CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 16 octobre 2025

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display:inline-block } .s44B8752F { width:177.11pt; display:inline-block } .s1721E4C5 { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s85226119 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s3DC36BA9 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline; color:#0069d6 }   FIFTH SECTION CASE OF M.S.L., TOV v. UKRAINE (Application no. 18049/18)     JUDGMENT   Art 1 P1 • Control of the use of property • Unlawful freezing of applicant company’s assets under Sanctions Act • Absence of sufficient procedural guarantees against arbitrariness • Lack of individualised justifications • Limited judicial review by Supreme Court Art 13 (+ Art 1 P1) • Absence of effective remedy in case circumstances   Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.   STRASBOURG 16 October 2025   FINAL   16/01/2026   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.   In the case of M.S.L., TOV v. Ukraine, The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Kateřina Šimáčková , President ,   María Elósegui,   Georgios A. Serghides,   Gilberto Felici,   Diana Sârcu,   Mykola Gnatovskyy,   Vahe Grigoryan , judges , and Victor Soloveytchik, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   18049/18) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by M.S.L., TOV, a limited liability company registered in Ukraine (“the applicant company”), on 10   April 2018; the decision to give notice of the application to the Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) and the decision to request further observations from the parties pursuant   to Rule 54 § 2 (c) of the Rules of Court; the parties’ observations and their additional observations; Having deliberated in private on 16 September 2025, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The case concerns economic restrictions imposed on the applicant company between 2015 and 2018 under the Sanctions Act and its unsuccessful attempts to challenge these measures. The applicant company relied on Article   1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, as well as Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention. THE FACTS 2.     The applicant company, M.S.L., TOV, is a limited liability company registered in Ukraine. It was represented before the Court by Ms   N.   Kucheruk, a lawyer practising in Kyiv. 3.     The Government were represented by their Agent, most recently Ms   M.   Sokorenko. 4.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. Background 5 .     Since 2014, Ukraine faced unprecedented threats to its statehood and territorial integrity. 6.     By the end of 27 February 2014 the Russian Federation, through the active involvement of its military personnel, occupied Crimea and assumed effective control over the peninsula. This further resulted in a “referendum” on the future status of the peninsula, which took place on 16 March 2014, and the purported annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation (for a more detailed description of the relevant events, see Ukraine v. Russia ( re Crimea) (dec.) [GC], nos. 20958/14 and 38334/18, §§   32-66, 16 December 2020). 7 .     Almost in parallel, in early March 2014 pro-Russian protests began across eastern regions of Ukraine. By early April 2014 they had escalated into widespread violence. Some protesters formed armed groups, which started to forcibly take control of administrative buildings across the Donetsk and Lugansk regions. They announced the creation of self-proclaimed entities known as the   “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”) and the “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”). The   separatist entities in question enjoyed military, economic and political support from the Russian Federation (see   Khlebik v. Ukraine , no. 2945/16, §§ 9-11, 25 July 2017, and Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.) [GC], nos. 8019/16 and 2 others, §§ 611-21, 628-39, 649-54, 670-75 and 684-97, 30 November 2022). From 11 May 2014 the Russian Federation, through, inter alia , its military forces, exercised effective control over the areas under separatist control in eastern Ukraine (see Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia , cited above, § 695). 8.     In response, starting from March 2014, various States and international organisations, led by the   European Union and   the United States   of America, imposed economic sanctions on individuals and entities considered to have played a role in the aforementioned events in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, and thus to have undermined democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine, as well as its sovereignty and territorial integrity. By March 2025 the European Union had applied restrictive measures (sanctions) in connection with actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine to a total of nearly 2,400   individuals and entities [1] . 9 .     In that context, on 14 August 2014 the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) adopted the Sanctions Act. Its Preamble referred, in particular, to “the need for an urgent and effective response to existing and potential threats to the national interests and national security of Ukraine, including hostile actions, armed attacks by other States or non-State entities, harm to the life and health of the population, hostage-taking, expropriation of property of the State, individuals and legal entities, causing property losses and creating obstacles to sustainable economic development and the full exercise by Ukrainian citizens of their rights and freedoms” (see also paragraphs 48-52 below).   By March 2025 Ukraine had applied economic restrictions under the Sanctions Act to over 10,000 individuals and 7,000 legal entities [2] . 10.     The Minsk Protocol, signed by representatives of Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the Organisation for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE), supplemented by the so-called Minsk II agreement in February 2015, sought to de-escalate the hostilities in eastern Ukraine by establishing a ceasefire and outlining steps toward a political resolution (see Ukraine and the Netherlands v.   Russia , cited above, §§   74-79, 232-41 and 246). However, no stable and lasting ceasefire was achieved (see Khlebik , cited above, § 12). 11.     On 24 February 2022 the Russian Federation commenced a full-scale military attack on Ukraine, which remains ongoing. imposition of SANCTIONS on the applicant company 12 .     The applicant company is a major operator of State lotteries in Ukraine. In 2014 it was the largest contributor to the military tax ( військовий збір ), a special levy introduced by the Ukrainian authorities to support the country’s armed forces. According to information provided by the applicant company, which was also cited by the domestic court in the relevant proceedings (see paragraph 28 below), the company had, at the time of the events, a multi-tiered corporate structure involving shareholders from Ukraine, the United Kingdom and Cyprus, with a Cypriot national, M.Sh., indicated as the ultimate beneficial owner. 13 .     On 2 September 2015 the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine (“the NSDCU”) issued a decision entitled “On the application of personal special economic and other restrictive measures (sanctions)”, stating as follows: “In accordance with [section 5(3)] of [the Sanctions Act], [the NSDCU] has decided to: 1.     Support the proposals on the application of personal special economic and other restrictive measures (sanctions) that have been made by the Cabinet of Ministers ... and the Security Service of Ukraine. 2.     Apply, for a one-year period, personal special economic and other restrictive measures (sanctions) to: (1) individuals as per Annex 1; (2) legal entities as per Annex 2. 3.     The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, together with the Security Service of Ukraine and with the participation of the National Bank of Ukraine and the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine, shall ensure the implementation and monitoring of the effectiveness of the personal special economic and other restrictive measures (sanctions) provided for in paragraph 2 of this decision.” 14 .     The annexes in question consisted of two tables, one in respect of individuals and another one in respect of legal entities. Each table contained four columns: (i) a number, (ii) the name and identifying details of the individual/legal entity subject to personal economic and other restrictive measures (sanctions), (iii) the grounds for the imposition of restrictions and (iv) the sanction type. A total of 388 individuals and 105 legal entities were listed (with the applicant company listed as number 98), including the armed separatist groups “Zorya”, “Kalmius”, “Oplot”, “Prizrak”, “Smert”, “Somali” and “Sparta” [3] . The grounds for the imposition of sanctions, as indicated in the second column of the table, were similar for all the individuals and legal entities concerned: they were limited to a citation of section 3(1)(1) of the Sanctions Act, either in its entirety (as in the case of the applicant company) or in part (see paragraph 50 below). 15 .     The following sanctions were applied in relation to the applicant company: “(1)     Freezing of assets – a temporary restriction on the right to use and dispose of assets; (2)     Prevention of capital outflow; (3)     Suspension of economic and financial obligations; (4)     Termination of the issuance of permits and licences for the import and export of currency valuables, and restrictions on cash withdrawals from bank cards issued by [foreign entities to] foreign residents; (5)     Prohibition on the National Bank of Ukraine from registering [the applicant company] as a participant in an international payment system where the payment institution is a foreign entity.” 16 .     By Decree no.   549/2015 of 16 September 2015 (“the first presidential decree”), the President of Ukraine put into effect the NSDCU’s decision of 2   September 2015. The decree was published in the Government Gazette ( Урядовий кур’єр ) and entered into force on 22 September 2015. 17 .     On 16 September 2016 and 28 April 2017 the NSDCU issued decisions extending, each time for another one-year period, the economic restrictions earlier imposed on the applicant company and a number of individuals and legal entities. The 2016 decision indicated the same grounds for extending the sanctions in the same manner as those used in their original imposition (citing section 3(1)(1) of the Sanctions Act in respect of each individual and legal entity concerned – see paragraph 14 above). However, the 2017 decision did not indicate any grounds for the extension (either in the text or annexes thereto). The decisions were put into effect by presidential decrees: Decree no.   467/2016 of 17 October 2016, which entered into force on 31 October 2016 (“the second presidential decree”) and Decree no.   133/2017 of 15 May 2017, which entered into force on 17 May 2017 (“the third presidential decree”). 18. Following the expiry of the third presidential decree (see paragraph 17 above), the applicant company was not subject to any further economic restrictions (sanctions). ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS brought by the applicant company First set of proceedings [4] 19 . On 11 March 2016 the applicant company instituted administrative proceedings against the President of Ukraine before the Higher Administrative Court, as a first-instance court, seeking the invalidation of the first presidential decree (see paragraph 16 above) in so far as it concerned the applicant company. It argued, inter alia , that the impugned decisions lacked specific grounds for the imposition of sanctions, that the applicant company had not engaged in any unlawful activities, and that the imposition of sanctions had been arbitrary and in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No.   1 to the Convention. 20 . The representative of the President of Ukraine submitted objections in response to the applicant company’s claim, arguing that the impugned presidential decree had been issued on the basis of information provided by the Security Service of Ukraine (“the SBU”), within the President’s competence and in accordance with the applicable legislation. The SBU, which joined the proceedings as a third party, also objected. It insisted that the applicant company was controlled by citizens of the Russian Federation and was engaged in illegal gambling, money laundering and tax evasion. In particular, the SBU referred to a 2010 letter from the applicant company to the Ministry of Finance, in which the company indicated a certain Alfa Group (a large Russian private investment group) as its owner. It also referred to a similar remark about the applicant company made by the Minister of Finance during a 2014 briefing. Additionally, it referred to defamation proceedings from 2015 to 2016 in which the applicant company had unsuccessfully sought the retraction of a statement made in a letter sent by the SBU to a member of parliament alleging that the company was controlled by citizens of the Russian Federation. The SBU also referred to findings by the State Financial Monitoring Service implicating the applicant company’s officials in laundering over 26   million Ukrainian hryvnias (equivalent to more than 1 million euros at the relevant time), as well as to an ongoing criminal investigation into the matter. Regarding tax evasion, the SBU alleged that the applicant company had underpaid its taxes relating to the sale of one of its lotteries. Lastly, the SBU accused the applicant company of using banned online casino software, engaging in illegal gambling operations under the guise of lotteries, and promoting gambling addiction (ludomania). 21 . On 26 May 2017 the Higher Administrative Court stayed the proceedings. It noted that the applicant company’s claim raised the issue of compliance of the Sanctions Act with the Constitution, which only the Constitutional Court could assess. Accordingly, the case was referred to the Supreme Court of Ukraine, which, in turn, had the authority to initiate such a constitutional review. 22. According to the available information, on 4 September 2017 the Plenary of the Supreme Court of Ukraine decided that a referral to the Constitutional Court concerning the Sanctions Act required additional elaboration. Consequently, the referral was withdrawn from consideration ( знято з розгляду ). 23.     Following a judicial reform in Ukraine (see Gumenyuk and Others v.   Ukraine , no.   11423/19, §§   8-11, 22   July   2021), in January 2018 the applicant’s case was transferred to the Cassation Administrative Court within the newly created Supreme Court, which took over the examination of cases previously dealt with by the Higher Administrative Court. 24 .     On 2 August 2019 the Cassation Administrative Court resumed the proceedings. However, its ruling did not address whether a constitutional review of the Sanctions Act was necessary. 25. The Cassation Administrative Court adjourned the hearings multiple times, mainly because the applicant company’s representative was required to obtain State secret clearance to access the case file, and owing to the unavailability of the equipment necessary for the audio recording of hearings involving State secrets. Eventually, the applicant company’s representative was granted access to the case file, including documents compiled by the SBU outlining the grounds for the imposition of sanctions. 26 .     On 16 August 2022 the applicant company filed additional written submissions with the Cassation Administrative Court, relying on, inter alia , new grounds in support of its claim and providing further explanations regarding the effect of the imposed sanctions on its business operations. In particular, as to the new grounds, the company argued that there was no evidence that the first presidential decree had been pre-approved by the responsible officials within the Presidential Administration, as required by the established procedure. The applicant company also alleged that the responsible officials had failed to carry out an assessment of the fiscal impact the impugned sanctions may have had on the State budget, given the amount of military tax the company had previously paid (see paragraph 12 above). In its view, such an assessment was a mandatory step in the process of enacting any presidential decree. 27 .     The applicant company also asserted that, as a result of its bank accounts being frozen, it was no longer able to transfer or receive non-cash payments and pay out large monetary prizes to its customers. In this regard, it had made requests to the State Fiscal Service and the Ministry of Finance asking for clarification on how it could continue to pay taxes and other contributions to the State budget despite the freeze, but had received no meaningful reply. The only practical way for it to meet – even partially – its budgetary obligations was to use cash deposited with its network of lottery distributors. However, due to regulatory restrictions limiting such daily cash deposits to 10,000   Ukrainian hryvnias, its ability to make mandatory payments to the State had been severely curtailed. 28 .     On 29 November 2022 the Cassation Administrative Court dismissed the applicant company’s claim in full. Having examined its corporate structure, including the identities of the individual shareholders of its holding company and its network of subsidiaries, the Cassation Administrative Court established that, at the relevant time its corporate structure included shareholders from Ukraine, the United Kingdom and Cyprus, while its ultimate beneficial owner was a Cypriot national, M.Sh. The court further held that the applicant company belonged to the category of entities which could be subject to sanctions under the Sanctions Act, that there were sufficient grounds for imposing sanctions on the company, that the decision to impose sanctions was adequately reasoned, that the decision was not disproportionate and that the company had not challenged the procedure by which the sanctions had been imposed. Referring to the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court’s ruling of 7 July 2022 (see paragraph 57 below), it noted that the Sanctions Act set out the grounds, conditions and objectives for the application of sanctions in a sufficiently clear and foreseeable manner. 29 .     With regard to the grounds for imposing sanctions, the Cassation Administrative Court referred to information provided by the SBU in its objections to the applicant company’s claim (see paragraph 20 above), as well as to a classified “information document” prepared by the SBU. This document alleged that the company was controlled by citizens of the Russian Federation and was involved in money laundering, tax evasion, illegal gambling and the promotion of ludomania. One paragraph of the judgment was withheld from public access in view of the classified nature of the information it contained. The court further held that the SBU and other State authorities “bore responsibility” for the completeness and accuracy of the information provided. In support of this position, it referred to the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court’s ruling of 13 January 2021 (see paragraph   56 below), which stated that the existence of threats under the Sanctions Act was an evaluative concept implying a certain level of discretion and requiring only a limited judicial review. The Cassation Administrative Court concluded that the circumstances established by the SBU constituted “appropriate grounds for submitting proposals to the NSDCU” regarding the imposition of sanctions on the applicant company. However, the court declined to assess these grounds itself, stating as follows: “... the scope and outcome of the assessment of [the SBU’s proposals to the NSDCU] are beyond judicial review, as the administrative court is not authorised to decide on matters of national security and defence, nor to coordinate or oversee the authorities’ activities in the sphere of national security and defence. Such authority lies exclusively with the NSDCU in accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine and [the Sanctions Act]. It is the President of Ukraine who, in putting into effect the NSDCU’s decision, carries out an assessment of the existence and sufficiency of grounds for the application of sanctions.” The Cassation Administrative Court also rejected the applicant company’s arguments regarding the absence of court judgments establishing its involvement in any alleged wrongdoing. The court stated that sanctions imposed under the Sanctions Act differed from measures ordered within the framework of criminal proceedings and did not necessitate a prior finding of guilt in a criminal offence. As to the reasoning of the impugned presidential decree, it held that the relevant NSDCU decision, which was to be considered part of the decree, contained all the necessary details and was properly reasoned. Lastly, with regard to the proportionality of the imposed sanctions, the court referred in broad terms to the applicant company’s “actions and their assessment in the light of national interests” and, noting the limited duration of the sanctions, held that they had been proportionate. 30 .     On 12 January 2023 the applicant company lodged an appeal against the above ruling with the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court. In its appeal, the company argued, inter alia , that Ukrainian law did not provide for any limitations on the scope of review of presidential decrees by the domestic courts, and that the Cassation Administrative Court should therefore have examined the grounds for imposing sanctions on it, notwithstanding the President’s discretionary powers in this area. In this regard, it referred to a judgment of the Cassation Administrative Court in a similar case (see paragraph 54 below), in which the claimant had successfully challenged the imposition of sanctions in view of the lack of grounds for doing so. Furthermore, the applicant company argued that there was no admissible evidence demonstrating that it had ever been controlled by a citizen or entity of the Russian Federation, that the letter it had sent to the Ministry of Finance had been subsequently recalled and that the classified “information document” used by the SBU to substantiate its allegations against the applicant company contained unverified speculations. 31 .     The applicant company also challenged the SBU’s allegations concerning money laundering, tax evasion, illegal gambling and the promotion of ludomania (see paragraph 20 above), claiming that these facts had never been established in any judicial proceedings. It also submitted that neither the impugned presidential decree nor the NSDCU’s decision contained any information concerning the grounds for the imposition of sanctions on it. Lastly, referring to its additional observations (see paragraph 26 above), the applicant company claimed that the Cassation Administrative Court had wrongly concluded that it had not challenged the procedure by which the sanctions had been imposed. 32 .     On 27 August 2024 the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court found against the applicant company. In dismissing the appeal, it followed the reasoning of the first-instance court and, referring to its own ruling of 13   January 2021 (see paragraph 56 below), reiterated its conclusion about the limited judicial review of presidential decrees concerning the imposition of sanctions: “84. The Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court notes that, in accordance with [Article 124 § 3] of the Constitution of Ukraine, the jurisdiction of the courts extends to any legal dispute. However, in certain categories of disputes involving ... the authorities’ decisions (for instance, disputes regarding the imposition of [sanctions]), judicial review may be subject to certain limitations in view of the scope of discretionary powers of the authorities that issued the impugned decisions ... 86. The Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court concurs with the first-instance court’s conclusion that the scope and outcome of the [President’s] assessment of the significance of the risks that served as grounds for imposing [sanctions on the applicant company] are beyond judicial review, since the administrative court has neither the competence to decide on matters of national security and defence nor the authority to coordinate and oversee the activities of [the authorities in this domain]. 87. ...When enacting decisions of the NSDCU concerning such sanctions, the President ... must independently assess the existence and sufficiency of grounds for imposing sanctions. Judicial review of such decisions is limited, as, on the one hand, the court may not substitute its own assessment for that of the President regarding the reality of threats to the national interests, national security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and, consequently, the existence and sufficiency of grounds within his discretionary authority for imposing sanctions (as doing so would violate the principle of separation of powers), but, on the other hand, the court may verify compliance with the limits of that discretion and adherence to the procedure for imposing sanctions. 88. Accordingly, the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court dismisses the arguments in the [applicant company’s] appeal that, by referring to the limited judicial supervision in this category of cases, the court evaded the administration of justice.” 33.     The Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court further held that, in putting into effect the NSDCU’s decision concerning the applicant company, the President had not overstepped the discretionary powers vested in him. It also held, without providing any details, that the impugned decision contained no signs of arbitrariness. 34 .     With regard to the allegations of a breach of the internal procedure for the imposition of sanctions (see paragraph 26 above), the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court observed that those arguments had been submitted by the applicant company out of time and therefore should not be taken into consideration. As to the SBU’s attempts to lift the sanctions against the applicant company (see paragraph 46 below), it stated as follows: “136. The SBU’s proposal to consider lifting the sanctions, in itself, cannot be construed as an absence of grounds for imposing them, because, under the law, the establishment of such grounds falls exclusively within the competence of the NSDCU.” 35.     The rest of the applicant companies’ arguments were dismissed as unsubstantiated. Second [5] and third [6] sets of proceedings 36.     In October 2016 and November 2017 the applicant company brought administrative proceedings before the Higher Administrative Court seeking the annulment of the second and third presidential decrees, respectively, in so far as they applied to the company. 37.     Both sets of proceedings were adjourned multiple times, primarily because the judges and representatives of the parties lacked State secret clearance, and owing to the unavailability of the technical resources necessary for conducting hearings involving State secrets. 38.     On unspecified dates both sets of proceedings were transferred to the Cassation Administrative Court within the Supreme Court for consideration on the merits. 39 .     On 22 February 2023 and 8 February 2024 the Cassation Administrative Court dismissed the applicant company’s claims in the third and second sets of proceedings, respectively. 40 .     The applicant company appealed to the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court. However, on 27 August 2024 its representative filed two identical applications to withdraw its claims in the second and third sets of proceedings. Along with these applications, the representative made the following declaration: “The [applicant company] understands that in these challenging times it is important not only to pursue its own business interests, but also to contribute to societal cohesion, cooperation with State authorities and maintenance of economic stability. Under current conditions, all conflicts and disputes must be resolved in a spirit of national unity and in pursuit of the shared objective of defeating external aggression and restoring peace in Ukraine. The withdrawal of this claim, which challenges a decree of the former President, is a conscious decision which stems, in particular, from a deep understanding of the importance of cohesion over rivalry with the former State leadership during such a critical period for the country.” 41 .     On the same day the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court accepted the applicant company’s withdrawal of its claims, declared the decisions of the Cassation Administrative Court in the second and third sets of proceedings (see paragraph 39 above) invalid ( нечинними ) and closed both sets of proceedings. other relevant facts Criminal investigation in respect of the applicant company’s officials 42 .     On 5 October 2015 the applicant company’s ultimate beneficial owner, M.Sh., asked the SBU to launch a criminal investigation into the alleged offences committed by the applicant company’s officials, as implied by the NSDCU’s decision (see paragraph 13 above), stating that he had no prior knowledge of the allegations.   He referred, in particular, to the provisions of the Criminal Code penalising the following offences: infringement of the territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine (Article   110); financing of actions committed with the aim of forcibly changing or overthrowing the constitutional order, seizing State power, or changing the boundaries of the territory or State border of Ukraine (Article   110-2); creation of a terrorist group or terrorist organisation [7] (Article   258-3); and financing of terrorism (Article 258-5). 43.     Following M.Sh.’s request, on 14 December 2015 the SBU launched an official investigation under Article 258-5(1) of the Criminal Code. 44 .     On 31 March 2017 the SBU discontinued the investigation, concluding that no criminal offence had been committed. According to the available documents, its decision was based on interviews conducted with numerous former and current officials of the applicant company, and on information obtained from various State agencies, such as multiple SBU departments, the National Police, the State Fiscal Service and the State Financial Inspectorate, none of which indicated any involvement by the applicant company in the financing of terrorism. The applicant company’s application to the SBU for lifting the sanctions 45 .     On 7 September 2016 the applicant company requested that the SBU initiate the process of lifting the sanctions imposed by the NSDCU. The company provided information on its corporate structure and the identities of its founders and owners, denying any links with the Russian Federation or involvement in the financing of terrorism. 46 .     The following day the SBU informed the applicant company that, having examined its request and verified the information therein, it had sent a letter to the NSDCU with a suggestion to consider removing the company’s name from the list of legal entities subject to sanctions. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE Relevant domestic law and practice Constitution 47 .     The Constitution sets out the following principles and establishes the following rules: (i) the rule of law, including the superiority of the Constitution over ordinary legislation (Article 8); (ii) the inviolability of the right to private property, according to which “no one may be unlawfully deprived of the right to property” (Article 41); (iii) restrictions on constitutional rights may only be introduced in the cases specified in the Constitution (Article 64); (iv) the President of Ukraine is responsible for ensuring the independence and national security of the State and, on the basis and in accordance with the Constitution and the laws of Ukraine, issues decrees and directives that are binding throughout the territory (Article 106); (v) the NSDCU acts as the co-ordinating body under the President of Ukraine on matters of national security and defence, and its decisions are put into effect by presidential decrees (Article 107); (vi) the jurisdiction of the courts extends to all legal disputes and all criminal charges (Article 124); (vii) the Constitutional Court reviews the constitutionality of laws enacted by Parliament on applications from the President, no fewer than forty-five members of parliament, the Supreme Court, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights and the legislature of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (Article   150). Sanctions Act (as worded at the material time) 48 .     The Sanctions Act was adopted by Parliament on 14 August 2014. The relevant extract of the Preamble is quoted in paragraph 9 above. 49.     Section 1 sets out the objectives and principles as follows: “1.     To protect the national interests, national security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, to counteract terrorist activity, and to prevent violations and restore violated rights, freedoms and lawful interests of the citizens of Ukraine, society and the State, special economic and other restrictive measures (hereinafter referred to as sanctions) may be imposed. 2.     Sanctions may be imposed by Ukraine against a foreign State, a foreign legal entity, a legal entity controlled by a foreign legal entity or a non-resident individual, foreign nationals, stateless persons and entities engaged in terrorist activities. 3.     The imposition of sanctions shall not exclude the application of other measures to protect the national interests, national security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, its economic independence, rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of the citizens of Ukraine, society and the State.” 50 .     Section   3, which lays down the grounds for the application of sanctions, reads as follows: “1. The grounds for the imposition of sanctions shall include: (1) actions of a foreign State, foreign legal entity or individual, other entities that create real and/or potential threats to the national interests, national security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, promote terrorist activities and/or violate human and civil rights and freedoms, the interests of society and the State, result in the occupation of territory, expropriation or restriction of property rights, property losses, the creation of obstacles to sustainable economic development and full exercise by Ukrainian citizens of their rights and freedoms; (2) resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council; (3) decisions and regulations of the Council of the European Union; (4) facts of violations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Charter of the United Nations. 2. The imposition of sanctions shall be based on the principles of legality, transparency, objectivity, conformity to purpose and effectiveness. 3. The grounds for the imposition of sanctions shall also be the commission by a foreign State, a foreign legal entity, a legal entity controlled by a foreign legal entity or a non-resident individual, foreign nationals, stateless persons and entities engaged in terrorist activities, of the actions specified in [section 3(1)(1)] in relation to another foreign State, citizens or legal entities of the latter.” 51.     Section 4 lists the types of sanctions that may be applied. It includes, inter alia , the measures applied in relation to the applicant company (see paragraph 14 above). 52 .     Section   5 provides that decisions concerning the application, cancellation and amendments of sanctions in relation to certain foreign legal entities, legal entities controlled by a foreign legal entity or a non-resident, foreign nationals, stateless persons or entities engaged in terrorist activities are issued by the NSDCU and put into effect by presidential decrees. Such decisions are binding and take effect on the date of the decree’s enactment. Sanctions are lifted by the State authority that imposed them once the objectives for which they were introduced have been achieved. NSDCU Act (as worded at the material time) 53.     Section 10 of the NSDCU Act provides that decisions adopted by the NSDCU are put into effect by presidential decrees. After that, such decisions are binding on all State authorities. Domestic case-law 54 .     In a decision dated 18 June 2020 (case no. 9901/259/19) the Cassation Administrative Court ruled on a claim by a Swiss-registered legal entity seeking the annulment of the presidential decree by which a decision of the NSDCU had been put into effect. According to the wording of the decision, the claimant was included in the list of legal entities subject to sanctions in view of its alleged business relations with a Russian operator of a titanium dioxide plant in occupied Crimea. Having examined the case, the Cassation Administrative Court reviewed the grounds for the application of sanctions, found no factual information that could justify their application against the claimant and annulled the relevant part of the presidential decree. 55 .     In several other domestic cases related to sanctions, which the Government referred to in their observations, the Supreme Court dismissed the claimants’ claims after reviewing the grounds for imposing sanctions and examining the substance of the allegations made against them (see the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court’s rulings of 6   July   2023 in cases nos.   9901/635/18 and 9901/376/21; 13 January 2021 in case no. 9901/405/19; and 3 March 2020 in case no. 9901/783/18; see also the Cassation Administrative Court’s ruling of 24 May 2021 in case no. 9901/424/19). 56 .     In a ruling dated 13 January 2021 (case no. 9901/405/19), the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court, after reviewing an appeal concerning sanctions imposed on a legal entity, concluded that establishing the existence of threats under the Sanctions Act was an evaluative concept implying a certain level of discretion. In cases where sanctions were imposed on the basis of NSDCU decisions, it was the role of the President of Ukraine to make an independent assessment regarding the existence and sufficiency of grounds for the application of sanctions. As to the level of judicial scrutiny of such decisions, the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court held as follows : “Judicial review of such a decision is limited because, on the one hand, the court cannot reassess for the President the existence and sufficiency of such grounds within the limits of his discretion (which would infringe the principle of the separation of powers), but, on the other hand, the court can check whether the limits of that discretion and the procedure for the application of sanctions have been complied with.” 57 .     In its ruling of 7 July 2022 (case no.   9901/348/21), the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court, after reviewing an appeal by a company seeking the imposition of sanctions on third parties, concluded that under the Sanctions Act, the State had a legitimate right to derogate from certain constitutional rights, but, at the same time, in order to prevent arbitrariness and totalitarianism, it had to apply sanctions on an exceptional and temporary basis, and only as a measure of last resort. Moreover, it should apply them in a manner commensurate to the threats to be prevented. The Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court further observed that the Sanctions Act laid down the grounds, conditions and objectives for the application of sanctions in a sufficiently clear and foreseeable manner. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL MATERIAL Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights (Human Rights Council, Forty-eighth session, 13 September to 1 October 2021, A/HRC/48/59) 58.     The relevant extracts read as follows (footnotes omitted): “18. The Special Rapporteur recalls that, given the absence of a universally recognized definition of unilateral coercive measures and their illegal character as referred to in a number of resolutions of the Human Rights Council and the General Assembly, States prefer to present their unilateral activities as not constituting unilateral coercive measures and therefore to use other terms, including “sanctions”, “restrictive measures”, and many others ... 19. It is notable that today there is no clear definition even of the general notion of “sanctions” in international law.   ... 49. Targeted sanctions applied to individuals and companies were introduced in order to minimize the negative humanitarian impact of comprehensive or economic sanctions. International law does not regulate them specifically. They traditionally include travel and visa bans, freezing of assets, prohibitions to satisfy claims related to the introduction of sanctions, prohibition of the export of and of assistance in setting up hardware and software, prohibition of the purchase of hardware, limitations on dual ‑ use goods and equipment, and restrictions on the purchase of goods originating from a particular State. 50. The Special Rapporteur notes that the purpose of listing individuals or companies may be to implement resolutions of the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, often going beyond the authorization of the Council or acting autonomously to maintain international peace and security; to suppress international, transnational or national crimes; to promote and protect human rights, democracy, the rule of law or good governance; or to protect national security or other interests, often through the declaration of a state of emergency. ... B. Legal status of targeted sanctions 89. The Special Rapporteur notes with regret that States have shown a preference in recent times for imposing sanctions instead of starting criminal cases, as such action is easier and faster, and standards of proof are nearly non-existent. As a result, perpetrators of international crimes face no criminal charge, while a group of people suffer economic and travel limitations and are publicly branded international criminals, in violation of the right to the presumption of innocence.” Case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 59 .     The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has developed substant