CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;COMMITTEE;ENG — 14 octobre 2025

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s34DFC730 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s2E932ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt } .s4ACA9207 { page-break-before:always; clear:both; mso-break-type:section-break } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .s3AAE10DF { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s3CA22BA { font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .sA1D3DA2E { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .s586AA269 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:11.67pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; padding-left:8.18pt; font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .sCD7D0356 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:15pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; padding-left:4.85pt; font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .sD11CFAB7 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:15.01pt; margin-bottom:3pt; text-align:justify; padding-left:1.99pt; font-family:Arial } .sFBC99493 { font-style:italic } .s51DFF5CF { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:34pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-17pt; text-align:justify } .sE5BF05B1 { width:2.33pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block } .s7F175FE6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:51.05pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-17.05pt; text-align:justify } .sE5C1F6E3 { width:3.33pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block } .s2D9C6089 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sC986E16F { font-family:Arial; color:#ffffff } .sB6A7F5BF { width:17.54pt; display:inline-block } .s235C1871 { width:137.76pt; display:inline-block } .s5D826FD4 { width:25.88pt; display:inline-block } .s1B61D60 { width:156.43pt; display:inline-block }     SECOND SECTION CASE OF ÖLMEZ v. TÜRKİYE (Application no. 54328/20)             JUDGMENT   STRASBOURG 14 October 2025       This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Ölmez v. Türkiye, The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:   Jovan Ilievski , President ,   Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir,   Stéphane Pisani , judges , and Dorothee von Arnim, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   54328/20) against the Republic of Türkiye lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 25 November 2020 by a Turkish national, Ms Filiz Ölmez (“the applicant”), who was born in 1986 and lives in Şırnak, and was represented by Ms S. Doğanoğlu, a lawyer practising in Ankara; the decision to give notice of the application to the Turkish Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr Abdullah Aydın, Head of the Department of Human Rights of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Türkiye; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 23 September 2025, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1.     The application concerns allegations of ill-treatment suffered by the applicant, a lawyer practising in Şırnak, on 2 March 2016 in Cizre. 2.     On the day of the incident, the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Cizre public prosecutor’s office, stating that while she had been walking on the street at around 7 a.m., a police officer in an armoured vehicle had stopped her. After she had shown her lawyer identification card to the officer, she had been held by the arm, dragged, and then pulled to the police vehicle in an abrupt manner. Afterwards, the officer had quickly slammed the vehicle door, pinned her down inside the vehicle, squeezed her chin and throat and insulted her. When he understood that the applicant was a lawyer, she had been allowed to leave. 3.     A medical report drawn up on 2 March 2016 noted that the applicant complained of headache, nausea and pain in her back, arm, hand and wrist. The report further found that the applicant had minor superficial abrasions on her left and right hands. 4.     An incident report written and signed by four police officers stated that in the early hours of 2 March 2016 they had seen a woman taking pictures of the surroundings and had been suspicious of her actions, and police officer H.A. had wanted to conduct an identity check. During the encounter, the applicant had insulted and threatened H.A . The officers had neither conducted a physical intervention on the applicant nor arrested her. They had let her go after she had showed her lawyer identification card. 5.     On 3 May 2017 the public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Cizre Criminal Court of First Instance, charging police officer H.A. with intentional injury and charging the applicant with threatening and insulting a public servant in connection with the performance of his public duty. 6 .     On 22 November 2018 the Criminal Court found H.A. guilty of intentionally injuring the applicant by squeezing her wrist, holding that there was not any legal justification for his conduct, as there had not been any resistance or assault by the applicant against the police officers or anyone else. It sentenced H.A. to a judicial fine of 3,000 Turkish   liras (TRY   –   some 495   euros (EUR) at the relevant time). It subsequently suspended the pronouncement of the judgment in accordance with Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see for the text of that provision Durukan and Birol v.   Türkiye , nos. 14879/20 and 13440/21, § 23, 3 October 2023, and for its effects, for instance, Ateşoğlu v. Turkey , no. 53645/10, § 28, 20   January 2015) on the condition that he did not commit an intentional offence during the following five years. The Criminal Court, furthermore, found the applicant guilty of the offences of threatening and insulting a public servant, sentencing her to a judicial fine of TRY 9,000 (some EUR 1,490 at the relevant time). 7.     On 18 December 2018 the Cizre Assize Court rejected an objection lodged by the applicant against the Criminal Court’s decision regarding H.A. She also appealed against the judgment in so far as it concerned her sentence. The criminal proceedings against her are still pending. 8.     In the meantime, the applicant also brought an action for compensation in the Mardin Administrative Court. On 30 April 2019 the Administrative Court awarded her TRY 5,000 (some EUR 755 at the time) in respect of any non-pecuniary damage she had sustained on account of the police officer’s wrongful act resulting in her injury. 9.     The applicant submitted an individual application to the Constitutional Court, complaining of a violation of the prohibition of ill-treatment as a result of her ill-treatment by police officer H.A. and the domestic courts’ decision to suspend the pronouncement of the judgment against him. On 26   May 2020 the Constitutional Court rejected that application as being manifestly ill ‑ founded. 10.     The applicant complained before the Court that she had been subjected to treatment in violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the police officer’s conduct. She further asserted that the suspension of the pronouncement of the judgment in respect of police officer H.A. had resulted in impunity, in violation of the procedural aspect of Article 3 and Article   13 of the Convention. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT 11.     The Court considers at the outset that the applicant’s complaints under Articles   3 and 13 of the Convention fall to be examined under Article 3 of the Convention alone. admissibility 12.     The Government challenged the applicant’s victim status, arguing that an immediate and effective investigation into the incident had been conducted, resulting in the imposition of a judicial fine on police officer H.A. on account of his unlawful acts. The applicant had also received non ‑ pecuniary compensation following the administrative proceedings. Accordingly, the applicant’s complaints had sufficiently been redressed by the domestic courts and thus she no longer had victim status within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention. 13.     The Court considers that the Government’s objection concerning the applicant’s victim status raises issues that are closely linked to the substance of her complaint under Article 3 and should therefore be joined to the merits. 14.     The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. MERITS 15.     The Government submitted that, considering the circumstances of the present case as a whole, an assessment concerning the minimum level of severity had to be made. The applicant’s injuries had been minor and had been sustained at a time of heightened emotions, as she had insulted and threatened the police officer. The investigation had been prompt and effective and the suspension of the pronouncement of the judgment concerning the police officer had not resulted in impunity, as his sentence could have been executed if he had committed another wilful offence during the five-year period following the judgment. The police officer’s conduct in the present case had resulted in less serious injuries on the applicant in comparison to similar cases previously examined by the Court. Therefore, there had not been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. 16.     The general principles concerning the use of force by State agents have been summarised in   Bouyid v. Belgiu m ([GC], no. 23380/09, §§   100 ‑ 01, ECHR   2015). In particular, where an individual is deprived of his or her liberty or, more generally, is confronted with law-enforcement officers, any recourse to physical force which has not been made strictly necessary by the person’s conduct diminishes human dignity and is in principle an infringement of the right set forth in Article 3 of the Convention. 17.     In terms of the procedural obligations of the State under Article 3, the Court reiterates that in carrying out an effective official investigation into arguable allegations of treatment infringing Article 3, the domestic judicial authorities must on no account be prepared to let the physical or psychological suffering inflicted go unpunished (see Okkalı v.   Turkey , no.   52067/99, § 65, ECHR 2006-XII). While the Convention only requires that there should be an investigation capable of leading to the punishment of those responsible, the outcome of the investigations and of the ensuing criminal proceedings, including the sanction imposed as well as disciplinary measures taken, is considered decisive. It is vital in ensuring that the deterrent effect of the judicial system in place and the significance of the role it is required to play in preventing violations of the prohibition of ill-treatment are not undermined (see Shmorgunov and Others v. Ukraine , nos. 15367/14 and 13   others, § 329, 21   January 2021, with further references). Where a State   agent has been charged with crimes involving torture or ill-treatment, it is of the utmost importance that he or she should be suspended from duty during the investigation and trial, and should be dismissed if convicted (see Serdar   Güzel v. Turkey , no. 39414/06, § 42, 15   March 2011). 18.     Lastly, the Court emphasises that in cases concerning violations of Article   3, a suspension of the pronouncement of the judgment results in the impunity of the perpetrators, as it cancels the judgment with all its legal consequences, including the sentence, provided that the offender abides by the suspension order (see Ateşoğlu v. Turkey , no. 53645/10, § 28, 20   January 2015). Suspension of the sentences of the police officers who have acted in a manner inconsistent with Article 3 of the Convention falls into the category of measures which are unacceptable, as its effect is to render convictions ineffective (see Taylan v. Turkey , no. 32051/09, § 46, 3   July 2012, and Ateşoğlu , cited above, § 28). 19.     In the present case, as to the substantive aspect of Article   3 the Criminal Court found that the police officer in question had intentionally injured the applicant and that there had not been any assault by the applicant against the police or anyone else or any resistance to the police officers performing their duties (see paragraph 6 above). Thus, regardless of the minor nature of the applicant’s injuries, the Court finds that, as concluded by the domestic court, the police officer’s use of force was not made strictly necessary by the applicant’s own conduct. Given that the applicant referred only to minor bodily injuries and did not demonstrate that she had undergone serious physical or mental suffering, the treatment in question involved degrading treatment (compare Ilievi and Ganchevi v.   Bulgaria , nos.   69154/11 and 69163/11, § 56, 8 June 2021). 20 .     Regarding the procedural aspect of Article 3, the Court observes that even though the Criminal Court found that police officer H.A. had injured the applicant by using force that had not been made strictly necessary by her own conduct, it suspended the pronouncement of the judgment. It considers that the impugned court decision, which resulted in the impunity of the officer concerned, suggests that the domestic courts exercised their discretion to minimise the consequences of a serious unlawful act rather than show that such acts could in no way be tolerated (compare also Eski v.   Turkey , no.   8354/04, § 36, 5 June 2012, and Taylan , cited above, § 46). What is more, nothing in the case file suggests that disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the police officer, as he was not suspended from duty during the investigation or dismissed after his conviction. The Court, considering the shortcomings observed in the prosecution of police officer H.A. combined with the fact that no disciplinary measures were taken against him, considers that the State failed to fulfil its procedural obligation under Article 3 of the Convention. 21.     As for the Government’s objection that the applicant had lost her victim status, even assuming that the Criminal Court’s finding that the police officer concerned had committed the offence of intentional injury and the Administrative Court’s award of non-pecuniary damage to the applicant constituted an acknowledgment of a breach of the prohibition of ill-treatment, in view of its findings above (see paragraph 20 above), the Court cannot conclude that the criminal remedy afforded by the domestic courts provided the applicant with adequate redress. In that regard, it reiterates that an administrative lawsuit for the compensation of damage sustained on account of the unlawful acts of State agents is not capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible and cannot be considered a remedy that can provide sufficient redress in itself (compare Gäfgen v.   Germany [GC], no. 22978/05, §§ 116 and 119, ECHR 2010). Therefore, the Court dismisses the Government’s objection and finds that the applicant has victim status within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention. 22.     In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under both its substantive and procedural aspects. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 23.     The applicant claimed 100,000   euros (EUR) in respect of non ‑ pecuniary damage and EUR 10,200 in respect of costs and expenses. 24.     The Government contested those claims, considering them excessive. 25.     The Court awards the applicant EUR   12,000 in respect of non ‑ pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable. 26.     Having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award EUR 2,000 covering costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY, Joins to the merits the Government’s objection concerning the loss of victim status and dismisses it; Declares the application admissible; Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention; Holds (a)   that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into Turkish liras at the rate applicable at the date of settlement: (i)   EUR   12,000 (twelve thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage; (ii)   EUR   2,000 (two thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses; (b)   that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points; Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction. Done in English, and notified in writing on 14 October 2025, pursuant to Rule   77   §§   2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.     Dorothee von Arnim   Jovan Ilievski   Deputy Registrar   President