CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;GRANDCHAMBER;ENG — 15 décembre 2025
- ECLI
- ECLI:CE:ECHR:2025:1215JUD001691521
- Date
- 15 décembre 2025
- Publication
- 15 décembre 2025
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Un membre du pouvoir judiciaire a publié sur son compte Facebook des messages critiquant les institutions de l'État, notamment le système judiciaire, et évoquant la possibilité d'un déploiement de l'armée dans les rues comme solution pour préserver la démocratie constitutionnelle. Ces publications ont attiré l'attention des médias et suscité un débat public. Le magistrat a été soumis à une procédure disciplinaire pour avoir, selon les autorités compétentes, porté atteinte à l'honneur, à l'intégrité professionnelle et à l'image du système judiciaire.
Procédure
Le magistrat a fait l'objet d'une sanction disciplinaire par un organe disciplinaire, puis a contesté cette décision devant une juridiction supérieure (High Court). La juridiction a examiné les critères de conduite attendus d'un juge diligent, en se référant à des textes internationaux, nationaux et des recommandations. La sanction imposée consistait en une réduction de salaire de 5 % pendant deux mois, soit la deuxième sanction la moins sévère prévue par la loi.
Question juridique
La publication par un juge de messages critiquant les institutions de l'État et proposant une solution politique controversante, sur un réseau social public, constitue-t-elle une violation des obligations déontologiques et disciplinaires attachées à sa fonction, justifiant une sanction disciplinaire ?
Texte intégral
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text-transform:uppercase } .sB02CEFD6 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:18.34pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; padding-left:0.11pt; font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-transform:uppercase } .sE55129E8 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:18.45pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-transform:uppercase } GRAND CHAMBER CASE OF DANILEŢ v. ROMANIA (Application no. 16915/21)   JUDGMENT   Art 10 • Freedom of expression • Disciplinary sanction imposed on judge by National Judicial and Legal Service Commission for posting two messages on his Facebook page • Sufficiently precise legal basis • Consolidation by Grand Chamber of case-law principles with regard to freedom of expression of judges and prosecutors on internet and social media, with certain clarifications and definition of set of criteria that take into account limits imposed on such freedom by duty of discretion inherent in their office • Application to present case of new enumeration of review criteria: weighing up of various interests at stake and taking account of content and form of each of applicant’s two messages, context in which they were posted, their consequences, capacity in which applicant posted them, nature and severity of sanction imposed on him and chilling effect on profession as a whole, and procedural safeguards afforded to him • Remarks made by applicant on matters of public interest, whether or not directly related to functioning of justice system • Remarks not such as to upset requisite reasonable balance between, on the one hand, degree to which applicant, as judge, could be involved in society to defend constitutional order and State institutions and, on the other, need for him to be and be seen as independent and impartial in his duties • Reasons neither relevant nor sufficient • Interference not meeting “pressing social need”   Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.   STRASBOURG 15 December 2025   This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. Table of Contents PROCEDURE INTRODUCTION THE FACTS THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE A.   The applicant’s posts B.   Disciplinary sanction imposed on applicant by CSM’s Disciplinary Board for Judges 1.   Proceedings before the Judicial Inspection Board 2.   Proceedings before the CSM’s Disciplinary Board for Judges 3.   Appeal against the disciplinary sanction to the High Court RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE I.   DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A.   The Constitution B.   Law no.   303/2004 on the rules governing judges and public prosecutors C.   Code of Ethics for Judges and Prosecutors D.   Statutory provisions governing disciplinary and ethics-related proceedings against judges and prosecutors E.   Case-law of the Constitutional Court F.   Other domestic case-law 1.   Disciplinary proceedings against judges or prosecutors 2.   Other disciplinary proceedings against the applicant II.   INTERNATIONAL MATERIAL A.   Council of Europe 1.   Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 2.   European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) 3.   Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) 4.   European Court of Human Rights B.   United Nations C.   European Union D.   Inter-American Court of Human Rights III.   COMPARATIVE-LAW MATERIAL THE LAW I.   SCOPE OF THE CASE BEFORE THE GRAND CHAMBER II.   ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE   10 OF THE CONVENTION A.   Chamber judgment B.   The parties’ submissions 1.   The applicant 2.   The Government 3.   Third-party submissions C.   The Court’s assessment 1.   Whether there has been an interference 2.   Whether the interference was lawful 3.   Whether the interference pursued a legitimate aim 4.   Whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society III.   APPLICATION OF ARTICLE   41 OF THE CONVENTION OPERATIVE PROVISIONS CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE KRENC JOINT CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGES GNATOVSKYY AND RĂDULEŢU JOINT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES KTISTAKIS, ŠIMÁČKOVÁ, ELÓSEGUI, FELICI, DERENČINOVIĆ, ARNARDÓTTIR AND NÍ RAIFEARTAIGH In the case of Danileţ v. Romania, The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:   Arnfinn Bårdsen, President   Lado Chanturia,   Ioannis Ktistakis,   Kateřina Šimáčková,   María Elósegui,   Gilberto Felici,   Saadet Yüksel,   Lorraine Schembri Orland,   Andreas Zünd,   Frédéric Krenc,   Davor Derenčinović,   Mykola Gnatovskyy,   Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir,   Sebastian Răduleţu,   Gediminas Sagatys,   Stéphane Pisani,   Úna Ní Raifeartaigh , judges , and Abel Campos, Deputy Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 18 December 2024, 14 May and 15   October 2025, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no.   16915/21) against Romania lodged with the Court under Article   34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Romanian national, Mr   Vasilică-Cristi Danileţ (“the applicant”), on 18   March 2021. 2.     The applicant was represented by Ms   N. ‑ T. Popescu and Ms   M. ‑ C.   Ghirca ‑ Bogdan, lawyers practising in Bucharest. The Romanian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms   O. ‑ F.   Ezer, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 3.     The applicant complained, in particular, that there had been a violation of Article   10 of the Convention, on account of the finding that he was liable for a disciplinary offence for posting two messages on his Facebook page. 4.     The application was allocated to the Fourth Section of the Court, pursuant to Rule   52 §   1 of the Rules of Court. The Government were given notice of the application on 5   October 2021. 5 .     On 20   February 2024 a Chamber of the Fourth Section composed of Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer, President, Tim Eicke, Faris Vehabović, Armen   Harutyunyan, Ana Maria Guerra Martins, Anne Louise Bormann, Sebastian   Răduleţu, judges, and Ilse Freiwirth, Section Registrar, delivered its judgment. It declared, unanimously, the complaint concerning Article   10 of the Convention admissible and the complaint concerning Article   8 of the Convention inadmissible. The Chamber also held, by four votes to three, that there had been a violation of Article   10 of the Convention. A concurring opinion by Judge Răduleţu and a joint dissenting opinion by Judges Kucsko ‑ Stadlmayer, Eicke and Bormann were annexed to the judgment. 6.     On 20   May 2024 the Government requested that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber. That request was granted by a panel of the Grand Chamber on 24   June 2024. 7.     The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined in accordance with Article   26 §§   4 and   5 of the Convention and Rule   24. When Marko   Bošnjak’s term as President of the Court came to an end, Arnfinn   Bårdsen took over the presidency of the Grand Chamber in the present case (Rule   10). 8.     The applicant and the Government each submitted written observations on the merits of the case (Rule   59 §   1). 9.     Observations were also received from Media Defence, the Romanian Association of Judges and Prosecutors (AMR), the Association of Judges for the Defence of Human Rights (AJADO), Transparency International Romania (TI-Ro), the Foundation for the Defence of Citizens Against State Abuse (FACIAS) and CEU Democracy Institute, which had been granted leave by the President of the Grand Chamber to submit written comments as third parties (Article   36 §   2 of the Convention and Rules   71 §   1 and   44 §   3). The Romanian Judges’ Forum, whose leave to intervene as a third party in the proceedings before the Chamber (Rule   44 §   3) was extended to the proceedings before the Grand Chamber, also submitted written comments. 10.     In accordance with Rule   34 §§   3 and   4, the President of the Grand Chamber granted leave to the applicant and Ms   N.-T. Popescu, at their request, to use the Romanian language in the oral proceedings before the Court. 11.     A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 18   December 2024. There appeared before the Court: (a)     for the Government Ms   O.-F. Ezer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,   Agent , Ms   A.-M. Bărbieru, Permanent Delegation of Romania   to the Council of Europe,   Co-Agent , Ms   L.-C. Iordache, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr   C.-M. Drăgușin, Judge, member of the National   Judicial and Legal Service Commission,   Advisers ; (b)     for the applicant Ms   N.-T. Popescu, Ms   M.-C. Ghirca-Bogdan,   Counsel , Mr   V.-C. Danileț,   Applicant .   The Court heard addresses by Mr   V.-C. Danileţ, Ms   M. ‑ C.   Ghirca ‑ Bogdan, Ms   N. ‑ T. Popescu and Ms   O.-F. Ezer, and also the replies of Ms   M. ‑ C. Ghirca-Bogdan and Ms   O.-F. Ezer to questions put by judges. INTRODUCTION 12.     The application concerns, with regard to Article   10 of the Convention, the disciplinary sanction imposed on the applicant, a judge, for posting two messages on his Facebook page. THE FACTS THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 13.     The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Sânmartin. 14 .     The applicant joined the judiciary in 1998. At the relevant time, namely in January 2019, he was a judge at Cluj County Court. He was known for his active participation in debates on democracy, the rule of law and the justice system. He enjoyed significant nationwide renown, as a former member of the National Judicial and Legal Service Commission ( Consiliul Superior al Magistraturii   – “the CSM”), a former vice-president of a court, a former adviser to the Minister of Justice, a legal educator, a founding member of two non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working in the field of democracy and justice and the author of several articles on legal matters, and as a result of expressing his views on social media. 15.     The applicant is currently retired but has indicated that he remains active in the field of human-rights awareness-raising. The applicant’s posts 16.     In January 2019 the applicant posted two messages on his Facebook page, where he had some 50,000   followers. The messages were quoted and discussed by some media outlets and gave rise to a plethora of comments. 17 .     The first message, which was posted on 9   January 2019, read (translation by the Registry): “You might have noticed the string of efforts to attack, disrupt and discredit institutions such as the Directorate General of Information and Internal Protection, the Romanian Intelligence Service, the police, the National Anti-Corruption Directorate, the gendarmerie, the High Court of Cassation and Justice’s public prosecutor’s office, the High Court of Cassation and Justice and the army. [The attacks in question] didn’t just happen randomly after ‘the abuses committed by the powers that be’. Do people realise what it would mean to weaken [these] institutions or, worse, to bring services, the police, the courts and the army under political control? And speaking of the army, have you ever given much thought to Article   118 §   1 of the Constitution, which provides that ‘the army shall solely serve the will of the people in order to preserve   ... constitutional democracy’? What would happen if one day the army could be seen out on the streets defending... democracy, because support appears to be waning these days? Would you be surprised to know that this solution would be   ... constitutional?! I   think we can’t see the wood for the trees   ...” 18 .     As the applicant would subsequently state before the Judicial Inspection Board (see paragraph   20 below), his first message was posted in the context of the extension of the Army Chief of Staff’s term of office by a presidential decree of 28   December 2018. The Ministry of Defence subsequently applied to the Bucharest Court of Appeal on 14   January 2019 to have the execution of that decree suspended. Its application was initially granted by the Court of Appeal but then declared inadmissible by the High Court of Cassation and Justice (“the High Court”) in a final judgment of 9   April 2019. 19.     The second message, which was posted on 10   January 2019, included a hyperlink to a press article headed “A   prosecutor sounds the alarm. Living in Romania today represents a huge risk. The red line has been crossed when it comes to the justice system”, which had been published on a national news website. The article in question consisted in an interview with C.S., a prosecutor. In it, C.S. expressed his view on how the public prosecutor’s office was handling criminal cases and on prosecutors’ difficulties in dealing with the cases assigned to them. The hyperlink was accompanied by the following comment by the applicant about the article (translation by the Registry): “Now here’s a prosecutor with some blood in his veins ( sânge în instalaţie ), speaking his mind about dangerous prisoners being freed, our leaders’ bad ideas on legislative reform, and judges and prosecutors being ‘lynched’!” Disciplinary sanction imposed on applicant by CSM’s Disciplinary Board for Judges Proceedings before the Judicial Inspection Board 20 .     On 10   January 2019   – that is, the same day the second message was posted   – the Judicial Inspection Board, referring to Article   99   (a) of Law no.   303/2004 on the rules governing judges and public prosecutors (see paragraph   43 below), took up the case, of its own motion, with a view to disciplinary proceedings against the applicant for impairing the honour and image of the justice system. Seven days later it opened an investigation into the matter. The judicial inspectors analysed the content of the two messages. With regard to the first message, which had been quoted and discussed by 11   different media outlets, the inspectors considered that it contained a suggestion by the applicant that an intervention by the army to defend democracy would be constitutionally acceptable. As to the second message, in which the applicant had shared a link to a press article, the inspectors noted that he had added comments of his own, in which he had encouraged judges and prosecutors to express their views publicly on issues relating to the functioning of the justice system; criticising reforms, “lynchings” of judges and prosecutors and the adverse effects of compensatory remedies; and endorsing the subject matter of the article in question. The inspectors concluded that there were indications that the applicant had failed to comply with his duty of discretion and that this had been capable of tarnishing the image of the justice system. 21 .     In his pleadings before the Judicial Inspection Board the applicant pointed out that his first message had been posted in the context of the extension of the Army Chief of Staff’s term of office and thus had no connection with his judicial activities, his professional integrity or the image of the justice system. He further stated that his second message was intended to express his support for the prosecutor C.S. and to confirm that he still agreed with C.S.’s view. He requested that the Judicial Inspection Board take evidence that could testify to his level of professional integrity and the image of the justice system before and after the two messages in issue had been posted. 22 .     The Judicial Inspection Board took evidence from several witnesses. Most of them described the applicant as an honest judge who was highly active in the field of legal education for young people and who expressed discerning personal opinions in the public sphere. 23 .     The judicial inspectors also interviewed the applicant. He told them that his remarks had been made in the context of a public debate on the extension of the Army Chief of Staff’s term of office by a presidential decree of 28   December 2018   – a situation that had triggered an institutional dispute between the Ministry of Defence and the President’s Office. He reiterated that he had been expressing himself as an ordinary citizen and not as a judge, adding that the confirmation of the Army Chief of Staff’s appointment was a highly important matter for Romanian society because such an appointment on the basis of political criteria could, in his opinion, have ramifications for citizens’ lives. He specified that his message had been neither a warning nor a call to disobey the law. He stated that he regularly expressed his views in the media, and had done so by appearing on television since 2003 and by posting daily messages on his Facebook page   – where he had some 50,000   followers   – since 2011. Regarding the support he had expressed for the prosecutor C.S., the applicant asserted that he championed judicial independence and that he backed all initiatives to that end. 24.     The Judicial Inspection Board decided to pursue the case, opened of its own motion, for impairing the honour and image of the justice system   – a disciplinary offence under Article   99   (a) of Law no.   303/2004. It thus initiated disciplinary proceedings, referring the matter to the CSM’s Disciplinary Board for Judges (“the Disciplinary Board”). Proceedings before the CSM’s Disciplinary Board for Judges 25 .     A hearing was held on 16   April 2019, in which the Disciplinary Board noted that the applicant was absent and found it unnecessary to hear evidence from the witnesses again. It also filed the Judicial Inspection Board’s submissions, and postponed the delivery of its decision until 7   May 2019. 26 .     In a decision of 7   May 2019 the Disciplinary Board, made up exclusively of judges, approved the disciplinary action by a majority. It found that the applicant had committed the disciplinary offence provided for in Article   99   (a) of Law no.   303/2004 and, in accordance with Article   100   (b) of that same law (see paragraph   43 below), ordered his pay to be cut by 5% for two months   – a sanction intended to deter him from adopting similar behaviour in the future. 27 .     Noting that several media outlets had published the applicant’s messages, the Disciplinary Board pointed out that judges had a duty not to impair the dignity of their office or the impartiality and independence of the justice system, and a duty of discretion, both of which the applicant had breached. The members of the Disciplinary Board considered that the applicant, in his first message, had been insinuating that public institutions were controlled by politicians and had been proposing as a potential solution that the army intervene to preserve democracy. As to the second message, they noted that he had used the expression “ sânge în instalaţie ” (see paragraph   19 below), a form of words which, they found, had overstepped the limits of propriety and had been unworthy of a judge. 28 .     In the view of the Disciplinary Board, the posts in issue did not express value judgments but plain defamatory allegations, with no supporting arguments, such as to call into question the credibility of the State institutions. The applicant had chosen to disseminate those allegations to anyone who had access to his Facebook page, thus undermining the dignity of his office and impairing the impartiality and image of the justice system. The Disciplinary Board further considered that the fact that the applicant had expressed his views as an ordinary citizen did not discharge him from disciplinary liability, given his duty of discretion as a judge. It found that he had committed a disciplinary offence without direct intent and that such offence had had an impact on public confidence in   – and respect for   – the courts and on the image of the justice system, because his opinions as formulated in those messages, which had a readership of 50,000, had been quoted and discussed by a significant number of media outlets, giving rise to substantial public debate. 29 .     Three of the nine members of the Disciplinary Board issued a dissenting opinion. They explained that in his first message the applicant had expressed a personal opinion on a topical issue at the relevant time, namely the extension of the Army Chief of Staff’s term of office, the suspension of which had initially been granted by the Court of Appeal but later overturned by the High Court (see paragraph   18 above). The dissenting judges considered that forbidding judges and prosecutors outright from making any critical comments on matters of public interest amounted to an excessive restriction of their freedom of expression. In their view, the media’s different interpretations of the applicant’s messages could not be attributed to him, and the mere fact that he had expressed a personal opinion on a matter of public interest, without referring to the court in which he held office or to other judges or prosecutors, was not sufficient to find that he had breached his duty of discretion. Appeal against the disciplinary sanction to the High Court 30 .     The applicant appealed against his disciplinary sanction. He first pointed out that sanctions could be imposed on judges and prosecutors only for the disciplinary offences provided for in Article   99 of Law no.   303/2004 (see paragraph   43 below). He then challenged the Disciplinary Board’s decision, arguing that it had been based on a breach of rules of ethical conduct. He also criticised the Disciplinary Board’s assessment of whether his remarks were objectionable, arguing that it was vague and lacked specific examples. Regarding his first message, he asserted that it had not triggered a debate but that certain media outlets which, according to him, regularly criticised the justice system had misinterpreted his statements in bad faith. He submitted that the message in question was in line with what he had been teaching about the law for several years and that there was no evidence to suggest that the image of the justice system had been impaired. As to the second post in issue, the applicant confirmed that he had expressed his admiration for the prosecutor C.S. and had shown support for his statements, pointing out that he had been seeking to protect the image of the justice system and to champion the separation of executive and judicial powers. Lastly, he complained about the fact that the Disciplinary Board had refused to impose a less severe sanction on him. 31 .     In a judgment of 18   May 2020 the High Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal as unfounded. 32 .     Examining the lawfulness of the impugned decision, the High Court noted, after quoting Article   99   (a) of Law no.   303/2004 (see paragraph   43 below), that the disciplinary body had observed that the duty of discretion by which judges and prosecutors were bound under Article   90 §   1 of Law no.   303/2004 (see paragraph   43 below) was reproduced in Article   17 of the Code of Ethics for Judges and Prosecutors (see paragraph   45 below). Where a judge’s conduct was found to be incompatible with that Code of Ethics, it was reviewed under the procedure laid down in Articles   64 and   65 of the Regulations on the Organisation and Operations of the CSM (see paragraph   48 below). Such a review could only take place if the constituent elements of a disciplinary offence had not been made out. As regards the bearing of the above-mentioned provisions on the present case, the High Court found: “57.     ... [A] reading of the impugned decision’s reasoning as a whole shows that the disciplinary body examined whether, in the light of the factual situation, the constituent elements of the disciplinary offence defined in Article   99   (a) of Law no.   303/2004 had been made out, and not whether the provisions of the Code of Ethics for Judges and Prosecutors, as approved by plenary decision no.   328/2005 of the National Judicial and Legal Service Commission, had been infringed.” 33 .     As to the merits of the appeal, the High Court found that the Disciplinary Board had analysed the facts in the light both of the applicant’s right to freedom of expression and of his duty of discretion. To specify the scope of that duty and the interest it served to protect, the High Court stated, in particular: “66.     With regard to freedom of expression, it is beyond dispute that judges, as private citizens, enjoy an inviolable right to such freedom. However, according to the very wording of Article   10, paragraph   2, of the Convention, the exercise of that freedom, ‘since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary’. Accordingly, the inviolable nature of the right to freedom of expression is not absolute and, in the case of judges, freedom of expression is limited by a duty of discretion, and that limitation is inherent in the rules governing the office of judge or prosecutor, as the European Court of Human Rights has observed in its case-law relating to the restrictions on the freedom of expression of individuals in the civil service (see Morissens v.   Belgium ). 67.     As noted in the case-law (judgment no.   128 of 27   May 2019) of the High Court of Cassation and Justice, sitting as a five-judge bench, the purpose of the disciplinary offence defined in Article   99   (a) of Law no.   303/2004 is to ensure compliance with the duty of discretion incumbent on judges and prosecutors. This duty is in practice a product of the profession’s general ethical principles (independence, impartiality and integrity) and entails moderation and restraint in one’s professional, social and private life. The duty of discretion also requires judges and prosecutors to align their conduct with the moral and ethical principles recognised as such by society and to act in all circumstances in good faith and with fairness and propriety, it being specified that in practice it is impossible to list in legislation all behaviour that may amount to a breach of the duty of discretion. The applicant’s argument   – that the disciplinary body based its decision solely on a subjective assessment of the conduct expected of judges and prosecutors because there were no clear rules defining what they were or were not allowed to post on Facebook   – thus cannot but be dismissed.” 34 .     As regards the necessity of limiting the applicant’s right to freedom of expression, the High Court held: “68.     It should nevertheless be stated that the disciplinary body rightly found that the limits imposed on the right to freedom of expression were necessary to ensure a fair balance between the exercise of freedom of expression and, in the case of judges and prosecutors, the need to protect the authority of the judiciary. Judges and prosecutors thus have an obligation to exercise caution and impartiality in expressing their opinions, respecting the right of citizens to an independent, politically neutral, impartial and upright justice system. 69.     According to the terms of the impugned decision, which need not be reproduced in the present judgment, the defendant enjoys a right to freedom of expression that is nevertheless limited by the duty of discretion inherent in the office of judge or prosecutor, which is intended to ensure a fair balance, in line with the branches of State, between the exercise of that fundamental personal right and the prevailing legitimate public interest associated with the justice system, seen as a public service.” 35.     According to the High Court, the manner in which the applicant had expressed himself was inappropriate and unsatisfactory given his position and was such as to cast doubt on the credibility of State institutions. It had thus upset the requisite balance between the right and the duty in question. 36 .     With regard to the applicant’s message of 10   January 2019, the High Court found: “73.     As regards the judge’s comment on an article published on the website ziare.com, the disciplinary body rightly considered that the form of words he used   – ‘Now here’s a prosecutor with some blood in his veins ( sânge în instalaţie )’   – significantly overstepped the limits of propriety inherent in the office he held, such office requiring restraint and moderation in order to avoid impairing the image of the justice system. In such circumstances, the applicant’s claims that the reasoning in the impugned decision makes no reference to the posted remarks cannot be accepted. With regard to the grounds of appeal, it should be noted that the applicant justified his conduct by his capacity as a citizen playing an active role in promoting the proper functioning of the justice system and the rule of law, but that he did not make any specific criticism of the factors [which had been] taken into account by the disciplinary body concerning the form of words used and the requirements applicable to the conduct of judges and prosecutors in that regard. For these reasons, the argument that no sanction was imposed on the author of the article, which is not the subject of the present dispute, cannot be allowed.” 37 .     As to the message of 9   January 2019, the High Court stated: “70.     With regard to the disciplinary offence in issue in the present case, the decision finds fault with the judge for the manner in which he specifically expressed himself, which upset the aforementioned fair balance. The High Court endorses the reasoning of the disciplinary body, which considered that the defendant had expressed himself in an unprincipled, unsatisfactory manner for someone in his position, thereby potentially casting doubt on the credibility of certain State institutions. It is thus clear from the facts referred to in point   II.A of the present judgment that, having regard to the content of the opinions expressed and the manner in which he expressed them, the judge in question was suggesting that State institutions were politically biased and alluding to the possibility of ‘ the army deploying on the streets ’ as a solution for preserving constitutional democracy. ... 74.     Furthermore, the disciplinary body rightly considered that both the opinion expressed by the judge, according to which efforts were being made to dismantle and discredit important State institutions, and the rhetorical question regarding the deployment of the army on the streets as a possible constitutional solution, clearly overstepped the limits of permissible freedom of expression for a judge, in a manner capable of undermining the image of the justice system. In the light of the comments left by those who saw the judge’s opinion on his Facebook page, his message appears to have been such as to prompt readers to make a connection with other historical events, as is moreover apparent from the opinions expressed in the online comments.” 38 .     Regarding the truthfulness of the applicant’s allegations in his message of 9   January 2019, the High Court found: “75.     In the context of disciplinary proceedings, the issue of whether the elements included in the judge’s messages were true, constitutional, lawful or well-founded cannot be examined from the perspective of whether they had a factual basis, since neither the disciplinary body nor the appellate court has jurisdiction to rule on the questions of fact and law addressed in the opinions expressed publicly by the judge. 76.     From a disciplinary point of view, however, it is relevant that the judge, in a message to the general public that attracted online-media attention, expressed a personal opinion that called into question the credibility of State institutions, in particular the institutions of the justice system, and proposed a solution that could not be regarded as an appropriate public view for a judge.” 39 .     The High Court then endorsed the Disciplinary Board’s observations concerning the applicant’s lack of direct intent and the manner in which he had accepted the risk of impairing the image of the justice system by posting the two messages in issue on his Facebook page, where he had some 50,000   followers. As to the effects of the behaviour imputed to the applicant, the High Court stated: “81.     Contrary to the applicant’s assertions, and in line with the reasoning of the disciplinary body, it must be concluded that the commission of the acts in issue led to a decline in the requisite public confidence in   – and respect for   – judicial office. The image of the justice system, both as a system and as a service for protecting the legal order, was thus impaired, since the judge’s statements were quoted in the media, with headlines referring to his proposed solution for defending constitutional democracy, and generated heated public debate. 82.     This effect is unequivocally reflected in the media’s interpretation and coverage of the applicant’s opinions. It is significant that the media understood and reported that the judge had disseminated the idea that the army should deploy on the streets to defend constitutional democracy   – an idea that the rhetorical question in the Facebook post of 9   January 2019 clearly conjures up. ... 85.     The [above-mentioned] effect can even be seen in the manner in which online media outlets took up the judge’s opinions concerning the implied solution to the events reported   – opinions which, as stated above, were not appropriate for a judge, who is a representative of the justice system and whose individual behaviour reflects on the public image and reputation of that system.” 40 .     The High Court pointed out that the concepts referred to in Article   99   (a) of Law no.   303/2004, namely “honour”, “professional integrity” and the “image of the justice system”, were “complex and dynamic” in nature and could not be precisely defined or circumscribed. Like the Disciplinary Board, it considered that it was impossible to examine them on the basis of testimony or opinion polls, as the applicant had requested. As to whether the applicant’s behaviour deviated from that required of a member of the judiciary, the High Court noted that the issue had to be settled in the light of the criteria set out in various international documents, primary legislation, secondary legislation or other recommendations, the forms and legal force of which varied but which, taken as a whole, defined the conduct expected of a “diligent judge”. In the circumstances of the case, it found that the Disciplinary Board had reviewed all the relevant criteria (the direct consequences of the actions, the damage caused to the image and reputation of the justice system, the applicant’s conduct, non-compliance with the obligations inherent in his office, and the type of language used) before imposing a disciplinary sanction. 41 .     As to the sanction imposed on the applicant, the High Court explained: “88.     The fact that the disciplinary body did not apply the least severe disciplinary sanction   – a warning   –, but rather the second lightest sanction provided for in Article   100 of Law no.   303/2004, is justified by the following arguments, which were rightly relied on in the impugned decision: (i)   the acts committed had the direct and immediate consequences of impairing the image and reputation of the justice system, one of the fundamental pillars of a State governed by the rule of law; (ii)   the judge’s behaviour could have cast doubt among public opinion as to whether he complied with the obligations inherent in his office; (iii)   the form of words used overstepped the limits of the propriety and integrity required of judges; (iv)   the judge, through his inappropriate conduct, impaired the image and reputation of the justice system   – in terms both of authority and of appearance of impartiality   – and thus deviated from what is expected of a ‘diligent judge’, who acts in the public interest when administering justice and defending the general interests of society and who behaves in line with the specific requirements of his or her professional duties and ethical standards. 89.     Without denying the applicant’s extensive professional experience, it should be noted that the criticisms made in the appeal submissions are incapable of invalidating any of the arguments taken into account in imposing the disciplinary sanction in the individual case. Given that the judge’s inappropriate behaviour was perceived and disseminated in a negative light in the public sphere, as is clear from the facts referred to in point   II.A of the present judgment, and given that the judge concerned plays a role in shaping public opinion, since his posts are among the most read of any judge in south ‑ eastern Europe, there is no justification for imposing only the least severe disciplinary sanction on him on account of the damage caused to the justice system by the acts described. 90.     At the same time, it should be noted that in quantitative terms the sanction ordered was close to the minimum provided for in Article   100   (b) of Law no.   303/2004, since only a 5% reduction was imposed, versus a maximum reduction of 25%, for a period of only two months, as opposed to a maximum duration of one year. The fact that the sanction was thus adapted to the individual case shows that, in the light of the circumstances, the aim of the disciplinary proceedings was considered to have been satisfied by imposing the second lightest sanction, but reducing it to the minimum amount provided for by law.” RELEVANT LEGArticles de loi cités
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Synthèse
- Juridiction
- CEDH
- Chambre
- CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;GRANDCHAMBER;ENG
- Formation
- 8
- Date
- 15 décembre 2025
- Matière
- droits fondamentaux
Référence
ECLI:CE:ECHR:2025:1215JUD001691521
Données disponibles
- Texte intégral