CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITYCOM;ENG — 15 janvier 2026

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s2EF17D91 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sC986E16F { font-family:Arial; color:#ffffff } .s3AAE10DF { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s3CA22BA { font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .s819344C9 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:18pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-18pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt } .s2D9C6089 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s84651E4E { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:3pt; text-align:justify } .s7CB9076 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s68D1564D { width:34.89pt; display:inline-block } .sB51F05C5 { width:151.44pt; display:inline-block } .s5D826FD4 { width:25.88pt; display:inline-block } .s1B61D60 { width:156.43pt; display:inline-block }     FIRST SECTION DECISION Application no. 47682/21 Nikolina GRŽEVIĆ against Croatia   The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 15   January 2026 as a Committee composed of:   Frédéric Krenc , President ,   Davor Derenčinović,   Alain Chablais , judges , and Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   47682/21) against the Republic of Croatia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 17 September 2021 by a Croatian national, Ms Nikolina Gržević (“the applicant”), who was born in 1991, lives in Pazin and was represented by Ms M. Helebrant, lawyer practising in Zagreb; the decision to give notice of the application to the Croatian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms Š. Stažnik; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated, decides as follows: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1.     The application concerns the termination of the applicant’s disability allowance on account of bank interest paid to her on the compensation received for the injuries sustained in an accident resulting in disability. 2 .     In 2007, at the age of 15, the applicant suffered a traumatic brain injury in a car accident. Ever since she has been severely disabled, immobile and unable to communicate. She is fully dependent on her parents for assistance and care, and is under their guardianship. 3.     In 2008, by a decision of the Pazin Social Welfare Centre (hereinafter “the Pazin SWC”), the applicant was granted the right to a personal disability allowance ( osobna invalidnina ) in accordance with section 54 of the Social Welfare Act, in the monthly amount of 1,250 Croatian kunas (HRK;   approximately 166 euros (EUR)). 4.     By an out-of-court settlement with the insurance company concluded in 2012, the applicant was paid the amount of around HRK   2,000,000 (approximately EUR 265,500) in damages for the injuries sustained in the car accident. 5 .     On 31 December 2012 the Pazin SWC issued a decision allowing the applicant’s father to withdraw the compensation received from the applicant’s bank account and to invest it in term deposit accounts with three different banks. 6 .     According to the 2013 guardianship report submitted by the applicant’s father in January 2014, he invested HRK 1,000,000 (approximately EUR   132,700) in the bank P. with an interest rate of 4.3%, and HRK   450,000 (approximately EUR   59,700) in each of the banks Z. and E., both with an interest rate of 4.5%. 7.     Following the enactment of a new Social Welfare Act, on 25   March 2014 the Pazin SWC instituted ex officio proceedings with a view to establishing whether the applicant still fulfilled the requirements for the disability allowance. A number of documents were obtained, including medical documentation which showed that the applicant’s health remained unchanged, a letter from the Land Registry confirming that she did not own any property and a letter from the tax authorities stating that she had not had any taxable income in 2013. 8 .     By a letter dated 2 July 2014, the Pazin SWC enquired with the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth (“the Ministry”) whether the interest on the sums invested in the term deposit accounts in the applicant’s name were to be interpreted as “income” for the purposes of the calculation of her entitlement to the disability allowance under the new Social Welfare Act. 9 .     By a letter dated 24 July 2014, the Ministry replied that interest earned from savings were to be considered “income” within the meaning of the Social Welfare Act, and that the damages paid by an insurance company were considered “assets”. 10.     On 14 August 2014 the Pazin SWC asked the applicant’s parents to provide information on the exact amount of interest earned by the applicant between December 2013 and February 2014, stressing that it was not able to independently verify those amounts. 11.     By a letter dated 8 September 2014, the applicant’s lawyer replied that the applicant had not had any income in the period in question. She submitted that the Ministry’s interpretation of the relevant legislation was wrong because it had disregarded part of the Social Welfare Act provision that referred to the tax legislation under which neither the damages received outside of an individual’s economic activity, nor interest earned on that amount, could be regarded as “income”. 12.     In a conclusion dated 29 September 2014, the Pazin SWC formally invited the applicant’s parents to submit information on her income in relation to the interest earned, with a warning that should they fail to do so, it would terminate the applicant’s disability allowance. 13.     In reply, the applicant’s lawyer reaffirmed that the applicant had not had any income, that the Pazin SWC possessed all the relevant information on her bank deposits, since they had been subject to its approval, and that the Pazin SWC could also request information from those banks. The applicant’s lawyer also stated that the family was staying in a different town while the applicant underwent rehabilitation. 14 .     By a decision of 25 November 2014, the Pazin SWC terminated the applicant’s disability allowance as of 17 October 2014, stating that the applicant had received “income” in the form of bank interest and that her parents had failed to submit information relevant for the calculation of her entitlement to the disability allowance in accordance with section   107(1) of the Social Welfare Act. 15 .     The Pazin SWC’s decision was upheld on appeal by the Ministry of Demography, Family, Youth and Social Politics on 8 February 2017. 16 .     The applicant subsequently lodged an action for judicial review, arguing that the termination of her disability allowance had been unlawful and discriminatory because the interest she had received was not to be interpreted as “income” within the meaning of the Social Welfare Act. Among other things, she also relied on the Ministry’s general instruction from January 2015 which clarified the manner in which income was to be calculated under the Social Welfare Act and stating damages which were not linked to an economic activity were not considered “income”. 17 .     On 1 February 2019 the Zagreb Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s action, having found that the Pazin SWC’s decision terminating her disability allowance had been lawful, given the applicant’s failure to submit information relating to the amount of interest she had been paid. The appeal lodged by the applicant against that judgment was also dismissed by the High Administrative Court on 2   June 2020 for similar reasons. 18.     The applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint complaining, inter alia , of discrimination on the basis of her disability and of a violation of her property rights and her right to a fair trial. Her complaint was declared inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded by the Constitutional Court on 24   February 2021. The decision was served on the applicant’s lawyer on 18   March 2021. 19.     Meanwhile, in 2015 the applicant’s mother was granted the status of a parent carer ( roditelj njegovatelj ) and became entitled to a monthly allowance of HRK 2,500 (EUR 332) and, as of 29 June 2022, HRK   4,000 (EUR   531) per month. In 2021 the applicant was also granted the right to an allowance for vulnerable energy buyers. 20 .     On 12 January 2021, after the entry into force of a new Social Welfare Act, the applicant was again granted the personal disability allowance starting from 14 October 2020. 21.     Relying on Article   14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol   No.   1 thereto, the applicant complained of alleged discrimination occasioned by the unfair termination of her disability allowance. She also complained under Article 6 of the Convention, about the unfairness of the administrative proceedings in her case. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT 22.     The Court has summarised the general principles applicable to complaints under Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Article   1 of Protocol   No. 1 thereto in Guberina v. Croatia (no. 23682/13, §§   67-74, 22   March 2016). In particular, it stressed that a wide margin was usually allowed to the State under the Convention when it comes to general measures of economic or social strategy (see Hämäläinen v. Finland [GC], no.   37359/09, §   109, ECHR 2014). 23 .     As regards Article 6, the Court reiterates that it should not act as a court of fourth instance and will not therefore question under Article 6   § 1 the judgment of the national courts, unless their findings can be regarded as arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable (see Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2)   [GC], no.   22251/08, § 61, ECHR 2015). In that connection the Court observes that a domestic judicial decision cannot be qualified as arbitrary to the point of prejudicing the fairness of proceedings unless no reasons are provided for it or if the reasons given are based on a manifest factual or legal error committed by the domestic court, resulting in a “denial of justice” (see   Moreira Ferreira v.   Portugal (no. 2)   [GC], no.   19867/12, § 85, 11 July 2017), that is, an error so “evident” that no   reasonable court could ever have made it (see Bochan , cited above, § 62). 24.     In the present case, the applicant’s main complaint relates to the fact that she should have been treated differently from others on account of her disability and the specific circumstances of her case. In particular, she argued that the interest she had accrued on the amount received as compensation for her injuries in the car accident should not have been interpreted as “income” leading to the termination of her personal disability allowance, nor should she have been forced to prove the amount received in interest. 25.     The Court notes at the outset that the legislation in question concerned disability allowances and was applied to determine whether or not a person with disabilities fulfilled the legal requirements to obtain such an allowance. According to section 54 of the Social Welfare Act then in force, one of the requirements at the relevant time was the absence of any “income” within the meaning of that Act. 26.     The Court further notes that, prior to deciding her case, the competent administrative body inquired with the relevant Ministry as to the qualification of the interest the applicant had received on her savings (see paragraph 8 above). Once the Ministry had informed it that such interest was to be considered “income” within the meaning of the Social Welfare Act, the Pazin SWC invited the applicant’s parents several times to disclose the amount of interest received, which they refused to do. It can thus not be said that the competent domestic authorities had failed to recognise the factual specificity of the applicant’s situation or that they had failed to treat her differently from other persons on account of her disability (contrast Guberina , cited above, §   86). 27.     Furthermore, while the applicant argued that the 2015 instruction by the Ministry issued six months later had been contradictory to the one issued in her case, the Court notes that it is not its task to question the interpretation or the application of the domestic law (see paragraph 23 above). Once the Pazin SWC received no reply from the applicant’s parents concerning the amount of the interest perceived, it terminated the applicant’s disability allowance because she had received “income” but failed to prove its amount (see paragraph 14 above). This decision was subsequently upheld by the relevant Ministry and by two instances of administrative courts, in judgments which were neither arbitrary nor manifestly unreasonable. None of those authorities appears to have found the 2015 Ministry instruction, which explicitly dealt with damages but remained silent on the issue of interest (see   paragraph 16 above), relevant to the circumstances or contrary to the Pazin SWC’s conclusion in the applicant’s case. 28.     Finally, the Court cannot but note that as of 2020 and the entry into force of the new Social Welfare Act, personal disability allowance is no longer conditioned on the beneficiary’s income (see paragraph 20 above), which resulted in the applicant being able to again successfully claim that benefit and must have mitigated any perceived injustice in her case. 29.     In conclusion, in the light of all the material in its possession, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. 30.     Accordingly, the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article   35 §§   3   (a) and   4 of the Convention. For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Declares the application inadmissible. Done in English and notified in writing on 5 February 2026.     Liv Tigerstedt   Frédéric Krenc   Deputy Registrar   President