CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITYCOM;ENG — 12 février 2026

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s2EF17D91 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s3AAE10DF { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s3CA22BA { font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .s9F46BEC9 { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt } .s391E78BA { font-family:Arial; background-color:#ffffff } .s3DB046A9 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; background-color:#ffffff } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s3DC36BA9 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline; color:#0069d6 } .s2D9C6089 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s84651E4E { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:3pt; text-align:justify } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s4B08A3BC { width:27.19pt; display:inline-block } .sC986E16F { font-family:Arial; color:#ffffff } .s9D419EF6 { width:141.06pt; display:inline-block } .sBD1BE8CC { width:33.89pt; display:inline-block } .s556D3942 { width:152.1pt; display:inline-block } .s5D826FD4 { width:25.88pt; display:inline-block } .s1B61D60 { width:156.43pt; display:inline-block } .s1721E4C5 { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt }     FIFTH SECTION DECISION Application no. 77120/16 Vahe BABAYAN against Armenia   The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 12   February 2026 as a Committee composed of:   Andreas Zünd , President ,   Mykola Gnatovskyy,   Vahe Grigoryan , judges , and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   77120/16) against the Republic of Armenia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 7   December 2016 by an Armenian national, Mr Vahe Babayan (“the applicant”), who was born in 1969, lives in Yerevan and was represented by Ms   H.   Grigoryan, a lawyer practising in Yerevan; the decision to give notice of the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, concerning the alleged denial of access to a court, to the Armenian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr   Y.   Kirakosyan, Representative of the Republic of Armenia on International Legal Matters; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated, decides as follows: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1.     The application concerns the applicant’s allegation that he was denied access to the Criminal Court of Appeal owing to the unjustified application of the time-limit for lodging an appeal. The applicant relied on Article   6 §   1 and Article 13 of the Convention, as well as Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention. 2 .     On 29 December 2015 the Avan and Nor-Nork District Court of Yerevan (“the District Court”) found the applicant guilty of a crime under Article   117 of the former Criminal Code (the intentional infliction of bodily injury), but released him from criminal liability owing to the expiry of the statutory limitation period. Under Article 379 § 1 (1) of the former Code of Criminal Procedure (in force at the relevant time), an appeal against a judgment could be lodged within one month from the date the judgment was pronounced. 3.     On 16 February 2016 the applicant received the District Court’s judgment. 4.     On 29 February 2016 the applicant submitted a request to the District Court asking for the time-limit for lodging an appeal to be restored on the grounds that he had received the judgment late. 5 .     On 4 March 2016 the District Court examined the request and granted it, restoring the one-month time-limit for lodging an appeal. The court’s decision stated that it would take effect on the date it was pronounced. The applicant attended the hearing but left when it ended, without waiting for the decision to be pronounced. 6.     On 12 March 2016 the decision was served on the applicant by post. 7.     On 6 April 2016 the applicant lodged an appeal against the District Court’s judgment with the Criminal Court of Appeal. 8.     On 13 April 2016 the Criminal Court of Appeal refused to admit the appeal for examination on the grounds that the applicant had missed the one ‑ month time-limit for lodging an appeal, which the court found had started running again on 4 March 2016 at the latest. 9.     The applicant lodged an appeal against the decision of the Criminal Court of Appeal with the Court of Cassation, but the appeal was declared inadmissible for lack of merit on 16 August 2016. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT 10.     The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that he had been denied access to the Criminal Court of Appeal owing to the unjustified application of the time-limit for lodging an appeal. He contended that the above-mentioned time-limit had started running again on 12   March   2016, the date on which the decision restoring the original time ‑ limit had been served on him by post. 11.     The principles applicable to the examination of restrictions on access to superior courts were summarised by the Court in Zubac v.   Croatia ([GC], no.   40160/12, §§ 78-86, 5 April 2018). 12.     The Court reiterates that it is primarily for the national courts to resolve problems of the interpretation of procedural rules, such as time-limits for lodging appeals. Those rules are aimed at ensuring the proper administration of justice and compliance, in particular, with the principle of legal certainty. Litigants should expect those rules to be applied. That being so, the rules in question, or their application, should not prevent litigants from using an available remedy ( see Cañete de Goñi v. Spain , no. 55782/00, §   36, ECHR 2002-VIII, and Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain , nos.   38366/97 and 9 others, §§ 33 and 36, ECHR 2000 ‑ I). 13.     The Court observes that the applicant had missed the original time-limit for lodging an appeal because of late service of the judgment. Consequently, the District Court restored the time-limit by its decision pronounced on 4 March 2016, which was served on the applicant on 12   March   2016. 14.     The decision explicitly stated that it would take effect on the date it was pronounced (see paragraph 5 above). It therefore follows that the restored one-month time-limit started running again from that date, namely 4   March   2016. 15 .     The applicant based his calculation on the Constitutional Court’s decision of 16 October 2012. That decision noted that appellants had to have at their disposal the judicial decision being appealed against in order to study it and substantiate their appeal – a point also recognised, in essence, by the Court in its case-law (see Miragall Escolano and Others , cited above , §   37 in   fine ). The Constitutional Court also found, inter alia , that time-limits missed because of a delay in service of a decision subject to appeal had to be restored ex jure , without judicial discretion (see Vachik Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia , no. 15736/16, §§ 54-58, 15 May 2025). The Court notes, however, that the Constitutional Court’s decision concerned delays in serving the decision being appealed against, not procedural decisions restoring a time-limit. It therefore does not support the applicant’s argument that the time-limit for lodging an appeal started running again when the procedural decision was served. 16.     The judgment subject to appeal was served on the applicant on 16   February 2016, which made him aware of its content, thus enabling him to begin preparing his appeal. Possession of the court’s decision restoring the time-limit was not essential in that regard, as its sole procedural function was to enable the applicant to submit his appeal to the court. In particular, the applicant could reasonably have anticipated that the time-limit would be restored, given that the District Court had no judicial discretion in the matter (see paragraph 15 above). Moreover, the applicant was present at the District Court hearing and was informed that the decision would be pronounced on the same day, but chose not to wait for it to be pronounced. Although the applicant claimed that no specific time for the pronouncement of the judgment had been given, the record of the hearing – signed by the presiding judge and the court secretary – indicated that the court had announced that the decision would be pronounced at 12.30 p.m. on the same day. That record was not contested before the domestic courts, and the Court sees no reason to doubt its accuracy. In any event, since the applicant had the opportunity to begin preparing his appeal upon receipt of the judgment, the period remaining after service of the decision restoring the time-limit on 12 March 2016 still afforded him sufficient time to lodge it before the deadline of 4 April 2016. 17.     In these circumstances, and having regard to the national courts’ primary role in interpreting rules on time-limits, it cannot be said that the Criminal Court of Appeal’s decision amounted to a disproportionate hindrance impairing the very essence of the applicant’s right of access to a court, or exceeded the national margin of appreciation. The applicant’s complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention is therefore manifestly ill ‑ founded. 18.     The applicant reiterated the same complaint under Article 13 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention. In view of the above considerations, the Court finds that these complaints are likewise manifestly ill-founded. 19.     Accordingly, the application must be rejected in accordance with Article   35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Declares the application inadmissible. Done in English and notified in writing on 12 March 2026.   {signature_p_1}   {signature_p_2}   Martina Keller   Andreas Zünd   Deputy Registrar   President