CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 16 octobre 2025

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color:#0069d6 } .s3DB046A9 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; background-color:#ffffff } .s391E78BA { font-family:Arial; background-color:#ffffff } .s164635C0 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt; background-color:#ffffff } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt }   FIFTH SECTION CASE OF FAJSTAVR v. THE CZECH REPUBLIC (Application no. 48303/21)     JUDGMENT   Art 6 § 1 (criminal) • Fair hearing • Applicant’s drug-trafficking conviction decisively based on the testimony of co accused, having been granted the status of “cooperating accused”, who eventually benefitted from a more lenient sentence, not rendering trial unfair   Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.   STRASBOURG 16 October 2025   FINAL   16/01/2026     This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.   In the case of Fajstavr v. the Czech Republic, The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   María Elósegui , President ,   Georgios A. Serghides,   Gilberto Felici,   Andreas Zünd,   Diana Sârcu,   Sébastien Biancheri , judges ,   Pavel Simon , ad hoc judge , and Victor Soloveytchik, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   48303/21) against the Czech Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Czech national, Mr Aleš Fajstavr (“the applicant”), on 23 September 2021; the decision to give notice of the application to the Czech Government (“the Government”); the parties’ observations; the decision of the President of the Section to appoint Mr P. Simon to sit as an   ad hoc   judge (Article 26 § 4 of the Convention   and Rule 29 § 1 (a) of the Rules of Court), Ms K. Šimáčková, the judge elected in respect of the Czech Republic, having withdrawn from sitting in the case (Rule 28 § 3); Having deliberated in private on 16 September 2025, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The application concerns the applicant’s criminal conviction for drug trafficking, which was based to a decisive extent on the testimony of the applicant’s co ‑ accused, who had been granted the status of “cooperating accused”. It raises issues under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. THE FACTS 2.     The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Jihlava. He was represented by Mr F. Seifert, a lawyer practising in Prague. 3.     The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr P. Konůpka, of the Ministry of Justice. 4.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. PRE-TRIAL PROCEEDINGS 5 .     On 13 July 2016 the police brought criminal charges against N.M. for drug trafficking; on the same day, she largely confessed to the charges. Her ex-partner, J.J., also provided a statement to the police in which he mentioned that on one occasion the applicant had been present when O.K. had given N.M. drugs to transport to Switzerland. 6 .     On 20 July 2016, when N.M. was questioned again, she supplemented her previous statement by saying that her second trip to Switzerland in April   2015 had been organised by both O.K. and the applicant, who had come to her flat, packaged the drugs and put them in a suitcase before driving her to Prague to take the bus; on her return from Switzerland, they had waited for her in Prague and collected money from her. O.K. and the applicant had also allegedly accompanied her to the Prague bus station on her third trip to Switzerland in June 2015. On 15 September 2016 she reiterated that, in her opinion, both O.K. and the applicant had been involved in the drug trafficking, since they had always made arrangements together, but that she did not know more about their specific roles. At the end of those interviews, N.M. asked to be recognised as a   “cooperating accused” within the meaning of Article 178a § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter “the CCP”). 7 .     On 20 November 2016 the police brought criminal charges against N.M., O.K. and the applicant for the particularly serious offence of manufacturing and trafficking illegal drugs, committed within an organised group between January and June 2015. 8.     The following day the applicant was appointed a lawyer, his case warranting mandatory legal representation. 9 .     On 22 November 2016 the applicant was questioned in the presence of his lawyer and stated that he had known N.M. since he had once accompanied her and O.K. to the bus station in Prague and had been to her flat several times, but that he did not remember why. 10 .     On 16 December 2016 N.M. was questioned by the prosecutor, as a   cooperating accused, in the presence of all the accused’s lawyers, including the applicant’s. The latter asked her detailed questions about both her history of drug addiction and the applicant’s alleged role in the criminal activity. The applicant’s lawyer did not attend N.M.’s interview on 20 January 2017 and did not ask her any questions during her subsequent interview on 14   February   2017. 11 .     On 19 January 2017 the police took a new statement from N.M.’s ex-partner, J.J., so as to allow the accused’s lawyers to ask him questions. However, J.J. only referred to his initial statement and refused to make any further comments. 12 .     On 18 February 2017 a psychiatric expert, who had been commissioned by the police, delivered an expert report on N.M.’s mental state. According to the report, N.M.’s character was disharmoniously structured but she did not suffer from any mental illness; she was able to understand the purpose of criminal proceedings and to fully participate in them. However, given that she had been taking drugs since she was 14 years old, he recommended an outpatient drug addiction treatment. 13 .     On 6 October 2017 the applicant, O.K., N.M. and J.J. were formally indicted by the prosecutor; N.M. was designated as a cooperating accused. CRIMINAL TRIAL 14 .     The applicant and his lawyer attended the hearings held before the Ústí and Labem Regional Court on 26 April 2018, 27 June 2018, 23   November 2018, 15 January 2019 and 28 August 2019. The applicant denied engaging in the criminal activity in question, claiming that he had an alibi for the dates of both of N.M.’s trips to Switzerland in which he had allegedly been involved according to the indictment. Concerning the trip on 14-16 April 2015, he submitted a medical certificate stating that he had been hospitalised from 15 to 18 April 2015. As to the second trip on 12-14 June 2015, he asserted that during that period he had transported cars to Belgium, which he intended to prove by written evidence (namely documents pertaining to international carriage) and the hearing of witnesses J.V. and H.K. He further argued that N.M. had testified against him because he had insulted her in the past and because she was trying to obtain a reduced sentence; moreover, her reliability was doubtful, given that she had been a long-term drug addict. N.M., designated as a cooperating accused, stated that she had told the truth and confirmed her pre-trial statement which had been read out. She also responded to questions asked by the prosecutor, the court and her co-accused’s lawyers and admitted that she did not remember whether the applicant had been to Prague with her one time or two times. The court further heard J.V., a witness for the applicant, who stated that, according to the relevant carriage document, he and the applicant had loaded a car to be sold abroad, on 11 June 2015, and had remitted it to the buyer in Belgium on 13 June 2015; he could not, however, remember when exactly they had left together for Belgium, only that on their return journey they had spent one night at H.K.’s home in Belgium and had returned on 15   June 2015. A request by the applicant to hear H.K. was refused by the court without written reasoning. In his closing speech of 28 August 2019, the prosecutor admitted that N.M. was not a person of integrity but emphasised that she had incriminated herself in respect of a more serious offence (see paragraphs 5-7 above), had described the activities of the whole group and had shed light on the criminal activity under investigation, and that her statement had been supported by other pieces of evidence, in particular by statements of six other persons related to the acts committed by O.K. In his view she had satisfied the conditions set out in the CCP to be granted the status of cooperating accused and recommended that she receive a length of sentence below the lower statutory range (three years were proposed). 15 .     On 26 September 2019 the Regional Court found the applicant, O.K. and N.M. guilty of the particularly serious crime of manufacturing and trafficking illegal drugs committed within an organised group. The applicant was sentenced to ten years in prison and N.M. was given a three-year prison sentence. The court based itself on the statements of N.M., given both at the pre-trial stage and at trial, which it considered reliable since they described the actions of all members of the group in a logical and consistent way and were corroborated by other pieces of evidence, namely the statement of her ex-partner given on 13 July 2016, telephone recordings, a search of O.K.’s home and information provided by the bus company and the Swiss authorities. Referring to, inter alia , the expert report (see paragraph 12 above), the court found no reasons to consider N.M., designated as a   cooperating accused, unreliable and it observed that there had been no major conflict between her and the applicant in the past, contrary to what the latter had claimed, which might have driven N.M. to falsely incriminate him. It also considered untenable the applicant’s alibi, holding that his hospitalisation had not prevented him from being present when N.M. had left for Switzerland on 14 April 2015, and that his assertion that he and J.V. had left on 10 June 2015 had been refuted by J.V., according to whom the cars had been loaded only on 11 June 2015 and who had not remembered when exactly they had left. 16 .     The applicant appealed against that decision to the Prague High Court, which dismissed his appeal   on 13 March 2020 following a public hearing. It considered that the Regional Court had conducted a comprehensive examination of the evidence, pointing out that the hearing of the defence witness H.K. had been considered redundant in view of the evidence taken up to that point. Indeed, even if H.K. had been heard and had confirmed that the applicant had spent the night of 14-15 June 2015 at his home, this would not have refuted N.M.’s statement that the applicant had accompanied her to Prague on 12 June 2015. 17.     On 25 November 2020 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant, endorsing the lower courts’ findings. As to the fact that the witness, H.K., had not been heard, it observed that that did not amount to “omitted evidence” since the proposal to hear him had been considered and dismissed orally on the basis of adequate, albeit brief, grounds. 18.     Subsequently, the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal, which the Constitutional Court dismissed as manifestly ill-founded on 24 March 2021 (decision no. II. ÚS 617/21). In the Constitutional Court’s view, the applicant only disagreed with the interpretation of law by the lower courts and with their guilty verdict; however, all his concerns and arguments had been duly addressed. 19.     On 7 September 2021 the applicant was arrested in Germany, following from a European arrest warrant issued by the Regional Court. He was transferred to the Czech Republic on 3 November 2021 to serve his prison sentence. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (LAW N o . 141/1961) 20.     The concept of cooperating accused was introduced into the Czech Code of Criminal Procedure, with effect as of 1 January 2010, with a view to facilitating investigations and clarification of particularly serious crimes. It is governed by Article 178a. 21 .     Article 178a § 1 provides that in proceedings concerning an offence, the public prosecutor may designate in the indictment an accused as cooperating if he or she: (a) reports to the prosecutor facts that are likely to significantly contribute to the clarification of an offence committed by members of organised groups and undertakes to provide a comprehensive and truthful statement about those facts both in pre-trial proceedings and at trial; (b) confesses to the crime for which he or she is being prosecuted and there is no reasonable doubt that that confession is free, serious and definitive; (c) declares that he or she agrees to be designated as a cooperating accused. In addition, the prosecutor must consider such designation necessary, given the nature of the criminal offence which the accused has undertaken to clarify, also taking into account the offence referred to in the accused’s confession, the character of the accused and the circumstances of the case, especially whether and how the accused participated in committing the offence which he or she has undertaken to clarify and what consequences were caused by his or her actions. 22.     Under Article 178a § 2, if the cooperating accused has not committed a crime that is more serious than the crime he or she helped to clarify, if he or she did not participate as an organiser or instigator in the crime he or she helped to clarify, if he or she did not intentionally cause serious bodily harm or death, and if there are no grounds for an extraordinary increase of the prison sentence, the prosecutor may, under certain conditions, propose in the indictment that the punishment be waived. 23.     Pursuant to Article 178a § 3, before the prosecutor designates the accused as cooperating, he or she must question the accused, in particular about the content of the information provided and about his or her confession. The accused will also be asked whether he or she is aware of the consequences of his or her actions. Prior to the examination of the accused, the prosecutor must inform the accused of his or her rights, the substance of being designated as a cooperating accused, the obligation to maintain his or her confession and comply with the obligations set out in paragraph 1 of Article 178a, and must inform the accused of the fact that if he or she violates his or her obligations in the pre-trial proceedings or at trial, he or she will no longer be regarded as a cooperating accused. CRIMINAL CODE (LAW No. 40/2009), AS IN FORCE AT THE MATERIAL TIME 24 .     Article 39 § 1 provided that, in determining the type and length of a   sentence, the court had to take into account, inter alia , whether a perpetrator designated as a cooperating accused made a significant contribution to the clarification of a crime committed by members of an organised group. 25.     Under Article 41m, the court had to consider a mitigating circumstance, inter alia , the fact that the perpetrator had contributed, in particular as a cooperating accused, to the clarification of a criminal activity committed by members of an organised group. 26.     Article 46 § 2 allowed the court to refrain from punishing a perpetrator designated as a cooperating accused if the conditions laid down in Article   178a §§ 1 and 2 of the CCP had been satisfied and if the cooperating accused had provided a comprehensive and truthful statement, both in the pre-trial proceedings and at trial, about facts that were likely to contribute significantly to the clarification of a crime committed by members of an organised group. 27 .     Under Article 58 § 4, the court could reduce a prison sentence imposed on a perpetrator designated as a cooperating accused to a length below the lower limit of the statutory range if the conditions laid down in Article   178a   §   1 of the CCP had been satisfied and if the cooperating accused had provided a comprehensive and truthful statement about the relevant facts. In doing so, the court had to take into account the nature of the offence referred to in the cooperating accused’s confession in comparison with the offence committed by members of the organised group whose clarification he or she had contributed to, the significance of that offence, the character of the perpetrator and the circumstances of the case, in particular whether and how he or she had participated in it and which, if any, consequences his or her actions had caused. DOMESTIC COURT PRACTICE 28 .     The Supreme Court stated in its decision no. 7 Tdo 1315/2012 of 12   December 2012 that the institution of cooperating accused was viewed as an effective tool in combatting serious organised crime and as a legitimate means of gathering evidence. It emphasised that, according to the Court’s case-law, a statement of a cooperating accused could be used, provided that such evidence and the motivation behind it had been subjected to a careful assessment. Thus, there was always a need to consider the equivocal nature of that kind of statement and the risk of it being self-serving. Also, such evidence could not stand alone and had to be assessed critically. 29.     In decision no. 8 Tdo 661/2015 of 17 September 2015 the Supreme Court held that the position of a prosecutor who designated an accused as cooperating was not decisive or binding for the court, which had to consider all the circumstances relevant to the application of Article 58 § 4 of the Criminal Code in an autonomous and independent manner. 30 .     The Constitutional Court stated in its decision no. III. ÚS 859/13 of 13 March 2014 that the application of the institution of cooperating accused must be subject to the most stringent requirements and the process of assessing the credibility of a cooperating accused’s statement must be exceptionally thorough. In particular, it considered it necessary to examine his or her motives for cooperating and the compatibility of his or her statement with the other evidence gathered. 31 .     On 7 August 2018 the Constitutional Court held, in judgment no.   II.   ÚS 3525/16, that by accepting the status of cooperating accused the accused waived his or her right to refuse to testify, implying the privilege not to worsen his or her procedural situation, which was motivated by the expected, albeit discretionary, benefit of an extraordinary reduction of his or her prison sentence. 32.     In decision no. IV. ÚS 3816/18 of 29 January 2019 the Constitutional Court held that the regulation of the institution of the cooperating accused was meant to be optional, with a very wide range of discretion on the part of the prosecutor, and without any direct (compulsory) consequences for the material rights of the accused persons; those could only occur after the court had taken account of all the relevant circumstances. 33.     On 28 August 2019 the Constitutional Court confirmed, in decision no. III. ÚS 3193/18, that even if the prosecutor designated an accused as cooperating in the indictment, that position could not be binding on the court hearing the case, which had to ascertain that the conditions set out in Article   178a § 1 of the CCP had been satisfied. 34 .     In decision no. I. ÚS 2038/20 of 16 September 2020 the Constitutional Court held that while the findings of a criminal court could be based solely on the statement of a cooperating accused, the court had to explain, in a   sufficient and logical manner, why it considered that statement credible. In the case at hand, the main reason for concluding that the statement of a   cooperating accused was credible was the fact that it was consistent with other pieces of evidence. THE LAW ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION 35.     The applicant complained under Article 6 §§ 1 and 2 of the Convention that his criminal conviction had been based on unreliable statements of his co-accused, who had cooperated with the criminal authorities in exchange for a reduction of her sentence. The Court, which is the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, will examine the complaint from the standpoint of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: “In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a   fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...” Admissibility 36.     The Court notes that the application is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article   35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible. Merits The parties’ submissions 37.     The applicant asserted that his conviction had been based almost exclusively on the statement given by the cooperating accused, N.M. Moreover, her allegations about her second and third trips to Switzerland, in which he had allegedly been involved, had been inaccurate and contained contradictions, which had made them unreliable. Also, her statement had been significantly influenced by what she had been told by the prosecution or had read in the file. However, instead of being particularly cautious, the courts had downplayed or ignored those deficiencies and considered unreliable any evidence in his favour which had contradicted N.M.’s statement, such as the witness statement by J.V. They had also refused to hear H.K., who could have corroborated J.V.’s statement. 38.     The applicant further argued that, contrary to the Government’s allegations (see paragraph 42 below), N.M.’s testimony had not been corroborated either by J.J.’s statement, which had not implicated him in the offence, or by any other piece of evidence. He further argued that he had not been able to attend J.J.’s interview of 13 July 2016, as he had not yet been charged at that time, while on 19 January 2017 J.J. had refused to make any further comments (see paragraph 11 above). As to the other evidentiary material, such as telephone recordings and information provided by the bus company, they had not proved that he had played any role in N.M.’s trips to Switzerland or that he had himself exported or sold any illegal drugs. 39 .     As to the institution of cooperating accused as regulated by Czech law, the applicant submitted that it was devoid of virtually any guarantees. In pre-trial proceedings, it was at the prosecutor’s discretion whether an accused would be designated as cooperating within the meaning of Article   178a of the CCP, and there was no formalised agreement on the benefits for the accused. Yet, in the applicant’s view, the Court’s case-law presupposed the existence of a transparent agreement between the cooperating accused and the prosecutor, whose terms could be reviewed by a court. The fact that under Czech law the cooperating accused could only expect a discretionary benefit, which was to be determined by the court (see paragraph 43 below), confirmed in his view the problematic nature of that institution. In the present case, the applicant disagreed that the use of the institution of cooperating accused had been subjected to proper judicial review, emphasising that the Regional Court had given N.M. the same sentence as that proposed by the prosecutor, that is, a three-year prison sentence. Given that she had faced a sentence of between ten and eighteen years, the advantage she had obtained as a cooperating accused had thus been considerable. 40.     Moreover, the courts had failed to explain how the conditions set out in Article 178a § 1 of the CCP and Article 58 § 4 of the Criminal Code had been met. In this connection, the applicant emphasised that N.M. had given her key statement during the interview on 20 July 2016, which he or his lawyer could not attend, but she had not repeated it in full at any later occasion or, in particular, at trial. Lastly, the courts had not properly dealt with the issue of possible motives on N.M.’s part to incriminate him. 41.     Referring to the general principles set out in Xenofontos and Others v.   Cyprus (nos. 8725/16, 74339/16 and 74359/16, 25 October 2022), the Government submitted that the present case had to be distinguished from those in which the Court had found a violation of Article 6 (see Adamčo v.   Slovakia , no.   45084/14, § 71, 12 November 2019, and Erik Adamčo v.   Slovakia , no. 19990/20, § 76, 1 June 2023), in which the cooperating accused had practically been granted immunity. In their view, it was rather similar to cases which had been dismissed as manifestly ill-founded (they referred to Shiman v. Romania (dec.), no. 12512/07, 2 June 2015, and Czerski v. Poland (dec.) [Committee], no. 20170/14, 30 January 2024) and in which sufficient counterbalancing factors had compensated for the fact that the statement of the cooperating accused had constituted the main evidence against the applicants. They also emphasised the wide margin of appreciation enjoyed by the State in the fight against organised crime, especially in the field of international drug trafficking. 42 .     The Government argued that, while the applicant’s conviction had rested significantly on the statement of the cooperating accused, N.M., which had been corroborated by the pre-trial statement of her ex-partner, J.J. (see paragraph 5 above), it had also been supported by a substantial amount of objective evidence, such as telephone recordings and information provided by the bus company (see paragraph 15 above). In their view, the proceedings had been accompanied by appropriate procedural safeguards. In particular, the applicant had been assisted by a lawyer, he had been aware of N.M.’s identity and informed that she had been designated as a cooperating accused, and his lawyer had been allowed to attend all the examinations of N.M. during the pre-trial proceedings and ask her questions at the trial hearing. The applicant had also used the opportunity to put forward his account of the events and to challenge N.M.’s credibility, to which the court had duly responded; moreover, N.M.’s mental state had been subjected to an expert examination (see paragraph 12 above). As to the applicant’s argument that the key incriminating statement had been made by N.M. in the pre-trial proceedings, the Government submitted that such fact was not sufficient to render the applicant’s conviction unfair (they referred again to Shiman , cited above). 43 .     The Government further argued that the domestic courts had subjected the applicant’s case to an appropriate degree of scrutiny. They asserted that there had been no formalised agreement between N.M. and the prosecutor and that, contrary to the applicant’s allegations (see paragraph 39 above), such an agreement was not required by the Court’s case-law (they referred, in this respect, to Souroullas Kay and Zannettos v. Cyprus , no. 1618/18, 26   November 2024). Under the applicable legislation, it had been up to the court to assess whether N.M. could be granted the status of cooperating accused and given a reduction of her sentence, which had amounted to a   discretionary benefit (see paragraph 31 above). The Regional Court had also duly examined and explained why it had considered N.M.’s statement credible, pointing out that it had been sufficiently detailed, consistent and logical and that there had been no reasons for her to falsely incriminate the applicant (see paragraph 15 in fine ). In the Government’s view, had N.M. been motivated solely by a desire to gain benefits from her procedural status of cooperating accused, she would not have incriminated herself in respect of a more serious offence, as pointed out by the prosecutor (see paragraph 14 above). Lastly, the Government emphasised that N.M. had not received practical immunity or impunity, but only a reduction of her prison sentence, which was a benefit considerably less significant than that granted to the cooperating accused in Adamčo and Erik Adamčo (both cited above). The Court’s assessment (a)    General principles 44 .     The Court reiterates that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention does not set out any rules on how evidence should be assessed. The Court may interfere in this field only if a domestic court assesses evidence arbitrarily or manifestly unreasonably (see   Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], no.   22251/08, §   61, ECHR 2015). It also reiterates in this context that the admissibility of evidence is a matter for regulation by national law and the national courts (see, among many other authorities, Perić   v.   Croatia , no.   34499/06, § 17, 27   March 2008). The Court’s only concern is to examine whether the proceedings were conducted fairly and, in particular, whether the defendant’s rights were not unacceptably restricted and that he or she remained able to participate effectively in the proceedings (see, for example, Stanford v.   the   United Kingdom , 23 February 1994, § 26, Series A no.   282 ‑ A, and Sievert v. Germany , no. 29881/07, § 62, 19 July 2012). 45.     The use of statements made by witnesses in exchange for immunity or other advantages is an important tool in the domestic authorities’ fight against serious crime. However, the use of such statements may put into question the fairness of the proceedings against the accused and is capable of raising delicate issues as, by their very nature, such statements are open to manipulation and may be made purely in order to obtain the advantages offered in exchange, or for personal revenge (see Xenofontos and Others , §§   76-78, and Erik Adamčo , § 59, both cited above). The sometimes ambiguous nature of such statements and the risk that a person may be accused and tried on the basis of unverified allegations that are not necessarily disinterested must not, therefore, be underestimated (see Habran and Dalem v. Belgium , nos.   43000/11 and 49380/11 , § 100, 17 January 2017). However, the use of these kinds of statements does not in itself suffice to render the proceedings unfair. This depends on the particular circumstances in each case (see Shiman , cited above, § 34, and Oddone and Pecci v. San Marino , nos.   26581/17 and 31024/17, § 106, 17 October 2019). 46.     When assessing the effect of incriminating testimony given by an accomplice on the fairness of proceedings as a whole, the Court has taken into account,   inter alia , whether: –   the defence knew the witness’s identity; –   the defence knew about the existence of an arrangement with the prosecution; –   a domestic court reviewed the arrangement; –   the domestic court considered all the possible advantages received by the witness; –   the arrangement was discussed at the trial; –   the defence had the opportunity to test the evidence of the witness; –   the defence had the opportunity to test the evidence of the members of the prosecution team involved; –   the domestic court was aware of the pitfalls of relying on the evidence of an accomplice; –   the domestic court approached the testimony cautiously; –   the domestic court explained in detail why it believed the witness; –   there was untainted corroborating evidence; –   an appeal court reviewed the trial court’s findings in respect of the witness; and –   the question was addressed by all the courts dealing with the various appeals (see   Xenofontos and Others , cited above, § 79, with further references). (b)    Application of the general principles to the present case 47.     The Court notes at the outset that, in the present case, it is not concerned with testimony that was given by a witness whose identity was concealed from the accused or who was absent at trial. Indeed, the incriminating statement against the applicant was made by his co ‑ accused, N.M., whose identity was known to the defence and who was granted the status of cooperating accused within the meaning of Article 178a of the Czech Code of Criminal Procedure. The applicant and the domestic courts were aware of that arrangement from the very outset because, inter alia , N.M. was designated as such in the prosecutor’s indictment (see paragraphs 10 and 13 above). 48.     To the extent that the applicant challenged the domestic regulation of the institution of cooperating accused and the absence of any formalised agreement between that person and the prosecutor (see paragraph 39 above), the Court observes that it is not its role to review the legislation in abstracto , but to examine whether the proceedings against the applicant were fair as a   whole. 49.     The Court further observes that during the investigation N.M. was questioned at least three times after the applicant had been charged and that the applicant’s lawyer was allowed to participate in the interviews (see paragraph 10 above). The first ‑ instance court also came into direct contact with N.M., who was present when her statements from the pre-trial proceedings were read out, confirmed them in their entirety and answered questions posed to her (see paragraph 14 above). It is thus undisputable that, in the course of the trial, the applicant and his lawyer were able to observe N.M.’s demeanour under questioning, had an opportunity to challenge the latter’s credibility and the accuracy of her testimony and to contradict her account of the circumstances of the case. Indeed, the applicant tried to discredit the statement of N.M. regarding her two trips to Switzerland in which he had allegedly been involved, but his alibi was considered untenable by the courts (see paragraphs 15 and 16 above). 50.     It appears from the case file that the first ‑ instance court gave reasons as to why it considered irrelevant the inconsistencies pointed out by the defence, considering that N.M.’s statements made at the pre-trial stage and at trial were consistent (see paragraph 15 above). In this connection, the Court finds it important to note that N.M. incriminated the applicant during her interview on 20 July 2016 (see paragraph 6 above) and not in return for any benefit (compare Adamčo , §§ 58 and 65, and Souroullas Kay and Zannettos , § 12, both cited above). It also emphasises that she was not granted immunity; indeed, after having first been prosecuted for simple drug trafficking (see   paragraph 5 above), she was charged, following her further statements, with a more serious offence (see paragraphs 6 and 7 above) which carried a   punishment of ten years’ imprisonment or more. She was eventually sentenced to three years’ imprisonment, that is to say that the extent of the benefit which she was granted was determined by the court, as provided for in the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code as in force at the material time (see paragraphs 24-27 above). 51.     It is true that N.M.’s statement amounted to key incriminating evidence against the applicant. As to whether untainted corroborating evidence existed, the Court notes that according to the domestic courts, N.M.’s statement was – with regard to the applicant – corroborated in general terms by the testimony of J.J., who stated that the applicant had been present in N.M.’s flat when the drugs were being packed. The applicant himself admitted that he had been to N.M.’s flat and had accompanied her to the bus station in Prague (see paragraph 9 above). Furthermore, N.M.’s statement with regard to the other members of the group, namely O.K., was considered corroborated by other pieces of evidence, including telephone recordings, a   search of O.K.’s home and information provided by the bus company, which led the domestic court – that had the benefit of direct impression of her conduct under questioning – to consider her testimony reliable (see paragraph 15 above). 52.     Furthermore, the courts examined N.M.’s testimony not only by reference to other evidence, but also in the light of the psychiatric expert report on her mental state. They also considered her possible motivation to harm the applicant, addressing the latter’s complaints and objections in that regard, but found that there were no reasons to consider that there had been any major animosity between them which might have led N.M. to falsely incriminate him (see paragraph 15 in fine ). Thus, although the courts may be criticised for not having clearly considered the impact of that testimony on the fairness of the trial, it cannot be said that they were unaware of the reduced evidentiary value thereof or that they did not examine its reliability in a   careful and critical manner. 53.     Lastly, as regards the assessment of the admitted evidence, the Court reiterates that Article 6 of the Convention does not lay down any rules on the way evidence should be assessed, which are therefore primarily matters for regulation by national law and national courts. It is not the Court’s function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they might have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention (see   paragraph 44 above). In the present case, the Court observes that the domestic courts had before them additional circumstantial evidence supporting N.M.’s statements and finds that there is nothing to establish that the assessment of the evidence by them was arbitrary. It reiterates in this context that witness statements submitted in the course of a trial do not have to cover all the elements of the charges at issue but that some of them can be derived by means of logical reasoning or other material submitted to the acting judge (see Sievert , cited above, § 66). 54.     In view of the circumstances above, it cannot be said that the applicant’s conviction was based on evidence in respect of which he was not, or not sufficiently able to exercise his defence rights under Article 6 §   1 of the Convention, or that the overall fairness of the proceedings was compromised as a result of the courts’ reliance on the statement given by the applicant’s co-accused. 55.     There has accordingly been no violation of Article   6 § 1 of the Convention. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT Declares , unanimously, the application admissible; Holds , by six votes to one, that there has been no violation of Article   6   §   1   of the Convention. Done in English, and notified in writing on 16 October 2025, pursuant to Rule   77   §§   2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.     Victor Soloveytchik   María Elósegui   Registrar   President   In accordance with Article   45 §   2 of the Convention and Rule   74 §   2 of the Rules of Court, the separate opinion of Judge Serghides is annexed to this judgment. DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE SERGHIDES Introduction 1.     The applicant complained, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, that this provision had been violated because his conviction for drug trafficking had been based to a decisive extent (“almost exclusively”, as he argued, see paragraph 37 of the judgment) on the testimony of his co ‑ accused, N.M., who had been granted the status of “cooperating accused” as institutionalised by the domestic legislature, namely in the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure with effect from 1 January 2010 (see, for the pertinent legal framework, paragraphs 20-34 of the judgment). In particular, he complained that the statements in question had been unreliable, as his co-accused had cooperated with the criminal authorities in exchange for a reduction of her sentence. 2.     The judgment concludes that there has been no violation of Article   6   §   1 because, in the circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the applicant’s conviction was based on evidence in respect of which he was not, or not sufficiently, able to exercise his defence rights under Article 6 §   1, or that the overall fairness of the proceedings was compromised as a result of the courts’ reliance on the statement by his co-accused (see paragraphs 54 and 55 of the judgment). 3.     I respectfully disagree with such a conclusion and the corresponding point 2 of the operative provisions of the judgment holding that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The applicant also raised an issue under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. It is to be clarified that I will not examine this complaint merely because it was not communicated to the parties and not on the basis of what the Court states in the judgment, namely that the Court, as a master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, has decided to examine the complaint only from the standpoint of Article   6 § 1, thus de facto subsuming the Article 6 § 2 complaint under the Article 6 § 1 complaint (see paragraph 35 of the judgment). This is a practice with which, in any event, I am not in agreement (see mutatis mutandis , my partly dissenting opinion in Tomenko v. Ukraine , no. 79340/16, 10 July 2025). 4.     Under the relevant domestic law, i.e. the pertinent provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the “cooperating accused” could have the benefit either of not being punished at all or of having a reduced sentence (see paragraphs 26 and 27 of the judgment). In the end, the “cooperating accused” was given the same sentence as that proposed by the prosecutor, that is a three-year prison sentence, and, as the applicant argued, given that N.M. had faced a sentence of between ten and eighteen years, the advantage she had obtained as a cooperating accused had thus been considerable (see paragraphs 15 and 39 of the judgment). On the other hand, the applicant was sentenced to ten years in prison (ibid.). Two DIFFERING views on overall fairness 5.     As I have explained in other separate opinions [1] , there are two views or approaches as to the meaning of “overall fairness” of a trial: on the one hand, what I may call the “qualified procedural fairness view”, which is followed by the Court’s current case ‑ law and allows for a balancing exercise, and, on the other, what I may describe as the “principled view of procedural fairness” (or the “normative view”), which was to be found in some of the Court’s case-law in the past and which is also supported by substantial academic literature. 6.     My preference is for the principled view, which I thus advocate in this opinion. This approach does not permit balancing against other interests or considerations, since it regards each guarantee under Article 6 (save for the exceptions expressly stated in Article 6 § 1) as an independent guarantee, possessing an autonomous procedural value that must b