CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITYCOM;ENG — 20 novembre 2025

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s2EF17D91 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s3AAE10DF { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s3CA22BA { font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .s6C5BED22 { margin-left:25.5pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .sC36A6361 { font-family:Arial; color:#000000 } .s5E8F5A28 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:25.5pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s434D37A9 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s2D9C6089 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s46DB5BA6 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:3pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sC986E16F { font-family:Arial; color:#ffffff } .sBD1BE8CC { width:33.89pt; display:inline-block } .s25198F8F { width:149.77pt; display:inline-block } .s100D1E5 { width:50.22pt; display:inline-block } .s2CF788F1 { width:132.09pt; display:inline-block }     FIFTH SECTION DECISION Application no. 15866/23 RAVAK A.S. against the Czech Republic   The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 20   November 2025 as a Committee composed of:   María Elósegui , President ,   Andreas Zünd,   Mykola Gnatovskyy , judges , and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   15866/23) against the Czech Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 5 April 2023 by RAVAK   a.s. (“the applicant company”), a commercial company incorporated under Czech law on 1 October 1997, represented before the Court by Mr J. Juhás and Mr J. Kreysa, lawyers practising in Prague and Příbram; Having deliberated, decides as follows: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1.     The case concerns the lack of an oral hearing and the alleged unfairness of insolvency proceedings against the O. company, a debtor of the applicant company. The applicant company relied on Article 6 § 1 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in conjunction with Article 13. 2.     On 21 February 2011, on an application by a creditor, insolvency proceedings were started against the O. company at the Prague Municipal Court. On 11   April 2011 the applicant company joined the application as a   creditor of the O. company by virtue of debts amounting to approximately   19.3 million euros. 3.     On 9 July 2012 the Municipal Court rejected the application after holding an oral hearing, finding that the O. company was not insolvent. On 29 November 2012 the Prague High Court upheld the decision. 4.     On 3 April 2015 the Supreme Court quashed the decision of the High Court, which subsequently quashed the first-instance decision and remitted the case back to the Municipal Court. 5.     On 9 February 2017 the O. company joined the application for its insolvency. It asked the Municipal Court to allow its reorganisation in accordance with a reorganisation plan already adopted by the majority of its creditors and proposed appointing an expert to assess the value of its assets. 6.     On 16 February 2017 the Municipal Court established that the O.   company was insolvent, allowed the reorganisation and appointed an expert. In the absence of any other effective remedy, the applicant company lodged a constitutional appeal against the decision, complaining of a lack of reasoning. 7.     On 25 April 2017 the expert report was submitted. It concluded that a   reorganisation would result in all groups of creditors receiving a higher proportion of their claims compared with alternative solutions. 8.     On 18 January 2018 the Constitutional Court quashed the Municipal Court’s decision of 16 February 2017 on the basis that it violated the applicant company’s right to a fair trial on account of a lack of reasoning. 9.     On 6 February 2018 the Municipal Court issued a new decision, reiterating the conclusions of its previous decision of 16 February 2017. The applicant company again lodged a constitutional appeal against the decision. 10.     On 26 June 2018 the Constitutional Court quashed the above ‑ mentioned decision for a lack of reasoning. 11.     On 28 November 2018 the Municipal Court issued a new decision establishing that the O. company was insolvent and allowing its reorganisation. Following the Constitutional Court instructing the Municipal Court to give reasons for the decision, the latter court explained that the O.   company’s arrangement with some of its creditors who were willing to support the reorganisation plan did not show that that plan had any wrongful purpose, as long as the proposed solution was more profitable to creditors than the liquidation of the company. The applicant company lodged a   constitutional appeal against the decision. 12.     On 31 January 2019 the expert submitted an updated report, still recommending reorganisation as the most profitable solution. 13 .     On 11 June 2019 the Municipal Court held an in-person meeting of creditors which, by a majority, adopted the proposed reorganisation plan. The applicant company was present and voted against the plan. 14.     On 31 July 2019 the Municipal Court rejected the above-mentioned reorganisation plan submitted by the O. company, finding that it was unlawful and pursued the wrongful purpose of unduly favouring one of the creditors who, as a result, was expected to take over the company. The court thus ordered the O. company’s liquidation, which the company appealed against. 15.     On 27 September 2019 the Constitutional Court dismissed as manifestly ill-founded the applicant company’s constitutional appeal against the Municipal Court’s decision of 28 November 2018. It held that the decision had in fact been overturned by the same court’s decision of 31 July 2019, which had ordered the O. company’s liquidation in lieu of reorganisation. As an appeal was pending in relation to that decision, the Constitutional Court referred the applicant company to remedies which were available in those proceedings. 16.     On 24 October 2019 the High Court quashed the Municipal Court’s decision of 31 July 2019, disagreeing that the reorganisation plan had violated the law and pursued a wrongful purpose. It held that an agreement with one of the creditors to take over the company and its debts had been a logical solution and had not indicated favourable treatment of that creditor. The court disagreed with the applicant company that the changes made to the O.   company’s list of creditors throughout the proceedings had proved any wrongful purpose. 17.     On 21 November 2019 the Municipal Court approved the initial reorganisation plan, holding that the proposed solution was the most profitable to the O. company’s creditors, who had already adopted the plan by a majority. Without examining any other evidence, the court referred to the reorganisation plan and the expert report of 25 April 2017 in concluding, in agreement with the High Court, that the plan had not been unlawful or pursued any wrongful purpose. 18 .     On 13 May 2020, following an appeal by the applicant company, the High Court upheld that decision. In response to a request by the applicant company to hold an oral hearing in the case, in order to hear witnesses who would allegedly prove the wrongful purpose of the proposed reorganisation plan, the High Court explained that it did not consider the oral hearing necessary, as the facts had been sufficiently proved on the basis of the case file, and none of the proposed witness testimony was relevant for its decision ‑ making. 19.     On 30 May 2022 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal on points of law by the applicant company, agreeing with the insolvency courts’ conclusions. It found that holding an oral hearing as requested by the applicant company before the High Court had not been necessary in the circumstances of the case. There had been no important questions of fact or law to be examined, and the insolvency courts had been able to deal with the applicant company’s arguments on the basis of its extensive written submissions and the case file.   Moreover, the Supreme Court found that the in-person meeting of creditors held by the Municipal Court, at which the creditors had been able to vote on the reorganisation plan and express their objections to it (see paragraph 13 above), had been a “ sui generis ” oral hearing. 20.     On 29 July 2022 the Municipal Court terminated the insolvency proceedings, affirming that a major part of the reorganisation plan had been carried out. 21.     On 20 September 2022 the applicant company lodged a constitutional appeal challenging several decisions issued in the insolvency proceedings. It complained that it had been denied an oral hearing despite repeated requests, citing three submissions lodged with the Municipal Court in 2018 and the appeal lodged with the High Court (see paragraph 18 above). It also argued that the principle of equality of arms had been violated, as Czech law did not allow a creditor’s appeal against a decision allowing a reorganisation. The applicant company lastly claimed that the insolvency courts had not complied with the Constitutional Court’s binding instructions. 22.     In decision no. I. ÚS 2405/22 of 6 December 2022 the Constitutional Court dismissed the constitutional appeal as partly out of time (as to the failure to comply with its binding instructions) and partly manifestly ill ‑ founded. It held that the lack of an appeal against the decision allowing a   reorganisation during insolvency proceedings was compliant with the Constitution. It also endorsed the insolvency courts’ conclusion that it had not been necessary to hold an oral hearing in the present case, as there had been no important questions of fact or law to be decided. The applicant company’s objection that the reorganisation plan had pursued a wrongful purpose had been sufficiently examined on the basis of the parties’ submissions, the reorganisation plan and the expert report. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT The applicant company’s complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention 23.     Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant company complained that it had been refused an oral hearing in the case despite its repeated requests. 24 .     The Court reiterates that the right to an oral hearing constitutes a   fundamental principle enshrined in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention ( see Malhous v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 33071/96, § 55, 12 July 2001). Nevertheless, that right is not absolute. The Court’s established case-law (see Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v.   Portugal [GC], nos. 55391/13 and 2 others, § 190, 6   November 2018) indicates that under the following conditions, a   failure to hold an oral hearing does not compromise the fairness of civil proceedings: (a) where there are no issues of credibility or contested facts, and the courts may fairly decide on the basis of the case file; (b) where the case raises a legal issue of limited scope or complexity; or (c) where the case concerns highly technical issues. 25.     The Court notes at the outset that the present case relates to the second part of the insolvency proceedings, where the insolvency of the debtor had been established, and the courts were to assess the profitability of the proposed solution for the company’s creditors (see, similarly, Hodina   v.   the   Czech Republic [Committee] (dec.), no. 18381/23, 3 July 2025, and, in contrast, Exel v. the Czech Republic , no. 48962/99, 5 July 2005). The question in dispute at that stage of the proceedings was whether or not the reorganisation plan, already adopted at the meeting of creditors, pursued the wrongful purpose of unjustifiably favouring one of the creditors. 26.     The Court further observes that according to the established domestic practice, examining the potential wrongful purpose of the reorganisation plan that had already been adopted by the majority of creditors required the insolvency courts to mainly assess the reorganisation plan itself in terms of the extent to which it would satisfy the creditors’ claims, compared with other potential solutions (see Hodina , cited above, § 13). The Court is satisfied that such an assessment is technical rather than factual in nature, within the meaning of the Court’s case-law (see paragraph 24 above). It follows that the domestic courts could make an informed decision on the basis of the applicant company’s written submissions and the case file (see Brož v. the Czech Republic [Committee] (dec.), no. 11216/22 , 13   March 2025, § 19). 27.     Moreover, the Court notes that the applicant company did participate in a “ sui generis ” court hearing in the form of the in-person meeting of creditors held by the Prague Municipal City Court on 11 June 2019 (see paragraph 13 above). During the meeting, the applicant company was able to orally present its arguments against and objections to the reorganisation plan. It was also allowed to vote on the reorganisation plan and voted against it. 28.     In view of the above considerations, the Court concludes that the absence of an oral hearing in the present case did not amount to a violation of the applicant company’s right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 §   1 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis , Hodina , cited above, § 23). 29.     It follows that the complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected under Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. The remainder of the application 30.     As to the other complaints raised by the applicant company under Article 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court finds that, in the light of all the material in its possession and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, these complaints either do not meet the admissibility criteria set out in Articles 34 and 35 of the Convention or do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. 31.     It follows that the application must be rejected in accordance with Article   35 §   4 of the Convention. For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Declares the application inadmissible. Done in English and notified in writing on 11 December 2025.     Martina Keller   María Elósegui   Deputy Registrar   President