CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 16 décembre 2025

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margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:12pt } .s1721E4C5 { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt }     FIRST SECTION DECISION Application no. 16627/21 Imrich SCHEFFER against Slovakia and 47 other applications (see list appended)   The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 16   December 2025 as a Chamber composed of:   Ivana Jelić , President ,   Erik Wennerström,   Raffaele Sabato,   Frédéric Krenc,   Davor Derenčinović,   Alain Chablais , judges ,   Katarina Šmigová , ad hoc judge , and Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to the applications lodged on the various dates indicated in the appended table, Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants, Having regard to the decision of the President of the Chamber to appoint Ms Katarína Šmigová to sit as an ad hoc judge from a list submitted in advance by the respondent Government (Article 26 § 4 of the Convention and Rule 29 § 1 (a) of the Rules of Court), since the office of judge elected in respect of Slovakia is presently vacant, Having deliberated, decides as follows: THE FACTS 1 .     The applicants are Slovak nationals or companies incorporated in Slovakia (“the applicants”). Having been represented by the same lawyer practising in Bratislava, Mr B. Fridrich, a list of the applicants is set out in the appendix. 2.     The Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms   M.   Bálintová. The circumstances of the case 3.     The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 4.     The applicants operate or operated the various businesses specified in the appendix. The case concerns the repercussions on their rights connected to their businesses of measures taken in Slovakia in response to the spread of the SARS ‑ CoV ‑ 2 virus that causes COVID-19. 5 .     In particular, at a time when an extraordinary situation ( mimoriadna situácia ) had been declared under section 8 of the Civil Defence of the Population Act (Law no. 42/1992 Coll., as applicable at the relevant time – “the CDPA” – see paragraph 20 below), effective from 12 March 2020, the Public Health Service Authority ( Úrad verejného zdravotníctva – “the PHSA”) issued an order ( opatrenie – OLP/8326/2020) taking effect on 15   October 2020 in which it ruled, inter alia , under section 5(4)(k) and section 48(4)(e) of the Public Health Protection, Support and Development Act (Law no. 355/2007 Coll., as applicable at the relevant time – “the PHPSD Act” – see paragraphs 12 and 14 below) to close all fitness centres and some other facilities in which individuals gathered. Catering services were subject to the sanitary measures specified in the order. The order was replaced by a   subsequent order and decrees ( vyhláška ) issued by the PHSA, which included the following:   Legislation Entry into force Effect (among others) Order no. 12/2020 30 October 2020 - closure of all fitness centres and restrictions on the operation of catering services Decree no. 24/2020 16 November 2020 Decree no. 27/2020 27 November 2020 Decree no. 34/2020 11 December 2020 Decree no. 45/2020 19 December 2020 - closure of retail shops and other operations, including fitness centres, and restrictions on the operation of catering services Decree no. 70/2020 30 December 2020 Decree no. 77/2020 1 January 2021 Decree no. 3/2021 11 January 2021 Decree no. 13/2021 27 January 2021 Decree no. 45/2021 8 February 2021 Decree no. 98/2021 8 March 2021 Decree no. 131/2021 22 March 2021 Decree no. 186/2021 19 April 2021 - closure of fitness centres and restrictions on the operation of catering services Decree no. 194/2021 26 April 2021 - restrictions on the operation of fitness centres and catering services Decree no. 253/2021 11 October 2021 - closure of some fitness centres and restrictions on the operation of others and on catering services Decree no. 259/2021 22 November 2021 - closure of some retail shops and other operations, including fitness centres and catering services, and restrictions on the operation of others   6.     It is undisputed that the above legislation had repercussions on the applicants’ businesses in the form of having to close them or restrict their operations, as well as loss of clientele, as specified in the appendix. 7.     The Government explained that financial support in respect of losses incurred as a result of the contested measures had been available to businesses such as those of the applicants from two schemes operated under the authority of the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family and the Ministry of the Economy. 8 .     The scheme operated by the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family had been based on section 54(1)(e) of the Employment Services Act (Law no. 5/2004 Coll., as amended), and had aimed to ensure that employment was maintained during extraordinary situations, states of emergency or exceptional circumstances and to remove their consequences. It had consisted of temporary financial assistance from the State to maintain employment and support self-employed individuals (“the First Aid scheme”). The various measures had been implemented in the period from March 2020 to February 2022 and had been comprised of: (i) contribution in respect of wages to employers who had been forced to close their businesses (at various levels depending on the phase of the scheme ranging from 80% of the average monthly wages of the given employee and 100% of the total costs of the employee’s labour, up to an amount of 1,100 euros (EUR) per employee per month); (ii) contribution of up to EUR 870 per month to self-employed individuals; (iii) contribution to employers (a) if no work could be assigned (at various times between 80% of the average monthly wages of the given employee – up to a maximum amount of EUR 880 per employee per month) and 100% of the total costs of that employee’s labour (up to a maximum amount of EUR 1,000 per employee per month) or (b) in the event of lost revenue (lump sum of EUR 870 per employee for the costs of labour); and (iv) contribution to selected groups of self-employed individuals ranging at various times between EUR 105 and EUR 360. Once the eligibility conditions for those contributions had been met, the beneficiary had been legally entitled to obtain them. 9 .     The scheme operated under the authority of the Ministry of Economy had consisted of a subsidy under the Ministry of Economy Subsidies Act (Law no. 71/2013 Coll., as amended) in respect of rent available to businesses operated in rented premises. The subsidy would correspond to any discount on rent granted to the tenant by the landlord, up to 50% of the rent, and it would be paid directly to the landlord, with a notification of approval of the subsidy being sent both to the landlord and to the tenant (section 13c(6) and (14) of the Act). The subsidy however could not be claimed as a matter of legal entitlement (section 12(1)). 10 .     The Government specified that some of the applicants had in fact received financial support from the above sources as specified in the appendix. The figures provided by the applicants in that regard also appear in the appendix. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE Public Health Protection, Support and Development Act 11 .     Section 4 specifies the role of the Ministry of Health in matters regulated by the PHPSD Act. Under letter (g), as in force at the relevant time, during an extraordinary situation this included the power to ban or order certain activities within the necessary scope and for the necessary duration. With effect from 15 October 2020, the PHPSD Act was amended (Law   no.   286/2020 Coll. – “the 2020 Amendment”) to introduce, inter alia , a new provision (letter (g)) to section 4 specifying that the Ministry’s above ‑ mentioned power was without prejudice to the PHSA’s power to order measures under section 48 of the PHPSD Act, even during an   extraordinary situation (see the subsequent paragraphs). 12 .     Section 5 defines the status and powers of the PHSA. Pursuant to subsection   (4)(k), the PHSA has the power to order, inter alia , measures under section 48(4) in the event of a threat to public health, if such measures extend beyond the territorial reach of regional public health authorities. 13 .     Section 48(1) and (2) distinguishes between (i) (an ordinary) threat to public health and (ii) a level-two threat to public health. The existence of a   level-two threat is determined by the need for measures to be taken under the CDPA. 14 .     The powers of the PHSA in the event of a threat to public health are laid down in section 48(4) and comprise, inter alia , the power to order the closure of or restrictions on the operation of facilities in which individuals gather (letter (e) of subsection (4)). 15 .     Until 14 October 2020 the powers of the PHSA under section   48(4) could be exercised on the condition that section 48(5) (see paragraph   16 below) did not provide otherwise. The 2020 Amendment annulled that condition. The explanatory report ( dôvodová správa ) regarding the relevant part of the 2020 Amendment specified that the condition had become obsolete since the measures provided for under subsections (4) and (5) of section   48 were different and did not substantively overlap. The attendant interpretative uncertainties had needed to be resolved. 16 .     In the event of a level-two threat to public health, under section   48(5)(e) the PHSA has the power to make proposals to other authorities specified under the CDPA concerning measures to establish and lift a certain regime ( režimové opatrenia ) for the population of the endangered or affected territory. 17.     The 2020 Amendment introduced a new provision to the effect that, if measures under the PHPSD Act concerned an indefinite number of people, the right to compensation in respect of actual damage and lost profits resulting from their implementation would be excluded (section 58(8)). 18 .     The 2020 Amendment also introduced a new section 59b, addressing the format of the measures taken by the PHSA under section 48(4). If such measures were necessary in relation to the entirety or a part of the territory of Slovakia or a group of people defined in a manner other than by individual identification, they constituted generally binding statutes ( všeobecne záväzný právny predpis – subsection (1)) and were referred to as decrees (subsection   (3)). 19.     Under a newly introduced section 63l, orders issued by the PHSA up until the entry into force of the 2020 Amendment, which were still in force, were to be considered decrees within the meaning of section 59b from then on. Civil Defence of the Population Act 20 .     If the endangered or affected territory extends beyond the territory of an administrative region, the power to declare and lift the state of an   extraordinary situation for the endangered territory or for the territory in which an extraordinary incident within the meaning of section 3(2) of the Act occurred is bestowed upon the Cabinet (section 8). 21 .     Under section 3(2) of the CDPA, an extraordinary incident comprises, inter alia , situations of a level-two threat to public health under section   48(2) of the PHSA (see paragraph 13 above). Constitutional Court’s power to review legislation in the framework of the individual complaints procedure 22 .     It has been the Constitutional Court’s long-established practice that neither Article 127 of the Constitution, which provides for the individual complaints procedure, nor any other of its provisions gave standing to individuals to challenge generally binding statutes as being incompatible with the Constitution or with international instruments, including the Convention (see, for example, the decision of 7 November 2007, case no. IV. ÚS 287/07). 23.     Under an amendment, which was adopted on 9 December 2020 and which entered into force on 1 January 2025 (Constitutional Law no. 422/2020 Coll.), paragraph 5 has been added to Article 127 of the Constitution, providing that: “A complaint under paragraph 1 may be accompanied by an application for the Chamber of the Constitutional Court [in charge of examining that complaint] to initiate proceedings under Article 125 § 1 [of the Constitution] for a review of the compatibility of [the statute applicable in the matter at hand] with the Constitution, constitutional statute, international treaties under Article 7 § 5 [of the Constitution] ... If the Chamber [in question] finds the application well founded, it shall stay the proceedings [on the individual complaint] and file a motion for proceedings under Article 125 § 1 [of the Constitution]. The legal views of the Constitutional Court presented in a decision on that motion shall be binding on the [given] Chamber.” Constitutional Court’s position on the status of the orders and decrees issued by the PHSA 24 .     Prior to the entry into force of the 2020 Amendment (15   October 2020 – see paragraph 11 above), on 24 September 2020 the Constitutional Court issued a ruling in case no   I. US 435/2020, in which an individual had sought to challenge an order of the PHSA in view of the COVID-19 crisis concerning quarantine for individuals who had entered the territory of Slovakia. The court held that the order had constituted an administrative measure of a hybrid nature ( hybridný správny akt ) with both normative (abstract addressees) and individual (regulation of a specific situation) components. As the individual component had been more significant, the order was to be seen as a decision sui generis , which could be challenged individually before the administrative judiciary. As no such challenge had been brought, the complaint before the Constitutional Court was inadmissible owing to non ‑ exhaustion of ordinary remedies. This position has subsequently become established. 25 .     After the entry into force of the 2020 Amendment, on 27 April 2021 the Constitutional Court ruled on another case arising from an individual complaint seeking to challenge PHSA decrees issued under section   59b of the amended PHPSD Act imposing restrictions on the operation of businesses during the COVID-19 pandemic. The court held that even though the decrees had been labelled as generally binding statutes (see paragraph 18 above), in   respect of which no judicial review was available (see paragraph 22 above), such decrees had in fact constituted administrative measures of a   hybrid nature reviewable by the administrative judiciary (see paragraph 24 above). Under the subsidiarity principle, the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction was excluded. 26 .     On 1 December 2021, in a plenary formation, the Constitutional Court (PL. US 8/2021) examined an application by the Prosecutor General for the review of the lawfulness of certain aspects of sections 59b and 63l of the amended PHPSD Act. Noting that PHSA decrees issued under section 59b constituted generally binding statutes, rather than any individual legal administrative measures, it held that such decrees were reviewable by the Constitutional Court in proceedings under Article   125 §   1 of the Constitution for the review of the compatibility of secondary legislation with the Constitution, constitutional statute and certain international treaties. COMPLAINTS 27.     Relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and, in substance, also on Article   13 of the Convention, the applicants alleged that the PHSA’s orders and decrees had arbitrarily interfered with their property rights in that the PHSA had had no power to issue them and that they had been exempt from any judicial review. THE LAW Introductory remarks 28.     The present applications concern essentially the same matters as those in the case of Toromag, s.r.o. and Others v. Slovakia (dec.) ([Committee], nos.   41217/20 and 4 others, 28 June 2022), albeit with reference to the regulatory framework in place at later stages of the COVID-19 pandemic (ibid., § 1). The applicants are represented by the same lawyer (see paragraph   1 above) as the one representing the applicants in Toromag, s.r.o. and Others (cited above), and the applicants in the present applications nos.   17559/21 (Toromag, s.r.o.), 18720/21 (Štúdio pohybu Bubema, s.r.o.), 18758/21 (Retsus s.r.o.), 17262/21 and 22491/22 (M. Bado), and 17260/21 and 22741/22 (P. Marcina) are identical to those in Toromag, s.r.o. and Others (cited above). 29 .     As regards the present case, the Court also notes that the applicant M.   Karabin (applications nos. 16963/21 and 22488/22), P. Marcina (applications nos. 17260/21 and 22741/22), M.   Bado (applications nos.   17262/21 and 22491/22) and Slovakia Mango Franchisee s.r.o. (applications nos.   32892/21 and 26280/22) each introduced two applications with the Court, which again concerned different reference periods. Joinder of the applications 30.     Being represented by one and the same lawyer, the applicants in the present case each separately complained about essentially the same matters on the basis of the same arguments. 31.     Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single decision. Article 37 § 1 of the Convention: 32.     The relevant part of Article 37 § 1 provides that: “The Court may at any stage of the proceedings decide to strike an application out of its list of cases where the circumstances lead to the conclusion that (a)     the applicant does not intend to pursue his application; or ... (c)     for any other reason established by the Court, it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application. However, the Court shall continue the examination of the application if respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto so requires.” 33.     From point 24 of the applicants’ observations, it transpires that the applicant company in application no. 17559/21 (Toromag, s. r. o.) has legally ceased to   exist. Publicly available records confirm that information, attributing it to the applicant company’s dissolution. No interest has been established to   continue the proceedings in its stead by any other person. 34.     In a submission of 11 December 2024, the applicant company in application no.   32142/21 (CUBESHOP s. r. o.) informed the Court that it no longer wished to pursue the application. 35.     In accordance with Article 37 § 1 in fine , the Court finds no special circumstances regarding respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and its Protocols which require the continued examination of these applications. 36 .     In view of the above, it is appropriate to strike the applications nos.   17559/21 and 32142/21 out of the Court’s list of cases, pursuant to Article 37 § 1 (c) and (a) respectively. Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention 37.     The relevant part of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention provides that: “The Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application submitted under Article 34 if it considers that: (a)     the application is ... an abuse of the right of individual application”. Parties’ submissions 38.     The Government pointed out that, in their respective application forms, the applicants in applications nos. 16633/21, 16674/21, 16938/21, 16951/21, 16963/21, 17260/21, 17262/21, 17265/21, 17275/21, 17293/21, 17572/21, 18319/21, 18720/21, 18758/21, 20404/21, 20421/21, 31836/21, 32142/21, 32154/21, 32765/21, 32873/21 and 22491/22 had failed to inform the Court that in the relevant period they had received financial compensation as specified in the appended table. The applicant in application no. 17579/21 had indicated having received a   contribution of EUR 10,000 in respect of rent, whereas the available records indicated that the actual figure had been EUR 23,166.66. The applicant in application no. 38291/21 had specifically stated that it had been unaware of any subsidy in relation to rent and labour having been approved for 2021. The applicant in application no. 22488/22 had indicated that he had not applied for any compensation as he had been ineligible for it. According to the available records, he had in fact received EUR 7,925.96 from the First Aid scheme. 39 .     Furthermore, while it was apparent that the existence and amount of any damage was the key feature of the case, the applicants in applications nos.   16627/21, 16633/21, 16674/21, 16938/21, 16947/21, 16951/21, 16959/21, 16963/21, 17260/21, 17262/21, 17265/21, 17275/21, 17278/21, 17290/21, 17293/21, 17559/21, 17572/21, 17579/21, 18319/21, 18720/21, 18758/21, 20902/21 and 22491/22 had failed to substantiate those elements other than by giving a figure for the amount of alleged damage without any explanation, while the applicants in applications nos. 20404/21, 20421/21, 31836/21, 32142/21, 32146/21, 32149/21, 32154/21, 32157/21, 32160/21, 32233/21, 32238/21, 32701/21, 32765/21, 32873/21, 32892/21, 33406/21, 38291/21, 44638/21, 47365/21, 47371/21, 22488/22, 22491/22, 22741/22, 26276/22 and 26280/22 had substantiated such amounts by referring to their business figures in the past, yet again with no supporting evidence. 40.     The Government noted that the applicants in the present case were being represented before the Court by the same lawyer as the one representing the applicants in Toromag, s.r.o. and Others (cited above). That case had been rejected on account of abuse of the right of individual application, which partly had to do with the applicants’ failure to disclose to the Court that, in circumstances similar to those of the present applications, they had received financial assistance from public funds. However, even after that decision, the applicants in the applications concerned had failed to inform the Court of their existing or possible claims for such assistance. 41.     In sum, the Government submitted that the applications in question were to be rejected as an abuse of the right of individual application. 42 .     In reply, the applicants submitted that their applications had only contained basic information about the damage they had sustained, while their precise calculations had been reserved for their observations in reply to those of the Government. As indicated in paragraph 10 above, that precise information appears in the appendix. 43 .     The applicants further pointed out that the subsidy in respect of rent would be paid to their landlords and not directly to them. In addition, they submitted that (i) they had been unaware of the relevance of “the information about [any] financial assistance [received] under the First Aid scheme”; (ii) it had not been their intention to misinform the Court; and (iii) the basic information in their applications concerning their losses had already taken into account any financial assistance received under the First Aid scheme. The Court’s assessment 44.     Having regard to the Court’s finding concerning applications nos.   17559/21 and 32142/21 (see paragraph 36 above), the Government’s objection under Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention in relation to these applications has lost practical consequence and as such calls for no determination. 45.     As to the remaining applications concerned, the Court reiterates that an   application may be rejected as an abuse of the right of individual application, if, among other reasons, it was knowingly based on false information or if significant information and documents were deliberately omitted either where they were known from the outset or where new significant developments occurred during the proceedings (see Gross v.   Switzerland [GC], no. 67810/10, § 28, ECHR 2014, with further references). 46.     The Court considers that in cases such as the present one financial aid granted to applicants from public funds is directly linked to the questions of their victim status, any possible significant disadvantage suffered by them, as well as to the proportionality of the impugned measures complained of under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (for illustrative purposes, see Toromag, s.r.o. and Others , cited above, § 9). Consequently, information about such aid concerned the very core of the case. Having regard inter alia to Rule 47 § 7 of the Rules of Court, such information should have been submitted to the Court in the applicants’ application forms (lodged in 2020 and 2021). 47.     In this context, the Court notes that the above-mentioned case of Toromag, s.r.o. and Others concerned similar matters and that the applicants in that case were represented by the same lawyer as the one representing the applicants in the present case. In that case, in the decision which was taken in 2022, the Court found specifically that the applicants’ failure to inform the Court of such aid having been granted to them, along with other matters, amounted to deliberate withholding of significant information and documents, constituting a ground for rejecting their applications as being abusive (§§ 11 and 12) (see also, mutatis mutandis , Martins Alves v. Portugal (dec.), no. 56297/11, §§   11 ‑ 13 and 16 ‑ 17, 21 January 2014). 48.     It was accordingly at the latest when the Toromag, s.r.o. and Others decision was given, that the applicants in the present case directly and a   fortiori through the intermediary of their lawyer must have been aware of the particular relevance of the information about any financial aid from public funds for the assessment of their complaints under the Convention. 49.     Nevertheless, the applicants in applications nos. 16633/21, 16674/21, 16938/21, 16951/21, 16963/21, 17260/21, 17262/21, 17265/21, 17275/21, 17293/21, 17572/21, 18319/21, 18720/21, 18758/21, 20404/21, 20421/21, 31836/21, 32154/21, 32765/21 and 32873/21 in the present case received the above-mentioned financial aid without informing the Court about it, and addressed the matter for the first time (2023) only in reply to the Government’s inadmissibility objection to that effect. The situation was similar in application no. 38291/21, in which the applicant company stated that it had been unaware of any subsidy, whereas financial aid had in fact been paid to it, also with regard to the period under consideration. 50.     In their observations, the applicants concerned argued that they were unaware of any financial aid having been paid in respect of rent since such aid would have been paid directly to their landlords. While they would have received a notification of the approval of the subsidy (see paragraph 9 above), there was no separate notification of its payment. In that regard, the Court notes that the applicants have not denied having been notified of the approval of the subsidies. Moreover, there is no suggestion that the approved subsidies were not paid or that, payable as they were to the landlord, these subsidies did not translate to any discount on rent to be granted by the landlords to the applicants. As to the applicants’ remaining arguments, the Court notes that they were represented before the Court by a lawyer well aware of its procedures. In the circumstances, their explanations for the failure to   disclose the above-mentioned information to the Court (see paragraphs 42 and 43 above and, concerning applications nos. 20404/21 and 20421/21, also the applicants’ submissions cited in the appendix) cannot be accepted. 51.     Leaving aside the relevance of the applicants’ arguments, they give rise to concerns regarding their lawyer’s role as a legal representative in the proceedings before the Court (compare Gross , cited above, § 33), in particular noting that several other applications presented to the Court by him have already been rejected as having amounted to an abuse of the right of individual application (see Toromag, s.r.o. and Others , cited above, § 8). 52.     In so far as the precise calculation by the Government and the applicants of the aid received by the latter displays variations, the Court observes that the methods used vary in that the applicants took into account in their calculation only the pro rata portion of the amount received in respect of a given month in instances when the period under consideration started or ended in the course of that month. The figures provided by the Government referred to such months as a whole. 53 .     In sum, nothing has been presented to the Court or established otherwise that would lead to a different conclusion to the one that the applicants in the above applications deliberately withheld significant information, in view of which applications nos. 16633/21, 16674/21, 16938/21, 16951/21, 16963/21, 17260/21, 17262/21, 17265/21, 17275/21, 17293/21, 17572/21, 18319/21, 18720/21, 18758/21, 20404/21, 20421/21, 31836/21, 32154/21, 32765/21, 32873/21 and 38291/21 must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention as amounting to an abuse of the right of individual application. 54.     The situation with applications nos. 22488/22 and 22491/22 is different in that, in relation to the period under consideration in these applications, the applicants have not been shown to have received any aid. This is not altered by the fact that they may have received aid in respect of other periods. 55 .     In these two applications, as well as in a number of others (see paragraph 39 above), the Government objected, stating that the applicants had failed to substantiate their alleged damage. However, even if it is established that such a failure occurred, in so far as the objection has been substantiated, the Court finds that there is no abusive element attributable to the applicants. 56.     The Government’s objection under Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention in relation to applications nos. 22488/22 and 22491/22 accordingly cannot be sustained. 57.     As regards application no. 17579/21, the Court notes the difference in the amount of aid received by the applicant in respect of rent, as indicated in the application form (EUR 10,000) and in the applicant’s subsequent submissions (EUR 18,583.33). Irrespective of a further difference between those amounts and the one indicated by the Government (EUR 21,916.66), the Court finds it unnecessary to rule on their objection under Article   35 §   3   (a) of the Convention in relation to this application as it is in any event inadmissible on other grounds specified below. 58 .     The situation is similar with application no. 32892/21, in which the applicant company remained silent on having received any financial aid, whereas in fact it had received assistance from the First Aid scheme, but the Government’ objection under Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention is based on other facts falling outside the scope of that provision (see paragraph 55 above). Article 35 § 1 of the Convention 59.     The relevant part of Article 35 § 1, as applicable at the relevant time, reads as follows: “1.     The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, ... and within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken.” Parties’ submissions 60 .     The Government noted that the alleged violations resulted from an   order and decrees issued by the PHSA. Under the 2020 Amendment, since 15   October 2020 those instruments had had the nature of generally binding statutes. As such, they could only be challenged before the Constitutional Court in a procedure for a constitutional review of legislation under Article   125 of the Constitution (see, in particular, paragraph 26 above). In other words, the applicants as individuals and legal entities of private law had no standing to complain of the alleged violations at the domestic level, as a   result of which the time-limit for introducing their applications to the Court had started to run with the entry into force of the contested decision and decrees. Accordingly, any complaint with regard to measures applicable at any earlier periods was outside the time ‑ limit under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. 61.     In reply, the applicants concurred that no effective remedies had been at their disposal and stated that their complaints specifically and only concerned periods falling within the time-limit under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, and no earlier periods. The Court’s assessment 62.     In view of the Court’s findings under Article 37 of the Convention (see paragraph 36 above) and those in relation to the Government’s objection under Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention (see paragraphs 53-58 above), its assessment of their objection under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention concerns only the remaining applications, that is applications nos. 16627/21, 16947/21, 16959/21, 16967/21, 17278/21, 17290/21, 17579/21, 20902/21, 32146/21, 32149/21, 32157/21, 32160/21, 32233/21, 32238/21, 32701/21, 32892/21, 33406/21, 44638/21, 47365/21, 47371/21, 22488/22, 22491/22, 22741/22, 26276/22 and 26280/22. 63.     The parties did not dispute that the order and decrees concerned in the present case constituted generally binding statutes, which could not be challenged other than before the Constitutional Court, and that, as private parties, the applicants had no standing to challenge them before that court; this is not only provided in the PHSA, as amended by the 2020 Amendment (see paragraph 18 above), but also reflected in the Constitutional Court’s case-law (see paragraph 22 above). Any deviation from that position in a   decision of the Constitutional Court of 27   April 2021 (see paragraph 25 above) was readjusted by its plenary formation on 1 December 2021 (see paragraph 26 above). 64.     The Court notes that the contested measures in the present case, as defined in the appendix, were applicable prior to 1 February 2022 when Article   4 of Protocol No. 15 entered into force, shortening the six-month time-limit pursuant to Article 35 § 1 of the Convention to four months. In the present case, therefore, the six-month period applies, and the contested measures in the applications in issue fall within that period. 65.     In other words, the applicants in fact do not contest the regulatory regime in place more than six months before the introduction of the respective applications. In such circumstances, the Government’s objection in that regard calls for no decision. Remaining applications 66.     The applicants in applications nos. 16627/21, 16947/21, 16959/21, 16967/21, 17278/21, 17290/21, 17579/21, 20902/21, 32146/21, 32149/21, 32157/21, 32160/21, 32233/21, 32238/21, 32701/21, 32892/21, 33406/21, 44638/21, 47365/21, 47371/21, 22488/22, 22491/22, 22741/22, 26276/22 and 26280/22 alleged that they had incurred losses relating to their property as a   result of the order and decrees issued by the PHSA under review and argued that the interference with their property rights (i) had been unlawful as the PHSA had not had the authority to issue those instruments; and (ii) had not been subject to any safeguards, in particular no judicial review. In that regard, they relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and, in substance, also on Article   13 of the Convention. 67.     Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 reads as follows: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to   enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” Article 13 of the Convention provides that: “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.” Parties’ submissions (a)    The Government 68.     The Government acknowledged that the restrictions imposed on the applicants by way of the contested legislation had constituted an interference with their property rights, but argued that it had been lawful, had pursued a   legitimate aim, and a fair balance had been struck between that aim and the applicants’ rights. 69.     In particular, the Government stated that the PHSA had issued the order and decrees in the exercise of its powers under section   5(4)(k) and section   48(4) of the PHPSD Act (see paragraphs 12 and 14 above). Any powers conferred upon other authorities under the CDPA to take measures on the basis of proposals by the PHSA in the event of a level-two threat to public health under section 48(5) of the PHPSD Act (see paragraph 16 above) had not negated those bestowed upon the PHSA under section 48(4) of the PHPSD Act and had existed in parallel to them. At the same time, no other legislation applicable in the event of a level-two threat to public health had suspended the PHSA’s powers under section 48(4) of the PHPSD Act. Any arguments by the applicants to the contrary were no more than their subjective perceptions short of any basis in terms of official recognition. 70.     The Government stated that the restrictions applicable to the applicants under the order and decrees in question had undoubtedly served the legitimate aim of protecting public health and that aim had to be seen in the light of the State’s positive obligation to take the necessary measures to   protect the lives of persons within their jurisdiction and to safeguard their physical integrity, including in the sphere of public health. 71.     As regards the existence of a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individuals’ fundamental rights, the Government relied on having a wide margin of appreciation with regard both to choosing the means of achieving the said aim and to ascertaining whether the consequences of their use were justified in the general interest for the purpose of achieving that aim. The issues at stake had been unprecedented matters of an epidemiological and thus a highly expert nature, which had been addressed by the competent authorities based on the information available at the given time. 72 .     Furthermore, the Government pointed out the compensation schemes that had been available to the applicants and the fact that they had actually made use of them. Those schemes had been based on the notion of distributive justice which did not presuppose full compensation. In that regard, the Government referred to the decision of the Constitutional Court of Austria of 14   July 2021 in case no. G 202/2020 which, they submitted, showed that the absence of compensation for businesses affected by legislation adopted to combat the spread of COVID-19 did not amount to an   unconstitutional interference with the fundamental right to inviolability of property. The Government stated that that position followed from the court’s acknowledgment that, if closing businesses had been necessary to prevent the spread of the disease, property rights had not obliged the State to provide further compensation beyond the various existing assistance packages for businesses. 73.     In addition, the Government argued that it was unjustified for the applicants to expect compensation for any alleged lost profits at the same level as actual profits prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic had been an objective fact and it would have had a negative impact on any profits at the time of the pandemic and possibly also after it. 74.     In sum, in the Government’s view, the applicants’ complaint under Article   1 of Protocol No. 1 was manifestly ill-founded and, as such, devoid of any arguable basis for the purposes of their additional complaint under Article   13 of the Convention. As a result, the complaint under Article 13 was also manifestly ill-founded. (b)    The applicants 75.     The applicants contended that the order and decrees had been arbitrary in that they had been issued under the powers of the PHSA provided for in section   48(4) of the PHPSD Act applicable in times of an ordinary threat to public health, rather than a level-two threat. That legal provision had, however, been inapplicable at the given time in view of the fact that an   extraordinary situation had already been declared (see paragraph 5 above). Under the applicable law, an extraordinary situation responded to an   extraordinary incident and that comprised a level-two threat to public health (see paragraphs 20 and 21 above). As there had been a level-two threat to public health, the power to take response measures had shifted to the authorities specified under the CDPA, following a recommendation by the PHSA, as provided for under section 45(5) of the PHPSD Act (see paragraph   16 above). In sum, since the order and decrees had been issued by the PHSA directly, it had acted ultra vires . As the Government themselves admitted (see paragraph 60 above), since 15 October 2020 there had been no remedy against the PHSA’s order and decrees, which had therefore lacked safeguards. In sum, the interference with their property rights had not been in accordance with the law for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No.   1. 76 .     In addition, in reply to the Government, the applicants acknowledged the existence of a legitimate aim for the interference with their property rights, in particular that of protecting public health, but argued that the means employed had not been proportionate to that aim. In that regard, they asserted that the Government had failed to demonstrate that achieving that aim would have been impossible with less stringent measures. Their losses consisted not only of lost income during the period when their business had been forced to   close, but also in the attendant loss of clientele whose confidence had never been fully restored. There was no other way of quantifying the lost profits than by referring to past income. The State assistance schemes referred to by the Government had been manifestly insufficient. The State had interfered with the standard b