CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITYCOM;ENG — 2 décembre 2025

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s2EF17D91 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sC986E16F { font-family:Arial; color:#ffffff } .s3AAE10DF { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s3CA22BA { font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .s819344C9 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:18pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-18pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt } .s2D9C6089 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s84651E4E { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:3pt; text-align:justify } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sB00DFE03 { width:22.87pt; display:inline-block } .sA0993303 { width:139.09pt; display:inline-block } .s5D826FD4 { width:25.88pt; display:inline-block } .s1B61D60 { width:156.43pt; display:inline-block }     THIRD SECTION DECISION Application no. 16077/23 INTERZERO D.O.O. against Slovenia   The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 2   December 2025 as a Committee composed of:   Lətif Hüseynov , President ,   Canòlic Mingorance Cairat,   Vasilka Sancin , judges , and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   16077/23) against the Republic of Slovenia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 12 April 2023 by a Slovenian company, Interzero d.o.o. (“the applicant company”), which was established in 2004 and is registered in Ljubljana, and was represented by Osterman Perko o.p. d.o.o., a law firm based in Ljubljana; the decision to give notice of the application to the Slovenian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mrs B. Jovin Hrastnik, Senior State Attorney; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated, decides as follows: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1 .     The application concerns alleged breach of property right of the applicant company by State authorities and lack of effective remedies. 2.     The applicant company’s main activity is the collection and removal of non-hazardous waste. On 6 December 2004, following a request by the applicant company, the Slovenian Environment Agency issued an environmental licence allowing it to carry out packaging waste (hereinafter “waste”) handling activities but also obliging it to dispose of a specified quantity of municipal waste from a public service provider at its own expense, the proportions of such waste being determined by the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning (hereinafter “the Ministry”) on a yearly basis. The licence was subsequently extended until 31 December 2012. In 2010 the Ministry published the municipal waste handling proportions for that year, pursuant to the Decree on Waste Handling (“the Decree”). The applicant company brought an action before the Administrative Court, challenging the published proportions. 3 .     On 25 August 2011 the Administrative Court rejected the action, stating that the published proportions could not be challenged by means of an administrative dispute and that the applicant company should instead request a formal administrative decision from the Ministry setting out the proportions, which could then be challenged, inter alia , in court proceedings. The applicant company subsequently requested that the Ministry issue administrative decisions setting out the municipal waste handling proportions for 2010, 2011 and 2012. The Ministry refused, stating that such decisions could not be issued. The applicant company subsequently challenged the Ministry’s refusal before the Administrative Court, requesting that the court determine the municipal waste handling proportions. On 5   September 2013 the Administrative Court dismissed the action on the grounds that the provision of the Decree concerning the determination of municipal waste handling proportions, implemented by the Ministry through publication on its website, lacked a legal basis. The applicant company did not challenge that decision before the Constitutional Court. 4 .     In the meantime, on 28 December 2012, following a request by the applicant company, the Slovenian Environment Agency issued a decision granting a new environmental licence (hereinafter “the 2013-2022 environmental licence”), which – in addition to the rights with respect to waste disposal – again included an obligation for it to dispose of municipal waste from a public service provider in accordance with the proportions published by the Ministry. The licence was granted for ten years. The applicant company did not appeal against that decision. 5 .     On 6 August 2013 the Ministry published the municipal waste handling proportions for 2013.   On 28 February 2014 the Inspectorate for Agriculture and the Environment (hereinafter “the Inspectorate”) ordered the applicant company to take over 3,103 tonnes of waste by 31 March 2014, in accordance with the proportions determined by the Ministry and published on its website. The Inspectorate found that the applicant company had failed to dispose of all the waste required. 6.     On 14 March 2014 the applicant company lodged an appeal against the Inspectorate’s decision. The company claimed that the facts had been incompletely and incorrectly established, and that the decision was unlawful. On 31 March 2014 the applicant company informed the Inspectorate that it was implementing the measures pursuant to its decision and requested an extension of the deadline for compliance until 30 April 2014. 7.     On 9 September 2014 the Ministry allowed the applicant company’s appeal and referred the case back to the Inspectorate for re-examination, finding that the reasoning provided in its decision was insufficient to establish with certainty that the applicant company had failed to fulfil its obligation to take over the municipal waste. 8.     On 20 March 2015 the Inspectorate discontinued the proceedings against the applicant company, finding that the latter had, in the meantime, disposed of all the waste required for 2013 and that a new decision on the matter could therefore no longer be taken. 9.     On 15 December 2014 the applicant company brought an action for damages against the State, alleging that it had been compelled to carry out a specific act on the basis of an unlawful decision. It claimed damages in excess of 182,000 euros (EUR). 10 .     On 21 March 2017 the Ljubljana District Court dismissed the applicant company’s action, disagreeing with the conclusions of the Administrative Court of 5 September 2013 (see paragraph 3 above). It found that none of the statutory conditions for liability in such cases had been fulfiled, namely “qualified unlawfulness”, damage, causation and fault. 11 .     On 20 April 2017 the applicant company appealed, arguing that all the conditions for liability had been met. On 27 September 2018 the Ljubljana Higher Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the actions complained of could not be considered unlawful under the standard of “qualified unlawfulness”, which required a breach of “the highest constitutional norms or fundamental civilisation standards”. The court noted that the 2013 waste handling proportions had been duly published on the Ministry’s website in line with both the Decree and the 2013-2022 environmental licence. Furthermore, it held that the applicant company had not exhausted all available legal remedies, as it had failed to request a formal administrative decision from the Ministry. The court found that the applicant company had not explained why it had not pursued legal remedies in response to the determination of the 2013 waste handling proportions. Moreover, the court held that no link had been established between the alleged unlawful actions and the alleged damage, as the Inspectorate had merely imposed an obligation already contained in the 2013-2022 environmental licence (see paragraph 4 above). It held that the applicant company had consented to that environmental licence and to the obligation to dispose of the waste in accordance with the proportions published on the Ministry’s website. It concluded that, since two of the four cumulative elements necessary to establish State liability for damages had not been met, it was unnecessary to examine the remaining two. 12.     On 9 November 2018 the applicant company filed a motion for leave to appeal on points of law, which the Supreme Court dismissed on 18   December 2018. 13.     On 4 March 2019 the applicant company filed a constitutional complaint. On 5 December 2022 the Constitutional Court declined to accept it for consideration. 14.     The applicant company complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, in conjunction with Article 13 of the Convention, that the right to obtain compensation for damage caused by unlawful State acts had turned out to be merely theoretical in its case because of the requirement to prove that the State had acted with “qualified unlawfulness”. In this connection, the applicant company also complained that there had been no legal basis for the obligation to manage and dispose of additional waste at its own expense. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT 15.     The Court reiterates that an applicant may allege a violation of Article   1 of Protocol No. 1 only in so far as the impugned decisions relate to his or her “possessions” within the meaning of that provision. “Possessions” can be “existing possessions” or claims that are sufficiently established to be regarded as “assets” (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos.   37685/10 and 22768/12, § 142, 20 March 2018). 16.     Therefore, the issue to be examined is whether the applicant company’s compensation claim stemming from the alleged unlawful actions of the Inspectorate had a sufficient basis in national law to be regarded as an “asset” and therefore “possession” protected by Article 1 of Protocol No.   1 to the Convention (see Radomilja and Others , cited above, §   144). 17.     The Court has previously held that no legitimate expectation can be said to arise where there is a dispute as to the correct interpretation and application of domestic law and the applicant’s submissions are subsequently rejected by the national courts (see   Kopecký v. Slovakia [GC], no. 44912/98, § 50, ECHR 2004-IX). In the present case, the applicant company’s compensation claim was dismissed, as the domestic courts found that at least two of the required statutory elements had not been established (see paragraphs 10 and 11 above). That finding was contested by the applicant company, which considered that it had satisfied all the statutory requirements for claiming compensation and that it was almost impossible to establish the element of “qualified unlawfulness”. This argument was closely related to its allegation that there was no legal basis for the obligation to manage and dispose of additional waste at its own expense. 18.     The Court observes that the applicant company essentially disputes the interpretation and application of domestic law, and the assessment of whether the statutory requirements for State liability for damages were met. In this connection, the Court notes, firstly, that by accepting the 2013-2022 environmental licence (see paragraph 4 above), the applicant company agreed to the obligation to dispose of the municipal waste in accordance with the Ministry’s proportions. Secondly, although the applicant company argued that the Ministry’s determination of municipal waste handling proportions lacked a statutory basis – as noted in the Administrative Court’s decision of 5 September 2013 (see paragraph 3 above) – it did not challenge its obligation to dispose of the municipal waste in accordance with the proportions published on the Ministry’s website with respect to the 2013-2022 environmental licence by seeking a formal administrative decision from the Ministry, which could have been challenged through available domestic remedies, as noted by the Higher Court (see paragraph 11 above). As regards the Administrative Court’s decision issued in relation to the previous licence, it would appear that the first-instance court in the compensation proceedings disagreed with it (see paragraph 10 above). Be that as it may, it must be noted that the applicant company did not pursue further remedies against the Administrative Court’s decision (see paragraph 3 above), such as a constitutional complaint, as also pointed out by the Government in their observations. 19.     The Court does not find it necessary to address whether the standard of “qualified unlawfulness” itself raises an issue under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and Article 13 of the Convention in cases concerning State liability for breaches of Convention rights. This is because, in the present case, the domestic courts’ findings related to the applicant company’s obligations stemming from the 2013-2022 environmental licence and its failure to use available remedies do not appear in any way arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable. In the light of this, the Court holds that under the relevant law, as interpreted and applied by the domestic authorities, the applicant company had neither a right nor a claim amounting to a “legitimate expectation” within the meaning of the Court’s case-law to obtain the compensation in question. 20.     It follows that the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4. 21.     Having regard to the fact that Article 13 of the Convention is not autonomous and to the conclusion that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is not applicable, the Court considers that Article 13 cannot apply in the present case. It follows that the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 taken together with Article 13 is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4. For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Declares the application inadmissible. Done in English and notified in writing on 15 January 2026.     Olga Chernishova   Lətif Hüseynov   Deputy Registrar   President