CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 13 novembre 2025

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display:inline-block } .s7F175FE6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:51.05pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-17.05pt; text-align:justify } .sE5C1F6E3 { width:3.33pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block } .s2D9C6089 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s7CB9076 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sC986E16F { font-family:Arial; color:#ffffff } .sD8AE9261 { width:36.9pt; display:inline-block } .s756AA39C { width:164.45pt; display:inline-block } .s5A65B3DC { width:46.56pt; display:inline-block } .s44B8752F { width:177.11pt; display:inline-block }   FIRST SECTION CASE OF A.R. v. POLAND (Application no. 6030/21)   JUDGMENT   Art 8 • Private life • Prolonged uncertainty, as to the applicable laws and the permissibility of abortion on foetal abnormality grounds, caused by the delayed publication and entry into force of the Constitutional Court’s judgment introducing amendments, and resulting in the applicant travelling abroad for termination • Art   8 applicable • Impugned proceedings affected the applicant’s Art   8 rights • Findings in M.L. v.   Poland that the relevant judgment was not been adopted by a “tribunal established by law” relevant • Impugned restriction not issued by a body compatible with the rule of law requirements • Lack of required foreseeability owing to the general uncertainty as to the applicable legal framework • Interference not “in accordance with the law”   Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.   STRASBOURG 13 November 2025   FINAL   13/02/2026   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of A.R. v. Poland, The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Ivana Jelić , President ,   Erik Wennerström,   Georgios A. Serghides,   Raffaele Sabato,   Frédéric Krenc,   Alain Chablais,   Anna Adamska-Gallant , judges , and Ilse Freiwirth, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   6030/21) against the Republic of Poland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Polish national, Ms A.R. (“the applicant”), on 11 January 2021; the decision to give priority to the application under Rule   41 of the Rules of Court; the decision to give notice to the Polish Government (“the Government”) of the complaints under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention; the decision not to have the applicant’s name disclosed; the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant; the comments submitted by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, who exercised her right to intervene in the proceedings and submitted written comments (Article   36   §   3 of the Convention and Rule   44   §   2 of the Rules of Court); the comments submitted by the third-party interveners, who were granted leave to intervene by the President of the Section (Article   36   §   2 of the Convention and Rule   44   §   3); Having deliberated in private on 4 March 2025 and 30 September 2025, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the latter date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The case concerns restrictions on abortion introduced by the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 22 October 2020 declaring unconstitutional the relevant provisions, which had allowed for legal abortion in the event of foetal abnormalities, and the impact of that judgment on the applicant’s personal situation. It raises issues under Articles   3 and 8 of the Convention. THE FACTS 2.     The applicant was born in 1981 and lives in Cracow. She was represented before the Court by Ms A. Bzdyń, Ms   K.   Ferenc and Ms.   M.   Gąsiorowska, lawyers practising in Warsaw. 3.     The Polish Government were represented by their Agent, Mr   J.   Sobczak, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 4.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. BACKGROUND TO THE CASE Constitutional Court case no. K 13/17 5.     On 22 June 2017 a group of 104 members of parliament lodged an application with the Constitutional Court to have the following provisions declared incompatible with the Constitution (case no. K 13/17) – sections   4a(1)(2) and 4a(2) of the Law on family planning, protection of the human foetus and conditions permitting the termination of pregnancy ( Ustawa o planowaniu rodziny, ochronie płodu ludzkiego i warunkach dopuszczalności przerywania ciąży – “the 1993 Act”), which related to legal abortion on the ground of foetal abnormalities. 6 .     Among the signatories of the application was Ms K.   Pawłowicz, a member of parliament who was subsequently elected to the office of judge of the Constitutional Court on 5 December 2019. 7.     In October 2019 parliamentary elections were held. 8.     On 21 July 2020 the Constitutional Court discontinued the proceedings on the ground that the application had been lodged during the previous term of the Sejm. Constitutional Court case no. K 1/20 9 .     On 19 November 2019 a group of 118 members of parliament lodged a new application with the Constitutional Court to have sections   4a(1)(2) and   4a(2) (first sentence) of the 1993 Act declared incompatible with the Constitution (case no. K 1/20). 10 .     On 22 October 2020 the Constitutional Court, sitting in a plenary formation (thirteen judges), held by a majority of eleven votes to two that sections 4a(1)(2) and 4a(2) (first sentence) of the 1993 Act were incompatible with the Constitution. The bench included Judge K.   Pawłowicz and Judges M.   Muszyński, J. Wyrembak and J.   Piskorski and was presided over by Judge J.   Przyłębska, the President of the Constitutional Court. Publication of the judgment in the Journal of Laws was postponed. 11 .     On 27 January 2021 the Constitutional Court published the judgment of 22 October 2020, together with its reasoning, in the Journal of Laws. The judgment entered into force on the date of its publication. Nationwide protests 12 .     The Constitutional Court’s ruling prompted widespread protests, including demonstrations involving thousands of participants all over the country. The protests were organised by, among others, All-Poland Women’s Strike, a women’s social rights movement in Poland. Federation for Women and Family Planning 13.     In January 2021 the Federation for Women and Family Planning (“FEDERA”), a Polish non-governmental organisation campaigning for sexual and reproductive rights, posted online a pre-filled form for applications to the Court, together with attachments. FEDERA further encouraged women of child-bearing age living in Poland to lodge applications with the Court. 14.     Potential applicants were invited to print out the pre-filled application form, add information about their personal circumstances, sign it and send it to the Court. The circumstances of the present case 15 .     The applicant submitted the pre-filled application form, to which she added some details about her personal situation. She stated that she had one preschool-age child. At the time of the delivery of the Constitutional Court’s judgment (see paragraph 10 above) she had been fifteen weeks pregnant. The pregnancy was intentional. However, the results of medical tests taken on 5   November 2020 confirmed that the foetus she had been carrying suffered from a genetic disorder called trisomy 18. She had not wanted to risk that the judgment would be published before she would have completed the various steps required to qualify for a legal abortion (as provided by sections 4a(1)(2), 4a(3)   and   4a(5) of the 1993   Act). She further submitted that she had been worried about the risk of borders closing because of COVID-19 restrictions and about the approach of some hospitals with respect to abortions even before the publication of the Constitutional Court’s judgment. She also referred to the trauma she could have experienced in those hospitals on account of the use of the conscientious objection clause by medical practitioners there. For all those reasons, she had travelled to the Netherlands where the pregnancy was terminated in a private clinic on 12   November 2020. The applicant had been seventeen weeks pregnant on that date. The applicant submitted bills relating to the transport costs (1,235.36   Polish zlotys (PLN) (approximately 300 euros (EUR)), accommodation (EUR   320) and medical fees (EUR 875)). 16 .     The applicant contended that she had suffered stress on account of the physical and psychological impact of her travelling abroad for an abortion, in addition to the financial burden the situation had entailed. She also submitted that she had had difficulties confirming her rights to a special shortened maternity leave because she had undergone the termination abroad. She had submitted the relevant documents in November 2020, yet her case had still been pending in January 2021. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE 17.     The relevant domestic law and practice as well as the relevant international documents are set out in detail in the judgment M.L. v.   Poland (no.   40119/21, §§ 25-72, 14 December 2023). 18.     In addition, the following information is relevant in the present case. ACCESS TO LEGAL ABORTION 19.     The conditions for access to legal abortion are set out in the Law of 7   January 1993 on family planning, protection of the human foetus and conditions permitting the termination of pregnancy ( Ustawa o planowaniu rodziny, ochronie płodu ludzkiego i warunkach dopuszczalności przerywania ciąży – “the 1993 Act”). 20 .     Initially, section 4a of the 1993 Act provided that legal abortion was possible until the twelfth week of pregnancy where the pregnancy endangered the mother’s life or health; prenatal tests or other medical findings indicated a high risk that the foetus would be severely and irreversibly damaged or suffering from an incurable life-threatening disease; or there were strong grounds for believing that the pregnancy was a result of rape or incest. 21.     On 4 January 1997 the 1993 Act was amended. In particular, the amendment allowed legal abortion during the first twelve weeks where the mother either suffered from material hardship or was in a difficult personal situation. 22.     However, in December 1997, further amendments were made to the text of the 1993 Act, following a judgment of the Constitutional Court given in May 1997. In that judgment the Constitutional Court held that the provision legalising abortion on grounds of material or personal hardship was incompatible with the Constitution as it stood at that time. 23 .     Subsequently, on 22 October 2020, the Constitutional Court declared that section 4a(1)(2) of the 1993 Act, which allowed for legal abortion in the event of foetal abnormalities, was also incompatible with the Constitution. The judgment was published in the Journal of Laws on 27 January 2021 and entered into force on that date (see paragraphs 10 and 11 above). 24.     Section 4a of the 1993 Act, as it stands at present, reads, in so far as relevant: “(1)   Abortion may be carried out only by a physician where: 1.     pregnancy endangers the mother’s life or health; 2.   (ceased to have effect) 3.     there are strong grounds for believing that the pregnancy is a result of a criminal act. 4.   (ceased to have effect) (2)     In cases listed above under subsection (1), sub-paragraph 2, abortion may be performed until such time as the foetus is capable of surviving outside the mother’s body; in cases listed under sub-paragraph 3 above, [abortion may be performed] until the end of the twelfth week of pregnancy. (3)     In cases listed under subsection (1), sub-paragraphs 1 and 2 above, abortion shall be carried out by a physician working in a hospital. ... (5)     Circumstances in which   abortion   is permitted under subsection   (1), sub ‑ paragraphs 1 and 2, above shall be certified by a physician other than the one who is to perform the   abortion, unless the pregnancy entails a direct threat to the woman’s life ...” THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT Constitutional provisions 25 .     The relevant provisions of the Constitution read as follows: Chapter VIII. Courts and tribunals Article 173 “The courts and tribunals shall constitute a separate power and shall be independent of other branches of power.” Article 188 “The Constitutional Court shall adjudicate on the following matters: (1)     the conformity of statutes and international agreements with the Constitution; (2)     the conformity of a statute with ratified international agreements whose ratification required prior consent granted by statute; (3)     the conformity of legal provisions issued by central State organs with the Constitution, ratified international agreements and statutes; (4)     the conformity of the purposes or activities of political parties with the Constitution; (5) constitutional complaints, as specified in Article   79 §   1.” Article 190 “1.     Judgments of the Constitutional Court shall be universally binding and final. 2.     Judgments of the Constitutional Court regarding matters specified in Article   188 shall immediately be published in the official publication in which the original normative act was promulgated. ... 3.     A judgment of the Constitutional Court shall take effect from the day of its publication; however, the Constitutional Court may specify another date for when the binding force of a normative act will end. Such a time-limit may not exceed eighteen months in relation to a statute, or twelve months in relation to any other normative act. ... 4.     A judgment of the Constitutional Court on a normative act’s non-conformity with the Constitution, an international agreement or a statute [a normative act], on the basis of which a final and enforceable judicial decision or a final administrative decision ... [has been] given, shall be a basis for reopening the proceedings or for quashing the decision ... in a manner specified in provisions applicable to the given proceedings, and on the basis of principles [specified in such provisions]. 5.     ...” Publication of Constitutional Court’s judgments 26 .     The Law of 20 July 2000 on Promulgation of Normative Acts and Certain Other Legal Acts ( Ustawa o ogłaszaniu aktów normatywnych i niektórych innych aktów prawnych – “the 2000 Act”), sets out the conditions for the publication of legal acts. The relevant provisions read as follows: Section 2 [Obligation to promulgate a normative act]. “(1) The publication of a normative act in the official gazette shall be obligatory. (2) The obligation to promulgate a normative act which does not contain generally applicable provisions may be disapplied by way of separate law [to that effect].” Section 3 [Immediate promulgation of acts]. “Normative acts shall be promulgated without delay.” 27 .     Pursuant to section 21 of the 2000 Act the Prime Minister is responsible for the publication of legal acts in the Official Journal. THE LAW PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS 28.     The applicant complained that she was a potential victim of a breach of Article 8 of the Convention. While she had not been refused an abortion on the ground of foetal defects, the 1993 Act still breached her rights as she had been forced to adapt her conduct. She also complained under Article   8 of the Convention that the restriction had not been “prescribed by law” as (i) the composition of the Constitutional Court had been incorrect and in breach of the Constitution, since Judges J. Piskorski, M. Muszyński and J.   Wyrembak, assigned to the bench, had been elected by the Sejm to judicial posts that were already occupied; (ii) the appointment of Judge   J.   Przyłębska, the President of the Constitutional Court and the presiding judge in the relevant case, was also open to challenge; and (iii) Judge   K.   Pawłowicz, who had sat in the case, had not been impartial since she had previously been a member of parliament in favour of restricting abortion laws in Poland.   Lastly, the applicant claimed to be a potential victim of a breach of Article   3 of the Convention as the prospect of being forced to give birth to an ill or dead child caused her anguish and distress. 29.     The Government made several preliminary objections as to the admissibility of the application. They argued that it was incompatible ratione materiae and ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention. They further submitted that the applicant had not complied with the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies. Lastly, they stressed that the applicant had abused the right of petition. The Court finds that these objections should be examined separately as regards the complaints under Articles 3 and 8. Article 3 The parties (a)    The Government 30.     The Government maintained that the complaint under Article 3 of the Convention was incompatible ratione personae , manifestly ill-founded and should be declared inadmissible for abuse of the right of petition. They further maintained that the present case did not disclose a level of severity sufficient to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention. In their view, the case should be distinguished from R.R. v. Poland (no. 27617/04, §§   159-60, ECHR   2011 (extracts)), in which the Court found that the applicant’s suffering, caused by the doctors’ intentional failure to provide timely prenatal examinations that would have allowed her to take a decision as to whether to continue or terminate her pregnancy, had reached the minimum threshold of severity under Article 3 of the Convention. They noted that in the present case the applicant had not been refused termination of pregnancy or prenatal testing, had not experienced procrastination, undue delay or confusion in her diagnosis and treatment, and had not been treated in a humiliating manner. 31.     The Government conceded that a situation where a woman discovered that her unborn child had severe defects was extremely difficult. A diagnosis confirming foetal abnormalities must have a significant emotional effect on any woman and her family. However, while such a critical diagnosis caused distress, subsequent events, including a woman’s inability to terminate the pregnancy, should not be analysed in isolation. It was thus impossible to separate different facts which affected a woman’s emotional state in such a complex and distressing situation. (b)    The applicant 32.     The applicant argued that the restrictions introduced by the Constitutional Court had caused her serious and real emotional suffering. She submitted that they had caused her uncertainty and left her feeling concerned for her future. She also submitted that following the abortion that she had had to undergo abroad, she had started psychological therapy in order to deal with the trauma that she had suffered. 33.     The applicant referred to the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee’s findings in Mellet v.   Ireland (Views adopted by the Committee under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, concerning communication No.   2324/2013, 17 November 2016, UN Doc. CCPR/C/116/D/2324/2013) and Whelan v. Ireland (Views adopted by the Committee under article 5   (4) of the Optional Protocol, concerning communication No.   2425/2014, 11   July 2017, UN Doc. CCPR/C/119/D/2425/2014), in which the Committee had stated that by prohibiting and criminalising abortion, the State in question had subjected the applicants to severe emotional and mental pain and suffering. She submitted that her situation was similar to that of the applicants in those cases and that she had experienced similar suffering and burdens. The Court’s assessment 34.     The Court does not consider it necessary to address all the arguments advanced by the Government, since it finds that this complaint is inadmissible for the following reasons. 35.     The Court reiterates its case-law to the effect that ill ‑ treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article   3. The assessment of this minimum depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among many other authorities, Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380/09, §   86, ECHR   2015). 36.     The Court observes that the applicant’s complaint was formulated in generic terms with reference to the views expressed by the UN Human Rights Committee in two decisions concerning fatal foetal abnormalities. It further accepts that in the present case, travelling abroad for an abortion must have been psychologically arduous. Howev er, having regard to the material before it, the Court considers that the applicant failed to the substantiate her claim that the restrictions introduced by the Constitutional Court resulted in treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention (compare Tysiąc v.   Poland , no.   5410/03, § 66, ECHR   2007-I; A, B and C v.   Ireland [GC], no.   25579/05, §   164, ECHR   2010 and M.L. v. Poland , cited above, §§   83-84, the latter relating to a complaint expressed in very similar terms). 37.     In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds that this complaint should be rejected as manifestly ill‑founded, pursuant to Article 35   §§   3   (a) and 4 of the Convention. Article 8 Jursidiction ratione materiae (a)    The parties (i)       The Government 38.     The Government submitted that the applicant’s complaint under Article 8 was incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention. In that regard, they referred to the Court’s case law on the question of the beginning of life and protection of a foetus (see H. v.   Norway , no.   17004/90, Commission decision of 19   May 1992, DR   73, p.   155; Boso v.   Italy (dec.), no.   50490/99, ECHR   2002-VII; Vo v.   France [GC], no.   53924/00, ECHR 2004‑VIII; and A, B and C v. Ireland , cited above, §   222). 39.     They stated that the Court had previously made it clear that Article   8 could not be interpreted as conferring a right to abortion, and that the Convention did not guarantee a right to specific medical services as such. In their view, the crux of the present case was not a breach of existing provisions of the Convention, but the applicant’s request to be granted a right to terminate a pregnancy. They also noted that no instrument of international law to which Poland was party explicitly provided for a right to abortion. Furthermore, States might limit the right to terminate a pregnancy to exceptional cases, in view of the profound moral views of a given society and its wish to accord protection to the right to life of an unborn child. For all the above reasons, the decision to protect the right to life of unborn children under Polish law and the decision to determine the scope of exceptions to this principle were sovereign decisions within the remit of the Polish lawmaker. 40.     Since the Convention did not grant a right to terminate a pregnancy or a right to specific medical services, and since none of its provisions could be interpreted as conferring such rights, a State could not be precluded from shaping its domestic regulations on reproductive healthcare services and access to abortion in line with its moral view enshrining the need to protect the life of an unborn child, also taking into account the broad margin of appreciation which States had in this area. Consequently, the Government were of the view that Article 8 of the Convention was not applicable. (ii)     The applicant 41.     The applicant argued that the crux of the case was not the right to terminate a pregnancy as such, but the fact that as a direct consequence of the Constitutional Court’s judgment she could not access an abortion on the grounds of foetal abnormalities. 42.     She further stated that she did not claim a right to abortion. She merely submitted that the legislation concerning availability of legal abortion touched on the most intimate sphere of her life, namely a decision whether to have a child or not and in what circumstances. (b)    The Court’s assessment 43.     The Court notes that the notion of “private life” within the meaning of Article   8 of the Convention is a broad concept which encompasses, inter alia , the right to personal autonomy and personal development (see Pretty v.   the United Kingdo m , no. 2346/02, § 61, ECHR 2002-III). It concerns subjects such as gender identification, sexual orientation and sexual life (see, for example, Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom , 22 October 1981, §   41, Series   A no.   45, and Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v.   the United Kingdom , 19   February   1997, §   36, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997 ‑ I), a   person’s physical and psychological integrity (see Tysiąc , cited above, §   107), as well as decisions to have or not have a   child or to become genetic parents (see Evans v. the United Kingdom [GC], no.   6339/05, §   71, ECHR   2007-I). 44.     The Court further observes that it previously held that the prohibition of abortion in Poland on the grounds of foetal malformation, where abortion had been sought for reasons of health and well-being, came within the scope of the applicant’s right to respect for private life, and that Article   8 was applicable (see M.L. v. Poland , cited above, § 94, with a reference to A, B and C v.   Ireland , § 214). 45.     The Court does not discern any reason to hold differently in the present case, which concerns access to legal abortion in a situation of foetal genetic disorder (namely trisomy 18). It follows that Article 8 of the Convention is applicable and the Government’s objection must be dismissed. Alleged lack of victim status (a)    The parties (i)       The Government 46.     The Government submitted that the applicant could not be regarded as a victim of a violation of Article 8. In particular, the Government referred to the Court’s position on “potential victims” as set out in Dudgeon (cited above), Norris v.   Ireland (26   October 1988, Series A no. 142) and S.A.S. v.   France ([GC], no.   43835/11, ECHR 2014 (extracts)). They also noted that the present application had been lodged before the publication of the Constitutional Court’s judgment on 27 January 2021. The applicant, however, despite having been in a situation which had allowed her to terminate the pregnancy in Poland, had not made use of that possibility but instead had decided to terminate the pregnancy abroad. (ii)     The applicant 47.     The applicant disagreed with the Government’s submissions that she could not claim to be a victim of a breach of the Convention. She submitted that there were no doubts under the Court’s case-law that a pregnant woman who sought an abortion could claim to be a victim of a breach of Article 8 of the Convention ( P. and S. v. Poland , no. 57375/08, §§   79 ‑ 84, 30   October   2012 ). 48.     She submitted that the judgment of the Constitutional Court had created a legal environment within which she had suffered uncertainty and fear because of the unclear status of that judgment under the domestic law prior to its publication. (b)    The Court’s assessment 49.     The Court reiterates that Article 34 of the Convention does not allow complaints in abstracto alleging a violation of the Convention. The Convention does not provide for the institution of an actio popularis (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v.   Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 101, ECHR 2014), meaning that applicants may not complain about a provision of domestic law, a domestic practice or public acts simply because they appear to contravene the Convention. However, an individual may nevertheless argue that a law breaches his or her rights in the absence of a specific instance of enforcement, and thus claim to be a “victim”, within the meaning of Article 34, if he or she is required either to modify his or her conduct or risk being prosecuted, or if he or she is a member of a category of persons who risk being directly affected by the legislation (see, in particular, S.A.S. v. France , cited above, §§   57 and 110, and the references cited therein, A.M. and Others v.   Poland (dec.), no.   4188/21, §   72, 16   May 2023   and Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], no.   53600/20, §§ 460-64, 9 April 2024). 50 .     The Court notes that the present application is readily distinguishable from the cases of A.M. and Others v. Poland (cited above, § 86) and K.B. and K.C. v. Poland ((dec.), nos. 1819/21 and 3639/21, §§ 59-63, 4   June 2024) where the applicants had complained of a risk of a future violation, and the Court concluded that they had failed to put forward any reasonable and convincing evidence that they were at real risk of being directly affected by the amendments introduced by the Constitutional Court’s judgment. It should also be distinguished from that of M.L. v. Poland (cited above) in which the Court concluded that the applicant was “directly affected” by the legislative change in question. In the latter case the applicant had qualified for a legal abortion on the ground of foetal abnormalities and a hospital appointment had been scheduled, but the Constitutional Court’s judgment had entered into force just before her appointment, making it impossible to have an abortion in Poland on those grounds (ibid. §§ 100-04) and for that reason the applicant had travelled abroad to terminate the pregnancy. 51.     In the present case despite arguing that the applicant could not be considered a “victim” for the purposes of Article 34, the Government did not dispute the core factual submission that she had travelled abroad for an abortion. Regarding her reasons for doing so, the Court observes that shortly after the delivery of the Constitutional Court’s judgment the applicant received the results of genetic tests confirming that the foetus suffered from a serious genetic disorder – trisomy 18 (see paragraph 15 above). She subsequently travelled to the Netherlands, where the pregnancy was terminated in November 2020. As the Government rightly pointed out, at the relevant time abortion on grounds of foetal abnormality was still legal in Poland. However, the Court notes that judgments of the Constitutional Court have to be published without delay (see paragraph 26 above). The publication would have removed the possibility for the applicant to obtain a legal abortion in Poland with immediate effect (see paragraph 11 above). The Court therefore accepts that the applicant risked being directly affected by the impending change in law resulting from the Constitutional Court’s judgment and therefore travelled abroad for an abortion for reasons of health and well ‑ being. 52.     The Court further accepts the applicant’s argument that that caused her pain and suffering (see paragraph 16 above). Undoubtedly, obtaining an abortion abroad, away from the support of her family, rather than undergoing the procedure in the security of her home country, constituted a significant source of added anxiety (compare, A, B and C v. Ireland , §   126 and M.L.   v.   Poland , § 101, both cited above). 53.     As regards the financial burden of travelling abroad, the applicant, who travelled at her own expense, submitted that her travel costs and medical fees had amounted to EUR 1,495 (see paragraph 15 above). The Court observes that those costs could have constituted a considerable expense for the applicant. 54.     On the whole, the Court is of the view that many of the negative experiences described by the applicant could have been avoided if she had been allowed to terminate her pregnancy in the security of her home country. 55.     Given the above considerations, the Court finds that the applicant was not a potential victim but was “directly affected” by the legislative change in question (see M.L. v. Poland , cited above, § 104). 56 .     The Government’s objection must therefore be dismissed. Non-exhaustion of domestic remedies (a)    The parties (i)       The Government 57 .     The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies as she had not provided the Polish authorities with an opportunity to address, and thereby potentially remedy, the alleged violations of the Convention. As submitted by the applicant, she had been fifteen weeks pregnant at the time when the Constitutional Court’s judgment had been delivered. When she had discovered that the foetus suffered from trisomy   18, she had decided to travel to the Netherlands to undergo a termination of pregnancy there. However, the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 22   October 2020 removing the provision allowing for legal abortion in the event of foetal abnormalities from the 1993 Act had only entered into force on 27 January 2021, the date of its publication. Thus, the applicant could have terminated the pregnancy in Poland, had the relevant medical tests confirmed severe and irreversible damage of the foetus or that it suffered from an incurable life-threatening disease. 58.     In any case, even if the applicant had had difficulties in accessing legal abortion in Poland, the Government maintained that she had had a number of remedies at her disposal. They noted that a complaint under section 31 of the Law of 6 November 2008 on patients’ rights (“the 2008 Act”) or a complaint to the Patients’ Rights Ombudsman (see M.L. v. Poland , cited above, §   44) were available to women who had been refused lawful terminations of pregnancy and those who had been refused prenatal examinations. They further submitted, in general terms, that domestic law provided for various types of civil, criminal and disciplinary proceedings against medical practitioners. Moreover, the right to family planning and the right to lawful termination of pregnancy were considered personal rights within the meaning of Articles 23 and 24 of the Civil Code. Consequently, the applicant could have had recourse to civil compensatory remedies under Articles 23 and   24, in conjunction with Article 448 of the Civil Code. (ii)     The applicant 59.     The applicant disagreed with the Government’s submissions. She submitted firstly that proceedings under the 2008 Act were not effective in the case of women seeking a legal abortion. In that regard, she referred to the findings made by the Committee of Ministers in the process of executing the judgment in the case of Tysiąc (cited above). In particular, it was noted during that process that the appeal mechanism created by the 2008 Act had a number of apparent deficiencies, such as excessive formal requirements and delays. It was further stressed that a guarantee that such appeals would be examined urgently was of the essence for effective access to lawful abortion. The applicant argued that the Government had failed to indicate any example of an effective use of the appeal mechanism under the 2008   Act. 60.     Secondly, with respect to civil remedies, the applicant submitted that they were solely of a retroactive and compensatory character, and therefore would not have been effective in her case, where speediness had been an important factor. 61.     In the applicant’s view, none of the remedies advanced by the Government would have guaranteed her right to legal and timely access to an abortion. (b)    The Court’s assessment 62.     The Court reiterates that the obligation to exhaust domestic remedies requires an applicant to make normal use of remedies that are available and sufficient in respect of his or her Convention grievances (see Vučković and Others v.   Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], nos. 17153/11 and 29 others, §§   70-71, 25 March 2014, and, most recently, Communauté genevoise d’action syndicale (CGAS) v. Switzerland [GC], no. 21881/20, §§   138 ‑ 45, 27   November 2023). 63.     As regards a complaint under section 31 of the 2008 Act, the Court has previously held that that remedy was not effective in a situation of a woman seeking to have a legal abortion (see M.L. v. Poland , cited above, §   113). Similarly, in view of its previous findings (see Tysiąc , §   118, and v.   Poland , §   114, both cited above) the Court does not consider that the civil remedies mentioned by the Government could have proved effective in the present case. 64 .     In so far as the Government alleged that the applicant had not attempted to obtain a legal abortion in Poland, the Court considers that that objection is closely linked to the merits of the applicant’s complaint under Article   8. Accordingly, it joins that objection to the merits.   Abuse of the right of petition (a)    The parties (i)       The Government 65.     The Government submitted that the application should be declared inadmissible as an abuse of the right of individual application within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. They stressed that the application had been lodged in the context of a political debate concerning reproductive health. In that regard, they referred to the Court’s press release of 8   July 2021 giving notice of twelve applications concerning restrictions on abortion rights in Poland, in which the Court had stated that over 1,000 similar applications had been lodged with it. 66.     They maintained that the applicant’s arguments in relation to the Constitutional Court were of a political nature and aimed to discredit that court. The applicant had exercised her right of application to describe the functioning of the Constitutional Court in a negative manner, rather than to protect her rights under the Convention. Furthermore, the perception of the applicant that she could not have legally terminated her pregnancy in Poland was unsubstantiated and unverified, as she had not had any recourse to domestic remedies. (ii)     The applicant 67.     The applicant referred to the Court’s case-law concerning abuse of the right of petition and maintained that the Government had interpreted Article   35 § 3 (a) of the Convention incorrectly. She submitted that they had failed to prove that she had knowingly intended to conceal any information or had changed the facts of the case in order to mislead the Court. (b)    The Court’s assessment 68.     The Court reiterates that the concept of “abuse” within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention must be understood in its ordinary sense according to general legal theory – namely, the harmful exercise of a right for purposes other than those for which it is designed (see Zhdanov and Others v. Russia , nos.   12200/08 and 2 others, §   79, 16 July 2019). 69.     The Court further reiterates that it has previously examined an analogous objection in a similar case and rejected it (see M.L. v.   Poland , cited above, §   122). 70.     In the present case, the Government’s arguments are based on their own perception of the applicant’s possible intentions behind her decision to lodge an application with the Court. Consequently, having regard to its case-law on the issue, the Court finds, despite the arguments raised by the Government with regard to the applicant’s conduct and the context of the application, that the applicant’s complaint cannot be regarded as an abuse of the right of application within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It accordingly dismisses the Government’s preliminary objection. Overall conclusion on admissibility 71.     The Court finds that the applicant’s complaint under Article   8 of the Convention is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION 72.     The applicant complained that she was a victim of a breach of Article 8 of the Convention on account of the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 22   October 2020. She also complained that the restriction had not been “prescribed by law” given the allegedly incorrect composition of the Constitutional Court. That provision of the Convention reads, in so far as relevant, as follows: “1.     Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life ... 2.     There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” The parties’ submissions The applicant 73.     The applicant submitted that there had been an interference with her right to respect for her private life under Article 8 of the Convention on account of the restrictions resulting from the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 22   October   2020. 74.     She stressed that the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 22   October   2020 had reopened the political debate on legal abortion in Poland. In that context she referred to the dissenting opinion of Judge   L.   Garlicki concerning the previous ruling of the Constitutional Court, in which it was stated: “it is not the role or task of [the] Constitutional Court to resolve general issues of a philosophical, religious or medical nature, as these are issues beyond the knowledge of the judges and the competence of the courts. Regardless of the moral assessment of abortion, the Constitutional Court can o