CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITYCOM;ENG — 29 janvier 2026

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s2EF17D91 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s3AAE10DF { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s3CA22BA { font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s819344C9 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:18pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-18pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .sDECD9755 { margin-left:11.67pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; padding-left:6.78pt; font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .sDA7B489D { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:15pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; padding-left:3.45pt; font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .s84651E4E { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:3pt; text-align:justify } .s2D9C6089 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sC986E16F { font-family:Arial; color:#ffffff } .sBD1BE8CC { width:33.89pt; display:inline-block } .s25198F8F { width:149.77pt; display:inline-block } .s5D826FD4 { width:25.88pt; display:inline-block } .s1B61D60 { width:156.43pt; display:inline-block } .s1721E4C5 { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s85226119 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 }     FIFTH SECTION DECISION Application no. 212/24 P-HOLDING, S.R.O. against the Czech Republic   The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 29   January 2026 as a Committee composed of:   María Elósegui , President ,   Kateřina Šimáčková,   Gilberto Felici , judges , and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   212/24) against the Czech Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 22 December 2023 by a   Czech company, P-holding, s.r.o. (“the applicant company”), registered in Prague, which was represented by Mr M. Dančišin, a lawyer practising in Prague; Having deliberated, decides as follows: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1.     The application concerns a dispute over ownership of land (“the Land”) which had previously belonged to the church and had been seized by the former communist regime. The applicant company complained under Article   1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 2.     Following the Communist coup in February 1948, the State implemented a land reform programme whereby it expropriated, inter alia , a   number of church lands without providing compensation. This was also the case in respect of the Land which, until 1956, had been owned by the Order of the Knights of the Cross with the Red Star (“the Order”). Under section 29 of the Land Ownership Act (Law no. 229/1991 – “the LOA”), enacted after the fall of the communist regime, lands previously expropriated from the church could not be transferred to other persons pending the adoption of the Church Property Settlement Act (Law no. 428/2012 – “the CPSA”), in order to secure the restitution of these lands to their original owners. 3 .     In 2010 a certain H. acquired the Land under the LOA on the basis of a court judgment given in proceedings brought by H. for an order that the Land Fund ( Pozemkový fond ) enter into a contract for the transfer of substitute land. Those proceedings ended in November 2010. In October 2010 H.   entered into a contract with the applicant company to sell them the Land for the equivalent of 167,205 euros. The contract indicated that on the date on which it took effect, no final decision had yet been given in the proceedings brought by H. In November 2010 the Land Fund and H. entered into a contract for the transfer of substitute land to H., which included the Land. 4.     The applicant company’s ownership of the Land was registered on 3   February 2011. 5.     On 31 December 2015 the Order brought a claim under section 18 of the CPSA, seeking a declaration that the Land was owned by the State [1] . 6 .     The claim was dismissed by the lower courts, which held that although section 29 of the LOA prohibited the transfer of the Land, as H. had acquired the Land by a court judgment, the acquisition was not contrary to that provision. Consequently, the claim under section 18 of the CPSA could not succeed. In September 2019 the Supreme Court quashed the lower courts’ judgments and remitted the case for fresh consideration. It held that the judgment on which H.’s ownership of the Land was based did not bind the Order, as it had not been a party to those proceedings. The Order could therefore seek a declaration under section 18 of the CPSA that the Land was in State ownership. The Supreme Court further found that a transfer of ownership based on a court judgment might contravene section   29 of the LOA, and therefore considered it appropriate to apply its own relevant case-law and that of the Constitutional Court to examine whether the applicant company had been a bona fide purchaser of the Land, and thereafter to assess the competing property rights. 7.     On 27 October 2021 the first-instance court allowed the Order’s claim, finding that the Land was in State ownership. The court held, in particular, that when the contract of sale took effect, no final decision had yet been given in respect of H.’s claim. The court noted that the applicant company had financed H.’s legal proceedings and had provided services to assist him in identifying the Land, at a time when all the surrounding plots were owned by the Order. It therefore considered that H. and the applicant company should have examined the Land’s ownership status more carefully by consulting the land register, and that they had known, or ought to have known, that the Land was subject to a church restitution claim, and thus they were not bona fide purchasers. The first-instance court ruled that the transfer of the Land based on the contract entered into pursuant to the court judgment was null and void ab initio , as was the subsequent contract of sale transferring the ownership rights in the Land to the applicant company. 8.     On 27 April 2022 the appellate court upheld the first-instance judgment. 9.     On 24 January 2023 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal on points of law brought by the applicant company. 10.     On 30 August 2023 the Constitutional Court (III. ÚS 930/23) dismissed as manifestly ill-founded a constitutional appeal brought by the applicant company. 11.     The relevant domestic law and practice are described in Rybářství Třeboň a. s. and Rybářství Třeboň Hld. a. s. v. the Czech Republic (nos.   18037/19 and 33175/22, §§ 54-63, 7 November 2024). THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT Alleged violation of Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 12.     The applicant company complained that it had been deprived of its ownership rights acquired in good faith on the basis of the land register and the 2010 judgment. It argued that the interference was not in the public interest and not proportionate. 13.     The Court accepts that the applicant company was deprived of its property as a result of the passing of the CPSA and the findings of the domestic courts in proceedings instituted by the Order. By virtue of the domestic courts’ decisions, the applicant company’s title to the Land was annulled, as the CPSA made it possible for churches and other religious communities to apply to a court for the determination of State ownership of property which had originally belonged to them, but which had been transferred from State ownership to third parties prior to the entry into force of the CPSA, in breach of section 29 of the LOA. The Court finds that there was an interference, which had a legal basis in the domestic law, with the applicant company’s right under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which amounted to a deprivation of possessions within the meaning of the second sentence of that Article (see Rybářství Třeboň a. s. and Rybářství Třeboň Hld. a. s. v.   the   Czech Republic , nos. 18037/19 and 33175/22, § 83 with further references, 7   November 2024). 14.     The Court has already held that the CPSA served the fundamental public interest of the restoration of justice and respect for the rule of law, even where it interfered with the long-standing property rights of third parties (ibid., § 90). The Court considers that its findings are equally pertinent to the applicant company’s complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. There are therefore no grounds to reach a different conclusion in the circumstances of the present case. 15.     As to the proportionality of the interference in question, the Court observes that the domestic courts thoroughly examined the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the Land and responded to all of the applicant company’s arguments. Furthermore, the applicant company was not deprived of its property as a result of expropriation – a situation in which, had it occurred, the availability of compensation would have been central to the proportionality assessment – but as a consequence of the declaration that the transfer of the Land to H. and subsequently to the applicant company had been void ab initio , because they had acted in bad faith. The Court notes in this connection that in civil law, the consequences of a transaction being declared void ab initio are generally limited to an obligation to return the possession concerned or the purchase price paid. It observes, however, that the applicant company, having enjoyed the possession of the Land for more than a decade, has not specified the financial consequences of the contested court decisions, and has not indicated whether it sought the return of the purchase price from H. 16.     Having regard to all the foregoing considerations, the Court, emphasising above all the wide margin of appreciation that the respondent State enjoys in the matter (ibid., § 102), does not find that the applicant company had to bear an individual and excessive burden. 17.     It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. Alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the COnvention 18.     The applicant company further complained of a breach of legal certainty resulting from the domestic courts’ decisions on State ownership. 19.     The Court reiterates that the right to a fair hearing under Article   6   §   1 of the Convention, interpreted in the light of the principles of the rule of law and legal certainty, encompasses the requirement that where the courts have finally determined an issue, their ruling should not be called into question (see Gražulevičiūtė v. Lithuania , no. 53176/17, §   72, 14   December 2021). It   notes, at the same time, that the res judicata effects of judgments have limitations ad personam and as to material scope (see Kehaya and Others v.   Bulgaria , nos. 47797/99 and 68698/01, § 66, 12 January 2006; Esertas v.   Lithuania , no. 50208/06, § 22, 31 May 2012; and Gražulevičiūtė , cited above, § 74). 20.     In the present case, the Court observes that the domestic courts held that the Order had not been a party to the proceedings in which H. had been found to be the owner of the Land. Consequently, the Order was not bound by the 2010 judgment (see paragraph 3 above), and there could be no breach of the applicant company’s right to legal certainty when the Order exercised its right under section 18 of the CPSA and subsequently obtained a judicial declaration that the Land was owned by the State rather than by H. (see   paragraph 6 above). The Court further observes that the applicant company was represented by a professional lawyer, that its arguments were duly examined by the domestic courts at four levels of jurisdiction, including the Constitutional Court, and that their judicial review was fully adversarial. The Court thus finds that there is nothing in the proceedings to suggest either that the applicant company was denied a reasonable opportunity to put forward its case or that the domestic courts’ findings were tainted with arbitrariness. 21.     It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. 22.     In the light of the above, the Court finds that the application must be declared inadmissible in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.   For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Declares the application inadmissible. Done in English and notified in writing on 19 February 2026.     Martina Keller   María Elósegui   Deputy Registrar   President       [1] Section 18 enabled church entities to bring a claim seeking a declaration that the State was the owner of property that had originally been church property and had been transferred by the State to other persons in breach of section 29 of the Land Ownership Act, prior to the entry into force of the CPSA. If successful, the church entities could then claim restitution and reacquire the property.