The applicant complained that he had not been included in the proceedings before the Constitutional Court, despite being directly affected by the review of the Detailed Urban Plan, as he was in the process of obtaining a building permit for his plot of land. He argued that his construction rights had been compromised in the proceedings before the Constitutional Court and that he had wished to present arguments before that court in defence of his right to obtain a building permit. The court had erred in its interpretation of the domestic law and had failed to admit relevant evidence. 12 .     The Government submitted that direct participation of the applicant in the proceedings at issue was not provided for under domestic law, which recognised only the initiator of the constitutional review and the authority that adopted the contested act as parties to such proceedings. The Government emphasised that the Constitutional Court conducted an abstract review limited to legal questions, focusing solely on the documents submitted by the Municipality. In particular, the court examined the legality of the procedure for the adoption of the Detailed Urban Plan, without addressing the applicant’s or the initiator’s individual civil rights. The proceedings were not adversarial in nature and did not involve a determination of conflicting interests between the parties. Moreover, no public hearing was held, even for the recognised participants, as the Constitutional Court found it unnecessary to hear oral argument. The decision was adopted exclusively on the basis of written submissions, and the review was confined to assessing the compliance of the contested planning act with higher-ranking legal norms, rather than adjudicating on individual claims concerning civil rights or obligations. Relying on relevant domestic case-law, the Government further argued that the applicant could have sought compensation before a civil court for any damage resulting from his inability to rely on the then valid detailed urban plan under section 141 of the Law on Obligations, but he had not done so. 13.     The Court has consistently held that Constitutional Court proceedings do not in principle fall outside the scope of Article 6 § 1. When there is a genuine and serious dispute relating to a civil right, Constitutional Court proceedings come within the scope of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention if their outcome is directly decisive for the right in question ( see Pinkas and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina , no. 8701/21, § 37, 4 October 2022). Mere tenuous connections or remote consequences are not sufficient to bring Article 6 § 1 into play (see Fabbri and Others v. San Marino [GC], nos. 6319/21 and 2   others, § 76, 24 September 2024, and Zapletal v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 12720/06, 30 November 2010 with further references). 14.     The Court will examine the present case on the assumption that Article   6 § 1 of the Convention is applicable, as the outcome of the proceedings before the Constitutional Court had a direct and decisive impact on the applicant’s civil rights, namely his ability to obtain a building permit, and can thus be said to involve the “determination” of his civil rights within the meaning of Article   6 (compare, mutatis mutandis , Menemen Minibüsçüler Odası v. Turkey , no. 44088/04, §§ 6, 8, 19 and 27, 9   December 2008; Gavella v. Croatia (dec.), no. 33244/02, ECHR   2006-XII (extracts); and Wendenburg and Others v. Germany (dec.), no. 71630/01, ECHR 2003-II (extracts)). 15.     The Court further observes that, in accordance with domestic law, the applicant had not been authorised to participate in the constitutional review proceedings at issue, which had been brought by a third party (see   paragraph   9 above). His access to the Constitutional Court was accordingly restricted. The Court must therefore determine whether the restriction pursued a “legitimate aim” and whether there was a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved. The limitations applied must not restrict the access left to the individual in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired (see, for the general principles, Zubac v. Croatia [GC], no. 40160/12, §§ 76-78, 5 April 2018). 16.     The Court observes that the limitation on the participation of third interested persons as the applicant in the review proceedings before the Constitutional Court served the legitimate interest of securing an efficient procedure before that court. As to whether that restriction was proportionate to that aim, the Court notes that the proceedings in question related to an abstract review of the legality and constitutionality of a general normative act – the Detailed Urban Plan –, and not to the applicant’s individual dispute. In such proceedings, domestic law does not provide for third-party participation, and the Constitutional Court’s examination was confined to the formal compatibility of the act with higher-ranking laws, without assessing any personal circumstances or adversarial claims (compare and contrast Menemen Minibüsçüler Odası , cited above, §§ 24-26). 17.     The Court has already held that in proceedings involving a decision affecting a large number of individuals, notably those conducted before constitutional courts following a challenge to legislation, it is not always required or even possible that every individual concerned is heard before the court (see Gavella , cited above). The Court considers that the same considerations must apply in the present case, which does not involve legislation in the strict sense, but rather a detailed urban plan adopted by a municipal authority, which is equally of a general and normative character and affects a large number of persons whose property is situated in the zone covered by the urban plan. 18.     Moreover, while the applicant could not participate in the proceedings before the Constitutional Court, he had access to ordinary administrative and judicial remedies to contest the refusal of his building permit and to seek compensation for any damage caused by the Municipality (see paragraph 12 above). Having also regard to the nature of the Constitutional Court proceedings, the limitations applied were therefore proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and did not restrict the applicant’s right of access to court under Article 6 § 1 in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right was impaired. 19.     It follows that the application must be declared manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Declares the application inadmissible. Done in English and notified in writing on 6 November 2025.     Dorothee von Arnim   Péter Paczolay   Deputy Registrar   President