CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 2 décembre 2025

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THE FACTS 2.     The applicants, Mr Lukas Svirplys (“the first applicant”) and Mr   Raimedas Latvys (“the second applicant”), are Lithuanian nationals who were born in 1998 and 1999, respectively, and live in Vilnius. They were represented before the Court by Mr D. Murauskas, a lawyer practising in Vilnius. 3.     The Lithuanian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr R. Dzikovič, and their Co-agent, Ms N. Bruskina. The first applicant’s complaint to the police and the initial measures carried out by the authorities 4 .     On 10 June 2022 the first applicant lodged a complaint with the police, in which he submitted that on 9 June 2022, at around 1.30   p.m., when he and his boyfriend – the second applicant – had been on their way home, a man whom they did not know had started following them. When the applicants had approached their apartment building, the man had begun filming them with his mobile phone. The applicants had tried to enter the building, but because they had been stressed and scared, they had not managed to type the correct entry code on their first try. The man had told them to face the camera, called them “faggots” ( pydarai ) and used other slurs, and accused them of acting contrary to Lithuanian law. After the applicants had entered the building, the man had not allowed them to close the door for some time and threatened that if he saw them again, “it would not end well”. Eventually they had managed to close the door of the building and the man had left. The first applicant enclosed a video-recording of the man walking away, which he had made through the window of the apartment building. The day after the incident the applicants had seen the same man park his car close to their building – the first applicant provided the registration number of the vehicle. He submitted that the incident had caused both applicants emotional distress and feelings of humiliation and insecurity; he wished to lodge a civil claim in the amount of 2,000   euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 5 .     On 22 June 2022 the police questioned the first applicant as a witness. He confirmed the circumstances described in his complaint (see paragraph 4 above), described the alleged perpetrator and provided a photograph of the individual’s car. He also said that, the day after the incident, the applicants had seen the alleged perpetrator sitting with other people near their building. 6 .     On the basis of the information provided by the first applicant, the police identified the alleged perpetrator as L.R. and contacted him by phone. L.R. said that on the day in question he had seen the applicants holding hands, which he had considered as attention-seeking and disrespectful to society. He had pretended to film them and asked them whether it was appropriate to flaunt their relationship in public, in view of the fact that same‑sex civil unions were not allowed under Lithuanian law. He also said that he “had nothing against homosexual persons” but that everyone had to behave in public in a way that did not disturb or disrespect others. He had not intended to frighten or insult the applicants but only to explain to them that in public they had to act in accordance with Lithuanian law. 7 .     On 29 June 2022 the police decided not to open a pre-trial investigation under Article 145 of the Criminal Code, on the grounds that the threat allegedly expressed by L.R. could not be seen as realistic and that there had not been any actual danger to the applicants’ life or limb. 8.     On 1 July 2022, before any appeals against the above-mentioned decision were lodged, the Vilnius prosecutor annulled it. The prosecutor observed that, while the police had examined the first applicant’s complaint from the angle of Article 145 of the Criminal Code, the events described in that complaint might also constitute criminal offences under Article 167 of the Criminal Code (unlawful collection of information about the private life of another person – see paragraph 54 below) or Article 169 of the Criminal Code (discrimination on the grounds of nationality, race, sex, origin, religion or other grounds – see paragraph 55 below). The prosecutor ordered the police, inter alia , to question both applicants as witnesses and to issue a new decision on whether to open a pre-trial investigation under Article   145, 167 or 169 of the Criminal Code. 9 .     On 8 July 2022 the police questioned the second applicant as a witness. He provided essentially the same account of the events as that given by the first applicant (see paragraphs 4 and 5 above). He also said that L.R. had told them that he would break their legs if he ever saw them holding hands again. 10 .     On 8 July 2022 the police decided not to open a pre-trial investigation. The decision repeated the reasons presented in the previous decision why a pre-trial investigation under Article 145 of the Criminal Code could not be opened (see paragraph 7 above). It further stated that there was no indication that the criminal offence under Article 167 of the Criminal Code could have been committed because L.R. had not actually filmed the applicants on his phone but had only pretended to do so (see paragraph 6 above). Nor was there any indication that the criminal offence under Article 169 of the Criminal Code could have been committed because L.R. had not carried out any discriminatory actions and had said that he “had nothing against homosexual persons” (see paragraph 6 above). 11 .     On 25 July 2022 the first applicant lodged an appeal against the above-mentioned decision, in which he argued that the police had essentially relied on the statements given by L.R., despite the alleged perpetrator having an obvious interest in avoiding criminal liability. The first applicant contended that L.R.’s actions had been clearly indicative of discrimination against the applicants on the grounds of their sexual orientation, which was prohibited under Article 169 of the Criminal Code. He also submitted that L.R.’s actions could amount to incitement of hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation under Article 170 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph   56 below) or to disturbance of public order under Article   284 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 57 below), and the fact that he had expressed bias against the applicants on the grounds of their sexual orientation should be considered an aggravating circumstance (see paragraph   58 below). 12 .     On 1 August 2022 the prosecutor allowed the appeal lodged by the first applicant and instructed the police to issue a new and duly reasoned decision on whether to open a pre-trial investigation. Decisions taken in 2022 not to open a pre-trial investigation Decision of the police of 10 August 2022 13 .     On 10 August 2022 the police issued a new decision not to open a pre ‑ trial investigation. Firstly, the decision stressed that, in order for the criminal offence under Article   145 of the Criminal Code to be committed, there had to be sufficient grounds to believe that the threat might be acted upon. Secondly, for the criminal offences provided in Articles 169 and   170 of the Criminal Code to be committed, an offensive or denigrating public statement alone was not sufficient unless it included a direct or indirect incitement to hatred or discrimination, or encouragement to use physical violence, which could pose a real threat to the values protected by those provisions. 14 .     In the light of the foregoing, the police concluded that L.R.’s actions had not been so dangerous as to warrant criminal liability. His statements had not been aimed at having the applicants killed or seriously injured. Moreover, he had not actually filmed them on his mobile phone but had only pretended to do so (see paragraph 6 above). While the opinion which he had expressed met the definition of discrimination, it lacked the level of dangerousness necessary to attract criminal liability: L.R. had asserted that he “had nothing against homosexual persons” (see paragraph   6 above) and he had made his statements in a private conversation with the applicants. Accordingly, there were no objective and factual elements showing that the criminal offences under Article   145 § 1, Article 167 § 1, Article 169 § 1 or Article 170 of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs   52-56 below) had been committed. Decision of the prosecutor of 31 August 2022 15 .     On 18 August 2022 the first applicant lodged an appeal against the decision of the police. He contended that L.R.’s actions had been dangerous and that his threats had been real, as proved by the fact that, following the incident, the first applicant had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder – for which he provided relevant medical documents. He further submitted that, according to the Court’s case-law, incitement of hatred did not necessarily need to include incitement to commit violence or other criminal activity ( he relied on Féret v.   Belgium , no.   15615/07, §§ 72-73, 16   July 2009). Moreover, he referred to recommendations issued by the Prosecutor General’s Office on investigating hate crime and hate speech, according to which, when assessing whether the perpetrator’s actions had been motivated by bias or prejudice, one of the relevant factors was the absence of any other motives for his or her actions. The first applicant submitted that all the relevant circumstances of the case could not be established without opening a pre-trial investigation. 16 .     On 31 August 2022 the prosecutor of the Vilnius district dismissed the appeal lodged by the first applicant. The prosecutor held that although L.R. had used words which had a negative and denigrating connotation and were of a threatening nature, they had not been such as to attract criminal liability under Article   145 § 1 of the Criminal Code. In particular, L.R. had not used any physical violence against the applicants, his actions had not been particularly aggressive or intense, and the incident had not lasted long. The prosecutor was of the view that, if L.R. had really sought to threaten the applicants, he would have taken more aggressive physical action. Thus, his intent to threaten them could not be established. 17 .     Furthermore, the prosecutor endorsed the finding of the police that it had not been established that L.R. had actually filmed the applicants on his mobile phone, thus, the criminal offence under Article 167 § 1 had not been committed either (see paragraph 14 above). 18 .     Turning to alleged offences under Articles 169 and 170 of the Criminal Code, the prosecutor acknowledged that L.R.’s statements had undoubtedly attested to his immature views and that he had expressed them in an unethical and offensive manner which had overstepped the acceptable limits of freedom of expression. However, they had not been so dangerous as to warrant criminal liability under those provisions. 19 .     Accordingly, the prosecutor concluded that all the necessary procedural measures had been taken and all the relevant circumstances had been established. If the first applicant had sustained damage to his health because of L.R.’s actions (see paragraph 15 above), he could seek compensation for that damage in civil proceedings. Decision of the pre-trial judge of 19 September 2022 20 .     On 8 September 2022 the first applicant lodged an appeal against the prosecutor’s decision, in which he essentially repeated the arguments that he had raised in his previous appeals (see paragraphs 11 and 15 above). 21 .     On 19 September 2022 the pre-trial judge of the Vilnius District Court dismissed the appeal lodged by the first applicant. The pre-trial judge agreed with the police and the prosecutor that, in the circumstances of the case, there were no grounds to find that L.R. had made specific and realistic threats to kill or seriously injure the applicants, so as to require criminal liability under Article   145 § 1 of the Criminal Code. He had not carried out any violent actions or had any items on him which could have been used to injure the applicants and the incident had been a one-time occurrence. Thus, there had not been sufficient grounds for the applicants to believe that the threat might be acted upon. 22 .     Furthermore, the pre-trial judge acknowledged that L.R.’s behaviour and words had been inappropriate and unethical and had expressed his negative views towards sexual minorities. However, for the reasons provided in the previous decisions (see paragraphs   13 and 16 above), there were no grounds to find that L.R. had sought to foster a negative attitude towards homosexuals or to incite discrimination or urge violence against them. Although his words had been of a negative and denigrating nature and directed against homosexuals, they could not have caused any real harm to the equality and dignity of homosexual people as a group or incite others to use violence against that group. The pre-trial judge emphasised that criminal liability was a measure of last resort which should only be used if the aims pursued could not be attained by more lenient measures. Decision of the Vilnius Regional Court of 19 October 2022 23 .     On 27 September 2022 the first applicant lodged an appeal against the decision of the pre-trial judge, in which he repeated the arguments that he had raised in his previous appeals (see paragraphs 11, 15 and 20 above). 24 .     On 19 October 2022 the Vilnius Regional Court dismissed the appeal lodged by the first applicant. It held that, when assessing whether there had been a threat to kill or seriously injure someone within the meaning of Article   145 § 1 of the Criminal Code, the way in which the victim had understood the perpetrator’s words was important but not decisive and that there had to be objective factors capable of showing that the threat had been real. In the case at hand, L.R. had expressed his disapproval and hostility towards the applicants in an inappropriate and offensive manner, but it had been his spontaneous reaction to the situation and not a real threat of death or serious injury. The fact that the applicants and L.R. were neighbours and had later run into each other (see paragraphs 4 and 5 above) did not confirm that the threat had been real because L.R. had not threatened them during any further encounters. 25 .     The court further held that the criminal offence of discrimination under Article 169 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 55 below) could only be committed by a civil servant or a person equivalent to a civil servant, or a private person carrying out certain functions. However, L.R. was a private person who did not carry out any such functions. Moreover, his behaviour – slurs and denigrating words which he had uttered personally to the applicants, and his harassment of them – when assessed in the light of the principles of reasonableness, proportionality and justice, were not sufficiently dangerous to attract criminal liability. 26 .     With regard to Article 170 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 56 below), the court held that, in order to constitute a criminal offence under that provision, the public statements in question had to be directed at a certain audience and seek to incite that audience to have a negative attitude towards or to discriminate or use violence against a group of people or a person belonging to that group. However, L.R.’s words had only been directed at the applicants, during a private conversation, and the applicants had not alleged that anyone else might have heard them. Accordingly, it could not be found that L.R. had sought to incite discrimination or violence against homosexual people. 27 .     Lastly, the court addressed the argument raised in the appeal that L.R.’s actions might have constituted the criminal offence of disturbance of public order under Article 284 of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 11 and 23 above). It held that, in order for that criminal offence to be committed, the perpetrator’s actions had to actually disturb public order or peace, for example, by humiliating, shocking or scaring others. However, since no third party had participated in the interaction between the applicants and L.R., neither public order nor peace had been disturbed. Reopening of the criminal proceedings in 2024 28.     On 15 February 2023 the applicants lodged the present application with the Court. On 7 February 2024 the Court gave notice of the application to the Lithuanian Government. 29 .     On 19 April 2024 the chief prosecutor of the Vilnius region annulled the decision issued by the police on 10 August 2022 (see paragraphs 13 and 14 above) and the decision issued by the prosecutor on 31 August 2022 (see paragraphs 16-19 above) and instructed the police to carry out a further clarification of the circumstances described in the first applicant’s complaint (see paragraph 4 above). The chief prosecutor noted that in the previous proceedings the authorities and courts had examined whether the circumstances described by the first applicant might have constituted criminal offences under Article 145 § 1, Article 167 § 1, Article 169 § 1 and Article   170 of the Criminal Code, and the chief prosecutor was not questioning their findings in that regard. However, the first applicant had also asked them to examine whether L.R. might have committed the criminal offence provided in Article 284 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 11 above), but the police and the prosecutor had not addressed that matter. Furthermore, when adopting the decision of 10   August 2022, the police had relied on L.R.’s explanation which he had given to an investigating officer by phone (see paragraph 6 above), but L.R. had not been questioned in accordance with the procedure established in the Code of Criminal Procedure, which constituted a grave procedural error. 30 .     On 7 and 9 May 2024 the police questioned the applicants as witnesses. They provided essentially the same account as in their previous complaints and statements (see paragraphs 4, 5 and 9 above). In addition, they submitted that L.R. had been standing close to them and they had seen on the screen of his phone that he had been filming them, that he had appeared aggressive and yelled at them and that they had been scared that he might act upon his threats. They also said that after the incident they had no longer felt safe living in that building and had started looking for an apartment elsewhere. 31 .     On 9 May 2024 the police questioned L.R. as a witness. He gave essentially the same statements as before (see paragraph 6 above) but denied having used any swearwords or slurs or having threatened the applicants in any way. He also said that he had pretended to film them on his mobile phone in order to “discipline” ( sudrausminti ) them and to preclude any indecent gestures or words that they might use against him. 32 .     On 13 May 2024 the police decided not to open a pre-trial investigation under Article 284 of the Criminal Code, finding that neither public order nor peace had been disturbed because nobody else had seen the incident between the applicants and L.R. 33 .     On 23 May 2024 the first applicant lodged an appeal against the decision of the police. On 30 May 2024 the prosecutor granted that appeal, annulled the police’s decision and decided to open a pre-trial investigation under Article   284 §   1 of the Criminal Code. Pre-trial investigation 34 .     On 7 June 2024 L.R. was officially notified that he was suspected of having committed a criminal offence under Article 284 § 1 of the Criminal Code and questioned as a suspect. He stated that on the day of the incident, he had seen the applicants holding hands. They had attracted his attention because they had been dressed “horribly” and “in a particularly provocative manner” – they had been wearing brightly coloured women’s clothing, such as tights and skirts. While walking, they had kissed. At that time, there had been a lot of discussion about the possibility of legalising same-sex civil unions in Lithuania, but they had not been legalised. L.R., “being a dutiful citizen of the Republic of Lithuania”, had therefore sought to remind the applicants of that fact. He had shouted at them “wait”, after which they had started walking faster. L.R. had approached them and had asked them why they were holding hands when that was against Lithuanian law. They had not replied. He had then asked them whether it was appropriate to publicly flaunt their relationship when same-sex civil unions had not been legalised in Lithuania, but they still had not replied. L.R. denied using any slurs or offensive words, threatening the applicants or hindering them from entering their apartment building, and said that he had spoken to them in a calm tone. He also said that he “had nothing against people with homosexual views” and that he “knew some great homosexuals”, but he believed that in public everybody had to behave in such a manner as not to disturb others. After that day, L.R. had run into the first applicant a few times but had ignored him. 35 .     In June and July 2024 the police examined the video-recording of L.R. provided by the first applicant (see paragraph 4 above), visited the location of the incident and took photographs, and spoke to the residents of nearby buildings and employees of nearby businesses, but were unable to identify anyone who had any information about the incident. The police also examined L.R.’s posts on social media in order to determine whether he had posted any homophobic content, but did not find any relevant information. They also sought to examine the mobile phone which L.R. had used during the incident but he informed the police that that phone had been lost. 36 .     On 30 July 2024 the prosecutor who was supervising the pre-trial investigation decided to discontinue the investigation under Article 284 of the Criminal Code and instead open an investigation under Article 148 § 1 of the Criminal Code (restriction of another person’s freedom of action – see paragraph 53 below). 37 .     On the same day, the applicants were granted victim status in the pre ‑ trial investigation under Article 148 § 1 of the Criminal Code. 38 .     On 31 July 2024 L.R. was officially notified that he was suspected of having committed a criminal offence under Article 148 § 1 of the Convention and questioned as a suspect. He confirmed his earlier statements (see paragraph 34 above) and denied having used any psychological coercion against the applicants or having otherwise limited their freedom of action. 39 .     On 1 September 2024 the applicants each lodged a separate civil claim in the criminal proceedings. The first applicant claimed EUR 510 in respect of pecuniary damage, corresponding to the cost of the psychological help which he had sought after the incident, and EUR 2,500 in respect of non ‑ pecuniary damage. The second applicant claimed EUR 1,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. They both submitted that after the incident they had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and that it had had an effect on their social lives – they had become afraid of strangers and no longer felt safe in public or when being alone; they both worked in the field of fashion but because of the fear and anxiety they had refused certain projects and avoided mass public events. The first applicant also submitted that the stress caused by the incident had led to him developing digestion problems; moreover, he had tried to spend less time in Vilnius in order to avoid running into L.R. and from September to December 2022 he had gone to live in Spain. 40 .     On 6 September 2024 the prosecutor drew up an indictment against L.R. whereby he was charged with the criminal offence under Article 148 §   1 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 53 below). The indictment stated that L.R., being motivated by the fact that same-sex civil unions had not been legalised in Lithuania and by his beliefs that people of the same sex should not hold hands or kiss in public, that men should not wear women’s clothing and that same-sex relationships should not be publicly displayed, had demanded that the applicants refrain from lawful actions and otherwise act in accordance with his demands – namely, that they stop holding hands in public. He had done so by using psychological coercion against the applicants: following them, humiliating them, calling them “faggots”, hindering them from entering their apartment building, telling them to look at his phone camera and threatening them with physical force if he ever saw them holding hands again. On the same day the applicants were informed that the case had been forwarded to the Vilnius District Court for examination on the merits. Proceedings before the Vilnius District Court 41.     The Vilnius District Court held hearings on 5 November and 17   December 2024, 9 and 22 January and 18 March 2025. 42 .     At the hearing of 5 November 2024 the applicants’ lawyer submitted a request to the court asking it to change the legal characterisation of L.R.’s actions from Article 148 § 1 of the Criminal Code to either discrimination under Article 169 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 55 below) or disturbance of public order under Article 284 of the Criminal Code, with prejudice on the grounds of sexual orientation as an aggravating circumstance (see paragraphs   57 and 58 below). The court decided to rule on that request at a later stage. 43 .     On 15 April 2025 the Vilnius District Court issued its decision. It decided to change the legal characterisation of L.R.’s actions from restriction of another person’s freedom of action under Article   148 § 1 of the Criminal Code to discrimination under Article 169 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph   55 below). In that connection, the court held as follows: “... [L.R.’s] actions were not directed against just any individuals or a heterosexual couple, but against a same-sex couple – [the applicants] – who, according to the accused, should not hold hands or kiss in public, should not wear women’s clothing because they are men and should not publicly flaunt a same-sex relationship, because he considers that a public display by homosexuals of their relationship is morally unacceptable and because a law on civil unions has not been enacted in Lithuania. At the court hearings and during the pre-trial investigation, the two victims consistently submitted that [L.R.] had noticed them specifically because of their sexual orientation ‑ because they were holding hands in public. The court has no reason to doubt that, at the time of the events in issue, [the applicants] were in a relationship, saw themselves as a family and lived together in a single household. It emphasises that ... [members of] the LGBTQ+ community have the right, in public, to hold hands, wear the clothes that they want to wear, kiss, etc., without fearing potential negative consequences. The mere fact that some of [the applicants’] behaviour in public was unacceptable to [L.R.] did not give him the right, and even less so a duty, as [L.R.] argued, to approach them and to infringe on their rights, freedoms and equality, on the grounds of their sexual orientation. It must be noted that the criminal offence under Article 169 of the Criminal Code belongs to the category of hate crimes. Hate crimes constitute discrimination – unequal treatment of persons, restricting their rights or providing [some with] certain privileges on the grounds of their personal characteristics, that is to say, infringement of equality of all persons. A hate crime can be distinguished [from other crimes] on the basis of the following elements: (i) the victim – the perpetrator chooses the victim because of his or her real or perceived belonging to a certain social group (for example, the LGBTQ+ community); and (ii) prejudice or bias motive – the perpetrator’s prejudice against individuals belonging to a certain group. The court observes that on 26 July 2023 the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Lithuania issued order no. I-164 on the approval of the recommendations for investigating hate crime and hate speech ... Paragraph 21.2 of that order provides that, in the context of hate crimes, a bias motive should not only be understood as the feeling of bias, in view of the following: [paragraph] 21.2.1. [states that] the perpetrator may commit the criminal offence because of other feelings (for example, anger, jealousy or peer pressure); [paragraph] 21.2.2. [states that]   the perpetrator may have no negative feelings towards a specific individual but be prejudiced against the group of people to which the victim belongs; [paragraph] 21.2.3.   [states that] the perpetrator may be prejudiced against anyone who does not belong to the group with which the perpetrator identifies; and [paragraph] 21.2.4. [states that] the victim may be just a symbol of a certain idea (for example, immigration) to which the perpetrator is hostile. The Supreme Court has held that discrimination on the grounds of age, sex, sexual orientation, disability, race, colour, nationality, language, origin, ethnicity, social status, belief, convictions or views may be manifested by various actions which seek to discriminate against a group of people or an individual, that is, to impede their participation in a certain activity equally with others, or to restrict their rights and freedoms. The rights and freedoms which are sought to be restricted [on the above ‑ mentioned grounds] must be guaranteed by law, and in some cases they must be guaranteed only to a certain group of people. Discriminatory actions are not allowed in political, economic, social, cultural, professional and other activities. Nor are they allowed in the public space. The criminal offence under Article 169 of the Criminal Code is considered to be committed the moment when the unlawful actions are carried out. It should also be noted that discrimination ... may be manifested by various actions: insults; ... creating a frightening or humiliating environment; ... etc. In the present case, it has been established that [the applicants] attracted [L.R.’s] attention only because they belong to the LGBTQ+ community and that, when committing the criminal offence in issue, the accused was prejudiced not against [the applicants] personally but against homosexuals ... Although throughout the criminal proceedings [L.R.] asserted that he was not prejudiced against the LGBTQ+ community as such or against homosexuals, and publicly available information examined by the authorities did not confirm it either, the court finds that ... [L.R.’s] actions and the slurs and threats which he uttered disprove those assertions.” 44 .     The Vilnius District Court observed that, according to the Court’s case-law, discrimination based on sexual orientation is as serious as discrimination based on “race, origin or colour” (it relied on Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden , no. 1813/07, 9 February 2012). 45 .     The court found no reason to question the applicants’ account of the relevant events and held that L.R.’s actions had contained the necessary objective elements of the criminal offence of discrimination. It held, in the relevant part, as follows: “... [T]he court is of the view that [L.R.] is trying to minimise the dangerousness of his actions and that the statements which he gave throughout the proceedings must be considered as his defensive position. Although the court has found some small discrepancies in [the applicants’] testimony as well, it considers that they presented a consistent account of the essential facts and that their overall account is corroborated by other evidence. The court also takes note of the fact that [the applicants] were [L.R.’s] victims [and that] during the events in question they had been scared and had been in a weaker position; moreover, a rather substantial amount of time has passed since the incident, thus, at the time of the court proceedings they could have been objectively unable to remember all the circumstances in detail. ... The court has no grounds to question [the applicants’] testimony, as it was given under oath, they were warned about liability for giving false testimony, and they stated that they were not related to the accused and had not known or seen him before the events in issue. Furthermore, it has not been established that they might have any reason to slander or harm the accused; accordingly, the court considers their testimony to be decisive, albeit not the only, evidence supporting [L.R.’s] guilt. ... The court critically assesses the accused’s assertion that he had simply approached [the applicants], since [L.R.] himself acknowledged that they had started walking faster [after he had called out to them] – in the court’s view, there is no reason to doubt that [L.R.] followed them to the door of their apartment building. That was confirmed by [both applicants] ... The court does not doubt that [L.R.] used slurs against [the applicants] ... [including calling them ‘faggots’] ... The court considers that those words had a negative and discriminatory meaning [and that their use] debased [the applicants’] dignity. Furthermore, the court does not doubt that [L.R.] was filming [the applicants] because [the second applicant] confirmed that he had seen the amount of time of filming [running on the screen of L.R.’s phone] and the accused had asked them to face the camera several times ... The court considers that by filming the victims, the accused sought to humiliate them, even if it has not been established that the video-recording was publicly disseminated ... [Both applicants] consistently submitted that [L.R.] had threatened them with physical violence, namely that if he ever saw them holding hands again, he would break their legs and arms, and it would not end well for them. [L.R.] denied having threatened them, although he told the court that he had approached [the applicants] in order to discipline them; that when [the applicants] had not replied to his question, he had asked the same question again in a raised voice; and that when walking away from them he may have said something but it had not been a threat; however, later he submitted that he had not disciplined the victims but had only asked them a question which they had ignored. These contradictory statements lead the court to conclude that the accused threatened [the applicants] in the manner alleged by them throughout the proceedings. [L.R.] also denied having held the door of the [applicants’] apartment building open, although he did acknowledge that they had not managed to type the correct entry code on their first try ... Having examined [the applicants’] testimony, the court finds that the accusation against [L.R.] that he held the door of the apartment building open has been proved. In view of the fact that the criminal offence under Article 169 of the Criminal Code is considered to be committed at the moment when the unlawful actions are carried out, and the discrimination against [the applicants] by [L.R.] on the grounds of their sexual orientation was committed actively – by following homosexuals who he did not know, debasing the dignity of a same-sex couple, holding the door of the apartment building open, filming them and threatening them with physical violence if they held hands in public again – the court concludes that the objective elements of the criminal offence under Article 169 of the Criminal Code have been established.” 46 .     Furthermore, the Vilnius District Court was satisfied that L.R. had acted with a direct intent, as required under Article 169 of the Criminal Code, because such an intent had been evident from his actions that had been motivated by the applicants’ sexual orientation. The court was also satisfied that L.R.’s actions – following the applicants, using slurs against them, filming them and threatening them with physical violence – had been sufficiently dangerous to attract criminal liability, especially in view of the fact that the incident had taken place near their home and that those actions had been intense. Accordingly, the court found L.R. guilty of the criminal offence of discrimination. 47 .     When determining the sentence, the court noted that there were no circumstances mitigating or aggravating L.R.’s responsibility. In that connection, it observed that the aggravating circumstance provided in Article   60 § 1 (12) of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 58 below) could not be imputed in cases where prejudice or bias against a certain group of people or an individual belonging to that group was one of the elements of the criminal offence in question. The court further observed that L.R. had no valid convictions (his two previous criminal convictions had already expired); he had received several administrative penalties, mostly for breaching road traffic regulations, and had paid the fines; and he had a young child, a place of residence, a lawful source of income and financial obligations. Accordingly, the court considered that the aims of the punishment would be achieved by imposing a fine of EUR 2,600 – slightly above the minimum provided in Article   169 of the Criminal Code. 48 .     The court then addressed the first applicant’s civil claim in respect of pecuniary damage (see paragraph 39 above). It observed that he had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and that between 2022 and   2024 he had attended psychological counselling and had provided the relevant receipts. The court saw no reason to question the causal link between the criminal offence committed by L.R. and the first applicant’s diagnosis and the related expenses. It therefore granted his claim under that head in full and awarded him EUR   510, to be paid by L.R. 49 .     As to the applicants’ claims in respect of non-pecuniary damage (see paragraph 39 above), the court held as follows: “It has been established that [L.R.] discriminated against [the applicants] on the grounds of their sexual orientation in a public place, close to their home. The victims were followed, filmed, insulted with slurs and threatened. The court considers that [the applicants] undoubtedly experienced negative emotions: stress, anxiety, humiliation, and feelings of fear and abasement. Moreover, the court has no reason to doubt that after the criminal offence committed by [L.R.], [the applicants] could have been scared to participate in mass public events. It has been established that [both applicants] continued to suffer from the consequences [of the criminal offence] – they were both diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and prescribed psychological counselling, while [the first applicant] was also prescribed medication. The court takes note of the fact that [the first applicant] attended psychological counselling and sought help in multiple establishments, whereas [the second applicant] consulted a psychologist once. ... The fact that at the time of the commission of the criminal offence the perpetrator lived close to [the applicants’] home and that the offence was committed near their home, could have created additional fear, anxiety and stress for them, [in view of the possibility that they might] run into [L.R.] every time they left their home. Moreover, both victims work in the fields of fashion, art and creation, thus, the negative experience which they suffered solely because of their sexual orientation, appearance or behaviour must have undoubtedly had an impact on their professional activity – the court does not doubt that, after the incident, it became more difficult for [the applicants] to use their creativity and engage in their favourite activities and that they became scared to participate in public events and afraid of strangers, and had to restrict themselves as a result.                         [The first applicant] ... submitted that after the criminal offence he had experienced some physical disorders for which he had sought medical help. The court observes that the conclusions by medical specialists available in the case file do not show that the digestion problems which he suffered were caused by stress or negative feelings [relating to the criminal offence]. Moreover, before the court [the first applicant] confirmed that he had gone to Spain to study, even though in the civil claim he had submitted that he had left because of the stress following the incident, thus the court finds that [L.R.’s] actions were not the only reason why [the first applicant] left Lithuania. ... Before the court, [L.R.] disputed [the applicants’] civil claims and submitted that ... [their active presence on social media] did not suggest that they had been depressed or otherwise vulnerable ... He had also seen [both applicants] on social media wearing jumpers with the word ‘faggot’ written on them ... ... In the court’s view, [the applicants’ activity on social media] does not in any way refute the fact that, as a result of [L.R.’s] actions, they experienced stress, negative emotions and fear. On the contrary, as submitted by [the applicants], it was precisely on social media that they were able to be more open after the incident. A lot of attention was given to [the second applicant’s] creation – jumpers with the word ‘faggot’ written in rainbow colours. [The second applicant] explained to the court in detail the circumstances in which the jumpers had been created and his idea behind them ... From publicly available information ... it is apparent that he has also created and publicly presented various other provocative and original creations. This leads the court to conclude that ... the jumper with the word ‘faggot’ is a continuation of his creative activity. ... When determining the awards to be made in respect of non-pecuniary damage, the court also takes into account the fact that the criminal offence was committed in June 2022 and the pre-trial investigations against [L.R.] were discontinued several times, which could have caused [the applicants] feelings of injustice and disappointment. However, the court notes that at present [the applicants] actively participate in various projects and TV programmes, post about their daily life on social media, continue to engage in their favourite activities, maintain contact with others and are not isolated from society. It should also be noted that [the first applicant] acknowledged that psychotherapy was helping him and [the second applicant] admitted that in his claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage he might have also included a loss of income. In the light of the foregoing and having regard to the criteria of fairness, justice and reasonableness and the courts’ practice in similar cases, the court holds that [the applicants’] claims in respect of non-pecuniary damage should be granted in part.” The court awarded EUR 2,000 to the first applicant and EUR 1,000 to the second applicant, payable by L.R. 50 .     Appeals against the decision of the Vilnius District Court could be lodged within 20 days. No appeals were lodged, either by the defendant, the prosecutor or the applicants, and the decision became final. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE Domestic legal framework and practice Constitution 51 .     The relevant provisions of the Constitution read: Article 21 “The human person shall be inviolable. Human dignity shall be protected by law. It shall be prohibited to torture or injure a human being, degrade his dignity, subject him to cruel treatment, or to establish such punishments. ...” Article 22 “Private life shall be inviolable. ... Information concerning the private life of a person may be collected only upon a justified court decision and only according to the law. The law and courts shall protect everyone from arbitrary or unlawful interference with his private and family life, as well as from encroachment upon his honour and dignity.” Article 29 “All persons shall be equal before the law, courts, and other state institutions and officials. Human rights may not be restricted; no one may be granted any privileges on the grounds of sex, race, nationality, language, origin, social status, belief, convictio