CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITYCOM;ENG — 5 février 2026

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s2EF17D91 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s3AAE10DF { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s3CA22BA { font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .s819344C9 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:18pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-18pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s2D9C6089 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s84651E4E { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:3pt; text-align:justify } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sC986E16F { font-family:Arial; color:#ffffff } .s68D1564D { width:34.89pt; display:inline-block } .s3FD9E4E3 { width:138.43pt; display:inline-block } .s5D826FD4 { width:25.88pt; display:inline-block } .s1B61D60 { width:156.43pt; display:inline-block } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s85226119 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 }     FIRST SECTION DECISION Application no. 39639/18 Olga GRIBUSTE against Latvia   The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 5   February 2026 as a Committee composed of:   Davor Derenčinović , President ,   Artūrs Kučs,   Anna Adamska-Gallant , judges , and Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   39639/18) against the Republic of Latvia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 13   August 2018 by a Latvian national, Ms Olga Gribuste (“the applicant”), who was born in 1981, lives in Riga and was represented by Ms R. Matjušina, a lawyer practising in Riga; the decision to give notice of the complaint under Article 6   §   1 concerning the length of proceedings to the Latvian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms   E.L. Vītola, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated, decides as follows: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1.     The case concerns the applicant’s complaint that criminal proceedings which she joined as a civil party – in order to seek compensation in respect of damage resulting from the criminal offence in question – did not comply with the “reasonable time” requirement. 2.     The criminal proceedings (no. 11517055511) were instituted on 18   April 2011 on suspicion of large-scale misappropriation. The applicant was recognised as a victim on 16 June 2011 and claimed 20,240.64 Latvian lati (approximately 28,800 euros (EUR)) in respect of pecuniary damage within those criminal proceedings. 3 .     On 28 January 2014, while the criminal proceedings were still pending, the applicant brought separate civil proceedings against the accused person (A.M.), seeking to recover the debt of EUR 28,800 from him. 4 .     On 26 September 2014 the Cēsu District Court gave judgment in the civil case (no. C33262014) and fully upheld the applicant’s debt claim. On 17 October 2014 that judgment took effect. 5.     On 29 March 2018 the criminal proceedings concluded with the conviction of A.M. However, the criminal courts dismissed the applicant’s compensation claim in respect of pecuniary damage, finding that there were no grounds to decide on the claim as the matter had already been settled in the civil proceedings. 6.     The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 about the length of the criminal proceedings with regard to her compensation claim in respect of pecuniary damage. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT 7.     The Government raised several preliminary objections. Firstly, they argued that the applicant could not claim to be a “victim” of a violation of her rights under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. They noted that the applicant had failed to ascribe sufficient legal relevance to the Cēsu District Court’s judgment of 26 September 2014, which had resulted in her misidentifying the relevant domestic proceedings, the length of which had to be evaluated in the present case. Secondly, the Government invited the Court to conclude that the applicant had not suffered any significant disadvantage, given that she had obtained a determination of her core grievance within seven months and 20   days by way of civil remedies. Thirdly, they submitted that the applicant had failed to lodge her application within six months [1] from the date on which the final decision was taken, arguing that the Cēsu District Court’s judgment of 26 September 2014 had to be taken as the “final decision” in the determination of the applicant’s civil rights within the meaning of Article   6   §   1 of the Convention. Lastly, the Government submitted that there were two domestic remedies available to the applicant that she had failed to pursue. 8.     The applicant disagreed with the Government’s objections and maintained her complaints. She contended that she had not been required to pursue one of the domestic remedies referred to by the Government and argued that the civil proceedings were not relevant to her claim concerning the length of the criminal proceedings and did not pertain to the case. On that basis, the six-month time-limit had been observed. 9.     The Court does not consider it necessary to examine all the objections raised by the Government because, for the reasons mentioned below, it considers that the applicant’s complaint about the length of the criminal proceedings is inadmissible. 10.     The Court reiterates at the outset that the Convention does not confer any right to “private revenge” or to an actio popularis . Thus, the right to have third parties prosecuted or sentenced for a criminal offence cannot be asserted independently (see Perez v. France [GC], no. 47287/99, §   70, ECHR 2004 ‑ I). 11.     The Court observes that the criminal proceedings complained of did not relate to the determination of criminal charges against the applicant. The applicant had joined those proceedings as a civil party and was seeking compensation in respect of damage resulting from the criminal offence in question. Thus, the criminal limb of Article 6 § 1 does not apply to the present case. 12.     The Court further reiterates that Article 6 § 1 under its “civil head” may, however, be applicable to criminal proceedings, where an applicant shows that, from the moment when he or she joined them as a civil party until their conclusion, the civil component remained closely connected with the criminal component. The applicant must show that prosecution for a criminal offence was indissociable from his or her ability to exercise a right to bring civil proceedings in domestic law ( ibid., §§ 67-70). Where an applicant has an effective possibility in domestic law of asserting his or her civil rights regardless of the outcome of criminal proceedings, which serve a purely punitive purpose, the applicability of Article 6 § 1 reaches its limits, even where an applicant might have lodged a pecuniary claim within the framework of the criminal proceedings (see Khaylo v.   Ukraine , no.   39964/02, §   89, 13 November 2008, and the case-law cited therein). 13.     Turning to the present case, the Court observes that the applicant chose to exercise her civil rights in separate civil proceedings (see paragraphs   3 and 4 above). Those civil proceedings concluded with the applicant’s debt claim against A.M. being granted, and she was awarded the same amount as she was seeking to recover from him in respect of pecuniary damage in the criminal proceedings. The criminal courts, in dismissing the applicant’s compensation claim, reasoned that the question of compensation in respect of pecuniary damage had already been settled in the civil proceedings and that there were no grounds for them to decide on the matter. The Court therefore finds that, after bringing separate civil proceedings and settling her pecuniary claim via that avenue, the criminal proceedings – which at that point were still ongoing – were no longer aimed at the determination of her pecuniary claim. Accordingly, the applicability of Article   6   §   1 in that regard had reached its limits. 14.     Against that background, it follows that the applicant’s complaint about the allegedly unreasonable length of the criminal proceedings which she had joined as a civil party is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article   35   §   3 and must be rejected pursuant to Article   35 § 4. For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Declares the application inadmissible. Done in English and notified in writing on 5 March 2026.     Liv Tigerstedt   Davor Derenčinović   Deputy Registrar   President [1] Protocol No. 15 to the Convention has shortened to   four months   from the final domestic decision the time-limit provided for by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. However, in the present case the six-month period still applies, given that the application was lodged with the Court prior to 1 February 2022, the date of entry into force of the new rule (pursuant to Article   8 §   3 of Protocol No. 15 to the Convention).