CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITYCOM;ENG — 29 janvier 2026

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s2EF17D91 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s3AAE10DF { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s3CA22BA { font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .s819344C9 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:18pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-18pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt } .s2D9C6089 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s84651E4E { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:3pt; text-align:justify } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sC986E16F { font-family:Arial; color:#ffffff } .sBD1BE8CC { width:33.89pt; display:inline-block } .s25198F8F { width:149.77pt; display:inline-block } .s5D826FD4 { width:25.88pt; display:inline-block } .s1B61D60 { width:156.43pt; display:inline-block } .s1721E4C5 { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .sD00444C6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt } .s75A32C27 { border-collapse:collapse } .s2F3EB0E4 { border:0.75pt solid #838383; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top; background-color:#dfdfdf } .s2EF62ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt } .sE1A7A04C { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#424242 } .sBAADFE8C { border:0.75pt solid #838383; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top }     FIFTH SECTION DECISION Application no. 1161/21 Denisa BLAŽOVÁ against the Czech Republic and 2 other applications (see list appended)   The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 29   January 2026 as a Committee composed of:   María Elósegui , President ,   Kateřina Šimáčková,   Gilberto Felici , judges , and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the applications against the Czech Republic lodged with the Court under Article   34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by the applicant whose details appear in the appended table (“the applicant”), on the various dates indicated therein; the decision to give notice of the applications to the Czech Government (“the Government”) represented by their Agent, Mr P. Konůpka, of the Ministry of Justice; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated, decides as follows: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1.     The case concerns the surveillance of two vehicles used by the applicant and her partner, D.K. Criminal proceedings were pending in Slovakia against D.K., who was suspected of kidnapping and murdering a cooperating witness in those proceedings and hiding his body in the Czech Republic. 2.     On 9 November 2016 the Trenčín regional prosecutor’s office of the Slovak republic (“the Slovak regional prosecutor”) submitted a request to the Prague municipal prosecutor’s office (“the municipal prosecutor”) for mutual assistance in investigating the suspected murder. They asked the municipal prosecutor to document, in a manner consistent with Czech law, D.K.’s movements and communications. 3.     On 9 November 2016 the municipal prosecutor authorised the Czech National Organised Crime Agency (“the NOCA”) to carry out the requested measures and other actions necessary to uncover the investigated criminal activity. 4.     On 10, 11, 13 and 15 November 2016 the Slovak regional prosecutor supplemented the request, specifying that the suspect had been using a black metallic Audi A6 owned by another member of their organised group (“vehicle 1”). 5.     On 12 November 2016 the NOCA submitted a request to the municipal prosecutor for a warrant for surveillance of vehicle 1 under Article 158d § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure during the period from 12 November 2016 to 12 March 2017. To avoid delays and possible risk to life and limb, on the same day the NOCA began tracking the vehicle by GPS on the basis of Article   158d § 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On 14 November 2016 the municipal prosecutor granted the warrant and submitted a request to the Prague 5 District Court (“the District Court”) for a warrant, under Article   158d § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for the surveillance of the interior of vehicle   1. A court warrant was requested, as the surveillance would interfere with the privacy of home and correspondence.   On the same day the District Court issued the warrant, authorising surveillance from 4 p.m. on 14   November 2016 to 4 p.m. on 14 March 2017. 6.     On 9 December 2016 the NOCA submitted a request to the municipal prosecutor for a warrant for the surveillance, from 9   December 2016 to 9   June   2017, of another vehicle (“vehicle 2”), which, according to their investigation, had been used by D.K. and other suspects. On the same day the municipal prosecutor issued a warrant authorising surveillance from 9   December 2016 to 9 May 2017. She also submitted, under Article   158d § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a request for a court warrant authorising the surveillance of the interior of that vehicle. On 12   December 2016 the District Court issued the warrant authorising surveillance from 2 p.m. on 12   December 2016 to midnight on 9   May 2017. 7 .     On 22 December 2016 the applicant became the owner of vehicle   1, which she allegedly used from that day until 6 March 2017, when it was apprehended by the Slovak police. The applicant also allegedly used vehicle   2 from 1 January 2017 to 6 March 2017. 8.     On 6 March 2017 the Slovak police apprehended the applicant and D.K. while they were travelling together in vehicle 2. 9.     On 21 June 2017 the municipal prosecutor forwarded to the Office of Special Prosecutions of the Slovak Republic a report on the surveillance, including all the collected data. 10.     On 22 January 2020 D.K.’s defence counsel informed the applicant of the surveillance carried out on vehicles 1 and 2. 11 .     On 18, 19 and 20 March 2020 respectively the applicant lodged three constitutional appeals against (i) the municipal prosecutor’s warrant of 14   November 2016 and the related actions of the NOCA and the municipal prosecutor, (ii) the District Court’s warrant of 14 November 2016, and (iii)   the District Court’s warrant of 12 December 2016. She requested that the Constitutional Court declare the warrants null and void and order the destruction of all the data intercepted through the surveillance authorised by them. All of her constitutional appeals were dismissed as belated (decisions nos. IV. ÚS 715/20 of 15 June 2020, II. ÚS 832/20 of 1 September 2020, and II. ÚS 845/20 of 15 September 2020 respectively), as they had been lodged after the one-year statutory time-limit, which ran from the moment the alleged interference had been terminated. 12 .     On 10 August 2020 D.K. requested the Prague High Prosecutor’s Office (“the High Prosecutor”) to review the lawfulness of the procedure followed by the NOCA and the municipal prosecutor in connection with the surveillance of vehicle 1. He complained, among other things, that the surveillance (i) had not been duly justified, (ii) had not had a legal basis, as it had not been requested by the Slovak police, (iii) had not been duly authorised by a court, and (iv) had been unlawful from the moment the vehicle’s owner had changed. 13.     On 1 October 2020 the High Prosecutor dismissed D.K.’s request as ill-founded. In response to D.K.’s arguments, it held that the surveillance had been (i) duly justified by the Slovak police’s request, (ii) lawfully authorised by the municipal prosecutor’s decision of 9 November 2016, (iii) lawfully authorised by a subsequent court warrant, and (iv) that the change of the vehicle’s owner had had no impact on the justification of the surveillance. 14 .     On 11 December 2020, within two months from the High Prosecutor’s communication of 1 October 2020, D.K. lodged a constitutional appeal against that communication, the surveillance and the warrant authorising it. 15 .     On 16 February 2021 the Constitutional Court dismissed the constitutional appeal as manifestly ill-founded. It held that the surveillance had been duly justified by the Slovak request for mutual assistance and all aspects of the surveillance had been lawfully authorised, including by a court warrant. It also considered that the applicant’s ownership of vehicle 1 did not impact the lawfulness of the surveillance because the warrants had been issued on account of the car being used by D.K. and other suspects, which had been the case until February 2017. 16.     On 28 February 2024 the Slovak Supreme Court quashed a judgment by the Specialised Criminal Court in which the latter found D.K. guilty of several offences, including murder, following the delivery of the Court’s judgment in Krátky and others v. Slovakia (no. 35025/20, 15 February 2024). The case was remitted back to the Specialised Criminal Court. The   Specialised Criminal Court’s judgment did not rely on data from the surveillance conducted in the Czech Republic. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT 17.     Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single decision. 18.     The applicant complained under Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention that the surveillance of her car had been unlawful and that she had not had any effective domestic remedy in that regard. 19.     The Court observes that, without attempting to use any other domestic remedy, notably the request for review by a superior prosecutor under section   12(d) of the State Prosecution Act (see, for example, B.Ü. v. the Czech Republic , no. 9264/15, §§ 58 and 64, 6 October 2022), the applicant challenged the surveillance and the related prosecutor’s and courts’ warrants by means of constitutional appeals. All those appeals were dismissed as belated, as the statutory time-limit for lodging a constitutional appeal was one year from the end of the interference, without any extension. 20.     In her decision to turn directly to the Constitutional Court, the applicant relied on the Constitutional Court’s judgment no. II. ÚS 2597/18 of 9 April 2020 (“the Constitutional Court’s judgment”), according to which if an appellant challenged simultaneously a court warrant and police conduct in its implementation, he or she could lodge a constitutional appeal without first requesting a prosecutor’s review of the police’s conduct. 21.     However, the Court is not convinced that the applicant’s reliance on the above-cited Constitutional Court judgment is pertinent to the present case. That judgment concerned criminal proceedings against an accused in respect of whom a home search was conducted to uncover his alleged criminal activity. The accused was directly affected by the court warrant itself, which was, moreover, the sole legal basis for the interference. 22.     In the applicant’s case, the surveillance of the vehicles followed three different legal regimes: immediate police surveillance without a warrant (under Article 158d § 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), localisation surveillance on the basis of the prosecutor’s warrants (under Article 158d § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) and surveillance of the interiors of the vehicles authorised by court warrants (under Article 158d § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). The exemption set out in the Constitutional Court’s judgment could only apply to the surveillance authorised by the court warrants. The applicant would therefore be, in any event, required to submit a request for review under section 12(d) of the State Prosecution Act in relation to the remaining acts of surveillance. 23.     Moreover, the Court also finds erroneous the applicant’s reliance on the Constitutional Court’s judgment in respect of the surveillance conducted on the basis of the court warrants. Those warrants were issued to uncover offences allegedly committed by D.K. and to monitor his activity while the applicant was not an owner of any of the vehicles (see paragraph 7 above). Any potential interference with her privacy on account of her use of the vehicles could only have become known during the implementation of those warrants by the police. Furthermore, as the applicant was not the subject of the surveillance, the implementation of the warrants should have proceeded in a manner which was respectful of her privacy, ensuring that only the data concerning D.K. and those necessary for the criminal proceedings were kept on the file, and all the data concerning the applicant deemed unnecessary as evidence should have been destroyed. It follows that any potential interference with the applicant’s rights was attributable to the implementation of the court warrants rather than the warrants themselves. 24.     The Court further notes that by the time the applicant lodged the constitutional appeals against the court warrants (on 19 and 20 March 2020), both had already been expired for about three years (on 14 March and 9   May   2017 respectively). Their quashing by the Constitutional Court would only have led to the declaration that the interception of the applicant’s data had been unlawful and to the ordering of their destruction. Both these types of redress, however, could have also been obtained in the procedure under section 12(d) of the State Prosecution Act. Had the applicant been successful in using that remedy, she could have also successfully sought compensation under the State Liability Act. It follows that the applicant could have effectively obtained a review of the lawfulness of the alleged interference with her privacy and an appropriate redress. 25.     Furthermore, the Court cannot overlook the fact that if the applicant had made use of the remedy under the section 12(d) of the State Prosecution Act and had not been successful, she could have lodged a constitutional appeal, raising the same complaints without their being dismissed as belated. Indeed, the applicant’s partner, by relying on that strategy, had his objections substantively reviewed by the Constitutional Court (see paragraphs 14-15 above). In the Court’s view, his lack of success does not automatically imply that that remedy would have obviously been futile in the applicant’s case. The applicant thus chose a procedural strategy with no prospects of success and prevented the Constitutional Court from reviewing her complaints on the merits. 26.     The Court notes the applicant’s argument that the Constitutional Court did not dismiss her constitutional appeal for failure to exhaust domestic remedies. It appears, nevertheless, that the inadmissibility of her constitutional appeals ratione temporis was self-evident and the Constitutional Court therefore did not need to examine other possible reasons for their inadmissibility. In other words, finding her constitutional appeals clearly belated does not imply that the Constitutional Court found that the applicant had duly exhausted available remedies. 27.     In view of the foregoing, the Court considers that the applicant had at her disposal a domestic remedy for her complaint under Article 8 that was accessible and effective, and that her complaint is thus inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies within the meaning of Article   35 §   1 of the Convention. It follows that the complaint under Article 13 is manifestly ill-founded. Accordingly, the applications must be rejected in accordance with Article 35   §   4. For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Decides to join the applications; Declares the applications inadmissible. Done in English and notified in writing on 19 February 2026.     Martina Keller   María Elósegui   Deputy Registrar   President   Appendix List of cases: No. Application no. Case name Lodged on Applicant Year of Birth Place of Residence Nationality 1. 1161/21 Blažová v. the Czech Republic 17/12/2020 Denisa BLAŽOVÁ 1991 Bučany Slovak 2. 13473/21 Blažová v. the Czech Republic 01/03/2021 Denisa BLAŽOVÁ 1991 Bučany Slovak 3. 15980/21 Blažová v. the Czech Republic 15/03/2021 Denisa BLAŽOVÁ 1991 Bučany Slovak