CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 4 novembre 2025

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s2EF17D91 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s3AAE10DF { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s3CA22BA { font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .s8B15FBF9 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:8.5pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .s6C5BED22 { margin-left:25.5pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s5E8F5A28 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:25.5pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s743F3A55 { margin-right:0pt; margin-left:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .s2044A09A { margin-left:6.51pt; margin-bottom:6pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; padding-left:1.99pt; font-weight:normal; font-style:italic } .sAE6FB95D { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:32.01pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; padding-left:1.99pt; font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s2D9C6089 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s84651E4E { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:3pt; text-align:justify } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sC986E16F { font-family:Arial; color:#ffffff } .s4F597665 { width:33.22pt; display:inline-block } .sEEEC397 { width:146.09pt; display:inline-block } .sB8467130 { width:24.88pt; display:inline-block } .s766CA6F { width:155.43pt; display:inline-block }     SECOND SECTION DECISION Application no. 19088/21 GEO SOLAR DOO DELCHEVO against North Macedonia   The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 4   November 2025 as a Chamber composed of:   Arnfinn Bårdsen , President ,   Saadet Yüksel,   Jovan Ilievski,   Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir,   Gediminas Sagatys,   Juha Lavapuro,   Hugh Mercer , judges , and Hasan Bakırcı, Section Registrar, Having regard to the above application lodged on 30 March 2021, Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant company, Having deliberated, decides as follows: THE FACTS 1.     The applicant company, Geo Solar Doo Delchevo, is a limited liability company incorporated under the law of North Macedonia and which has its registered office in Delchevo. It was represented by Mr T. Torov, a lawyer practising in Shtip. 2.     The Government of North Macedonia (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms D. Djonova. The circumstances of the case 3.     The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 4.     In 2007 the respondent State introduced preferential feed-in tariffs for production of renewable energy. In 2011 the government adopted a decree on preferential tariffs for electricity, fixing preferential tariffs for electricity produced and delivered from photovoltaic power plants at 0.30 euros (EUR) per kWh for plants with an installed capacity of up to 0.050 MW and at EUR   0.26 per kWh for plants with an installed capacity greater than 0.050   MW but less than 1 MW (see paragraph 40 below). 5.     According to the information submitted by the Government, the applicant company operated a solar photovoltaic power plant, Solar 1. It obtained the status of a preferential producer of renewable energy for that power plant, which entitled it to a preferential feed-in tariff for the electricity generated. It decided to expand its electricity production and invested in the construction of two more solar photovoltaic power plants, Solar 2 and Solar   3, located on the same cadastral land plot. 6.     On 11 July 2012 the applicant company lodged an application for preferential tariffs with the Energy Regulatory Commission in respect of the Solar 2 power plant with a planned capacity of 54.72 kW. A similar application was submitted in respect of the Solar 3 power plant. 7 .     On 20 July 2012 the Energy Regulatory Commission suspended the examination of the applicant company’s application for preferential tariffs pending an opinion from the government, the Ministry of Economy and the State Administrative Inspector on whether the application complied with the Energy Act, the decree on preferential tariffs for electricity and the Rulebook on preferential producers of electricity from renewable sources of energy. It relied on section 223(2) of the General   Administrative Procedure   Act   (see paragraph 27 below) but did not provide any further reasons. The applicant company received a copy of that ruling ( заклучок ). Its application in respect of the Solar 3 power plant was also suspended on the same day. 8 .     On 6 August 2012 the Energy Regulatory Commission received the opinion from the Ministry of Economy summarising the applicable legal provisions. 9.     On 15 August 2012 the Solar 2 and Solar 3 power plants commenced operations. 10.     On 1 November 2012 the Energy Agency registered the applicant company’s Solar 2 solar photovoltaic power plant in the national register of renewable energy power plants. 11 .     On 16 April 2013 the Energy Regulatory Commission granted the provisional status of preferential producers of renewable energy to eight companies whose applications for preferential tariffs, lodged in May or June 2012, had also been suspended on 20 July 2012. 12.     On 16 April 2013 the government of the respondent State adopted a new decree on preferential tariffs for electricity which reduced the applicable preferential feed-in tariff from EUR 0.30 euros to EUR 0.16 for photovoltaic power plants with an installed capacity of up to 0.050 MW and from EUR   0.26 to EUR 0.12 for photovoltaic power plants with an installed capacity greater than 0.050 MW but less than 1 MW (see paragraph 41 below). The decree entered into force on 18 April 2013. 13 .     On 14 June 2013 the Energy Regulatory Commission granted the provisional status of a preferential producer of renewable energy to the Solar   2 power plant. It also ruled that the Solar 2 power plant was to be commissioned within one year of that decision. On the same day a similar decision was also made in respect of the Solar 3 power plant. 14.     On 15 July 2013 the Energy Regulatory Commission issued a final decision granting the applicant company the status of a preferential producer of renewable energy for the Solar 2 power plant, valid until 15 July 2028. It noted that the Energy Agency had confirmed that the Solar 2 power plant had been constructed and complied with all the technical and regulatory requirements in force on the date the provisional status had been granted. On the same day a similar decision was also made in respect of the Solar 3 power plant. 15.     On the same date the Energy Regulatory Commission also issued a decision granting the applicant company the right to use a preferential tariff for electricity produced by its Solar 2 photovoltaic power plant. The tariff of EUR 0.12 per kWh was approved for a period of 15 years. On the same day a similar decision was also made in respect of the Solar 3 power plant. 16 .     On 30 July 2013 the applicant company complained to the Commission for the Resolution of Energy Disputes that the Energy Regulatory Commission had delayed the examination of its application for preferential tariffs for its Solar 2 photovoltaic power plant in breach of the 30-day statutory time-limit (see paragraph 35 below). It argued that its application had been complete and free of any deficiencies and that the Energy Regulatory Commission had not requested any amendments or additional documentation. Instead, the Energy Regulatory Commission had suspended the proceedings without any lawful basis. No further procedural action had been taken for ten months and the reasons for the delay had never been explained. Because of the unlawful delay in processing its application, the applicant company had been granted a lower preferential tariff than it would have received if its application had been examined within the statutory time-limit. While the proceedings in respect of the applicant company’s fully constructed, operational and licensed power plant remained pending without resolution, the Energy Regulatory Commission had granted higher preferential tariffs of EUR 0.26 per kWh to other companies – many with incomplete projects – just one day before the lower tariff rates had come into effect (see paragraph 11 above). It requested permission to use the tariff of EUR 0.26 per kWh. 17.     The applicant company lodged a similar complaint in respect of its Solar 3 photovoltaic power plant. 18.     On 12 September 2013 the Commission for the Resolution of Energy Disputes dismissed the applicant company’s complaint relating to the Solar 2 photovoltaic power plant. It found that the Energy Regulatory Commission had been entitled to seek opinions from other competent State bodies as to the correct interpretation of the applicable legal provisions. Pursuant to section 151(8) of the Energy Act (see paragraph 36 below), the applicable preferential tariff was to be determined on the basis of the date on which the provisional status of a preferential producer of renewable energy was granted. 19.     On 18 October 2013 the applicant company challenged the decision by the Commission for the Resolution of Energy Disputes before the Administrative Court. It advanced the same arguments as before (see paragraph 16 above). It further argued that, given that the delay in the examination of its application for preferential tariffs had been unlawful, the applicable tariff should have been that which had been in effect on the date the Energy Regulatory Commission had been legally required to make its decision, that is, EUR 0.26 per kWh. Relying on an expert financial report, the applicant company claimed that, as a result of the application of the lower tariff, its financial losses over the 15-year period during which the preferential tariffs applied would amount to 9,686,250 Macedonian denars (MKD, equivalent to approximately EUR 157,500). After accounting for interest payments on the bank loan, the granted tariff was insufficient to cover the basic operating costs of Solar 2, rendering the project economically unsustainable. The applicant company therefore requested the court to either reconsider the applicable tariff or to compensate for the lost profits in the amount of MKD   9,686,250. 20.     On 20 January 2014 the Commission for the Resolution of Energy Disputes filed its submissions in response. It explained, among other things, that 62 applications for preferential tariffs had been suspended pending consultation with the government and the Ministry of Economy regarding the following matter. The Commission for the Resolution of Energy Disputes had discovered that many legal entities were dividing large photovoltaic projects into smaller units of less than 50 kW located on the same land plot to qualify for higher preferential tariffs intended for small producers. That practice increased the overall cost of purchasing electricity from such producers, which in turn raised electricity prices for all final consumers in the country. Meetings with government representatives had been held to review procedures and criteria for granting the status of a preferential producer of renewable energy to power plants, with the aim of promoting competition by allowing multiple entities to qualify. This discussion followed the government’s September 2011 initiative to restrict each legal entity to obtaining the status of a preferential producer of renewable energy for only one power plant. New regulations clarifying the application of preferential tariffs to situations where a legal entity had several photovoltaic projects had been adopted in April   2013 (see paragraph 39 below). The decisions to grant preferential tariffs issued in April 2013 (see paragraph 11 above) had pertained exclusively to companies that operated a single photovoltaic power plant at one construction site, where construction had already commenced and preparatory sessions had been held in July 2012. Their circumstances had thus been different from those of the applicant company. 21.     On 17 August 2016 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant company’s administrative-dispute claim in respect of the Solar 2 photovoltaic power plant. It found that the contested decision by the Commission for the Resolution of Energy Disputes had been lawful and that there had been no grounds for reaching a different conclusion. The tariff of EUR 0.12 per kWh had been established in accordance with the applicable decree on preferential tariffs for electricity and the Rulebook on preferential producers of electricity from renewable sources of energy in force on the date on which the provisional status of a preferential producer of renewable energy had been granted. 22.     The applicant company lodged an appeal, contending in particular that the Administrative Court had failed to address its arguments that the lower preferential tariff had been granted as a direct result of an unlawful delay in the processing of its application for preferential tariffs. 23 .     On 6 November 2017 the Higher   Administrative Court dismissed the applicant company’s complaints relating to the Solar 3 photovoltaic power plant. The applicant company received that decision by post on 6   February   2018. 24.     On 29 May 2020 the Higher   Administrative Court upheld the lower court’s decision relating to the Solar 2 photovoltaic power plant, finding no reason to depart from the reasons given therein. The applicant company received that judgment by post on 1 October 2020. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK General Administrative Procedure Act (Official Gazette nos.   38/2005, 110/2008 and 51/2011) 25 .     Section 147(1) of the General   Administrative Procedure   Act, as in force at the material time, provided that where the administrative authority conducting the proceedings encountered an issue that had to be resolved in order to decide the matter, and that issue constituted a separate legal question within the competence of a court or another authority (preliminary question), the administrative authority could, under the conditions provided in this Act, suspend the proceedings until the competent authority resolved the question. The suspension was to be ordered by way of a ruling ( заклучок ) against which a separate appeal could be lodged, unless the ruling was issued by a second-instance authority. 26 .     Section 221(2) provided that if the competent administrative authority, whose decision was subject to appeal, failed to issue and deliver its decision within the prescribed time-limit, the party could lodge an appeal as though its request had been dismissed. 27 .     Section 223(2) provided that incidental matters arising in the course of the proceedings were to be resolved by a ruling ( заклучок ), unless disposed of by a decision. 28 .     Section 225 provided that a separate appeal could be lodged against a ruling ( заклучок ) only where expressly authorised by law. The ruling was required to be reasoned and to contain instructions on the right of appeal. Any such appeal had to be lodged within the same time-limit, in the same manner and before the same authority as an appeal against a decision. Rulings against which a separate appeal was not permitted could be challenged by the parties in an appeal against the decision, unless the General Administrative Procedure Act expressly excluded the right to appeal against the ruling. 29.     Section 230(1) provided that an appeal had to be submitted within 15   days from the date of receipt of the decision, unless otherwise provided for by law. Energy Act (Official Gazette nos. 16/2011, 136/2011, 79/2013 and 164/2013) 30.     Section 30(2) of the Energy Act, as in force at the material time, provided that, in the procedure for adopting decisions, the Energy Regulatory Commission had to apply the General Administrative Procedure Act, unless another procedure was prescribed by the Energy Act. 31.     In order to promote the construction of new power plants based on renewable energy sources or high-efficiency combined facilities, such energy generation facilities could be granted the status of a preferential producer of renewable energy, entitling them to sell the electricity produced at preferential tariffs (section 149). 32 .     The government prescribed, separately for each type of preferential producer, among other things, the preferential tariffs for electricity and the period of their application (section 150(2)). 33.     A power plant could be granted the status of a preferential producer of renewable energy if it met the following conditions: (1) it generated electricity from renewable energy sources or from high-efficiency combined power plants; (2) it satisfied the specific requirements and the maximum installed capacity prescribed by government decree; and (3) the total installed capacity of the plant, together with the total installed capacity of power plants of the same type already entered in the Register of Preferential Producers, did not exceed the maximum installed capacity for that type as determined by the government (section 151(1)). 34 .     In addition to the conditions set out in section 151(1), one of the following requirements also had to be met: (1) the plant had obtained authorisation for the construction of an energy facility in accordance with the law; (2) it had obtained a construction permit for an energy facility for which authorisation was not required; (3) it had signed a concession agreement for the use of a natural resource for electricity generation; or (4) the right to construct the energy facility had been acquired through a public call procedure in accordance with the law (section 151(2)). 35 .     Interested parties were to submit an application for preferential tariffs to the Energy Regulatory Commission (section 151(4)). If the proposed power plant met the conditions for the status of a preferential producer of renewable energy, the Energy Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of receiving the application, was to grant the requestor the provisional status of a preferential producer of renewable energy. It also set a deadline for the plant to be put into operation (section 151(5)). The holder of a provisional status could request an extension of its validity from the Energy Regulatory Commission (section 151(6)). 36 .     Preferential producers were entitled to preferential tariffs under the conditions applicable on the date on which the provisional status of a preferential producer of renewable energy was granted (section 151(8)). 37 .     After receiving confirmation from the Energy Agency that the facility had been constructed and complied with the applicable requirements and prescribed installed capacity, the Energy Regulatory Commission was to issue a final decision granting the status of a preferential producer of renewable energy and a decision on the use of preferential tariffs, effective as of the date of adoption of the decision. The preferential producer thereby acquired all the rights arising under the Energy Act (section 151(9) and (10)). Rulebook on preferential producers of electricity from renewable sources of energy 38.     Section 2(2), (3) and (4) of the Rulebook on preferential producers of electricity from renewable sources of energy of 8 February 2012, adopted by the Energy Regulatory Commission (Official Gazette nos. 18/2012 and 97/2012), provided that if a single legal entity owned (i) multiple power plants using the same renewable energy source but located at different sites or (ii) multiple power plants using different renewable energy sources, whether at the same site or at different sites, it was required to obtain the status of a preferential producer of renewable energy for each power plant separately, in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Rulebook. A power plant for the production of electricity from renewable energy sources was defined as a facility for the generation of electricity constituting a distinct technical and technological unit located on a single construction site. 39 .     On 24 April 2013 the Rulebook on preferential producers of electricity from renewable sources of energy was amended (Official Gazette no.   63/2013). In particular, a new paragraph 5 was added to section 2. It provided that, where several projects of the same type or of a related type based on technology were implemented on a single construction or cadastral parcel, the same preferential tariff was to be applied to all such projects, as if they constituted a single photovoltaic power plant with the corresponding total capacity (new section 2(5)). Procedures that had been initiated prior to the adoption of the amendments in which no decision had been issued granting the provisional status of a preferential producer of renewable energy would continue to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the amended Rulebook (section 3 of the amending Rulebook). The amendments entered into force on the date of their adoption (section 4 of the amending Rulebook). Decrees on preferential tariffs for electricity 40 .     The decree on preferential tariffs for electricity, adopted by the government of the respondent State on 13 December 2011 (Official Gazette nos. 176/2011 and 19/2012) on the basis of section 150(2) of the Energy Act (see paragraph 32 above) provided that a photovoltaic power plant could acquire the status of a preferential producer of renewable energy if its installed capacity was less than or equal to 1 MW (section 9(1)). The preferential tariffs for electricity produced and delivered from photovoltaic power plants based on the installed capacity were set at EUR 0.30 per   kWh for plants with an installed capacity of up to 0.050 MW, and at EUR   0.26 per kWh for plants with an installed capacity greater than 0.050   MW (section   9(2)). The preferential producer had the right to apply the preferential tariffs for electricity generated from photovoltaic power plants for a period of 15 years (section 9(3)). 41 .     The decree on preferential tariffs for electricity, adopted by the government of the respondent State on 16 April 2013 (Official Gazette, no.   56/2013) on the basis of section   150(2) of the Energy Act (see paragraph 32 above) provided that a photovoltaic power plant could acquire the status of a preferential producer of renewable energy if its installed capacity was less than or equal to 1 MW (section 9(1)). The preferential tariffs for electricity produced and delivered from photovoltaic power plants based on the installed capacity were set at EUR 0.16 per kWh for plants with an installed capacity of up to 0.050 MW and at EUR 0.12   per kWh for plants with an installed capacity greater than 0.050 MW (section 9(2)). The preferential producer had the right to apply the preferential tariffs for electricity generated from photovoltaic power plants for a period of 15 years (section 9(3)). Upon the entry into force of this decree, the previous decree on preferential tariffs for electricity (see paragraph 40 above) ceased to apply (section 12). It entered into force on the day following its publication in the Official Gazette (section 13). COMPLAINT 42.     The applicant company complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that it had been deprived of its possessions as a result of the allegedly unlawful delay in the processing of its application for preferential tariffs for solar energy production, combined with the reduction of the preferential tariff during that period. THE LAW The parties’ submissions on admissibility The Government 43.     The Government submitted that the applicant company had not had a legitimate expectation of obtaining the preferential tariffs set out by the 2011 decree on preferential tariffs for electricity applicable at the date of lodging its application for preferential tariffs. The domestic law clearly specified that the applicable preferential tariff had to be determined on the basis of the date on which the provisional status of a preferential producer of renewable energy was granted (see paragraph 36 above). The tariffs were established by the government (see paragraph 32 above) and were subject to amendment or revision at any time. The 2013 decree on preferential tariffs for electricity, applicable on the date the applicant company had been granted the provisional status of a preferential producer, had been published in the Official Gazette and had been accessible, clear and precise. It clearly had indicated the day of its entry into force. There was no case-law on which to base a legitimate expectation to obtain the tariffs applicable at the date of lodging an application for preferential tariffs. The circumstances of the companies that in April 2013 had been granted preferential tariffs set by the 2011 decree (see paragraph 11 above) had been different from those of the applicant company. Unlike the applicant company, each of them had submitted an application for a single photovoltaic power plant and had been granted the provisional status of a preferential producer before the change of tariffs. The Government submitted a table showing that companies in circumstances comparable to those of the applicant company had obtained the same preferential tariffs as the applicant company. 44.     The Government also submitted that the applicant company had not complied with the then six-month rule. An administrative-dispute claim against the decision to grant the applicant company the right to use the preferential tariff in the amount of EUR 0.12 per kWh had not been an effective domestic remedy in the circumstances of the case. The applicant company’s complaint in respect of the Solar 3 plant had been dismissed by the Higher Administrative Court on 6 November 2017 and the judgment had been received by the applicant company in February 2018 (see paragraph 23 above). The applicant company should have understood at that moment that its identical complaint in respect of the Solar 2 plant had had no prospects of success. Furthermore, the ruling to suspend the examination of the applicant company’s application for preferential tariffs had in any event been outside the scope of review of those administrative-dispute claim proceedings. The applicant company should have instead appealed against the ruling to suspend the examination of its application under sections   147, 223 and 225 of the General Administrative Procedure Act (see paragraphs 25, 27 and 28 above) or lodged an administrative-dispute claim against the failure to deliver the decision within the prescribed time-limit (see paragraph 26 above). The administrative-dispute claim against the decision to grant the applicant company the right to use the preferential tariff in the amount of EUR 0.12 per kWh could not, therefore, be taken into account for the purposes of compliance with the six-month rule. The applicant company 45 .     The applicant company submitted that its application for preferential tariffs should have been examined within the 30-day statutory time-limit (see paragraph 35 above). There had been no reason to suspend the examination of its application for preferential tariffs, as it had applied for the tariff applicable to power plants of more than 50 kW; thus, it had not divided its project into smaller units of less than 50 kW to benefit from a higher tariff. The fact that it had ultimately been granted the status of a preferential producer of renewable energy showed that it had complied with all the statutory requirements. It had invested money into the project and had been deprived of its investment as a result of the reduction of the preferential tariffs. 46.     The applicant company further argued that it had complied with the six-month time-limit. Despite the dismissal of its administrative-dispute claim in respect of the Solar 3 plant, it could not have predicted the outcome of the administrative-dispute claim in respect of the Solar 2 plant and could not have been expected to lodge an application with the Court before obtaining a final decision. An administrative-dispute claim against the failure to deliver a decision within the prescribed time-limit was not an effective remedy, as such proceedings usually lasted for eight years. The ruling to suspend the proceedings had not contained reasons and had not mentioned that it could be appealed against. The Court’s assessment 47.     The Court does not consider it necessary to examine the Government’s objection as to non-compliance with the then six-month rule or the same objection in so far as it may be construed as one concerning non ‑ exhaustion of domestic remedies   because the application is   in any case inadmissible   for the reasons set out below. 48.     The Court reiterates that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 does not guarantee the right to acquire property.   An applicant can allege a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 only in so far as the impugned decisions related to his or her “possessions” within the meaning of this provision. “Possessions” can be either “existing possessions” or claims that are sufficiently established to be regarded as “assets”, in respect of which the applicant can argue that he or she has at least a “legitimate expectation” of obtaining effective enjoyment of a property right (see Kopecký v. Slovakia [GC], no. 44912/98, § 35, ECHR   2004-IX, and Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, §§ 142 and 143, 20 March 2018).   By way of contrast, the hope of recognition of a property right which it has been impossible to exercise effectively cannot be considered a “possession” within the meaning of Article   1 of Protocol No. 1, nor can a conditional claim which lapses as a result of the non-fulfilment of the condition (see Kopecký , loc. cit.). A legitimate expectation must be therefore of a nature more concrete than a mere hope and be based on a legal provision or a legal act such as a judicial decision.   No “legitimate expectation” can be said to arise where there is a dispute as to the correct interpretation and application of domestic law and the applicant’s submissions are subsequently rejected by the national courts (see Béláné Nagy v. Hungary [GC], no. 53080/13, §§ 74 and 75, 13 December 2016). 49.     The Court’s case-law does not contemplate the existence of a “genuine dispute” or an “arguable claim” as a criterion for determining whether there was a “legitimate expectation” protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The Court takes the view that where the proprietary interest is in the nature of a claim it may be regarded as an ‘asset’ only where it has a sufficient basis in national law, for example where there is settled case-law of the domestic courts confirming it (see Kopecký, cited above, § 52). For the recognition of a possession consisting in a legitimate expectation, the applicant must have an assertable right which, applying the principle enounced in paragraph 52 of   Kopecký (cited above), may not fall short of a sufficiently established, substantive proprietary interest under the national law (see Béláné Nagy , cited above, § 79). 50.     Future income cannot be considered to constitute “possessions” unless it has already been earned or is definitely payable (see   Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal   [GC], no. 73049/01, § 64, ECHR 2007 I, and   Juszczyszyn v.   Poland , no. 35599/20, § 344, 6 October 2022, with further references). 51.     The issue to be examined in the present case is whether the applicant company’s claim to obtain the preferential tariff set out in the 2011 decree on preferential tariffs for electricity, as applicable on the date of lodging its application for preferential tariffs amounted to “possessions” protected by Article 1 of Protocol No.   1, that is to say, whether that claim had a sufficient basis in national law to be regarded as an “asset” in respect of which the applicant company could argue that it had at least a “legitimate expectation” of obtaining effective enjoyment of a property right. 52.     The Court notes that the applicant company did not refer to any legal provision or case-law capable of giving rise to a legitimate expectation of obtaining the preferential tariff established by the 2011 decree on preferential tariffs for electricity in force at the date of its application for preferential tariffs. The domestic law expressly provided that the applicable preferential tariff was to be determined on the basis of the date on which the provisional status of a preferential producer of renewable energy was granted (see paragraph 36 above). It was only at that moment that the producer could claim a legitimate expectation to rely on the tariff being fixed and immune from amendment or revision. 53.     In so far as the applicant company argued that its application for preferential tariffs should have been examined within 30 days (see paragraph 45 above), the Court observes that, after the examination of the application was suspended (see paragraph 7 above), it should have become clear to the applicant company that it would not be examined within 30 days. In any event, applicable tariffs were determined by the government (see paragraph   32 above). Given that the government could amend them at any time, the applicant company could not claim any legitimate expectation that the tariff would remain unchanged during the examination of its application for preferential tariffs, irrespective of whether that examination lasted 30 days or longer. 54.     Furthermore, once the new tariffs were officially published, specifying both their effective date and the invalidation of the previous tariffs (see paragraph 41 above), and given that at that moment it had not yet been granted provisional status of a preferential producer of renewable energy, it should have become clear to the applicant company that it could no longer expect to benefit from the former tariffs applicable at the date of lodging its application. 55.     Finally, as regards the applicant company’s argument that it had been deprived of its investment as a result of the reduction of the preferential tariffs, the Court notes that nothing in the domestic law required the applicant company to secure funding or start the construction before lodging an application for preferential tariffs (see paragraph 34 above). The Energy Regulatory Commission set an extensible deadline for the plant to be put into operation in its decision to grant the provisional status of a preferential producer of renewable energy, during which the applicable preferential tariff was fixed (see paragraphs 35-37 above). Within that deadline, the producer could complete all necessary administrative and financial formalities, construct the plant and obtain conformity certification. In the present case, the deadline was set at one year (see paragraph 13 above) and the applicant company did not argue that this period was insufficient. It was the applicant company’s choice to assume the risk of making its investment before obtaining the provisional status of a preferential producer of renewable energy – that is, before it could claim a legitimate expectation to rely on the tariff being fixed and immune from amendment or revision. 56.     In view of the above considerations, the Court finds that the applicant company’s claim to obtain the feed-in tariff set up by the 2011 decree on preferential electricity tariffs, as applicable on the date of lodging its application for preferential tariffs did not constitute “possessions” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No.   1. The guarantees of that provision do not therefore apply to the present case. 57.     Accordingly, the applicant company’s complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is incompatible   ratione materiae   with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected pursuant to Article   35 §   4. For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Declares the application inadmissible. Done in English and notified in writing on 27 November 2025.     Hasan Bakırcı   Arnfinn Bårdsen   Section Registrar   President