CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 9 décembre 2025

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(“the applicant”) is a Syrian national who was born in 1981, and is currently in Sweden. The President granted the applicant’s request for his identity not to be disclosed to the public (Rule 47 § 4). He was represented before the Court by Mr M.A. Lala, a lawyer practising in Vagnhärad. 2.     The Swedish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agents, Ms T. Hydén and Mr F. Bergius, both of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 3.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. Domestic proceedings 4.     In 2019 the applicant lodged an application for asylum in Sweden. His wife and children had applied for asylum in Sweden earlier the same year. He submitted, inter alia , that he had previously been imprisoned in Syria because of his activities in opposition to the Assad regime; that he was still of interest to the Syrian authorities; and that he had been called up for service in the military reserve in Syria but had not complied with that summons. 5.     On 26 August 2021 the Migration Agency ( Migrationsverket ) dismissed his application and ordered his deportation to Syria. Asylum applications lodged by his wife and children were likewise dismissed, and their deportation was ordered to Syria (in respect of the children) and Lebanon (in respect of his wife), on the basis of their respective nationalities. 6 .     The Migration Court ( Migrationsdomstolen ) upheld these decisions on appeal, finding, inter alia , as follows. In view of the information about Syria available to the court, the applicant did not risk being summoned for service in the military reserve or being punished for any previous failure to heed a summons. While his account of his past activities in opposition to the Assad regime and imprisonment was accepted, he had not established as probable that he would be at risk because of those activities upon his return to Syria. Moreover, the general security situation in the applicant’s home region was not so severe that everyone there was at risk of being subjected to treatment warranting protection. The court also noted that while the deportation orders concerned deportation to Syria and Lebanon respectively, the family members could still choose to travel instead to any country that would accept them. Given their respective citizenships and the possibility of their obtaining residence permits in Syria and Lebanon, the family members should be able to reside together in either of those countries. 7.     On 20 December 2022 the Migration Court of Appeal ( Migrationsöverdomstolen ) denied the applicant and his family members leave to appeal, thereby rendering the above-noted decisions final and non ‑ appealable. 8.     Subsequently the applicant applied for a residence permit on the basis of the fact that he had employment in Sweden, and his wife and children applied for residence permits as his family members. Their applications were dismissed because the applicant’s submitted passport lacked his signature (and he therefore had not verified his identity), and the other family members’   applications were contingent on his. This decision was upheld on appeal by the Migration Court, and, on 26 January 2024, the Migration Court of Appeal refused them leave to appeal. Developments in Syria, and the Swedish authorities’ policies regarding returns and decision-making in cases concerning Syria 9.     After the application had been communicated to the respondent Government, there were developments in the situation in Syria. On 7   December 2024 the Assad regime, which had ruled Syria for over 50 years, was overturned and a new interim government was subsequently installed. 10 .     On 10 December 2024 the Migration Agency issued a legal-position paper entitled “Legal position: Assessment of protection needs and enforcement measures for persons from Syria” ( Rättsligt ställningstagande: Prövning av skyddsbehov och verkställigheter för personer hemmahörande i Syrien , RS/007/2024), which imposed a general halt to decision-making in respect of cases concerning applications for asylum lodged by persons from Syria and a general suspension of the enforcement of all deportation orders to Syria. In this document the Migration Agency noted, inter alia , that security developments in Syria were very uncertain and difficult to assess, and that it was currently not possible to assess, with certainty, how the conflict or the political situation would develop. It was therefore not possible to carry out, with sufficient certainty, a forward-looking assessment of the need for protection of persons from Syria. 11 .     On 10 March 2025 the Migration Agency published an updated version of this legal-position paper which extended the general halt in decision-making, noting that it remained difficult to assess how the situation in Syria would develop and that the prevailing uncertainty meant that it was currently not possible to carry out a forward-looking assessment of the need for protection with sufficient certainty. In the same update, the general suspension of the enforcement of deportation orders to Syria was lifted. The Migration Agency stated that the initial phase of the rapidly emerging situation in Syria had passed and that there were no practical impediments to enforcement. The Migration Agency therefore considered that a general suspension was no longer needed and that the issue of impediments to enforcement could be handled in the usual manner. In that regard, the Migration Agency stated that if the current situation in Syria prevented a person from returning there, that person could submit a notification to the Migration Agency of any impediments to enforcement, in accordance with Chapter 12 of the Aliens Act ( utlänningslagen , 2005:716). 12 .     On 10 June 2025 the Migration Agency published a further updated version of its legal-position paper, by which the general decision-making halt was prolonged until 10 September 2025. The Migration Agency stated, inter   alia , that the limited information available regarding the level of indiscriminate violence – together with the continuing uncertain and difficult ‑ to-assess situation in Syria – meant that it was not possible to make a forward-looking assessment of the need for protection with sufficient certainty. This updated version of the legal-position paper did not mention anything regarding the enforcement of deportation orders to Syria. 13.     On 11 September 2025 the Migration Agency decided to revoke the above ‑ mentioned legal-position paper. The Migration Agency stated that nine months had passed since the fall of the Assad regime and that there was now sufficient information about Syria to make a forward-looking assessment in respect of all parts of an asylum case. Accordingly, the decision to temporarily halt decision-making in asylum cases could be revoked. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK Domestic law 14.     The basic provisions applicable in the present case concerning the right of aliens to enter and remain in Sweden are laid down in the Aliens Act. 15.     An alien who is considered to be a refugee or a person eligible for subsidiary protection is, with certain exceptions, entitled to a residence permit in Sweden (Chapter 5, section 1, of the Act). The term “refugee” refers to an alien who is outside the country of his or her origin owing to a well ‑ founded fear of being persecuted on grounds of race, nationality, religious or political beliefs, or on grounds of gender, sexual orientation or other membership of a particular social group, and who is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country (Chapter   4, section   1). The term “person eligible for subsidiary protection” refers to an alien who does not qualify as a refugee but is outside the country of his or her origin because there are substantial grounds for believing ( grundad anledning att anta ) that, upon return to his or her country of origin, the alien would be at risk of being punished by the death penalty or subjected to corporal punishment, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or as a civilian would face a serious and personal risk of being harmed by reason of indiscriminate violence in connection with an external or internal armed conflict, and who is unable or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of his or her country of origin. (Chapter   4, section 2). The above applies irrespective of whether the persecution or ill ‑ treatment is at the hands of the authorities of the country or if those authorities cannot be expected to offer effective protection against such acts by private individuals. 16 .     As regards the enforcement of a deportation or expulsion order, account has to be taken of the risk of capital or corporal punishment or torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. According to a special provision on impediments to enforcement, an alien must not be sent to a country where there are reasonable grounds for believing ( skälig anledning att anta ) that he or she would be in danger of being punished by the death penalty or subjected to corporal punishment, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Chapter   12, section 1). In addition, an alien must not, in principle, be sent to a country where he or she risks persecution (Chapter 12, section 2). 17.     Under certain conditions, an alien may be granted a residence permit even if a deportation or expulsion order has acquired legal force. This is the case when new circumstances have emerged which indicate ( innebär ) that there are impediments to enforcement of the nature referred to in Chapter   12, sections   1 or 2, or where there are medical or other special reasons why the order should not be enforced (Chapter 12, section 18). If a residence permit cannot be granted under those criteria, the Migration Agency may instead decide to re-examine the matter. Such re-examination shall be granted where it may be assumed ( kan antas ), on the basis of new circumstances relied upon by the alien in question, that there are lasting impediments to enforcement of the nature referred to in Chapter   12, sections   1 and 2, and that those circumstances could not have been raised previously or the alien shows that he or she has a valid excuse for not having done so. Should the applicable conditions not have been met, the Migration Agency shall decide not to allow an application for re-examination (Chapter   12, section   19). 18.     A decision by the Migration Agency, pursuant to Chapter   12, section   19, not to allow a re-examination is subject to appeal to a Migration Court (Chapter 14, section 5), whose decision may be further appealed against before the Migration Court of Appeal (Chapter 16, section 9). 19 .     If an alien cites new circumstances, within the meaning of Chapter   12, section   19, the deportation order may not be enforced until the Migration Agency has determined whether a re-examination should take place (Chapter   12, section 19 a, subsection 1). Furthermore, if the matter of re ‑ examination has not been previously decided on and the alien appeals against the Migration Agency’s decision not to allow a re-examination, the Migration Court shall determine whether a stay of execution as regards the deportation order should be issued, and the order may not be enforced until this matter has been determined (Chapter 12, section 19 a, subsection 3). 20 .     If a re-examination is granted, the ensuing proceedings can result in the alien being granted a residence permit by the Migration Agency. If a residence permit is not granted, the Migration Agency’s decision is subject to appeal to a Migration Court (Chapter 14, section 3). That court’s ruling can be further appealed against before the Migration Court of Appeal (Chapter   16, section 9). If a re-examination has been granted, the deportation order may not be enforced until a final decision has been delivered in the re ‑ examination proceedings (Chapter 12, section 19 a, subsection 2). 21 .     In the travaux préparatoires to Chapter 12, section 19, of the Aliens Act (prop. 2004/05:170, p. 227), it was noted that one of the situations in which a re-examination may be relevant was if the alien cited a completely new circumstance in support of his or her need for protection in Sweden – for example, that the political conditions in his or her home country had changed completely since the case had been examined. In later travaux préparatoires (prop.   2016/17:17, p.   73-85 and 94 ‑ 95) it was noted that Chapter   12, section   19, of the Aliens Act implemented Article   33   §   2   (d) and Article   40 §§   2-5 of the Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26   June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (recast) (“the recast Asylum Procedures Directive”), and that Chapter   12, section   19 a, of the Aliens Act partially implemented Article   46   §§ 6 and 8 of the recast Asylum Procedures Directive (see paragraph 22 below). European Union law 22 .     The recast Asylum Procedures Directive provides,   inter alia , as follows: Article 33: Inadmissible applications “... 2. Member States may consider an application for international protection as inadmissible only if: ... (d) the application is a subsequent application, where no new elements or findings relating to the examination of whether the applicant qualifies as a beneficiary of international protection by virtue of Directive 2011/95/EU have arisen or have been presented by the applicant; or ...” Article 40: Subsequent application “1. Where a person who has applied for international protection in a Member State makes further representations or a subsequent application in the same Member State, that Member State shall examine these further representations or the elements of the subsequent application in the framework of the examination of the previous application or in the framework of the examination of the decision under review or appeal, insofar as the competent authorities can take into account and consider all the elements underlying the further representations or subsequent application within this framework. 2. For the purpose of taking a decision on the admissibility of an application for international protection pursuant to Article 33(2)(d), a subsequent application for international protection shall be subject first to a preliminary examination as to whether new elements or findings have arisen or have been presented by the applicant which relate to the examination of whether the applicant qualifies as a beneficiary of international protection by virtue of Directive 2011/95/EU. 3. If the preliminary examination referred to in paragraph 2 concludes that new elements or findings have arisen or been presented by the applicant which significantly add to the likelihood of the applicant qualifying as a beneficiary of international protection by virtue of Directive 2011/95/EU, the application shall be further examined in conformity with Chapter II. Member States may also provide for other reasons for a subsequent application to be further examined. 4. Member States may provide that the application will only be further examined if the applicant concerned was, through no fault of his or her own, incapable of asserting the situations set forth in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article in the previous procedure, in particular by exercising his or her right to an effective remedy pursuant to Article   46. 5. When a subsequent application is not further examined pursuant to this Article, it shall be considered inadmissible, in accordance with Article 33(2)(d).” Article 41: Exceptions [to] the right to remain in case of subsequent applications “1. Member States may make an exception [to] the right to remain in the territory where a person: (a) has lodged a first subsequent application, which is not further examined pursuant to Article   40(5), merely in order to delay or frustrate the enforcement of a decision which would result in his or her imminent removal from that Member State; or (b) makes another subsequent application in the same Member State, following a final decision considering a first subsequent application inadmissible pursuant to Article   40(5) or after a final decision to reject that application as unfounded. Member States may make such an exception only where the determining authority considers that a return decision will not lead to direct or indirect   refoulement   in violation of that Member State’s international and Union obligations. 2. In cases referred to in paragraph 1, Member States may also: ... (c) derogate from Article 46(8).” Article 46: The right to an effective remedy “1. Member States shall ensure that applicants have the right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal, against the following: (a) a decision taken on their application for international protection, including a decision: ... (ii) considering an application to be inadmissible pursuant to Article 33(2); ... 5. Without prejudice to paragraph 6, Member States shall allow applicants to remain in the territory until the time limit within which to exercise their right to an effective remedy has expired and, when such a right has been exercised within the time limit, pending the outcome of the remedy. 6. In the case of a decision: ... (b) considering an application to be inadmissible pursuant to Article   33(2)(a), (b) or (d); ... a court or tribunal shall have the power to rule whether or not the applicant may remain on the territory of the Member State, either upon the applicant’s request or acting ex officio , if such a decision results in ending the applicant’s right to remain in the Member State and where in such cases the right to remain in the Member State pending the outcome of the remedy is not provided for in national law. ... 8. Member States shall allow the applicant to remain in the territory pending the outcome of the procedure to rule whether or not the applicant may remain on the territory, laid down in paragraphs   6 ...” COMPLAINTS 23.     The applicant complained that his removal to Syria would expose him to a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, inter alia , because he was wanted by the Syrian authorities. He also complained that the decision to deport him violated Article 8 of the Convention as it interfered with his family life. THE LAW 24.     The applicant relied on Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention which read as follows: Article 3 “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” Article 8 “1.     Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” The parties’ submissions The Government 25.     The Government primarily contended that the application should be declared inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies, given that the applicant could request a re-examination under Chapter   12, section   19, of the Aliens Act. The Government submitted that this possibility was explicitly referred to in the Migration Agency’s updated legal-position paper of 10   March 2025 (see paragraph 11 above), and that the applicant had not submitted any application for a re-examination of his case. In the alternative, they argued that the application was manifestly ill ‑ founded. 26 .     The Government observed that the Assad regime, from which the alleged threats previously invoked by the applicant had originated, was no longer in power. Furthermore, the applicant had not, to date, relied before the domestic authorities on his membership of the Alawite minority and the alleged consequences thereof following the overthrow of the Assad regime (see paragraph   30 below). The Government submitted that although the Migration Agency could assess developments in Syria ex officio , pursuant to Chapter   12, section 18, of the Aliens Act, such an assessment did not entail a new examination of the applicant’s individual grounds for protection. It was primarily the applicant’s own responsibility to cite any new circumstances that he considered to constitute impediments to the enforcement of his deportation order. 27.     The Government further submitted that an application for a re ‑ examination of his case would have suspensive effect (see paragraph   19 above). Furthermore, if a re-examination were granted, he would be entitled to a full set of new proceedings, with suspensive effect, before the Migration Agency and the courts (see paragraph 20 above). 28.     The Government acknowledged that an application for re ‑ examination constituted an extraordinary remedy, but held that given the special circumstances of the case at hand – where the alleged threats that the applicant had referred to were partially new and all of them had to be assessed in relation to a new security situation in the country of destination – an application for a re-examination pursuant to Chapter   12, section   19, of the Aliens Act constituted an accessible and effective remedy capable of affording redress in respect of his complaints and offering reasonable prospects of success. 29.     The Government argued that it would run counter to the purpose of the rule on exhaustion of domestic remedies and the Court’s subsidiary role if the Court were to act as the first-instance court in the examination of the applicant’s case in the light of the new security situation in Syria. The Government further submitted that after domestic proceedings concerning an application for a re-examination of the applicant’s case, it would still be open to the applicant to lodge a new application with the Court. The applicant 30 .     The applicant disputed the Government’s arguments. He submitted that extraordinary remedies did not need to be exhausted unless they offered a real prospect of success. Moreover, the proposed remedy was not practically accessible or effective since it was prone to delays. He furthermore submitted that the situation in Syria was unstable and dangerous and that the overthrow of the Assad regime had given rise to new risks for persons such as himself (an Alawite and a Shia Muslim). He argued that the subsidiary role of the Court obliged it to intervene when national mechanisms had failed, and that he had exhausted all reasonably effective domestic remedies. The Court’s assessment 31 .     The Court reiterates that an assessment of whether domestic remedies have been exhausted is normally carried out with reference to the date on which the application in question was lodged with the Court. However, this rule is subject to exceptions, which may be justified by the particular circumstances of each case (see, among other authorities, Demopoulos and Others v.   Turkey (dec.) [GC], nos.   46113/99 and 7 others, §   87, ECHR 2010 ; Communauté genevoise d’action syndicale (CGAS) v.   Switzerland [GC], no.   21881/20, §   158, 27   November 2023; and Paic and Wernersson v.   Sweden (dec.), nos.   12908/23 and 24544/23, §   55, 20   May 2025). The Court further reiterates that an applicant is not normally required to avail him ‑ or herself of an extraordinary remedy for the purposes of the exhaustion rule under Article   35 §   1 of the Convention, except in special circumstances (see, for example, Kiiskinen v.   Finland (dec.), no.   26323/95, ECHR 1999-V (extracts); Prystavska v.   Ukraine (dec.), no.   21287/02, ECHR 2002-X; Williams v.   the United Kingdom (dec.), no.   32567/06, 17   February 2009; Dinchev v.   Bulgaria (dec.), no.   17220/09, §§   27-29, 21   November 2017; and Nicholas v.   Cyprus , no.   63246/10, §   37, 9   January 2018). Moreover, remedies that have no precise time-limits – thus creating uncertainty and rendering nugatory the four ‑ month rule contained in Article   35 §   1 of the Convention – are not normally considered to constitute effective remedies within the meaning of Article   35 §   1 (see, for example, Williams , cited above, and Nicholas , cited above, §   38). 32.     The Court, however, observes that the circumstances of the present case are in several respects exceptional. It is undisputed between the parties that – after the final decision in the applicant’s domestic proceedings, and after he had lodged his application with the Court and it had been communicated to the respondent Government – major changes in the conditions of the country of destination were brought about through a regime change, which could have a significant impact on the potential risks faced by returnees in general and by the applicant in particular. 33.     In cases concerning whether a deportation that has not yet been carried out would be in breach of Articles   2 or 3 of the Convention, it may often be necessary for the Court to take into account information that has come to light since the final decision taken by the domestic authorities, since the situation in a country of destination may change over the course of time, and the material point in time for the assessment of the claimed Article 3 risk is that of the Court’s consideration of the case (see, for example, Sufi and Elmi v.   the United Kingdom , nos.   8319/07 and 11449/07, § 215, 28   June 2011; F.G. v.   Sweden [GC], no.   43611/11, §   115, 23   March 2016; and Khasanov and Rakhmanov v.   Russia [GC], nos.   28492/15 and 49975/15, §   106, 29   April 2022). However, in the present case the Court observes that it is not merely a question of taking into account new information concerning developments in the country of destination, but of assessing the potential risks faced by the applicant in an entirely new situation, following a regime change. 34.     The domestic authorities have not yet assessed whether the applicant   – owing to the general situation, the applicant’s personal characteristics, or a combination of the two – would face a real risk of treatment contrary to Article   3 of the Convention, in the light of the changed circumstances in Syria. This was not assessed in the asylum proceedings, since those were concluded prior to December 2024. However, the Court takes note of the Government’s assertion that an application for re-examination pursuant to Chapter   12, section   19, of the Aliens Act would have enabled (and would enable) the domestic authorities to make such an assessment. 35 .     The Court observes that it is undisputed between the parties that an application for re-examination is an extraordinary remedy, and it sees no reason to hold otherwise. However, the Court notes that an application for re ‑ examination is not per se an application for the reopening of proceedings with a view to quashing a judgment that has acquired legal force and allowing for the re-opening of those proceedings. Rather, it is a particular mechanism available in domestic law whereby a re-examination can be granted if there are new circumstances relating to a person’s need of asylum, with a view to ensuring safeguards against refoulement and implementing provisions of European Union law concerning subsequent applications for international protection. Moreover, considerations relating to the interest in not rendering nugatory the four-month rule provided by Article   35 §   1 of the Convention (see paragraph 31 above) are less relevant in the present case, given the fact that in respect of complaints concerning removals that raise risks under Articles   2 and/or 3, if the removal decision has not been enforced and the individual remains on the territory of the State wishing to remove him or her, the four month time ‑ limit has not yet started to run (see M.Y.H. and Others v.   Sweden , no.   50859/10, §§   38-42, 27   June 2013;   O.D. v.   Bulgaria , no.   34016/18, §§   32-33, 10   October 2019; and J.A. and A.A. v.   Türkiye , no.   80206/17, §   41, 6   February 2024). 36 .     An application for re-examination would furthermore have a certain automatic suspensive effect, which is required for a remedy to be effective when an individual alleges that his or her removal would expose him or her to treatment contrary to Article   2 or 3 of the Convention (see, among other authorities, M.S.S. v.   Belgium and Greece [GC], no.   30696/09, §   293, ECHR 2011, and M.K. and Others v.   Poland , nos.   40503/17 and 2 others, §   143, 23   July 2020). An automatic suspensive effect would be in place at least until the Migration Agency determined whether a re-examination should take place or, if the Migration Agency decided not to allow a re ‑ examination and the applicant appealed against such a decision, until the Migration Court determined whether a stay of execution in respect of the deportation order should be issued. Should a stay of execution or a re-examination be granted, the suspensive effect of the remedy would be further extended (see paragraphs 19-20 above). 37 .     The Court reiterates that the purpose of the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies is to afford the Contracting States the opportunity of preventing or putting right the violations alleged against them before those allegations are submitted to the Court (see, among other authorities, Selmouni v.   France [GC], no.   25803/94, §   74, ECHR 1999-V, and Paic and Wernersson , cited above, §   51). The Court further reiterates that the machinery of protection established by the Convention is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights, and emphasises that it is not a court of first instance (see, among other authorities, Demopoulos and Others , cited above, §   69; Vučković and Others v.   Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], nos.   17153/11 and 29 others, §§   69-70, 25   March 2014; and Communauté genevoise d’action syndicale (CGAS) , cited above, §§   138 and   160). 38 .     Specifically, in cases regarding the expulsion of asylum seekers the Court does not itself examine the actual asylum applications or verify how the States honour their obligations under the Refugee Convention. Its main concern is whether effective guarantees exist that protect the applicant against arbitrary refoulement (be it direct or indirect) to the country from which he or she has fled. The primary responsibility for implementing and enforcing the guaranteed rights and freedoms is laid on the national authorities, and the Court’s role is subsidiary to theirs (see, for example, the above ‑ cited cases of F.G. v.   Sweden , §   117; and Khasanov and Rakhmanov , §   102). 39.     Having regard to the foregoing, the Court finds that, given the circumstances of the present case and the Court’s fundamentally subsidiary role, the applicant was obliged to avail himself of the remedy indicated by the Government – namely lodging an application for re-examination – in relation to his complaint under Article   3 of the Convention (contrast Sufi and Elmi , cited above, §   206, and A.B. and Y.W. v.   Malta , no.   2559/23, §   74, 4   February 2025). 40.     The fact that Migration Agency could have acted (and still could act) ex   officio (see paragraph 26 above) does not alter this assessment. The Court notes that it is the shared duty of an asylum ‑ seeker and the immigration authorities to ascertain and evaluate all relevant facts in asylum proceedings, and that the domestic authorities are obliged to take into account not only the evidence submitted by the applicant but also all other facts that are relevant in the case under examination (see, for example, J.K. and Others v.   Sweden [GC], no.   59166/12, §§   87 and 91-98, 23   August 2016, and A.M.A. v.   the   Netherlands , no.   23048/19, §   68, 24   October 2023). However, it is in principle for an applicant to adduce evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if the measure complained of were to be implemented, he would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article   3. Moreover, it is incumbent on persons who allege that their removal would amount to a breach of that Article to adduce, to the greatest extent practically possible, material and information allowing the authorities of the Contracting State concerned, as well as the Court, to assess the risk a removal may entail (see, among other authorities, the above ‑ cited cases of F.G. v.   Sweden , §   113; J.K. and Others v.   Sweden , §§   91-92; and Khasanov and Rakhmanov , §   109-12). 41.     Furthermore, the Court observes that the applicant still has the possibility of applying for a re ‑ examination of his case and, should such a request ultimately prove unsuccessful, he has the possibility of lodging a new application with the Court, which would then have the benefit of the views of the national authorities (see, mutatis mutandis , Vučković and Others , cited above, §   90, with further references; Mansouri v.   Italy (dec.) [GC], no.   63386/16, §   112, 29   April 2025; and Paic and   Wernersson , cited above, §   73). 42.     Accordingly, the Court finds that the applicant has not exhausted domestic remedies in relation to his complaint under Article   3 of the Convention. 43.     As to his complaint under Article 8 of the Convention, the Court notes that – apart from being of a general nature – this complaint concerns the potential impact of the applicant’s deportation on his family life and is therefore closely linked to the assessment of whether he faces a real risk of treatment contrary to Article   3 in Syria. It is thus also dependent on the outcome of a future request for a re-examination of his case. The same conclusions in regard to exhaustion of domestic remedies should therefore apply to this complaint. 44.     It follows from the considerations above that the Government’s objection must be upheld and the application be declared inadmissible for non ‑ exhaustion of domestic remedies, pursuant to Article   35 §§   1 and 4 of the Convention. It is thus not necessary to examine the Government’s other objection to the admissibility of the application. For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Declares the application inadmissible. Done in English and notified in writing on 15 January 2026.     Ilse Freiwirth   Ivana Jelić   Section Registrar   President