CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 25 novembre 2025

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ALBANIA (Application no. 37896/19)   JUDGMENT   Art 6 § 1 (civil) • Fair hearing • Dismissal of Supreme Court judge based on findings of vetting proceedings that assessed his contact with persons involved in organised crime • Vetting bodies’ failure to sufficiently inform the applicant of the essential factual elements underlying the serious allegations against him and to give him access to any additional documents they examined • Applicant’s ability to mount a viable defence and to challenge the credibility or basis of the allegations significantly restricted • Unjustified restrictions on the applicant’s procedural rights without adequate counterbalancing factors • Very essence of the applicant’s procedural rights affected   Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.   STRASBOURG 25 November 2025   FINAL   23/03/2026   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Selimi v. Albania, The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Ioannis Ktistakis , President ,   Peeter Roosma,   Darian Pavli,   Diana Kovatcheva,   Úna Ní Raifeartaigh,   Mateja Đurović,   Vasilka Sancin , judges , and Milan Blaško, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   37896/19) against the Republic of Albania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Albanian national, Mr Shkëlzen Kujtim Selimi (“the applicant”), on 8 July 2019; the decision to reject the applicant’s request for the recusal of Darian   Pavli, the judge elected in respect of Albania, on 19 August 2021 (Rule   28 of the Rules   of   Court as in force at that time); the decision to give notice to the Albanian Government (“the   Government”) of the complaints concerning the applicant’s rights to a fair hearing and to respect for private life and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 4 November 2025, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The present case concerns the applicant’s dismissal from the office of Supreme Court judge in vetting proceedings under Law no. 84/2016 (“the   Vetting Act”). THE FACTS 2.     The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Tirana. He was represented by Mr A. Saccucci and Ms   G. Borgna, lawyers practising in Rome. 3.     The Government were represented by Mr   O.   Moçka, General State Advocate. 4.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. I.         Background information 5.     In 2016 Albania embarked on implementing comprehensive reforms to its justice system: the Constitution was amended, and several statutes – concerning, among other things, the transitional re-evaluation of all serving judges (hereinafter “the vetting process”) – were enacted.   The vetting process was to be carried out by the Independent Qualification Commission (“the   IQC”) at first instance and – in the event of any appeals – the Special   Appeal Chamber (“the SAC”) attached to the Constitutional Court (jointly referred to as “the vetting bodies” – see Xhoxhaj v. Albania , no.   15227/19, §§   4-7, 9   February 2021). II.       Vetting proceedings in respect of the applicant 6 .     The applicant, a district court judge between 1999 and 2011, was appointed to the Supreme Court of Albania in 2011. 7.     In January 2017 the applicant filled in and submitted the following standard declaration forms: an integrity declaration, a declaration of assets and a professional self-appraisal form. He replied negatively to the question in the integrity declaration form asking if he had had any contact with “persons involved in organised crime” within the meaning of the Vetting Act (see, as regards that declaration form, Thanza v. Albania , no.   41047/19, § 64, 4   July 2023). A.    CISD report 8.     The Classified Information Security Directorate (“the CISD”) – which was attached to the Prime Minister’s Office and assisted the vetting bodies with the assessment of each judge’s background integrity – prepared Report   no. 12112 dated 2 November 2017 and submitted a redacted version of it to the IQC. It was added to the applicant’s vetting file as a classified (“State secret”) document. 9 .     The redacted version of the report reads as follows: “ ... 1. Referring to the vetting subject’s declaration form, the Working Group carefully reviewed his file ... It was decided to send a request for a background check to the Prosecutor General’s Office ... and to the U.S. Embassy [ redacted ]. They reported as follows: ... [The applicant] has expressed inaccuracies in the declaration form – namely, in part   5 (c) ‘Security Data’ – by failing to disclose inappropriate contact with persons involved in organised crime. That non-disclosure renders him liable for concealing a fact and for his inaccurate and untruthful completion of the declaration form ... The collected intelligence and other information may raise reasonable suspicions of his implication or inappropriate contact with persons involved in organised crime. From information provided by the verifying authorities we have become aware that: ‘there is information [ redacted ] that raises reasonable suspicions of his involvement in illegal activities, which was demonstrated by virtue of a judge’s passive corruption while exercising his duty and exerting illegal influence over persons exercising public functions [ disponohen të dhëna ... ku ngrihen dyshime të arsyeshme për përfshirjen në veprimtari të kundërligjshme, shfaqur në formën e korrupsionit pasiv të gjyqtarit gjatë ushtrimit të detyrës dhe ushtrim i ndikimit të paligjshëm ndaj personave që ushtrojnë funksione publike ].’ Furthermore, we are informed that: ‘[ redacted ] has had inappropriate contact [ redacted ]’ Having assessed the information, we consider that: [ redacted ] 2.     The information available in respect of the vetting subject, which indicates his involvement in corrupt activities involving justice official [ informacionet që disponohen në ngarkim të tij, për implikim në veprimtari korruptive të funksionarit të drejtësisë ] over a relatively long period of time and in more than one instance – through the promise of or the direct or indirect solicitation of any kind of undue benefit, in return for performing or refraining from performing an action related to official duties – suggests that [the applicant], pursuant to section 37 (b) and (c) of [the Vetting Act], [is] a person with tendencies towards involvement in criminal activity and an individual who may be easily subjected to pressure by criminal structures. 3.     The information available against the vetting subject, which concerns corrupt activities, highlights the circumstances of the establishment of the fact [ informacionet që disponohen në ngarkim të subjektit të rivlerësimit për veprimtari korruptive, evidentojnë rrethanat e konstatimit të faktit ] that there exists inappropriate contact with a person or persons involved in organised crime, as defined in section 3 (15) of this Act, in the form of exchange of money, favours, or gifts; this is completely incompatible with the [applicant’s] duties. There exists information from the verifying authorities that the vetting subject has inappropriate contact, within the meaning of section 38 (4) of the Act, with [ redacted ]. [ redacted ] [ redacted ] [The applicant] is unfit to remain in office. Find attached the declaration form and the official letter from the verifying authorities.” 10 .     Between December 2017 and April 2018, the IQC made several requests to the CISD. The IQC sought the declassification of the above ‑ mentioned report (see paragraph 12 below). It also requested the declassification of the information (i) classified as a “State secret” sent by Letters no. 12310 of 2   November 2017, no. 12559 of 22   December 2017, no.   852 of 23   January 2018, and (ii) classified as “Confidential” sent by Letter no.   1762/3 of 18   October 2017. It is unclear whether the CISD replied to any of those requests. B.    The IQC’s investigation 11.     From February 2018 onwards, during the investigation stage of the vetting proceedings the IQC asked the applicant a series of written questions about his interaction with several people (hereinafter, F.D., I.Ç., A.D. and A.S.). In particular, the IQC asked whether between 2010 and 2012 the applicant had used a specific vehicle owned by A.S.; it also asked the applicant to explain his relationship with A.S. The applicant replied that A.S. was his distant relative and that his wife had occasionally used A.S.’s vehicle to commute to her work in Fier (see also paragraphs   13, 17, 19 and 20 below). 12 .     In May 2018 the CISD authorised a partial declassification of its report of 2   November 2017 so that it could be disclosed to the applicant while remaining redacted. The report mentioned certain information provided by “verifying authorities”; that information was attached to the report, but it was not disclosed to the applicant. 13 .     Shortly before the end of the investigation, by a letter of 4 July 2018, the International Monitoring Operation (“the IMO” – its mandate is described in paragraph 31 below) submitted a “finding” to the IQC. That letter (which was drafted in English) reads as follows: “Based on information provided on condition by reliable and credible foreign government confidential sources, International Observers offer this finding, pursuant to Art. 49.5 and Art. 49.10 of Law no. 84/2016: There is evidence that strongly suggests that assessee Shkelzen Selimi engaged in inappropriate contacts (Art. 38.4 of Law no.   84/2016), direct and indirect, with a persons [ sic ] on behalf of [A.I], aka [BQ], who was involved in organised crime (as defined in Art. 3.15 of Law no. 84/2016). In the first half of 2015, Selimi attempted to intercede on behalf of [A.I.] in order to influence the outcome of [A.I.’s] pending case before the Albanian courts seeking his extradition to Italy to face criminal charges. As the probable result of this intervention by Selimi, in July 2015 the request to extradite [A.I.] to Italy was denied and he remained free of custody.” 14 .     Other documents – presumably originating from foreign authorities – were submitted to the IQC with or in relation to the IMO’s above-noted finding (as confirmed by the IQC – see paragraph 21 below). Those submissions were not disclosed to the applicant. 15 .     On the basis of the CISD’s report and the applicant’s replies, the IQC conducted enquiries and received information and documents from Albanian authorities, including the State Intelligence Service, the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Serious Crimes Prosecution Office, and the courts. C.    IQC’s report on its investigation 16 .     Following the completion of its investigation, the IQC drafted a report (“the investigation report”); its findings (in particular as regards A.I.) may be summarised as follows: (a)     The IMO had submitted information about the applicant’s (involvement in the) exertion of illegal influence over persons exercising public functions. The CISD report stated that there was intelligence raising reasonable suspicions that the applicant had been involved in illegal activities – specifically, passive corruption (that is, bribe-taking) on the part of a/the judge and the exertion of unlawful influence over persons exercising public functions. The above-specified data was verified, and it transpired that the applicant was “acquainted with” ( ka njohje me shtetasin ) A.I. – a person involved in organised crime. A.I. was subject to criminal proceedings in Italy on charges of international trafficking in cocaine, and it was a generally known fact (within the meaning of section 49 of the Vetting Act) that A.I. was an inappropriate contact. (b)     It could be seen from the insurance policies taken out in respect of a car registered in the name of A.S. (who had a conviction for resisting law ‑ enforcement officers) that the applicant had used that car during the period 2010-11 and during the period 2011-12. A.S. was widely known to work (have worked) as A.I.’s driver. The applicant admitted to having used that car and “to knowing that person” (that is, presumably, A.S.), but he had not “declared this fact in the questionnaire sent to him at the beginning of the vetting process” in December 2017. (c)     It could be seen from the files relating to A.I.’s extradition, the IMO’s finding, the CISD report and supporting documents received by the IQC that the applicant may have successfully exerted his influence in that case. (d)     Having conducted its investigation, the IQC had “formed the conviction” that the applicant “[had] ties” with A.I., who “[was] publicly known and proven to be involved in organised crime”. Thus, the applicant had known A.I. and had failed to declare him as an inappropriate contact. He had also assisted him by engaging in unlawful actions (manifested in the form of passive corruption on the part of a/the judge while exercising his duty) and exerting unlawful influence over individuals holding public functions. (e)     The applicant had also been a member of the panel that had examined a request for the extension of A.I.’s detention in July 2014. 17 .     The IQC passed the burden of proof onto the applicant, and he was required to disprove the findings made in the IQC’s investigation report.   Specifically, the report concluded as follows: “Under Article Dh §§ 3 and 4 of the Annex to the Constitution, if the vetting subject has inappropriate contact with individuals involved in organised crime, it shall be presumed that [the vetting subject] should be dismissed from his office; the subject has the obligation to prove otherwise. If the vetting subject attempts to make inaccurate statements or to conceal contact with individuals involved in organised crime, it shall be presumed that [the vetting subject] should be dismissed from his office; the subject has the obligation to prove otherwise. As regards the finding sent by the [IMO], the burden of proof falls on you to provide explanations for the [conclusions of this investigation] and whether you are acquainted with [A.I.] [ a njiheni ju me shtetasin ].” 18.     On 7, 11 and 24 July 2018 the applicant requested that either the redacted parts of the CISD’s report be disclosed or that the classified information be examined in ex parte proceedings (if necessary, in his absence and with a representative chosen by the IQC to act on his behalf). It appears that those requests were (implicitly) refused. 19 .     The applicant submitted to the IQC his objections to the factual findings and legal conclusions contained in the investigation report. It does not appear that at that stage of the proceedings he made any specific statement as to whether he personally knew A.I. or had had any direct encounters or contact or any kind of relationship with him. 20 .     The applicant clarified that A.S. was a distant relative of his from Kruja (the applicant’s hometown). A.S. resided in Fier with his wife and children and, at the relevant time, had been employed as the driver for the CEO of a State-controlled company based in Fier. Although his family connection to A.S. was distant, their relationship had grown closer after the applicant’s wife had been appointed as a judge to the Fier District Court. The sole reason for the relationship becoming closer was that she had occasionally required transportation from their home in Vlore to her workplace in Fier. A.S. had occasionally been asked to provide this transportation when the family car had been out of service or when there had been bad weather along the road. That had been the only factor linking the applicant to A.S., and as a result, they had met a few times in Fier, Vlore, or Tirana. Those occasional encounters had not given him any insight into A.S.’s social circle in Fier or elsewhere, and nor had they given him the opportunity to come to know people that A.S. might have met or any legal issues he may have faced. It was impossible for the applicant to know whether A.S. was acquainted with or associated with A.I. or whether he had any legal problems. The applicant’s interactions with A.S. – which had been in any case strictly limited – had essentially come to an end in 2011, when the applicant had moved to Tirana to serve in the Supreme Court. After the move, their interactions with each other had been limited to occasional meetings during family events. D.    IQC’s decision 21 .     The IQC held a public hearing. By a decision of 30 July 2018 (as corrected by a decision of 17   September 2018), the IQC held as follows. Although the CISD carried out in each case a background assessment of the vetting subject, the IQC nevertheless had to conduct its own in-depth investigation and to verify the information presented by the CISD. The IQC had done that in the applicant’s case; in particular, it had requested additional information from the public authorities. Certain facts and evidence in the file had constituted a State secret that could not be “made public” ( nuk   bëhet   publik ) within the meaning of section 39 of the Vetting Act. The IMO’s finding had been accompanied by confidential information that could not be “made public” – that had been a condition set by a foreign government; revealing that information could jeopardise its source. That confidential information had been considered together with the other evidence contained in the case file. Non-disclosure of classified information in such circumstances did not violate the vetting subject’s fundamental rights. 22.     The IQC dismissed the applicant from his office, pursuant to section   61   (2) and (3) of the Vetting Act, in particular, for failing to declare in his vetting declaration his inappropriate contact with A.I. and for having had inappropriate contact with A.I., stating as follows. (a)     The IMO’s finding (see paragraph 13 above) stated that the applicant had been involved in exerting illegal influence over persons exercising public functions. That finding constituted evidence proving a fact, circumstance or legal standard ( standard ligjor ) that had existed or had occurred, within the meaning of the Vetting Act. The finding was credible and sufficiently consistent with the other evidence. It was accompanied by confidential information that could not be “made public”. That was a condition set by a foreign government; disclosing that information could endanger its source. It could be seen from the examination of the extradition file in respect of A.I. and the supporting “confidential” material received by the IQC that the applicant had successfully exerted influence in respect of that case. Moreover, the applicant had been part of the panel which, on 2 July 2014, had examined the prosecutor’s request for A.I.’s detention to be extended (see paragraph 27 below). Furthermore, a foreign court decision submitted by the IMO stated that A.I. faced criminal proceedings pending in Italy in respect of his alleged participation in a criminal organisation and in drug trafficking. (b)     The IQC was persuaded that the applicant was acquainted with A.I. (non-casual contact). It appeared that the applicant had helped him, through unlawful actions in the form of passive corruption on the part of a judge and unlawful influence over other persons exercising public functions. (c)     The applicant had not declared A.I. as an inappropriate contact. Nor had he declared his acquaintance with A.I. (d)     It could be seen from the insurance policies taken out in respect of A.S.’s car that during the period 2010-11 and again during the period 2011 ‑ 12 the applicant had used that car. A.S. was generally known as A.I.’s driver. The applicant had not disclosed his use of the car in the questionnaire sent to him at the start of the vetting process in 2017. He had acknowledged such use only after being asked about it by the IQC. (e)     The applicant had not specified whether he knew A.I., or whether they had had any non-casual contact or communication. The IQC examined the applicant’s explanations relating to his use of A.S.’s car and concluded that they did not disprove the IMO’s finding. 23.     The IQC also (i) held against the applicant his “inappropriate contact” with another person, F.D., and his failure to declare that contact; and (ii) had reasonable suspicions that he could be easily put under pressure by people “involved in organised crime” within the meaning of the Vetting Act. 24 .     The applicant appealed to the SAC. He referred to his “lack of deliberate acquaintance” with A.I. ( mungesën e vullnetshme të njohjes ). He argued that (i) he had not been asked any question in connection with A.I. during the investigation, and (ii) he had been unable to exercise his defence rights, since the findings relating to A.I. had been based on confidential data (including data concerning the place and method of the alleged attempt of unlawful influence for A.I.’s benefit). It was uncertain whether the credibility of the allegations had been verified: for example, it had not been ascertained whether the source (another person) had any conflict of interest, or had simply wanted to take revenge against the applicant. Moreover, the applicant added, if the corruption allegation had concerned his wife’s work at the Fier District Court, she had not been involved in A.I.’s case and therefore could not have acted inappropriately in that regard. E.     SAC’s decision 25 .     By a decision of 7 February 2019 (as corrected by a decision of 19   April 2019), the SAC upheld the applicant’s dismissal from office. It held as follows as regards the general procedural aspects of the vetting case. (a)     The applicant had had sufficient information regarding the IQC’s investigation. During the investigation the IQC had had questioned him more than ten times and he had provided explanations or raised objections in respect of the issues raised by the IQC. The SAC ruled that by asking the applicant questions about certain individuals (and issues relating to those individuals, which had ultimately been cited as reasons for his dismissal from office), the IQC had disclosed, at a sufficient and reasonable level, the circumstances and the identities of the relevant persons for whom the burden of proof had then been passed to the applicant and on which the disciplinary measure of dismissal from office had been ultimately decided. While protecting State secrets – pursuant to Law no.   8457 of 1999 and Albania’s commitments with international partners under section 39 (2) of the Vetting   Act – the IQC had informed the applicant (at an early stage of the investigation) of those circumstances that would later burden him with disciplinary responsibility within the meaning of Article Dh of the Annex to the Constitution and section 61 (2) and (3) of the Vetting Act. (b)     The CISD’s report, in its declassified part, indicated that requests had been sent to law-enforcement agencies and foreign States. Thus, the applicant had been sufficiently informed of the relevant circumstances and the source of the information on which the IQC’s findings had been based. At each stage of the proceedings before the IQC the applicant had had an opportunity to provide explanations and to exercise his defence rights in respect of his involvement in certain events and with individuals identified as inappropriate contacts. The IQC had found the CISD report to be correct and had drawn its own conclusions on the basis of that report, the IQC’s investigation and the applicant’s explanations. (c)     The IQC’s decision to limit the applicant’s access to classified “secret” documents had been proportionate and had not violated the essence of his right to be informed of the facts attributed to him and of their sources. Although he had not had access to the classified documents, he had been informed of the essential facts derived from them. He had been invited to provide explanations in respect of these facts, which were later used for his dismissal from office – specifically, his connection with two individuals considered as constituting inappropriate contacts. The applicant had also been informed of the sources from which the IQC had obtained that information – namely, law-enforcement agencies and foreign States. Those sources were considered as “recognised sources” ( burime   të njohura ) within the meaning of section   49 (4) of the Vetting Act (see paragraph 35 below). The applicant had been given as much information from the classified documents as was reasonable and necessary to guarantee his defence rights. The IQC had been right not to grant access to the classified documents as to have done so would have compromised national security and revealed the activities of law ‑ enforcement agencies operating through covert methods, and could have endangered the lives and health of other people and the integrity of partner relationships between Albania and other States. (d)     The IQC had had full access to all of the classified documents from which the facts the applicant had been informed of had been derived. It had conducted its own analysis of the data. The SAC had been afforded the same level of access and had carried out a comprehensive review and analysis of each of those classified documents. As a result, the SAC was convinced that all the facts attributed to the applicant were sufficiently proven. (e)     The applicant had been afforded sufficient knowledge of the relevant facts and individuals disclosed by the secret data. The SAC’s conclusion in this respect was supported by other data obtained from open and official sources that gave context to the events or classified material while also providing the applicant with sufficient understanding of them. 26 .     As to the factual circumstances relating to A.I. specifically, the SAC held as follows. (a)     A.I. had been prosecuted in Italy for participation in a criminal organisation engaged in drug trafficking. That was a listed offence under section 3   (1) of Law no. 10192 of 2009; he was thus “a person involved in organised crime” within the meaning of section 3 (15) of the Vetting Act. (b)     Throughout the vetting proceedings, the applicant had failed to clearly state whether he had had any specific or direct relationship or contact with A.I. That insincere stance appeared to have constituted an attempt to conceal his relationship with A.I. by avoiding direct affirmations or denials, thereby maintaining an ambiguous position. (c)     The nature of their relationship had been established by the IMO’s   “finding” (see paragraph   13 above), which had carried the probative value of an expert report – that is it constituted evidence that would be difficult for any adjudicating body to challenge, owing to its nature and the credibility of its source. The source’s reliability, integrity, impartiality, and professionalism – combined with the highly specific method employed to gather the information in question – had afforded it particular evidentiary weight ( vlerë të veçantë ). According to the IMO’s finding, the applicant had maintained stable contact ( lidhje të qëndrueshme ) with A.I. and had used his influence within the justice system (both through his own decisions and by means of swaying other officials) to ensure that efforts to secure A.I.’s extradition to Italy would fail. (d)     While the applicant argued that he could not have known that his distant relative, A.S., had been A.I.’s driver, a criminal case file against A.I. ( një   procedim penal në ngarkim të shtetasit A.I. ) indicated that A.S. had been identified as A.I.’s personal driver. (e)     In 2014 the applicant had been the rapporteur on a panel of the Supreme Court that had set aside a court decision in A.I.’s case and had remitted the matter to another lower-instance court (see paragraph 27 below). It followed that the Supreme Court had partly accepted A.I.’s appeal and had delivered a decision in his favour. That decision had ultimately influenced ( ka ndikuar përfundimisht ) the 2015 decision not to authorise A.I.’s   extradition. As to the IMO’s finding regarding the unlawful influence that the applicant had exerted on public officials in order to prevent A.I.’s extradition, the data reflected in this evidence had been confirmed and supported by the IQC’s investigation. The procedural history of the extradition case (see paragraphs 27 and 28 below) and the influence exerted by the applicant in respect of it had confirmed the circumstances described in the IMO’s finding. Given those circumstances, its probative value had become even more significant and had rightly influenced the IQC’s conviction that A.I. was an inappropriate contact for the applicant and that he had attempted to exert his influence in order to undermine the extradition process. The applicant’s submissions relating to his wife’s work in Fier had been irrelevant to the case. The applicant’s failure in 2017 to declare his relationship with A.I. in his vetting declaration form had violated Article   Dh   of the Annex to the Constitution and had rendered his declaration insufficient; that had constituted grounds for his dismissal from office. III.     Other proceedings 27 .     In March 2014 A.I. was arrested in Albania and detained with a view to his extradition to Italy. On 7 April 2014 the Tirana District Court extended his detention. Following an appeal by A.I., that decision was upheld on 30   April 2014. On 2 July 2014 the Supreme Court panel – composed of Judge A.M. as chairperson ( kryesues ) and rapporteur ( relatori ) and four other judges (including the applicant) – quashed that decision, ruling that the matter of A.I.’s detention should have been examined by the Fier District Court; the Supreme Court accordingly kept A.I. in custody pending the re ‑ examination of the matter by the Fier District Court. On 10 July 2014 the Fier District Court extended A.I.’s detention. On 15 July 2014 the District Court (in the person of Judge I.H.) dismissed a further request lodged by the prosecutor for A.I.’s detention to be again extended, because A.I. could not be lawfully detained beyond the maximum period provided by the Code of Criminal Procedure. The prosecutor appealed against that decision. It appears that A.I. remained in custody. The above-mentioned decision was then upheld on appeal and on 2 October 2014 by a panel of the Supreme Court composed of Judge E.I. as chairperson, Judge T.N. as rapporteur and three other judges (including the applicant). Judge I.H. ordered A.I.’s release and his placement under house arrest. That decision was confirmed on appeal and on 20   November 2014 by a panel of the Supreme Court composed of Judge A.M. as chairperson, Judge E.I. as rapporteur and three other judges (including the applicant). 28 .     In the meantime, in May 2014 the Tirana District Court ordered A.I.’s extradition to Italy. In July 2014 that decision was quashed on appeal because the matter should have been decided by the Fier District Court. In March 2015 that court (in the person of Judge M.Sh.) dismissed the extradition request and discontinued A.I.’s house arrest. That decision was confirmed on appeal in July 2015 and on 13 October 2015 by a panel of the Supreme Court composed of Judge   E.I. as chairperson, T.N. as rapporteur and three other judges (including the applicant). 29.     In 2022 proceedings were brought against the applicant under Article   257/a § 2 of the Criminal Code concerning the declaration or justification of his assets. He was acquitted by the trial court in July 2025. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE 30.     For a summary of the applicable domestic law and other references, see the above-cited judgments in Xhoxhaj , §§   93-209, and Thanza , §§   53 ‑ 73. The provisions, which are particularly relevant for the present case, may be summarised as follows. 31 .     Article B of the Annex to the Constitution of Albania reads as follows: “1.     The International Monitoring Operation shall support the re-evaluation process by monitoring and overseeing the entire process. This Operation includes partners within the framework of European integration and Euro-Atlantic cooperation and is led by the European Commission. 2.     The International Monitoring Operation exercises its duties in accordance with international agreements. It appoints international observers after notifying the Council of Ministers. Observers are appointed from among judges or prosecutors with no less than 15 years of experience in the justice system of their respective countries ... 3.     The international observer performs the following duties: ... b) Presents findings and opinions on matters reviewed by the Commission and the Appeal Chamber, and contributes to the background-check process [mandated by] Article Dh [of the Annex to the Constitution]. Regarding [such] findings, an international observer may request that the Commission or the Appeal Chamber consider evidence or may present evidence obtained from State bodies, foreign entities, or private individuals, in accordance with the law; ...” 32.     Article Ç of the Annex to the Constitution provides that the IQC and/or the SAC (as the case may be) – through their respective staff – will examine vetting subjects’ declarations regarding their past, and cooperate with domestic or foreign institutions in order to verify the truthfulness and accuracy of such declarations. The IQC and the SAC have direct access to the relevant government databases (except those classified as “State secret”). 33 .     Under section 38 of the Vetting Act, the background assessment must note the circumstances supporting a finding, as well as any mitigating circumstances. A background assessment that fails to consider supporting and mitigating circumstances is incomplete. Section 38 lists (i)   examples of situations indicating inappropriate contact (such as non-casual communication with a person involved in organised crime); (ii) examples of mitigating circumstances (such as where the vetting subject plausibly argues that he or she was unaware that the person in question was involved in organised crime, or has distanced himself or herself from that person); (iii)   examples of situations where it could be concluded that the background declaration was not completed fully and truthfully (such as a situation in which (a) there has been a failure to declare a contact which has been established by relevant and credible intelligence and which has been corroborated or deemed reliable, and (b) the vetting subject has had a contact that was either declared by the vetting subject or otherwise established, or there is other evidence of a benefit, action or consequence from that contact which creates a reasonable suspicion that the obtained information constitutes the only plausible explanation); and (iv) further mitigating circumstances or factors that could be considered to constitute a plausible explanation for a particular contact or failure to declare a contact. 34 .     Under section 39 of the Vetting Act, the CISD shall submit to the IQC a report that determines whether a vetting subject has completed his/her background declaration fully and truthfully, and whether there is information in that background declaration or elsewhere that indicates that s/he has inappropriate contact with persons involved in organised crime. The report shall provide a description of those contacts, together with elements that support or mitigate the finding of inappropriate contact. Such information shall not be disclosed ( nuk bëhet publik ) if it endangers the safety of a source or if such non-disclosure is a condition imposed by a foreign government. 35 .     Section 49 of the Vetting Act reads as follows: “... 3. Facts known to the Commission or facts that are generally known [ e njohura botërisht ] – as well as facts presumed by law – do not require further evidence. 4. The Commission and the Appeal Chamber shall base their decisions only on documents from recognised sources, or on evidence that is reliable or is clearly consistent with other evidence. They are entitled to evaluate – on the basis of their internal conviction – any indicia related to the circumstances of the case. 5. Documents or information obtained from foreign State sources in compliance with this law shall be considered by the Commission or the Appeal Chamber. ... 10. A finding presented in the form of a statement, document, or report by an international observer shall constitute evidence establishing a fact, circumstance or legal standard that exists or has arisen. The finding shall present the circumstances [relevant to] the observation provided [ konstatimin e bërë ]. The Commission or the Appeal Chamber shall consider the finding as being equivalent to an expert opinion. The refusal of any findings shall be done in a reasoned decision of the Commission or the Appeal Chamber. 11. A written opinion by an international observer shall be treated (during the re ‑ evaluation process) as constituting the conclusion reached by the latter in respect of a specific circumstance or drawn from the facts of a specific case. The opinion may influence the decision-making of the Commission or the Appeal Chamber, but it has no evidentiary value ...” 36.     Pursuant to section 50 of the Vetting Act, the IQC, the SAC and international observers shall collaborate with State institutions, individuals, or legal entities (domestic or foreign) in order to verify the truthfulness and accuracy of statements made by a vetting subject. They shall have full access to all databases and have the right to request international cooperation within the framework of international treaties and diplomatic channels. THE LAW I.          ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION 37.     The applicant complained that he had not had a fair hearing in the vetting proceedings, in breach of   Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows: “1.     In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ...” A.    Admissibility 38.     It is uncontested, and the Court finds, that the civil limb of Article   6   §   1 of the Convention was applicable to the applicant’s vetting case (see Xhoxhaj v. Albania , no. 15227/19, § 288, 9   February 2021). 39.     The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article   35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible. B.    Merits 1.      The parties’ submissions (a)    The applicant 40.     The applicant argued that the vetting bodies had failed to disclose the facts and the evidence underlying their decisions – especially regarding his alleged implication in judicial corruption involving A.I. The redacted CISD report had referenced unspecified episodes and individuals; all key details had been removed from the report. Attached information from verifying authorities had been withheld. The IMO’s letter had lacked specific details, and the SAC had referred vaguely to “open and official sources” – without identifying them or clarifying their relevance. The only disclosed evidence – the insurance for A.S.’s car and A.I.’s extradition file – had offered no insight into the allegations. 41.     The sole accusation was that the applicant had misused his position to obstruct A.I.’s extradition through direct or indirect influence. No specific facts had been disclosed in the case-file material or decisions. This had deprived him of the ability to mount an effective defence. The authorities had framed the allegations inconsistently: the IMO had stated that he had attempted to influence A.I.’s case; on the other hand, the IQC had submitted that he had successfully   done so. 42.     The applicant noted that even though the CISD’s and IMO’s respective findings had been pivotal to the conclusion that there had been “inappropriate contact” and corruption, the underlying classified evidence had not been disclosed to him. The few documents that had been disclosed had not substantiated that there had been any contact between the applicant and A.I.; neither had they suggested that any such contact – if it had existed at all – had been improper or unlawful. 43.     No compensating procedural safeguards had been applied. The vetting bodies had not assessed whether national security genuinely required non ‑ disclosure; nor had they considered alternatives such as the redaction of sensitive information, limited-access proceedings, or the appointment of a cleared representative for the applicant. The SAC’s reference to section   39 of the Vetting Act had merely implied the existence of reasons for non ‑ disclosure – but without explaining or evaluating them. The CISD’s decisions on confidentiality had not been open to review or appeal, and the vetting bodies had lacked the authority to challenge them. 44.     The vetting bodies had also accepted uncritically the IMO’s argument justifying non-disclosure – despite its vagueness. The IMO had merely stated that the evidence in question had been provided “on condition” (without any explanation regarding that condition or any risk to sources should the information in question be disclosed). The vetting decisions ha