CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;COMMITTEE;ENG — 13 novembre 2025

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POLAND (Application no. 10685/18)             JUDGMENT   STRASBOURG 13 November 2025   This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of A.G.-Ś. v. Poland, The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:   Davor Derenčinović , President ,   Artūrs Kučs,   Anna Adamska-Gallant , judges , and Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   10685/18) against the Republic of Poland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 16 February 2018 by a Polish national, Ms A.G.-Ś. (“the applicant”), who was born in 1960, lives in Poland and was represented by Mr L.M. Stępkowski, a lawyer practising in Wrocław; the decision to give notice of the complaints under Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention concerning the disclosure of the applicant’s medical records in the context of a criminal investigation against her husband to the Polish Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr J. Sobczak, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible; the decision not to have the applicant’s name disclosed; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 16 October 2025, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1.     The application concerns the disclosure of the applicant’s medical records in the context of a criminal investigation in respect of her husband. 2.     In 2008 the applicant’s husband, A.Ś., was charged with participation in an organised criminal group (in relation to large-scale fraud and money laundering). In February 2009 he was released from pre-trial detention on health grounds on the basis of expert medical opinions. 3 .     On 5 March 2009 the Cracow Regional Prosecutor ordered the relevant Regional Branch of the National Health Fund (“the NHF”) to provide information about any occasions after 1   January 2004 on which A.Ś. and   11 of his relatives, including the applicant, had used medical services in Poland (“the order”). The order exempted the NHF from the obligation to maintain doctor ‑ patient confidentiality. The only stated reason for the order was the need to determine whether the persons in question had used medical services during the relevant period. The order explicitly indicated that: (i) it was not subject to any appeal and (ii) it should only be served on the director of the competent NHF branch. 4 .     On 5 and 6 March 2009 the NHF sent the prosecutor information concerning the applicant’s medical history, including a list of: (i) medical services provided to the applicant, (ii) various treatments provided to her and the dates on which they were received, (iii) medical establishments which had provided her with medical services, (iv) pharmacies from which she had purchased medical products, (v) medication prescribed to her (including the dosage), and (vi) medical practitioners who had treated her. 5.     The applicant was questioned as a witness in the investigation in 2010. 6 .     The applicant claimed that she had only become aware of the order in 2012. On 16   August 2012 she lodged a criminal complaint with the Cracow Regional Prosecutor, alleging that the prosecution service had exceeded its powers by ordering the disclosure of her medical records. In a letter dated 19   November 2012, the prosecution service replied that her complaint lacked any basis since the medical information in question had been necessary for the criminal investigation. Additionally, the prosecutors in charge of the investigation issued a statement on 8 November 2012 explaining, inter alia , the reasons for the disclosure. They asserted that their aim had been to verify potential connections between the persons listed in the order and the medical experts who had given or could give their opinions during the investigation. In addition, the prosecutors reiterated that the impugned order had not been subject to appeal. 7.     Meanwhile, the case file of the investigation – which concerned nearly 30   suspects and included the applicant’s medical history – was made available to the parties to the criminal proceedings against the applicant’s husband and other, unspecified court proceedings. 8 .     On 10 July 2015 a domestic court ordered that the medical records in question be stored in a sealed envelope. 9 .     In the meantime, in 2014, the applicant lodged a claim for the protection of her personal rights, relying on Articles 23 and 24 of the Civil Code. In 2015 the Cracow Court of Appeal overturned an initial dismissal of the applicant’s claim and ordered the Cracow Regional Prosecutor to issue an apology. However, following a cassation appeal by the prosecution service, on 22   March 2017 the Supreme Court reversed the second-instance judgment, finding that the prosecutor’s order had been lawful and the applicant’s personal rights had therefore not been breached. 10.     The applicant complained, under Article 8 of the Convention, that the collection of her confidential medical information by the prosecutor’s office in the context of a criminal investigation in respect of her husband, and the subsequent retention of that information and its disclosure to other persons, had amounted to a breach of her right to respect for her private life. In that connection, under Article 13 in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention, she further complained that she had not been able to appeal against the disclosure of her medical records at the material time. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION Admissibility 11.     The Government argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust effective domestic remedies as she had not lodged an interlocutory appeal against the order. The applicant disagreed, arguing, inter alia , that that remedy had been unavailable to her as she had never been formally served with a copy of the order, which had in any event expressly stated that it had not been subject to any appeal. 12.     Having regard to the fact that both the order and the 2012 statement from the prosecutors in charge of the investigation indicated that no appeal was available (see paragraphs 3 and 6 above), and leaving aside the issue of the effectiveness of such a remedy, the Court is not persuaded by the Government’s argument that an interlocutory appeal had been available to the applicant. Accordingly, the Government’s objection must be dismissed. 13.     The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. Merits 14.     The general principles concerning protection from disclosure of personal data have been summarised in Z v. Finland (25 February 1997, §§   94-98, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-I). The protection of personal data, including medical information, is of fundamental importance to a person’s enjoyment of the right to respect for his or her private and family life as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. Respecting the confidentiality of health data is crucial not only for the protection of a patient’s privacy but also for the maintenance of that person’s confidence in the medical profession and in the health services in general. Without such protection, those in need of medical assistance may be deterred from seeking appropriate treatment, thereby endangering their own health (ibid., § 95; see also   Avilkina and Others v. Russia , no. 1585/09, § 45, 6 June 2013). Nevertheless, the interests of a patient and the community as a whole in protecting the confidentiality of medical data may be outweighed by the interest of investigating and prosecuting crime, where such interests are shown to be of even greater importance (see Z v. Finland , cited above, §   97). 15.     In the present case, the applicant’s medical information was – without her knowledge or consent – disclosed to the prosecution service, retained in the case file of a criminal investigation and made available to the parties to the proceedings against her husband and other, unspecified proceedings without any additional safeguards. The Court has already found that the disclosure of medical data to a prosecutor’s office can constitute an interference with the right to respect for private life (see Y.Y. v.   Russia , no.   40378/06, § 39, 23 February 2016, and the case-law references cited therein). It finds no reason to hold otherwise in the present case. 16.     It remains to be ascertained whether the interference was in accordance with the law, pursued one of the legitimate aims of Article   8 §   2 and was “necessary in a democratic society”. “In accordance with the law” 17 .     The Court notes that, as the basis for the disclosure, the domestic authorities ultimately referred to Article 15 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, pursuant to which all State and local government institutions are required, within the scope of their duties, to assist authorities conducting criminal proceedings and to do so within the timeframe specified by those authorities. 18 .     While taking note of the applicant’s argument that such a generally worded basis for the disclosure of medical information could have been open to extensive interpretation, the Court need not reach a definitive conclusion in this respect (see, mutatis mutandis , Avilkina and Others , cited above, § 37) because the interference was, in any event, disproportionate. “Legitimate aim” 19.     Concerning the “legitimate aim” pursued by the disclosure the Government, invoking the rationale provided by the prosecutors in the statement of 8 November 2012 (see paragraph 6 above), argued that the impugned measure had been taken to “prevent crime and ensure public order and the rights of others”. The applicant contested this. 20.     The Court observes that, while the applicant was not a suspect and was not accused in the ongoing criminal proceedings, she did, however, have an obvious link with a suspect in them (A.Ś.). In any event, similarly to its finding in paragraph 18 above, the Court finds no need to conclusively rule on this issue, given the disproportionate nature of the interference. “Necessary in a democratic society” 21.     In determining whether the measures employed by the authorities were “necessary in a democratic society”, the Court will consider whether, in the light of the case as a whole, they were proportionate to the aims pursued. 22.     In particular, it must establish whether a fair balance was struck between, on the one hand, the public interest in ensuring the reliability of expert medical opinions sought in criminal proceedings and, on the other, the applicant’s interest in maintaining the confidentiality of her medical records. 23.     Firstly, the Court notes with concern that in response to the order, the NHF provided the prosecution service with information far exceeding the scope of the request (see paragraphs 3-4 above). Thus, even if the authorities’ declared aim were to be accepted as legitimate, the scope of the disclosure was not proportionate to that aim, as it would have been sufficient to obtain the names of the medical practitioners from whom the applicant had received medical services and, at most, the dates on which those services had been provided. Consequently, the information exceeding the scope of the request should have been immediately removed from the case file. By keeping that irrelevant information in the case file, the domestic authorities acted disproportionately in pursuing their declared aim. 24.     Secondly (again assuming that the declared aim was legitimate), the Court does not see how the applicant’s medical records could have been of any relevance to the investigation once the suspected ties between the applicant and the medical experts had been verified. Accordingly, the information in question should have been removed from the case file or, at the very least, access to it should have been restricted. In that connection, the Court is struck by the fact that for over six years (see paragraphs 4 and   8 above) the domestic authorities took no measures aimed at limiting the scope of the interference. The Government essentially confirmed that the entirety of the applicant’s medical information transmitted by the NHF had been available to the parties to the relevant proceedings and other, unspecified proceedings until it was placed in a sealed envelope in 2015. That finding further attests to the disproportionate character of the interference. 25.     Consequently, even assuming that there had been a legitimate interest in ordering the NHF to provide the applicant’s medical information, the Court finds that (i) the scope of the disclosure made by the NHF, (ii) the prolonged retention of that information beyond what was necessary to verify the suspected ties between the applicant and the medical experts, and (iii) the subsequent disclosure of that information to other persons who had access to the case file were all disproportionate to the aim pursued by the prosecution service. There has accordingly been a violation of Article   8 of the Convention. REMAINING COMPLAINT 26.     The applicant also complained under Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention of the lack of an effective domestic remedy to challenge the disclosure at the material time. Having regard to the facts of the case, the submissions of the parties, and its above findings, the Court considers that it has examined the main legal question raised by the case and that there is no need to examine the remaining complaint (see   Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v.   Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 156, ECHR 2014). APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 27.     The applicant claimed 30,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non ‑ pecuniary damage, EUR 3,000 in respect of the costs and expenses incurred at the domestic level, and EUR 3,000 for those incurred before the Court. 28.     The Government contested the claims in respect of damage as excessive and contended that the applicant had failed to provide evidence that she had in fact incurred any costs in the proceedings at the domestic level or before the Court. 29.     The Court decides on an equitable basis to award the applicant EUR   7,000 in respect of non ‑ pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable. 30.     The Court reiterates that under Rule 60 of the Rules of Court, all claims for just satisfaction must be itemised and submitted in writing together with any relevant supporting documents, failing which the Court may reject the claim in whole or in part (see Malik Babayev v. Azerbaijan , no.   30500/11, §   97, 1 June 2017). The Court notes that the claims in respect of legal expenses are not supported by documentary evidence and must therefore be rejected. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY, Declares the complaint under Article 8 of the Convention admissible; Holds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention; Holds that there is no need to examine the admissibility and merits of the complaint under Article 13 read in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention; Holds (a)   that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, EUR 7,000 (seven thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement; (b)   that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points; Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction. Done in English, and notified in writing on 13 November 2025, pursuant to Rule   77   §§   2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.     Liv Tigerstedt   Davor Derenčinović   Deputy Registrar   President