CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 18 novembre 2025

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margin-bottom:0pt } .sC986E16F { font-family:Arial; color:#ffffff } .sB00DFE03 { width:22.87pt; display:inline-block } .s8ADCD53C { width:135.42pt; display:inline-block } .s5D826FD4 { width:25.88pt; display:inline-block } .s1B61D60 { width:156.43pt; display:inline-block }   THIRD SECTION CASE OF ISKRA DOO BEOGRAD v. SERBIA (Application no. 53002/21)   JUDGMENT   Art 1 P1 • Peaceful enjoyment of possessions • Unlawful demolition of the applicant company’s fence and seizure of land it had used for its business purposes for at least fifty years as part of the implementation of the Belgrade Waterfront project (Beograd na vodi) • Well-defined procedural legal framework designed to protect against arbitrariness entirely circumvented • Applicant company denied sufficient procedural guarantees against arbitrariness, including an opportunity to effectively challenge the impugned interference • Mere existence of special legislation enacted to implement the project could not negate the applicant company’s right to due process, the special legislation itself providing for the application of general legislation in matters it did not specifically regulate   Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.   STRASBOURG 18 November 2025   FINAL   18/02/2026   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Iskra DOO Beograd v. Serbia, The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Ioannis Ktistakis , President ,   Peeter Roosma,   Lətif Hüseynov,   Diana Kovatcheva,   Úna Ní Raifeartaigh,   Mateja Đurović,   Canòlic Mingorance Cairat , judges , and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   53002/21) against Serbia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Serbian company, Iskra DOO Beograd (“the applicant company”), on 15 October 2021; the decision to give notice to the Serbian Government (“the Government”) of the complaints concerning the destruction and seizure of the applicant company’s possessions, under Article 6 § 1 and Article 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 14 October 2025, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The application concerns the destruction and seizure of the applicant company’s possessions and the subsequent civil proceedings. The applicant company relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, as well as Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. THE FACTS 2.     The applicant is a limited liability company ( društvo sa ograničenom odgovornošću ) based in Belgrade. It was represented by Ms   A. Matić Alimpijević, a lawyer practising in the same city. 3.     The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms Z. Jadrijević Mladar. 4.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. THE RELEVANT CONTEXT 5 .     The applicant company was founded in 1946 as a State-owned company but had been transformed into a socially-owned company by 1964 (for more information on socially-owned companies, see   R.   Kačapor and Others v.   Serbia , nos. 2269/06 and 5 others, §§ 71-76, 15   January 2008). 6 .     In 1964 the applicant company erected a fence at 4-6 Hercegovačka Street, in the Savamala district of Belgrade, on land which it had already been using for its business purposes. The land in question was also socially-owned, and the applicant company had been using it on a continuous basis both before and after the erection of the fence. The applicant company obtained a permit for the construction work from the municipal authorities. 7 .     In 2010 the applicant company, along with all its assets, was sold to a private investor. The company continued to operate as a private limited liability company and to use the land in Hercegovačka Street, which had itself already been converted from socially-owned to State-owned property. THE EVENTS OF 8 MAY AND 24 JUNE 2015 AND RELATED PROCEEDINGS 8 .     On 8 May 2015 the above-mentioned fence was demolished without prior notice to the applicant company. 9 .     On 8 June 2015 the applicant company lodged a civil claim for protection of possession ( smetanje državine ), within the meaning of the relevant Serbian law (see paragraph 22 below), with the Belgrade Court of First Instance ( Prvi osnovni sud u Beogradu ) against Millennium Team DOO and Beograd na vodi DOO, two limited liability companies based in Belgrade. The applicant company maintained, in particular, that Beograd na vodi DOO had commissioned Millennium Team DOO to demolish the fence. The applicant company therefore asked the court to find, among other things, that there had been an interference by the defendant companies with the enjoyment of its possession and, furthermore, to order the two companies to rebuild the fence in question and refrain from any further interference to the same effect. 10 .     On 24 June 2015 the employees of Millennium Team DOO occupied part of the land used by the applicant company in Hercegovačka Street. They also brought in the machinery needed for the erection of their own temporary fence and immediately began construction work. 11.     On 22 July 2015 the applicant company amended the above-mentioned civil claim so as to include the events of 24 June 2015. 12 .     On 30 September 2016 the municipal authorities revoked the applicant company’s permit for the erection of its fence (see paragraph 6 above). The applicant company then lodged an appeal against that decision; it would appear that the second-instance proceedings are still pending. 13 .     On 5 May 2017 the Belgrade Commercial Court ( Privredni sud u Beogradu ) ruled that the defendant companies had indeed interfered with the applicant company’s possession of the land at issue on 8   May   and 24   June   2015. However, it dismissed the claim seeking to order the defendant companies to refrain from any further interference and to restore the applicant company’s possession to its previous condition. 14 .     On 13 July 2017 the Appellate Commercial Court ( Privredni apelacioni sud ) partially upheld the decision given at first instance, thus confirming the finding of an interference with the applicant company’s possession. However, it quashed the ruling concerning the refusal to order the respondent companies to refrain from any further disturbance and to restore the applicant company’s possession. 15 .     On 17 January 2019 the Belgrade Commercial Court ordered the respondent companies to refrain from any further interference with the possession at issue or face a fine, and to restore the applicant company’s possession to its previous condition. 16 .     On 10 April 2019 the Appellate Commercial Court varied the decision of 17 January 2019. The court did not accept the argument presented by Beograd na vodi DOO that there was no evidence linking the company to the interference with the applicant company’s possession. On the contrary, the court recognised, albeit only in its reasoning, that both defendant companies had in fact interfered with the applicant company’s possession. However, it dismissed the applicant company’s request to the effect that the respondent companies should refrain from any further interference and restore the possession to its previous state – that is, as it had been before the events of 8   May and 24 June 2015 (see paragraphs 8 and 10 above). The court explained that usually, the legal consequence of an established interference with one’s possession is to order the cessation of any further interference and the restoration of that possession to its original state. However, when this was not possible for legal or factual reasons, such a request would be dismissed. Consequently, the court found that returning to the previous state in the applicant company’s case had become impossible as it would be contrary to the law. Specifically, the 1964 permit had been revoked (see paragraph 12 above), making the rebuilding of the fence a violation of that decision. Furthermore, returning the land to the applicant company’s possession would contradict the Belgrade Waterfront Spatial Planning Decree, in which the land had been designated for public use (see paragraph 47 below). In its reasoning, the court also relied on Article 363 of the Enforcement Procedure Act (see paragraph 32 below), which provided that the enforcement of an obligation that did not depend solely on the will of the debtor could not be requested. Since restoring the property to its previous state in the applicant company’s case would also be against the established public interest (see paragraph 42 below), it did not depend solely on the will of the respondent companies, making restoration legally impossible. 17.     On 5 June 2019 the applicant company lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court against the Appellate Commercial Court’s decision of 10 April 2019, relying on the right to a fair trial, the “right to judicial protection of human rights” and the right to the peaceful enjoyment of property under the Serbian Constitution. 18 .     On 3 December 2020 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant company’s appeal, finding that the guarantees of a fair trial had been respected. Moreover, the court ruled that there had been no violation of the applicant company’s property rights, since the applicant company had not claimed that its property had been expropriated without compensation. THE EVENTS OF 25 APRIL 2016 AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS 19 .     On 25 April 2016, a large number of structures in the Savamala neighbourhood, including several buildings used by the applicant company were demolished. 20 .     The investigation into those events appears to be still ongoing. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK and practice CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA ( USTAV REPUBLIKE SRBIJE ; PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA (“OG RS”) No.   98⁄06) 21.     Article 58   of the Constitution guarantees,   inter alia , the “peaceful enjoyment of personal property and other property rights acquired under law”. PROPERTY ACT ( ZAKON O OSNOVAMA SVOJINSKOPRAVNIH ODNOSA ; PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (“OG SFRY”) NOS. 6/80 AND 36/90; THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (“OG FRY”) No. 29/96; AND IN OG RS No. 115/05) 22 .     Article 70 of this Act defines “possession” ( državina ) as actual control over an asset. 23.     Article 75 provides that those in possession of assets or rights have the right to protection against interference with or the deprivation of their possession. 24 .     Article 78 provides that a court of law must protect possession in accordance with the last state of possession and any interference that has occurred, without regard to the right to possession, the legal grounds for possession or the good faith of the possessor. A possessor who has obtained possession by force, secretly or by abuse of trust also enjoys the protection of his possession except against the person from whom he acquired possession in such a way. 25.     Article 79 provides that, when a court of law rules on an application for the protection of a possession, it must, on pain of a fine, prohibit further interference with the possession in question and order the return of the possession taken. It may also impose any other measures that may be regarded as necessary in order to prevent further interference. OBLIGATIONS ACT ( ZAKON O OBLIGACIONIM ODNOSIMA ; PUBLISHED IN OG SFRY N os . 29/78, 39/85, 45/89, 57/89; OG FRY N o . 31/93; and IN OG RS 18/20) 26 .     Article 154 of this Act defines the various grounds for claiming civil compensation. 27 .     Article 156 provides that anyone may require another person to eliminate a source of danger which may cause significant damage to him or others, or to refrain from an activity which causes nuisance, danger or damage. 28 .     Article 185 provides that the person responsible is obliged to restore the situation which existed before the damage occurred or to pay compensation if such restoration is not possible. CIVIL PROCEDURE ACT 2004 ( ZAKON O PARNIČNOM POSTUPKU ; PUBLISHED IN OG RS Nos. 72/11, 49/13, 55/14 AND 87/18) 29 .     Articles 448-54 of this Act regulate the specific details of the civil procedure for the protection of possession. 30 .     Article 449 provides that proceedings for the protection of possession are to be conducted as a matter of urgency. 31 .     Article 450 prohibits the consideration of the legal grounds for possession and excludes any award of damages in related proceedings. ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURE ACT ( ZAKON O IZVRŠENJU I OBEZBEĐENJU ; PUBLISHED IN OG RS Nos. 106/15, 106/06 AND 113/17) 32 .     Article 363 of this Act states that if an action that can only be performed by the enforcement debtor is not within his exclusive control, the enforcement creditor may not demand the execution of that particular action but may only claim compensation for damage. GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT ( ZAKON O OPŠTEM UPRAVNOM POSTUPKU ; PUBLISHED IN OG FRY Nos.   33/97 AND 31/01; AND IN OG RS No. 30/10) 33 .     Articles 192-209 of this Act set out the procedure for issuing rulings regarding rights and obligations in the form of decisions ( rešenja ). 34.     Article 213 provides that a party to administrative proceedings has the right to lodge an appeal against a decision given by a first-instance court. 35.     Articles 261-278 set out the exact procedure to be followed in the enforcement of final administrative decisions. 36.     Article 261 § 2 provides that a final administrative decision will be executed once it becomes enforceable ( kada postane izvršno ). Article   261   §   3 (1-4) provides that a first-instance administrative decision becomes enforceable: (i) upon expiry of the period in which an appeal against it may be lodged, if no appeal has in fact been lodged; (ii) on the date when the decision has been delivered, should an appeal not be allowed; (iii) on the date when the decision has been delivered when an appeal does not postpone enforcement; or (iv) on the date when the decision by which the appeal has been dismissed or rejected has been delivered. Pursuant to Article 261 § 5, the statutory fifteen-day voluntary enforcement period, used by default if the decision does not set out any other enforcement period, starts running from the date on which the decision becomes enforceable. 37.     Article 266 § 1 provides that the enforcement of non-pecuniary obligations (administrative enforcement) is to be carried out by administrative bodies themselves. Article 267 § 1 states that administrative enforcement is to be conducted by the administrative authority that gave the first-instance decision. 38.     Articles 274-78 provide that the enforcement of non-pecuniary obligations, such as demolition, is carried out through third parties ( preko drugih lica ) and by coercive means ( prinudom ). ADMINISTRATIVE DISPUTES ACT ( ZAKON O UPRAVNIM SPOROVIMA ; PUBLISHED IN OG RS N o . 111/09) 39.     Article 4 of this Act provides that an administrative act is an individual legal act by which the competent public authority, by direct application of the regulations, decides on a certain right or obligation of a natural or legal person, that is, another party to the administrative matter. 40.     Article 11 § 1 provides that a natural, legal or other person can bring an administrative dispute before a court of law if it is believed that its rights or interests, based on the law, have been violated by an administrative act. PLANNING AND CONSTRUCTION ACT ( ZAKON O PLANIRANJU I IZGRADNJI ; PUBLISHED IN OG RS No. 72/09) 41 .     This Act lays down, among other things, the procedure for the removal or demolition of objects, including when based on an administrative decision. THE BELGRADE WATERFRONT ACT ( ZAKON O UTVRĐIVANJU JAVNOG INTERESA I POSEBNIM POSTUPCIMA EKSPROPRIJACIJE I IZDAVANJA GRAĐEVINSKE DOZVOLE RADI REALIZACIJE PROJEKTA BEOGRAD NA VODI ; PUBLISHED IN OG RS Nos.   34/15, 103/15 AND 153/20) 42 .     Article 1 of this Act establishes the existence of a public interest for the expropriation of the property needed for the implementation of the Belgrade Waterfront project – a project of particular significance for the Republic of Serbia and the City of Belgrade. 43 .     Articles 1-9 regulate the procedure for the expropriation of the property needed for the purposes of the Belgrade Waterfront project. 44 .     Article 1 also provides that the Expropriation Act, the Planning and Building Act and the General Administrative Procedure Act will apply, mutatis mutandis , unless otherwise specified in this Act. 45.     This law was passed by the Serbian Parliament and entered into force on 15 April 2015. 46 .     The draft law, prior to its enactment, was also supplemented by an explanatory memorandum prepared by the government. According to that memorandum, the company Beograd na vodi DOO had been established by the government in order to assume complete managerial control of the Belgrade Waterfront Project “on behalf and in the interest of the Republic of Serbia”. That arrangement enabled the Republic of Serbia to exercise its “full control” over the company’s operations and to “oversee and influence the implementation of the Belgrade Waterfront project”.   THE BELGRADE WATERFRONT SPATIAL PLANNING DECREE ( UREDBA O UTVRĐIVANJU PROSTORNOG PLANA PODRUČJA POSEBNE NAMENE UREĐENJA DELA PRIOBALJA GRADA BEOGRADA – PODRUČJE PRIOBALJA REKE SAVE ZA PROJEKAT BEOGRAD NA VODI ; PUBLISHED IN OG RS No.   7/15) 47 .     The decree states that the aim of the Spatial Plan for the Belgrade Waterfront project is to “completely rebuild” that area of the city of Belgrade and turn it into “an elite part of the city and a new modern city centre”. The plan also provides that part of the area will be used for public purposes, such as squares and roads. 48.     This decree entered into force on 31 January 2015. DECISION TO ESTABLISH LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY BEOGRAD NA VODI ( ODLUKA O OSNIVANJU DRUŠTVA SA OGRANIČENOM ODGOVORNOŠĆU BEOGRAD NA VODI ; PUBLISHED IN OG RS No. 66/14) 49 .     This decision, adopted by the Serbian Government on 26 June 2014, established the company named Beograd na vodi DOO as a government-founded entity fully owned by the State. It also outlined the initial financial capital of the company and appointed its director. Decision on capital increase 50.     This decision, adopted by Beograd na Vodi DOO on 28 July 2015, introduced a new shareholder to Beograd na Vodi DOO: the United Arab Emirates-registered company, Belgrade Waterfront Capital Investment L.L.C. This company acquired a 68% ownership stake in Beograd na Vodi, while the remaining 32% remained under Serbian ownership. DOMESTIC CASE-LAW REFERRED TO BY THE GOVERNMENT 51 .     The Government provided the Court with three decisions given by the Belgrade High Court ( Viši sud u Beogradu ) in civil proceedings for the protection of possession in which that court found that the plaintiffs’ possession had been disturbed but dismissed their requests for the restoration of the possession to its previous state. 52.     In judgment Gž br. 2127/14 of 15 May 2014 the Belgrade High Court denied the plaintiff company’s request to revert the possession of a construction site to its former condition. The court reasoned that the factual circumstances had changed significantly by the time of the decision, as the site had since been developed into a finished building. Consequently, restoring it to its previous state as a construction site was regarded as impractical. 53 .     In judgment Gž br. 10833/13 of 4   December   2014 the Belgrade High Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ request for the public electricity company to restore possession to its previous state by removing the electrical cables installed beneath it. The court held that removing the cables would cause irreparable harm to the public utility company and found that it would not be economically justifiable, given that the damage caused to the plaintiffs had been disproportionately low and could be compensated for, and that there had been a public interest in installing the electrical cables. 54 .     In judgment Gž br. 11997/21 of 22 December 2021 the Belgrade High Court dismissed the plaintiff’s request to restore her possession of a flat. The court reasoned that doing so would prevent the rightful owner from using the flat and would grant possession to someone without a legitimate claim to it. THE LAW ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL N o .   1 55.     The applicant company complained under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that the seizure and destruction of its possessions had violated its property rights and that the subsequent civil proceedings had not been fair and had not afforded any protection. Being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case ( see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, §§ 114 and 126, 20 March 2018), the Court considers that this complaint falls to be examined under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ( see Nikolay Kostadinov v.   Bulgaria , no.   21743/15, § 44, 8 November 2022), which reads as follows: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” Scope of the complaint 56.     In their observations, the Government submitted that the applicant company had failed to inform the Court that it had brought civil proceedings seeking damages concerning the events of 25 April 2016, and that those proceedings were still pending (see paragraphs 19 and 20 above). The Government argued that, in any event, the complaint relating to those events was premature and that the Court could only examine it after the conclusion of the domestic proceedings. Moreover, the Government maintained that the applicant company had abused its right of individual application by not disclosing those civil proceedings to the Court. 57.     The applicant company disagreed and maintained that it had exhausted all domestic remedies regarding its claim for protection of possession (see paragraphs 9-16 above). 58.     The Court observes that the applicant company included the events of 25 April 2016 only in the “facts” section of the application form, omitting them from the “complaints” section. In addition, and as specifically stated by the applicant company in the application form itself, this “supplementary information” was merely provided in order to help the Court “better understand the situation in which the applicant company [had] found itself”. 59.     The Court is therefore of the opinion that, although the facts concerning the events of 25 April 2016 may be relevant for reasons of context, they do not fall within the scope of the applicant company’s complaint ( see, mutatis mutandis , Wiegandová v.   the   Czech Republic , no.   51391/19, § 51, 11   January   2024; see also, mutatis mutandis , S.W.   v.   the   United Kingdom , no.   87/18, § 43, 22   June 2021). The Court will therefore only examine the complaint relating to the events of 8 May and 24   June 2015, together with the related proceedings (see paragraphs 8-18 above). Admissibility Applicability of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 60.     The Court observes that the Government did not raise any plea of inadmissibility before it regarding the complaint’s compatibility ratione materiae with the Convention and the Protocols thereto. However, the Court considers that this question concerns a matter which goes to its jurisdiction and that, as such, it is not prevented from examining it of its own motion (see, for example, Ramiz Jafarov v.   Azerbaijan , no. 40424/12, § 34, 16   June   2022). The Court has further established that the question of the applicability of a particular provision of the Convention or its Protocols is an issue of the Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae , and that the relevant analysis should therefore be carried out at the admissibility stage unless there is a particular reason to join this question to the merits (see Denisov v.   Ukraine [GC], no.   76639/11, § 93, 25 September 2018). No such reason exists in the present case. (a)    Responsibility of the State 61 .     The Court notes, at the outset, that proceedings concerning a civil-law dispute between private parties do not by themselves engage the responsibility of the State under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (see, for example, Theo National Construct S.R.L. v. the Republic of Moldova , no.   72783/11, § 69, 11 October 2022, and the authorities cited therein). The mere fact that the State, through its judicial system, provides a “forum” for the determination of a private-law dispute does not give rise to an interference by the State with property rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, even if the substantive result of a judgment given by a civil court results in the loss of certain “possessions” (ibid., §   69, with further references). Conversely, when the subject matter of the dispute and the substantive provisions applied comprised significant elements of public law and involved the State in its regulatory capacity (see, for example, Gladysheva v. Russia , no. 7097/10, §§   57-59, 6   December 2011), or when court orders in proceedings between private parties pursued the public interest (see Zhidov and Others v.   Russia , nos.   54490/10 and 3 others, §§ 94-95, 16 October 2018), the Court has found that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was applicable. 62.     Turning to the present case, the Court observes that it is undisputed by the parties that the events in question resulted from a major development project, namely the Belgrade Waterfront project, which the Serbian government designated as a strategic priority and a project of special interest for the Republic of Serbia (see paragraph 42 above). To facilitate that project, the respondent State also enacted special legislation and decrees and founded the company Beograd na vodi DOO, the aim being to exercise full control over the execution of the project (see paragraph 46 above). In addition, it is clear that the government maintained full control over the functioning of the company from its establishment (see paragraphs 46 and 49 above). Consequently, the Court concludes that at the relevant time the company Beograd na vodi DOO did not enjoy “sufficient institutional and operational independence from the State”, and that as such its actions can be attributed to the State (see, mutatis mutandis , R. Kačapor and Others , cited above, §§   98 ‑ 99; see also Mykhaylenky and Others v.   Ukraine , nos. 35091/02 and 9   others, § 44, ECHR 2004-XII). It is also undisputed, and has been established by the domestic courts, that the demolition of the applicant company’s fence and the subsequent seizure of the land were carried out by Beograd na vodi DOO through an intermediary (see paragraphs 13, 15 and 16 above). Lastly, when dismissing the applicant company’s request to reinstate its possession, the domestic courts themselves explicitly relied on the public interest, as established by the respondent State’s authorities (see paragraph 16 above in fine ). 63 .     In the light of the above, the Court is unable to conclude that the events complained of and the related proceedings in the present case could be regarded as a resolution of a dispute between parties under private law. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is therefore applicable in this context. (b)    Whether the applicant company had a “possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (i)       The parties’ submissions 64 .     The Government contended that the applicant company was not the owner of the land which it had used for its business purposes, and which was subsequently occupied by others (see paragraphs 6 and 7 above). It therefore could not have had a legitimate expectation that it would receive compensation in any future expropriation proceedings under the applicable domestic legislation (see paragraph 43 above). 65.     The applicant company disagreed and maintained that it had used the land in question for decades. (ii)     The Court’s assessment 66 .     The Court considers that the above arguments concern the issue of whether the applicant company had a “possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and therefore whether that Article is applicable. 67.     The Court reiterates, in that connection, that an applicant may allege a violation of Article   1 of Protocol No. 1 only in so far as the impugned events or decisions relate to his or her “possessions” within the meaning of that provision. The concept of “possessions” referred to in the first part of Article   1 of Protocol No. 1 has an autonomous meaning which is not limited to ownership of physical goods and is independent from the formal classification in domestic law: certain other rights and interests constituting assets can also be regarded as “property rights”, and thus as “possessions” for the purposes of this provision. The issue that needs to be examined in each case is whether the circumstances of the case, considered as a whole, conferred on the applicant title to a substantive interest protected by Article   1   of Protocol No. 1 ( see Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal [GC], no.   73049/01, § 63, ECHR 2007-I). 68 .     The fact that the domestic laws of a State do not recognise a particular interest as a “right” or even a “property right” does not necessarily prevent the interest in question, in some circumstances, from being regarded as a “possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ( see Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], no. 48939/99, § 129, ECHR 2004-XII, and Depalle v.   France [GC], no. 34044/02, § 68, ECHR 2010). Importantly, even a long-standing tolerance on the part of the authorities can also confer property rights ( see Kosmas and Others v.   Greece , no. 20086/13, §§ 68-71, 29   June   2017, and Arnavutköy Greek Orthodox Taksiarhis Church Foundation v. Türkiye , no. 27269/09, §§ 45-46, 15   November 2022). 69.     It is not disputed by the parties that the fence erected in 1964 and demolished on 8 May 2015 was the property of the applicant company. 70 .     Nor do the parties dispute that, prior to the events at issue, the applicant company had “possession” ( državina ) of the land in question within the meaning of the Serbian Property Act, which defines possession as actual control over an asset (see paragraph 22 above). In this respect, the Court observes that it is not called upon to answer in the abstract whether the concept of “possession” under Serbian law aligns with the one contained in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Instead, its task is to examine whether the specific circumstances of this case, taken as a whole, vested in the applicant a substantive interest protected under that Article (see Anheuser-Busch Inc. , cited above, § 63). In this regard, the Court takes note of the Government’s argument that, under the applicable national law, the applicant company was not the owner of the land in question. It also notes, however, that the applicant company had used the land for its business purposes for decades prior to the events complained of, that is to say, since at least 1964, when the applicant company fenced in the land with the approval of the relevant authorities (see   paragraph 6 above). Moreover, when it was founded, the applicant company was State-owned and it subsequently became socially-owned until its privatisation in 2010 (see paragraphs 5 and 7 above). Consequently, the Court is able to conclude that the national authorities not only tolerated the existence of the applicant company on the land in question, but actually established it there in the first place (see, mutatis mutandis , the case-law cited in paragraph 68 above in fine ). 71.     The Court therefore considers that, in the specific circumstances of the present case, the time that elapsed, that is the continuous and uninterrupted recognition by the State of the applicant company’s de facto possession of the land in question, for a period of at least fifty years, gave rise to a proprietary interest that was sufficiently established and weighty to amount to a “possession” within the meaning of the rule expressed in the first sentence of Article 1 of Protocol   No.   1, which is therefore applicable to the complaint under consideration (see Öneryıldız , cited above, §§ 125-29, and, mutatis mutandis , The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy , no.   35271/19, § 265-66, 2   May   2024). Exhaustion of domestic remedies (a)    The parties’ submissions 72 .     The Government argued that the applicant company had pursued a legal remedy that had not been effective, yet, at the same time, had failed to exhaust available and effective domestic remedies, such as a civil claim for damages or civil proceedings to eliminate the risk of possible damage (see   paragraphs 26-27 above). 73 .     In particular, the Government contended that the remedy pursued by the applicant company in the present case could not ensure the “full protection of its property interests”. While in such proceedings courts could provide protection regardless of the legal basis for the possession in question and the possessor’s own good faith, the courts could also determine that, owing to legal or factual reasons, a restitution of the possession to the plaintiff and the prohibition of any further disturbances were simply not feasible, as had been the case in the applicant company’s situation. To that effect, the Government also submitted case-law in which domestic courts had dismissed requests for restitution of a possession on legal or factual grounds (see paragraphs 51-53 above). 74.     The applicant company disagreed and maintained that it had properly exhausted the legal avenue pursued and was not required to bring any additional proceedings concerning the same underlying issue. The applicant company further argued that the case-law submitted by the Government consisted of isolated examples and exceptions rather than an established practice of the national courts. (b)    The Court’s assessment (i)       Relevant principles 75.     The Court reiterates that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies referred to in Article 35 of the Convention obliges those seeking to bring a case against a State before the Court to firstly use the remedies provided by the national legal system. Consequently, States are exempted from answering for their acts before an international body before they have had an opportunity to put matters right domestically (see Vučković and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], nos. 17153/11 and 29 others, § 70, 25   March   2014). 76.     The obligation to exhaust domestic remedies therefore requires an applicant to make normal use of remedies which are available and sufficient in respect of his or her Convention grievances. The existence of the remedies in question must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness (ibid., § 71). 77 .     To be effective, a remedy must likewise be capable of remedying directly the impugned state of affairs and must offer reasonable prospects of success (see Balogh v. Hungary , no. 47940/99, § 30, 20 July 2004, and Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no. 56581/00, § 46, ECHR 2006-II). However, the existence of mere doubts as to the prospects of success of a particular remedy which is not obviously futile is not a valid reason for failing to exhaust that avenue of redress (see, for example, Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2) [GC], no.   10249/03, § 70, 17 September 2009, and Vučković and Others , cited above, §   74). 78.     An applicant’s failure to make use of an available domestic remedy or to make proper use of it (that is to say, by bringing a complaint at least in substance and in compliance with the formal requirements and time-limits laid down in domestic law) will result in an application being declared inadmissible by the Court (see Vučković and Others , cited above, § 72). 79 .     The Court has, however, also frequently emphasised the need to apply the exhaustion rule with some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism (ibid., §   76, with further references). It would, for example, be unduly formalistic to require applicants to pursue a remedy which even the highest court of their country would not oblige them to use (see D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 57325/00, §§ 117-18, ECHR 2007-IV). 80 .     In legal systems which provide constitutional protection for fundamental human rights and freedoms, such as the one in Serbia, it is incumbent on the aggrieved individual to test the extent of that protection (see   Vinčić and Others v. Serbia , nos. 44698/06 and 30 others, § 51, 1   December 2009). 81 .     As regards the burden of proof, it is incumbent on the Government claiming non-exhaustion to satisfy the Court that the remedy was an effective one, available in theory and in practice at the relevant time. Once this burden has been satisfied, it falls to the applicant to establish that the remedy advanced by the Government was in fact pursued, or was for some reason inadequate and ineffective in the particular circumstances of the case, or that there existed special circumstances absolving him or her from this requirement (see Vučković and Others , cited above, § 77 , with further references). (ii)     Application of those principles to the present case 82.     Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the core of the applicant company’s complaint revolves around the protection of its possession. In this context, it was not unreasonable, on the face of it, for the applicant company to seek redress through civil proceedings specifically designed to urgently restore possession to its previous holder, without the need to delve into the legal basis for doing so (see paragraphs 24, 29, 30 and 73 above). The fact that in the present case the domestic courts, in what would appear to have been a departure from the general rule, still went on to examine the legal grounds for the applicant company’s possession cannot, in the Court’s view, be construed as an ex post facto justification to the effect that the applicant company’s choice of legal avenue was therefore unreasonable. 83 .     The domestic courts themselves also partly ruled or reasoned in favour of the applicant company, finding that its right to enjoy its possessions had been violated (see paragraph 14 above). The first-instance court thus ordered, in its decision of 17 January 2019, the defendant companies to cease their interference and the restoration of the previous state of affairs, while the second-instance court confirmed, albeit in its reasoning only, that the restoration order would typically be the expected outcome for a successful plaintiff in a case of this sort (see paragraphs 15 and 16 above). 84.     With the above in mind, the Court concludes that the case-law submitted by the Government is itself very fact-specific (see paragraphs   51 ‑ 54 above) and, moreover, clearly an exception from the general rules governing possessory protection (see paragraph 16 above). It cannot therefore serve as a sound basis for discounting the applicant company’s reasonable choice of legal redress. 85.     In these circumstances, it is evident that the applicant company had no reason to believe, at the outset, that the civil proceedings which it had decided to pursue lacked a reasonable prospect of success or were an “obviously futile” avenue of redress (see paragraphs 77 and 83 above), all the more so since no legal proceedings were ever undertaken against it before the impugned occupation and demolition (see paragraphs 5-18 and 33-46 above). 86.     The Court further notes that the Constitutional Court itself, importantly, did not reject the applicant company’s complaints on the grounds of its having failed to make use of any other prior effective legal remedies, including the various types of civil proceedings for damages, as it could have done (see paragraph 18 above; see also Negovanović and Others v. Serbia , nos.   29907/16 and 3 others, § 67, 25 January 2022). It would thus be unduly formalistic for the Court to now hold otherwise (see paragraph 79 above in fine ; see also, mutatis mutandis , Dragan Petrović v.   Serbia , no.   75229/10, §§   55-57, 14 April 2020). 87.     In view of the foregoing, the Government’s objection as to the non &#x20