CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 16 décembre 2025

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RUSSIA (Applications nos. 13505/20 and 138 others – see appended list)     JUDGMENT   Art 8 • Private life • Home • Correspondence • Mass searches of homes and offices of persons and entities associated with Aleksey Navalnyy and seizure of property during searches • Search authorisations issued on the basis of standard-form investigator’s applications lacking individualised reasoning • Domestic court’s failure to carry out effective judicial scrutiny required under domestic law, depriving the authorisation procedure of its protective function against arbitrariness • Interference not “in accordance with the law” • Impugned orders couched in general and broad terms conferring virtually unfettered discretion upon the investigative authorities Art 1 P1 • Control of the use of property • Freezing of applicants’ bank accounts • Relevant orders issued and extended in disregard of express statutory requirements of individualised justification and periodic review of their necessity • No reference to any supporting evidence or a factual basis • Formalistic judicial review • Interpretation and application of domestic law failed to ensure foreseeability and afford the requisite safeguards against arbitrariness • Interference not “in accordance with the law” Art 1 P1 • Peaceful enjoyment of possessions • Seizure and retention of a sum of money from one individual applicant during searches • No judicial decision authorising the seizure as required by domestic law • Interference arbitrary and inconsistent with legal certainty and rule of law principles • Interference not “in accordance with the law” Art 11 (read in light of Art 10) • Freedom of association • Unjustified designation of one applicant organisation as “foreign agent” despite the absence of any evidence suggesting it was under foreign influence, control or direction or acting in the interests of a foreign entity • Rigid and formalistic application of “foreign agent” legislation • Disproportionate punitive fine capable of producing a chilling effect on civil society and public discourse Art 11 (read in light of Art 10) • Freedom of association • Designation of applicant organisations as “extremist” and ensuing dissolution or prohibition of their activities • Application of vague and overly broad notions of “extremism” and “extremist activity” extending to ordinary political, associational and expressive activities • Lack of foreseeability • Judicial review did not provide adequate and effective safeguards • Chilling effect of expansive and punitive operation of the “extremism” framework on political expression and association • Interference not “prescribed by law” Art 18 (+ Art 8, 11 and 1 P1) • Restriction for unauthorised purposes • Existence of ulterior purpose • Impugned measures were part of a concerted effort on an unprecedented scale to eliminate the organised democratic opposition centred around Aleksey Navalnyy   Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.   STRASBOURG 16 December 2025       FINAL   16/03/2026       This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.     In the case of Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) and Others v.   Russia, The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Ioannis Ktistakis , President ,   Peeter Roosma,   Lətif Hüseynov,   Diana Kovatcheva,   Úna Ní Raifeartaigh,   Mateja Đurović,   Canòlic Mingorance Cairat , judges , and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the 139 applications against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by individual applicants and applicant organisations (“the applicants”), on the dates listed in the appendix; the decision to give priority under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to application no. 22357/21; the decision to give notice to the Russian Government (“the Government”) of the complaints concerning the alleged violations of the applicants’ rights to respect for their home, to freedom of expression and association, to an effective remedy, to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions and to stand for election, as well as the alleged ulterior purpose behind the measures taken against the applicants, and to declare the remainder of the applications inadmissible; the information submitted by the parties and the applicants’ observations on the admissibility and merits; the decision of the President of the Section to treat as confidential all documents deposited with the Registry, excluding the application forms (Rule   33 § 2 of the Rules of Court); the decision of the President of the Section to appoint one of the elected judges of the Court to sit as an ad hoc judge, applying by analogy Rule 29 §   2 of the Rules of Court (see Kutayev v. Russia , no. 17912/15, §§ 5-8, 24 January 2023); Having deliberated in private on 18 November 2025, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The present case concerns various measures taken against Mr Aleksey Navalnyy, organisations affiliated with him, his own family members, his associates and, in some cases, their families. The applicants alleged violations of Article   8 of the Convention on account of mass searches of their offices and homes and the seizure of property during the searches, and violations of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention on account of the subsequent freezing of their bank accounts. They also contended that the registration of the Anti-Corruption Foundation as a “foreign agent,” the designation of that foundation, the Foundation for the Defence of Civil Rights and the Navalnyy Headquarters as “extremist”, and the subsequent disbandment of those organisations, alongside the above-mentioned measures, had infringed their rights to freedom of expression and association under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention, as well as their right to stand for election under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. Lastly, they argued that those measures formed part of an abusive pattern of restrictions in breach of Article 18 of the Convention, asserting that the authorities had pursued the ulterior aim of suppressing their political activities and persecuting them for publishing anti-corruption material. THE FACTS 2.     The applicants’ details and the names of their representatives appear in the appendix. 3.     The Government were initially represented by Mr M. Galperin, former Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and later by his successor in that office, Mr M. Vinogradov. 4.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.         Background 5 .     Aleksey Navalnyy was a political activist, opposition leader, anti ‑ corruption campaigner and popular blogger.   He died on 16 February 2024 while serving a 19-year sentence in a high-security penal colony in the Russian Arctic. 6 .     In 2011 Mr Navalnyy founded the Anti-Corruption Foundation (“ Фонд борьбы с коррупцией” – “FBK”), a non-profit organisation which investigated and published online reports on alleged corruption by high ‑ ranking Russian officials (see Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2) , no. 43734/14, § 6, 9 April 2019). The FBK gained widespread attention through documentaries such as He is Not Dimon to You (2017) (see, for more details, Navalnyy and Others v. Russia [Committee], nos. 25809/17 and 14 others, §   1, 4 October 2022) and Putin’s Palace: History of the World’s Largest Bribe (2021), alleging large-scale corruption at the highest level of power. The organisation was funded primarily through private donations. 7 .     In 2017 Mr Navalnyy established a network of regional offices across Russia, known as the Navalnyy Headquarters ( “Штабы Навального” ), which did not have legal-entity status and functioned as the organisational backbone of his 2018 presidential campaign. Each regional office was headed by a coordinator and included staff members and volunteers who organised local activities and maintained daily operations. After the campaign, the network continued to organise protests and, from late 2018, promoted a tactical-voting project known as “Smart Voting”, designed to consolidate the opposition vote against the ruling United Russia party. 8.     In 2019 Ms Liliya Chanysheva, who was Mr Navalnyy’s associate from Ufa, the capital of the Republic of Bashkortostan, registered a non-profit organisation, the Foundation for the Protection of Civil Rights ( Фонд защиты прав граждан «Штаб» – “Shtab”). This organisation channelled funds to Mr Navalnyy’s network of regional offices. It received financial support from a limited liability company, OOO Strana Prilivov, which handled merchandising and other revenue streams. 9 .     Also in May 2019 Ms Olga Guseva, a St Petersburg-based associate of Mr Navalnyy, founded the Foundation for the Defence of Civil Rights ( Фонд защиты прав граждан «ФЗПГ» – “the FZPG”). The FZPG paid court fines and legal costs for volunteers arrested at protests. After the FBK announced its voluntary winding-up in July 2020 to avoid enforcement of an 88 ‑ million ‑ rouble damages award, the FZPG became the legal shell through which the FBK continued to operate and pay salaries to its staff. 10.     Taken together, the FBK, the Navalnyy Headquarters, Shtab, the FZPG and related commercial entities formed an integrated structure that underpinned Mr Navalnyy’s campaign against corruption and his advocacy of democratic reform in Russia. Most of these organisations were forcibly liquidated in 2021, after the Moscow City Court designated the FBK, the Navalnyy Headquarters network and the FZPG as “extremist” (see below). 11.     Besides those organisations, the applicants in the present case include Mr Navalnyy’s close associates, among them FBK employees, coordinators of regional offices and volunteers, and in some cases their family members, who became the target of concurrent administrative and financial measures by the Russian authorities (see the appendix).       Investigation into money laundering    Institution of criminal proceedings 12.     On 15 July 2019 an investigator from the Moscow Department of the Ministry of the Interior filed a report indicating that funds exceeding 75   million Russian roubles (RUB; approximately 1,056,168 euros (EUR)), deposited via ATMs into the bank accounts of the FBK, Shtab, OOO Strana Prilivov, Mr Navalnyy and his associates, could have been obtained illicitly. 13.     On 3 August 2019 the Moscow Investigative Committee launched criminal proceedings for large-scale money laundering under Article 174 §   4(b) of the Russian Criminal Code, on the basis of preliminary inquiry measures that had been carried out. 14 .     According to the investigation, from 1 January 2016 to 31 December 2018, unidentified individuals – including persons affiliated with the activities of the FBK and its staff – had received over RUB 75 million from third parties, knowing that the funds had been obtained by criminal means. To legitimise their possession and use of these illicit funds, the accomplices had deposited the amount via cash-in and ATMs in Moscow into various bank accounts. The funds had then been transferred to the FBK’s accounts, thereby financing the organisation and completing the money-laundering scheme. 15 .     The investigation was launched against the backdrop of Russia’s mass protests in the summer of 2019, held in response to the exclusion of opposition candidates, including Mr Navalnyy’s associates, from the 2019 Moscow City Duma elections (see, for example, the Court’s judgments concerning the protests in Ivanov and Others v. Russia ([Committee], nos.   57884/19 and 21 others, 25 May 2023); Bestuzhev and Others v. Russia ([Committee], nos. 11350/20 and 26 others, 27 April 2023). 16.     On 5 August 2019 the investigator in charge of the case instructed the police to collect personal data on “active FBK members”, including their home addresses, property holdings and bank accounts. 17 .     The money-laundering investigation remains ongoing, with the latest known extension of the time frame until 3 August 2024.    Freezing of bank accounts 18 .     Following the investigator’s requests, between 6   August 2019 and 27   February 2020, the Basmannyy and Presnenskiy District Courts of Moscow issued freezing orders on the bank accounts of the applicants and, in some cases, their relatives, alleging that those accounts had been used to launder criminal proceeds. Some orders were made collectively in respect of several account-holders, including the applicants’ relatives, without any individualised assessment. The dates of the freezing orders and the corresponding appeal decisions for each applicant are listed in the appendix. 19 .     According to the criminal case file, the amount allegedly laundered totalled RUB 75,535,054.75, a figure that exceeded the combined balances on the applicants’ bank accounts; accordingly, every rouble in those accounts was frozen. Newly opened accounts were also blocked, bringing the total amount actually frozen to about RUB 57 million (approximately EUR   850,000). As a result, the FBK was unable to pay staff salaries or continue its ordinary activities. 20 .     The freezing orders followed a consistent and typical structure across all court decisions. The courts routinely used a standardised template, citing charges under Article 174 § 4(b) of the Criminal Code to justify the measure. They stated summarily that the bank accounts in question had been used for laundering criminal proceeds. The reasoning then followed a repetitive structure: to secure the enforcement of a future judgment in respect of a civil claim, fines or other financial penalties, it was deemed necessary to freeze the accounts in order to prevent any potential unlawful disposal of funds that might hinder or render impossible the execution of the judgment. 21.     In each case, the courts mechanically endorsed the investigator’s request, merely noting that it complied with the legal requirements as to form and content, without engaging with the specific facts or assessing the necessity and proportionality of the measure. The freezing orders were imposed for the duration of the preliminary investigation. Following the prolongation of the investigation, the investigators subsequently sought to have the freezing measures extended. 22.     Between 31 July 2020 and 22 April 2021 the domestic courts gave a series of collective rulings extending the freezing measures in respect of nearly all the applicants. The extension orders, made following requests by the investigator, were couched in identical terms and did not refer to any new factual or evidentiary material justifying the measures. They maintained the freezing measures for the duration of the preliminary investigation, which remains ongoing. 23.     Appeals by the applicants against both the initial freezing orders and their subsequent extensions were unsuccessful. The Moscow City Court upheld the measures in brief and formulaic terms, repeating the reasoning of the lower courts and concluding that the decisions had been justified and in accordance with Russian law.    Searches of homes and offices 24 .     Between 8 August and 23 December 2019, searches were carried out at the applicants’ offices, their homes, and, in some instances, the homes of their relatives across Russia. Items such as mobile phones, computers, documents and production equipment were seized. The great majority of the residential searches were performed on two dates: on 12 September and 15   October 2019. In total, about 191 searches were conducted in respect of individuals and entities affiliated with Mr Navalnyy. They targeted not only staff members of his organisations or their relatives but also his supporters and independent journalists who had no formal connection with him, such as the editor-in-chief of an online media outlet in Smolensk (see application no.   30769/20 in the appendix). 25 .     Details of the searches relating to each applicant are listed in the appendix, from which a typical pattern emerges. In the first scenario, the searches were authorised in advance by the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow on the basis of applications submitted by the investigator with reference to the results of operational-search activities, which indicated that funds obtained through criminal activity had been distributed among various regional offices and that a particular applicant, being connected to Mr   Navalnyy, might have been involved. No concrete facts implicating any specific applicant in the alleged offence were, however, cited in the investigator’s applications. The decisions of the Basmannyy District Court in each case followed a standard template: they referred to the charges brought against the FBK and its staff (see paragraph 14 above) and stated that the applicant concerned might be involved in the alleged money-laundering scheme. The court concluded that the investigator had sufficient grounds to believe that items, documents or electronic devices relevant to the criminal case could be found at the applicant’s premises and accordingly authorised the search and seizure of any such material. 26.     In the second scenario, at least 36 searches were conducted without prior judicial authorisation, being treated as “urgent” searches under Article   165 §   5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation, which dispenses with prior judicial authorisation where delay might jeopardise the investigation. The first such search took place on 8 August 2019 at the FBK’s office. The search record referred solely to the investigator’s decision of 7   August 2019 and cited the aim of locating criminally obtained funds and other items relevant to the criminal case. During that search, the investigator seized 170 items, including laptops, video cameras and storage devices, as well as documents relating to the functioning of the FBK. The FBK’s representative subsequently challenged the searches and seizures in the courts. On 20 May 2020, the Basmannyy District Court upheld the investigator’s actions, concluding in summary terms that the applicable procedures had been observed, the applicant’s representatives had been present, and everything had been carried out in accordance with Russian law. 27 .     As regards the “urgent” searches carried out in the applicants’ homes in various regions of Russia, the investigator referred to unspecified information suggesting that individuals affiliated with the FBK had been attempting to conceal documents relevant to the criminal case. However, no concrete data substantiating that claim were provided. The domestic court subsequently validated those searches, reasoning that they could not have been delayed as this might have resulted in the destruction or concealment of evidence pertinent to the investigation, and thus found that the searches had been lawful. 28.     The applicants appealed against both the search orders and the court decisions retrospectively validating the “urgent” searches. The appeal courts dismissed all appeals, except in a few cases where the applicants had not been duly summoned to the first-instance hearing. Following reconsideration in those cases, the first-instance courts again found that the searches had been lawful. The appeal courts thereafter fully endorsed the lower courts’ reasoning and confirmed that the searches and seizures had been justified and carried out in compliance with Russian law, without addressing the necessity of resorting to the urgent-search procedure in the absence of any established risk of destruction or concealment of evidence or instruments of the offence.     Designation of the FBK as a Foreign Agent 29 .     On 9 October 2019 the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation issued an order by which it included the FBK in the register of non ‑ commercial organisations performing the functions of a foreign agent. The FBK lodged an administrative claim seeking to have that order declared unlawful, arguing that it had not received any foreign funding, as its bank accounts had been frozen in August and September 2019 pursuant to various freezing orders. It further submitted that its inclusion in the register of foreign agents violated its rights to freedom of expression, dissemination of information and freedom of association, contrary to Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. 30.     On 1 November 2019 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow dismissed the applicant organisation’s claim. The court found that the FBK had received foreign funding from an individual in Spain in the amount of RUB 138,505.41 (approximately EUR 1,944), which had been transferred to its bank account on 6 and 17 September 2019. It further held that, despite the freezing of its accounts, the FBK had been under an obligation to return those funds. In fact it did so, using a different bank account, on 15 October 2019, after the Ministry of Justice had already issued the impugned order. That judgment was upheld on appeal by the Moscow City Court on 20 January 2020. On 10 June 2020 the Second Court of Cassation of General Jurisdiction rejected a cassation appeal by the FBK. Lastly, on 23 September 2020 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dismissed a final cassation appeal, finding no procedural defects in the decision to designate the FBK as a foreign agent. It held, in particular, that the FBK had received foreign funding and had failed to apply for inclusion in the register of foreign agents upon receipt of those funds. 31.     The FBK also made a separate request to be removed from the register of foreign agents. That request was rejected on 21 January 2020, and its attempts to challenge the Ministry of Justice’s refusal through the courts were unsuccessful. The final decision in those proceedings was taken by the Supreme Court on 26 April 2021. 32 .     Separately, on 28 July 2020 the Simonovskiy District Court of Moscow found that the FBK had committed an administrative offence under Article 19.34 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (“the CAO”) (violation of the established procedure for the activities of a non-commercial organisation acting as a foreign agent). The organisation was fined RUB   300,000 (approximately EUR 3,250). On 8 April 2021 the Moscow City Court upheld that judgment on appeal.    Extremism proceedings 33 .     On 16 April 2021 the Moscow prosecutor brought administrative proceedings against the FBK, the FZPG and the Navalnyy Headquarters, seeking to have them declared “extremist” and to have their activities banned under the Suppression of Extremism Act. The prosecutor stated, in particular, that the organisations in question were destabilising the social and political situation in the country through calls for violent actions, extremist activity, mass disorder and attempts to involve minors in illegal activities. 34 .     On 26 April 2021 the Moscow prosecutor ordered the Navalnyy network of regional offices to suspend its activities pending the court’s ruling. On 29 April 2021 the Navalnyy Headquarters, which did not have legal-entity status under Russian law, was disbanded as an organisation, ahead of the court’s decision declaring it “extremist”. On 30 April 2021 the Russian Financial Monitoring Service put the Navalnyy Headquarters on the list of organisations involved in “terrorism and extremism”. 35 .     On 9 June 2021 the Moscow City Court upheld the prosecutor’s administrative claim. It found that the FBK, the FZPG and the Navalnyy Headquarters had acted under the overall direction of Mr Navalnyy and his associates and shared common objectives. The court further established that the Navalnyy Headquarters operated as a public association without State registration or legal-entity status, was headed by Mr Leonid Volkov, and maintained offices in thirty-seven regions of Russia, functioning as an interregional structure. The organisations were held to have (i)     disseminated extremist content through their online platforms, including YouTube; (ii)     organised and conducted unauthorised public events across various regions of Russia, among them the summer 2019 protests in Moscow; (iii)     called on the audience to participate in unauthorised rallies in support of Mr Navalnyy on 23 January 2021, during which violence had been used against law ‑ enforcement officers; and (iv) involved minors in their activities. On that basis the court characterised the organisations’ conduct as systematic extremist activity aimed at the violent overthrow of the constitutional order, entailing violations of human rights and freedoms, harm to public order and the incitement of social discord. The Moscow City Court accordingly ordered the dissolution of the FBK and the FZPG and prohibited the further operation of the Navalnyy Headquarters network. The hearing was held in camera owing to the use of classified material. 36 .     That judgment was upheld on appeal on 4 August 2021 by the First Appeal Court of General Jurisdiction, and on 25 March 2022 the Second Court of Cassation rejected further appeals, confirming the lower court rulings. On 17 August 2022 the Supreme Court upheld the judgments, finding them lawful and well-founded. 37 .     On 11 August 2021, charges were brought against Mr Leonid Volkov, coordinator of the Navalnyy Headquarters network, and Mr Ivan Zhdanov, director of the FBK, under Article 239 § 2 of the Criminal Code. According to the investigating authorities, they had committed the offence of directing a non-profit organisation acting as a foreign agent, the activities of which were associated with inciting citizens to commit further unlawful acts. On 4   February 2021 the same charge was laid against Mr Navalnyy. 38.     On 9 November 2021 Ms Chanysheva was arrested in Ufa on suspicion of offences under the Criminal Code: public calls for extremist activity (Article 280 § 1), organisation of an extremist community (Article   282.1 § 3) and establishing a non-profit organisation violating citizens’ rights (Article 239 § 3). After a first-instance trial, an appeal, a cassation review and a retrial, on 9 April 2024 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Bashkortostan found her guilty on all counts and sentenced her to nine years and six months’ imprisonment. Ms Chanysheva was the first associate of Mr Navalnyy to be charged with “organisation of an extremist community” following the designation of the FBK as extremist, and her conviction was cited by the authorities as a precedent in other regional proceedings. On 1 August 2024 Ms Chanysheva was released as part of an international prisoner exchange. 39 .     According to the applicants, from 2022 to 2024 the Russian authorities continued to prosecute Mr Navalnyy’s supporters with reference to the designation of his organisations as “extremist”. The mere fact of having been involved in those organisations’ activities could give rise to criminal charges under Article 282.1 of the Criminal Code, which penalises the organisation of or participation in an extremist community. Furthermore, by July 2024 the authorities had opened criminal proceedings against more than 50 individuals across the country for their alleged involvement with the FBK or Mr Navalnyy’s regional network, on charges related to “extremist activity”. In addition, at least 37 people were prosecuted for making donations to the FBK, in some cases involving amounts that were manifestly negligible. Separately, at least 57 individuals were convicted under Article   20.3 of the CAO for displaying prohibited symbols, including by posting photographs of Mr Navalnyy or reposting material relating to him or his organisations that had been designated as extremist. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK         Relevant domestic law and practice    Legal instruments      Criminal Code 40.     The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, as in force at the material time, provided as follows: Article 174. Legalisation (laundering) of monetary funds or other property acquired by others through criminal means “1.     Carrying out financial operations or other transactions with monetary funds or other property knowingly acquired by other persons through criminal activity, for the purpose of giving a lawful appearance to the ownership, possession or disposal of those funds or that property, shall be punishable by: a fine of up to 120,000 roubles, or a fine in an amount equivalent to the convicted person’s wages or other income for a period of up to one year. ... 4.     The acts defined in paragraph 1 ... of this Article, when committed: (a)     by an organised group; or (b)     on an especially large scale, shall be punishable by compulsory labour for a term of up to five years with or without restriction of liberty for up to two years and with or without disqualification from holding specified offices or engaging in specified activities for up to three years, or imprisonment for a term of up to seven years with an optional fine of up to 1,000,000   roubles (or the convicted person’s wages or other income for up to five years) or without such a fine, with or without restriction of liberty for up to two years, and with or without disqualification from holding specified offices or engaging in specified activities for up to five years. Note. For the purposes of this Article and Article 174.1 of this Code, financial operations or other transactions involving monetary funds or other property shall be deemed to be committed on a large scale when their value exceeds 1,500,000 roubles, and to be committed on an especially large scale when their value exceeds 6,000,000   roubles.”      Code of Criminal Procedure 41 .     The Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation, as in force at the material time, provided as follows: Article 82. Storage of physical evidence “1.     Physical evidence shall be kept with the criminal case file until the judgment enters into legal force or until the expiry of the time-limit for appealing against the decision or ruling to discontinue the criminal proceedings, and shall be transmitted together with the criminal case, except in the cases provided for by this Article. Where a dispute over ownership of the property constituting physical evidence is to be resolved in civil proceedings, the physical evidence shall be kept until the court’s decision enters into legal force. 2.     Physical evidence in the form of: ... 3.1)     money, valuables and other property obtained as a result of the commission of a crime, as well as income derived from such property and discovered in the course of investigative actions, shall be subject to seizure in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 115 of this Code; ... 4.1)     money, after the necessary investigative actions have been carried out, shall be photographed or recorded on video or film and: (a)     shall be returned to their lawful owner ...” Article 115. Seizure of property “1.     To secure the enforcement of a sentence in respect of a civil claim, the recovery of a fine or other pecuniary penalties, or the possible confiscation of property referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 104.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, an investigator (with the consent of the head of the investigative body) or an inquiry officer (with the consent of the prosecutor) shall lodge an application with the court for the seizure of the property of a suspect, an accused person, or any other persons who, under the law, bear material liability for their actions. The court shall examine the application in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 165 of this Code. When deciding whether to seize property, the court must set out the specific factual circumstances on which its decision is based and must specify any restrictions on the ownership, use or disposal of the seized property. 2.     Seizure of property shall consist both in a prohibition, addressed to the owner or holder of the property, on disposing of it and, where necessary, on using it, and also in the removal of the property and its transfer into safekeeping. 3.     Seizure may also be applied to property held by other persons who are neither suspects nor accused, nor persons bearing statutory material liability for their actions, where there are sufficient grounds to believe that such property was obtained through the suspect’s or accused’s criminal conduct, or was used, or intended for use, as an instrument, equipment or other means of committing an offence, or for financing terrorism, extremist activity (extremism), an organised group, an unlawful armed formation, or a criminal community (criminal organisation). The court shall consider the application in the manner laid down in Article 165 of this Code. In deciding whether to seize the property, the court must set out the specific factual circumstances on which the decision is based, specify any restrictions on ownership, use or disposal of the seized property, and state the period for which the seizure is imposed, taking account of the time-limit for the pre-trial investigation in the criminal case and the time required to transmit the case to the court. The period of seizure fixed by the court may be extended in accordance with the procedure provided in Article 115.1 of this Code. ... 7.     Where monetary funds or other valuables held in an account, a deposit, or otherwise in safekeeping with banks or other credit institutions are placed under seizure, all transactions on that account shall be suspended, in whole or in part, up to the amount of the funds and valuables seized. ... 9.     A seizure imposed in respect of property, or any separate restrictions to which the seized property has been subjected, shall be cancelled by a ruling or decision of the person or body conducting the criminal proceedings whenever the application of that coercive procedural measure, or of the particular restrictions, is no longer necessary, and likewise where the period of seizure fixed by the court has expired or an extension has been refused. A seizure imposed on non-cash funds held in the accounts of persons who are neither suspects nor accused, nor persons bearing statutory material liability for their actions – where the seizure was imposed to secure enforcement of the sentence in respect of a civil claim – shall also be lifted if, during the pre-trial investigation, ownership of the seized funds has been established and there is no information from an interested party, supported by appropriate documents, indicating a dispute as to their ownership, or if ownership of those funds has been determined by a court in civil proceedings brought by a person recognised as a victim and/or civil claimant in the criminal case.” Article 115.1. Procedure for extending the period during which the coercive procedural measure of seizure of property is applied “1.     The period of seizure imposed on the property of the persons referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 115 of this Code may be extended if the grounds for applying that measure have not ceased to exist. 2.     Where the period of seizure fixed by the court in respect of property belonging to persons who are neither suspects nor accused, nor persons bearing statutory material liability for their actions, is about to expire, or where the preliminary investigation is suspended on the grounds set out in paragraph 1 of Article 208 of this Code, the investigator (with the consent of the head of the investigative body) or the inquiry officer (with the consent of the prosecutor) shall, no later than seven days before the expiry of the period of seizure or before the suspension of the preliminary investigation, lodge an application with the court at the place where the investigation is being conducted, seeking an extension of that period, and shall issue a corresponding order. The order initiating the application shall specify the concrete factual circumstances showing the need to extend the period of seizure and to maintain the restrictions placed on the property, and state the length of time for which extension is sought. Materials substantiating the application shall be attached to the order. 3. The application shall be examined by a single judge of a district court or of a military court at the corresponding level within five days of its receipt. ... 5.     Having considered the application, the judge shall give a ruling extending the period of seizure and maintaining or amending the restrictions on ownership, use or disposal of the property, or wholly or partly refusing to grant the application, including cancelling the seizure or varying the above-mentioned restrictions ... 6.     In deciding whether to extend the period of seizure or to maintain the restrictions upon the property, the person or body conducting the criminal proceedings and the court must ensure the observance of a reasonable period for applying this coercive measure to the property of persons who are neither suspects nor accused, nor persons bearing statutory material liability for their actions. When determining a reasonable period of seizure, account shall be taken of the circumstances specified in paragraph 3.2 of Article 6.1 of this Code ... 7.     A judge’s ruling made under paragraph 5 of this Article may be appealed against to a higher court by way of appeal or cassation in accordance with Chapters 45.1 and 47.1 of this Code.” Article 165. Judicial procedure for obtaining authorisation to carry out an investigative action “1.     In the cases set out in sub-paragraphs 4 to 9, 10.1, 11 and 12 of paragraph 2 of Article 29 of this Code, the investigator (acting with the consent of the head of the investigative body) or the inquiry officer (acting with the consent of the prosecutor) shall apply to the court for permission to carry out the investigative action, and shall issue a corresponding order. ... 4.     Having examined the application, the judge shall issue a ruling either authorising the investigative action or refusing to authorise it, giving reasons for any refusal. 5.     In exceptional circumstances, where an inspection of a dwelling, a search or seizure in a dwelling, a personal search, the seizure of an item pledged to or deposited with a pawn shop, or the seizure of property referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 104.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation cannot be delayed, those investigative actions may be carried out on the basis of an order issued by the investigator or inquiry officer without prior court authorisation. In such a case the investigator or inquiry officer shall, no later than three days from the start of the investigative action, notify the judge and the prosecutor that it has been carried out, attaching copies of the order authorising the action and of the record of the action so that the legality of the decision may be reviewed. On receiving that notification, the judge shall, within the period specified in paragraph 2 of this Article, examine the legality of the investigative action and issue a ruling declaring it lawful or unlawful. If the judge finds the action unlawful, all evidence obtained during it shall be deemed inadmissible under Article 75 of this Code.” Article 182. Grounds and procedure for conducting a search “1.     The basis for conducting a search shall be the availability of sufficient information to believe that, in a given place or with a given person, there may be instruments, equipment or other means of committing an offence, as well as objects, documents or valuables that may be of significance to the criminal case. 2.     A search shall be carried out on th