CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 17 février 2026

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BULGARIA (Application no. 6580/22)     JUDGMENT Art 8 • Home • Correspondence • Shortcomings in the legal framework permitting the infiltration of “agents on cover” into private organisations and “liberal professions” • Application by analogy of case-law principles developed in relation to covert surveillance • Work of an “agent on cover” could interfere with the applicant association’s rights • Mere existence of the relevant regulations amounting to an interference with the applicant association’s rights • Examination of the legal framework in the abstract • Lack of minimum safeguards against arbitrariness and abuse • Quality-of-law requirement not met   Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court .   STRASBOURG 17 February 2026   FINAL   17/05/2026   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION THE FACTS I.   THE APPLICANT ASSOCIATION II.   THE REGULATIONS ON “AGENTS ON COVER” A.   As originally issued in 2008 B.   The 2018 amendments 1.   Proposal by the Agency for those amendments 2.   Public consultation about that proposal (a)   Comments by the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee (b)   Comments by the Supreme Bar Council (c)   Response by the Agency (d)   Adoption of the amendments 3.   Text of the amendments III.   JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE AMENDED REGULATIONS A.   At first instance 1.   Course of the proceedings 2.   Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court B.   On appeal 1.   Course of the proceedings 2.   Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK I.   2007 ACT A.   The Agency, its tasks and powers B.   “Agents on cover” used by the Agency C.   Informers recruited by the Agency D.   Data processing by the Agency E.   General supervision of the Agency’s work 1.   By Parliament 2.   By the Government 3.   By the President of the Republic F.   Access to personal data processed by the Agency 1.   Relevant statutory provisions and regulations 2.   Case-law of the Bulgarian courts under those provisions (a)   2012 case (b)   2014-18 case (c)   First 2021-22 case (d)   Second 2021-22 case (e)   2024 case G.   Supervision of the processing of personal data by the Agency II.   SPECIAL MEANS OF SURVEILLANCE ACT 1997 III.   MANAGEMENT AND FUNCTIONING OF THE SYSTEM FOR SAFEGUARDING NATIONAL SECURITY ACT 2015 IV.   PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA ACT 2002 A.   Scope of application 1.   Ratione personae 2.   Application to processing for national security purposes B.   Right to access personal data and restrictions to that right 1.   In relation to processing falling within the scope of the GDPR 2.   In relation to processing by the authorities for law-enforcement purposes C.   Supervisory authority D.   Remedies 1.   In respect of processing falling within the scope of the GDPR 2.   In respect of processing by the authorities for law enforcement purposes V.   CODE OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE THE LAW I.   ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION A.   Admissibility 1.   The parties’ submissions (a)   Victim status (b)   Exhaustion of domestic remedies 2.   The Court’s assessment (a)   Victim status and exhaustion of domestic remedies (b)   Conclusion about the admissibility of the complaint B.   Merits 1.   Victim status and the existence of an interference with rights protected under Article 8 of the Convention (a)   The parties’ submissions (i)   The applicant association (ii)   The Government (b)   The Court’s assessment (i)   Could the work of an “agent on cover” interfere with the rights of the applicant association under Article 8 of the Convention? (ii)   Can the applicant association claim to be a victim of interference with those rights on account of the mere existence of the regulations on “agents on cover”? (α)   General principles (β)   Application of those principles ‒   Scope of the relevant law ‒   Availability of an effective remedy ‒   Conclusion 2.   Justification for the interference (a)   The parties’ submissions (i)   The applicant association (ii)   The Government (b)   The Court’s assessment (i)   General principles (α)   With regard to the level of safeguards (β)   With regard to the manner of examination of those safeguards (ii)   Application of those principles (α)   Accessibility of the law (β)   Grounds on which “agents on cover” may be used and persons who can be placed under surveillance by such agents (γ)   Duration of the deployment of “agents on cover” (δ)   Deployment procedure (ε)   Procedures for storing, accessing, examining, using, communicating and destroying data obtained as a result of the use of “agents on cover” (στ)   Supervision (ζ)   Notification (η)   Remedies (θ)   Conclusion II.   APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION A.   Damage 1.   The association’s claim and the Government’s comments on it 2.   The Court’s assessment B.   Costs and expenses OPERATIVE PROVISIONS   In the case of Green Alliance v. Bulgaria, The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Ioannis Ktistakis, President ,   Peeter Roosma,   Darian Pavli,   Úna Ní Raifeartaigh,   Mateja Đurović,   Vasilka Sancin, judges ,   Mira Raycheva, ad hoc judge , and Milan Blaško, Section Registrar , Having regard to: the application (no. 6580/22) against the Republic of Bulgaria lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an association with a registered office in Bulgaria, Green Alliance (“the applicant association” or “the association”), on 19 January 2022; the decision to give the Bulgarian Government (“the Government”) notice of the application; the parties’ observations; the decision of the President of the Section to exempt Diana Kovatcheva, the judge elected in respect of Bulgaria, from sitting in this case and his ensuing decision to appoint Mira Raycheva to sit as ad hoc judge in the case; Having deliberated in private on 27 January 2026, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1 .     Under regulations issued in 2008 and amended in 2018, Bulgaria’s State Agency for National Security (“the Agency”) can, on the decision of its head, infiltrate “agents on cover” ( служители на прикритие ) into a private entity or as members of a “liberal profession”. Those “agents on cover” conceal only that they are working for the Agency, but are not permitted to use covert surveillance techniques or equipment, and are in Bulgaria considered as different from “agents under cover”. The applicant association sought judicial review of those regulations, arguing that in the absence of effective safeguards in relation to the use of such agents, they permitted abusive and disproportionate interferences with rights protected under Article   8 of the Convention. The administrative courts dismissed its claim. 2 .     The main issues in the case are (a) whether the association can claim to be a victim of interference with its rights under Article 8 of the Convention by reason of the mere existence of the regulations permitting the deployment of “agents on cover”, and (b) if so, whether that inference is compatible with that Article. THE FACTS 3.     The applicant association was founded in 2006 and has its registered office in the town of Kostenets, in the Sofia Region. It was represented by Mr   T.   Trifonov, a lawyer practising in Sofia. 4.     The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms B. Simeonova of the Ministry of Justice. I.         THE APPLICANT ASSOCIATION 5 .     The association’s objectives, as set out in its articles of association, concern issues relating to the protection of the environment. II.       THE REGULATIONS ON “AGENTS ON COVER” A.    As originally issued in 2008 6 .     Acting pursuant to a general statutory delegation in paragraph 43 of the transitional and concluding provisions of the State Agency for National Security Act 2007 (“the 2007 Act”), which governs the work of the Agency, in February 2008 the Government issued Regulations governing the application of that Act. They were published in the Bulgarian State Gazette later that month ( ДВ, бр. 17 от 19.02.2008 г., стр. 7-17 ), and took effect following the expiry of three days after the date of their publication (in line with the general rule set out by Article 5 § 5 of the Bulgarian Constitution and section 41(3) and (4) of the Normative Instruments Act 1973). 7 .     Part 1 of Chapter 5 of those Regulations, comprising regulations 49-62, laid down the regime for the so-called “agents on cover” ( служители на прикритие ), which the Regulations distinguished from “agents under cover” ( служители под прикритие ), which are regulated elsewhere in Bulgarian law (see paragraphs 74 (h) and 75 below). [1] 8 .     By regulation 49, the use of “agents on cover” and their work must comply with the principles of lawfulness and clandestineness. 9 .     As initially worded, regulation 50 permitted the Agency to infiltrate “agents on cover” into State authorities, organisations and legal persons. 10 .     Regulation 51 specifies that (a) “agents on cover” are officers of the Agency who have a special status and the rights and duties pertaining to the position in which they are infiltrated, and that (b) only civil servants who have already undergone initial training and have obtained security clearance permitting them to access classified information may become “agents on cover”. 11 .     “Work on cover” by such agents is possible if there is a “proven operational need” (regulation 52(1)). Such a need exists if the Agency’s statutory tasks cannot be discharged in another way (regulation   52(2)). The head of the respective division or unit of the Agency must prove the existence of such an operational need to the Agency’s head (regulation 52(3)). 12 .     “Agents on cover” may carry out intelligence and counterintelligence work for the protection of national security (regulation 53(1)). Their precise tasks are to be set by the head of the Agency in each individual case (regulation 53(2)). They may not arrest, search, or interrogate people, or use firearms or physical force (regulation 53(3), read in conjunction with the relevant sections of the 2007 Act). 13 .     They must work in a way that does not risk exposing their cover (regulation 54). 14 .     As originally worded (before 2018 amendments to the Regulations   – see paragraphs 18-30 below), regulation 55(1) envisaged that Agency officers would be appointed as “agents on cover” by the head of the target entity upon a request by the head of the Agency. An existing employee of the target entity could also be appointed as an “agent on cover” by means of being engaged as an Agency officer (regulation 55(2)). 15 .     The appointment procedure before the 2018 amendments was as follows. The head of the Agency was to make a request to the target entity, identify the positions in that target entity that could be suitable for the infiltration of an “agent on cover”, and designate a contact officer from the Agency (regulation 56 (1)). If the target entity agreed, it was to inform the Agency about the skills and qualifications that the “agent on cover” had to have, and about the procedure to be followed when appointing someone to the target position (regulation 56(2)). The target entity could also suggest amendments to the rules or regulations governing its work in order to accommodate the possibility to infiltrate an “agent on cover” (regulation   56(3)). The head of the Agency and the target entity were then to coordinate how exactly the “agent on cover” would be infiltrated (regulation   56(4). The target entity had to treat all those organisational matters as classified information (regulation 56(5)). 16 .     The target entity was then under a duty to assist the “agent on cover” in the performance of his or her duties (regulation 56(6)). It had to be advised by the Agency if the “work on cover” was to be stopped (regulation 57(2)). The target entity had to take the necessary measures not to permit “work on cover” to be revealed, even after its end (regulation 58(1)). 17 .     Regulations 59-62 govern the employment rights of “agents on cover” in respect of pay, annual leave, and retirement. B.    The 2018 amendments 1.      Proposal by the Agency for those amendments 18 .     In April 2018 the Agency proposed to the Government that regulations 50, 51 and 55 be reworded and that regulations 56-58 be repealed (see paragraphs 9-10 and 14-16 above). In its view, those amendments   – whose effect would be to expand the list of potential target entities and do away with the requirement to obtain the target entity’s assent to infiltration   – were needed because practice showed that the way in which the regulations structured the infiltration of “agents on cover” prevented their quick and efficient use in a dynamically changing security environment that required timely and adequate responses to encroachments on national security. The existing procedure did not meet the Agency’s need to obtain the accurate information necessary for that purpose. In particular, the requirement to obtain the target entity’s assent posed a problem with respect to entities whose heads were unwilling to cooperate. Moreover, the categories of entities in which “agents on cover” could be infiltrated were too limited and did not reflect modern economic realities. 2.      Public consultation about that proposal 19 .     During the ensuing public consultation, opened in May 2018 and concluded in June 2018, comments were received from an association, the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, and from the Supreme Bar Council (the governing body of Bulgaria’s National Bar). (a)    Comments by the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee 20 .     The Bulgarian Helsinki Committee opposed the proposed amendments as a whole. It pointed out that, as attested by the Agency’s practice in relation to the expulsion of aliens, no specific facts were normally cited in support of its assertions that someone was a national security risk, and that this phrase was employed declaratively – anything could be made to fit the term. It could therefore be presumed that the same approach would be taken to the infiltration of “agents on cover”, which under the proposed amendments could be undertaken in respect of any private organisation or members of any “liberal profession” – accountants, auditors, journalists, lawyers – which would affect the clients of any such professionals. That was especially dangerous in the light of the Agency’s well-documented stance that it was above the country’s laws and in the light of the secrecy of its work. There were therefore no guarantees that the right to respect for private life would not be unlawfully interfered with. In particular, no judicial supervision was envisaged in relation to the use of “agents on cover”, nor any time-limits in respect of such use. Some sort of supervisory mechanism similar to that provided by law in respect of “special means of surveillance” (for the definition of that term in Bulgarian law, see   Ekimdzhiev and Others v.   Bulgaria , no. 70078/12, § 11, 11 January 2022 ; see also paragraphs   73-74 below) was indispensable. (b)    Comments by the Supreme Bar Council 21 .     The Supreme Bar Council took issue in particular with the possibility under the proposed amendments for “agents on cover” to be infiltrated as lawyers in private practice. In its view, that would contravene basic tenets of the Convention, the Constitution, the Bar Act 2004 and the Bar Code of Ethics, since it would enable “agents on cover” to pose as lawyers and   – instead of providing legal advice and assistance – harm the people who consulted them as clients. Even the mere suspicion by clients that their lawyers could be “agents on cover” could ruin public confidence in the legal profession. Moreover, the infiltration of Agency officers as lawyers, or in any “ liberal profession”, went beyond its statutory mandate. The Agency could fulfil its functions even in the absence of such a possibility. It had not explained specifically why it needed it. Nor had it pointed to the legitimate aim which that possibility would pursue – and that possibility seemed anyhow disproportionate to any such aim. It was therefore necessary to put language in the amendments that would make it plain that “agents on cover” could not be infiltrated as lawyers in private practice. (c)    Response by the Agency 22 .     In response, and having met in August 2018 with representatives of the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee and the Supreme Bar Council to hear their misgivings about the proposed amendments and explain the need for them, in early September 2018 the Agency wrote to the Minister of Internal Affairs. 23 .     The Agency stated, in relation to the concerns expressed by the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee (see paragraph 20 above), that those stemmed from a misunderstanding about the meaning that the competent authorities ascribed to the term “national security” and, more generally, about how those authorities operated. It was normal for their work to be secret. For its part, the term “national security” had been defined by statute (see paragraph   77 below), and it could not be said that it was being employed in a blanket manner in proceedings for the expulsion of aliens. In any event, no proper analogy could be drawn between that situation and the infiltration of “agents on cover”. There was no reason to suppose that such infiltration would be undertaken unlawfully; under the 2007 Act the Agency had to act lawfully and within the scope of its statutory tasks in all circumstances, including when engaging in clandestine work. Nor was it apparent how such infiltration could infringe anyone’s rights, especially since “agents on cover” remained fully liable for their acts. 24 .     It was also important to emphasise that “agents on cover” differed from “agents under cover”. The latter constituted a kind of “special means of surveillance” governed by the Special Surveillance Means Act 1997 (“the   1997 Act” – see paragraphs 73-75 below). They operated under a false identity, could use technical devices to document evidence of offending, and bore no criminal liability for acts carried out in the course of their duties. The Agency was not among the authorities which could deploy “agents under cover”. By contrast, “agents on cover” did not constitute a “special means of surveillance”. They could not use technical devices to record evidence, and could bear criminal liability for their acts. It was true that they could gather information about encroachments on national security or about persons intending to engage in such acts. But that was not unlawful or something which could affect Convention rights. In fact, all members of the public were under a legal duty to bring to the attention of the authorities information about criminal conduct that came their way. The same went for any Agency officer who came to learn of an offence directed against national security. The work of “agents on cover” could not therefore be seen as a form of covert surveillance requiring judicial supervision. In any event, supervision could be carried out by Parliament and the Government, in a general way, as well as by the judiciary, in cases of unlawful conduct relating to the use of “agents on cover”. 25 .     The Agency went on to state that the reservations of the Supreme Bar Council (see paragraph 21 above) were partly well-founded. Although the possibility for the Agency to infiltrate “agents on cover” into “ liberal professions” in general did not exceed its statutory mandate, the position was different with regard specifically to the legal profession. Even when the proposed amendments had been drafted initially, the understanding had been that “agents on cover” could not be infiltrated as lawyers in private practice. It was in any case preferable to avoid speculation on that point. The Supreme Bar Council’s suggestion that the proposed amendments be modified so as to clarify that “agents on cover” could not be infiltrated as lawyers in private practice therefore had to be accepted. The draft amendments had been revised accordingly. (d)    Adoption of the amendments 26 .     In September 2018 the Government adopted the amendments, as revised by the Agency in response to the Supreme Bar Council’s comments. They were published in the Bulgarian State Gazette later that month (see Постановление № 206 на Министерския съвет от 20.09.2018 г. за изменение и допълнение на Правилника за прилагане на Закона за Държавна агенция „Национална сигурност“, обн., ДВ, бр.   79 от   25.09.2018 г., стр. 3-4 ), and took effect following the expiry of three days following the date of their publication (in line with the general rule set out by Article 5 § 5 of the Bulgarian Constitution and by section 41(3) and   (4) of the Normative Instruments Act 1973). 3.      Text of the amendments 27 .     The amendments reworded regulations 50, 51 and 55, and repealed regulations 56-58 (see paragraphs 9-10 and 14-16 above). 28 .     Under the new wording of regulation 50 (see paragraph 9 above), “agents on cover” may be infiltrated into the State administration, into legal persons and into civil associations, and as persons exercising a “ liberal profession” (except as lawyers in private practice). 29 .     The wording of regulation 51 (see paragraph 10 above) was amended in such a manner as to clarify that the position in which an “agent on cover” could be infiltrated was not limited to a position in a public entity. 30 .     Regulation 55 (see paragraph 14 above) was amended to state merely that Agency officers had to be infiltrated as “agents on cover” in a manner that did not risk the exposure of their cover. III.     JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE AMENDED REGULATIONS A.    At first instance 1.      Course of the proceedings 31 .     In October 2018 the applicant association sought judicial review of   regulations   49-62, as partly amended in September 2018 (see paragraphs   6-30 above). It pointed out that the traditional term used in the legislation (specifically, the 1997 Act) to designate covert operatives was “agents under cover” (see paragraph 74 (h) and 75 below), whereas the term “agents on cover” could be found at the statutory level in only two provisions of the 2007 Act – sections 35a and 110(1)(7)(e) (see paragraph 48 below)   – without, however, being defined or elaborated on in those provisions. There had therefore been no proper statutory delegation for the Government to issue regulations specifically relating to “agents on cover”. The work of such agents could undoubtedly affect rights guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, since they could access covertly the in-house information or communications of any organisation, or could spy on its staff. The absence of statutory rules governing that work, and the resulting lack of safeguards against the misuse of “agents on cover”, meant that their use would not be “in accordance with the law”. The only means of ensuing compliance with that provision – in particular by appropriately limiting the length of time that such interference with rights could be carried out– was to subject the deployment of “agents on cover” to judicial supervision. Moreover, before issuing the Regulations the Government had not properly explained their purpose and expected impact – particularly in respect of rights protected by Article 8 of the Convention, as construed by this Court. 32 .     The Agency, which intervened in the proceedings as an interested party, contested the claim. It argued, firstly, that the claim was inadmissible, because (a) the regulations did not touch on a matter falling within the aims of the applicant association, as set out in its articles, (b) the regulations permitted – but did not require – the infiltration of “agents on cover” into all legal persons, and (c) unlike “agents under cover” under the 1997 Act (see paragraph   74 (h) and 75 below), “agents on cover” were not permitted to carry out visual or aural surveillance. In the alternative, the claim was without merit because the purpose of the amended regulations had been explained during the public consultation preceding the adoption of the amendments. The claim confused “agents under cover” and “agents on cover”. The regulations pursued a proper statutory purpose and fell within the statutory delegation given by the 2007 Act – which, in section 123(2)(6) (see paragraph   49 below), gave the Agency the power to conceal its officers and their work in a manner laid down in regulations for the application of the Act. No issue arose under Article 8 of the Convention, since the work of “agents on cover” did not entail unlawful intrusion into private life, home or correspondence. Their work was, in any event, not without external supervision – it could be supervised by Parliament and the government, pursuant to reports by members of the public to the Agency itself, and via the possibility to seek judicial review of any decisions of the Agency. 33 .     The government, which was the respondent to the claim, likewise argued that it was inadmissible – and in the alternative ill-founded – on the basis of arguments to the same effect as those made by the Agency. 34 .     In September 2019 the three-judge panel of the Supreme Administrative Court to which the claim had been assigned held that, in the light of its stated aims (as set out in its articles of association), the association had no standing to challenge the regulations. Non-governmental organisations could challenge statutory instruments only if those instruments directly and automatically affected their objects. That was not the case with the regulations in issue, which permitted (but did not automatically lead to) the deployment of “agents on cover” in non-governmental organisations (see опр.   № 12167 от 10.09.2019 г. по адм. д. № 13588/2018 г., ВАС, II о. ). 35 .     Following an appeal by the association, in December 2019 a five ‑ judge panel of the Supreme Administrative Court quashed that decision and remitted the case to the three-judge panel for an examination on the merits. It held that in so far as they permitted the use of “agents on cover” in non-governmental organisations, the regulations directly affected the association’s legal sphere. Its specific goals were irrelevant in that respect (see опр. № 16975 от 11.12.2019 г. по адм. д. № 12578/2019 г., ВАС, петчл. с-в ). 2.      Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court 36 .     The three-judge panel then examined the claim on the merits. The applicant association, the Agency and the Government all referred to their earlier submissions regarding the merits of the case (see paragraphs   31-33 above). 37 .     In December 2020 the three-judge panel dismissed the claim. It noted that the 2007 Act had empowered the government to issue regulations in respect of its application, which in the panel’s view meant that there had been proper statutory delegation for the impugned regulations. The procedure for   issuing the regulations had been followed, and they contravened no higher-ranking rules. In particular, regulations 49-62 fully accorded with section   123(2)(6) of the 2007 Act, which authorised the Agency to place its officers under cover and organise their clandestine work in a manner set out in the regulations (namely, regulations 49-62) regarding the application of the Act (see paragraph 49 below). Section 110(1)(7)(e) likewise referred to “agents on cover” (see paragraph 48 (b) below). None of those provisions were inconsistent with any other of those provisions (see реш. № 15819 от   21.12.2020 г. по адм. д. № 13588/2018 г., ВАС, II о. ). B.    On appeal 1.      Course of the proceedings 38 .     The applicant association appealed on points of law. It submitted that the three-judge panel had not duly addressed its argument that the regulations had been made without proper statutory delegation, since the 2007 Act itself had neither defined “agents on cover” nor set out their role. Moreover, under Article   8 of the Convention and this Court’s case-law, intrusions of the sort resulting from the use of “agents on cover” had to be surrounded by effective safeguards. The 1997 Act laid down many such safeguards – notably judicial supervision – with respect to “specials means of surveillance”. Since “agents on cover” could likewise interfere with “private life” and “correspondence”   – in particular that of the people working in the entities into which such agents would be infiltrated – such safeguards were required with respect to them as well; they were not inconsistent with the clandestine nature of those agents’ work. There was no good reason to distinguish in that respect between “agents under cover” under the 1997 Act and “agents on cover” under the Regulations. 39 .     The Agency and the Government contested the appeal, referring to the same arguments that they had made before the three-judge panel (see paragraphs   32-33 above). 2.      Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court 40 .     On 19 July 2021 a five-judge panel of the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the three-judge panel’s judgment.   It agreed that there had been proper statutory delegation for the impugned regulations. It went on to state that the law distinguished between “agents under cover” and “agents on cover”. An analysis of the statutory provisions governing the use of “special means of surveillance” indicated that unlike “agents under cover”, “agents on cover” could not employ such means. It followed that the argument, based on the   1997 Act (see paragraphs 73-75 below), that any deployment of “agents on cover” had to be subject to prior judicial authorisation (as required by the   1997 Act with respect to “special means of surveillance”) was without merit. Moreover, in view of the wording of regulation 50 (see paragraph   28 above), the work of an “agent on cover” could not affect someone’s private life, home or correspondence. The assertion that the regulations contravened Article   8 of the Convention was therefore also baseless (see реш. №   8672 от   19.07.2021 г. по адм. д. № 2863/2021 г., ВАС, петчл. с-в ) . RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK I.         2007 ACT A.    The Agency, its tasks and powers 41 .     The 2007 Act – which created the Agency and defined its tasks and powers – was enacted in December 2007 and came into force in January 2008. By paragraph 2(2) and (3) of the Act’s transitional provisions, the Agency is the successor to (a) the former National Security Service (which was previously part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs), (b) the division of that Ministry that is responsible for protecting the national communications infrastructure, (c) the military counterintelligence service of the Ministry of Defence, and (d) the former Financial Intelligence Agency. 42 .     The Agency is under the direct supervision of the government (section   2(1)). Its head is appointed by the President of the Republic, after being nominated the government, and his or her two deputies are appointed by the government (section 8(1) and (2)). The Agency’s main tasks are to (a)   safeguard national security from “encroachments directed against the national interests, independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Bulgaria, [its] territorial integrity, the fundamental rights and freedom of citizens, the democratic functioning of the State and the civic institutions, or the established constitutional order” (section 4(1)), and (b) carry out counterintelligence – in particular, for the protection of strategic installations (section   4(2) and (4)). It may be given other tasks only by [means of] statute (section   7). 43 .     It has, for instance, been given various tasks in relation to: (a)     money laundering and the financing of terrorism (sections 4, 4a, 5, 5b, 9, 9a, 9b, 9v, 11, 11a, 13-14a and 15 of the Measures Against Terrorist Financing Act 2003, and sections 8, 9e, 36a, 68, 71-79, 81-85, 87-94, 103 ‑ 04, 108-09 of the Measures Against Money Laundering Act 2018); (b)     combatting terrorism (sections 8(1) of the Terrorism Countermeasures Act   2016); (c)     the acquisition of Bulgarian nationality (sections 33 and 35 of the Bulgarian Citizenship Act 1998, and section 41(1)(3) of the 2007 Act); (d)     security vetting for clearance to access certain types of classified information (sections 11, 12, 14, 48-49 of the Protection of Classified Information Act 2002); (e)     migration control and the expulsion and related detention of aliens (sections 22(4), 24c(17), 24i(11), 24i(6), 33h(1), 33kk(8), 33p(9), 42g and 44 of the Aliens Act 1998, and section 41(1)(2) and (2) and (3) of the 2007 Act); (f)     the granting of asylum or humanitarian protection (section 58(10) of the Refugees and Asylum Act 2002, and section 41(1)(1) of the 2007 Act); (g)     the protection of nuclear installations (sections 112-14 of the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy Act 2002); and (h)     cybersecurity (section 15 of the Cybersecurity Act 2018). 44 .     In 2013-15 the Agency also had the task of investigating criminal offences related to national security (section 4(6) of the 2007 Act, added in June 2013 and repealed in February 2015). 45 .     The Agency’s two main areas of work are the gathering and analysis of intelligence (sections 18-20 and 28-29 of the 2007 Act). It can, in particular, engage in information analysis, forecasting and control ( прогностична [и] контролна дейност ), using its own information or information obtained from other authorities that is of importance for national security (section 4(3)). It may monitor people, objects and activities (section   5). 46 .     The Agency can, among other things, (a) carry out surveillance, (b)   infiltrate agents in the course of its operations, and (c) use not-for-profit legal persons or commercial companies (section 20(1)(6), (1)(12) and (1)(20) of the 2007 Act). It can do all that through “specific methods and techniques”, “special means of surveillance”, and people collaborating with it (section   20(2)). 47 .     Section 21 of the 2007 Act specifies that the Agency has at its disposal and may deploy “special means of surveillance”, under the conditions laid down in the 1997 Act (see paragraph 73 below). B.    “Agents on cover” used by the Agency 48 .     The 2007 Act mentions specifically the term “agents on cover” ( служители на прикритие ) in two provisions: ( a )     section 35a, added in July 2018, which states that the Agency may refuse – in order to protect its intelligence-gathering methods or techniques   – to disclose information about “agents on cover” or informers; and ( b )     section 110(1)(7)(e), which has featured in the Act since its enactment in its original form, and according to which officers of the Agency who are “agents on cover” may be dismissed if they do not discharge their duties efficiently. 49 .     In addition, section 123(2)(6) of the 2007 Act – which has likewise in the Act since its enactment in its original form – states that the powers of the Agency comprise “organising the placing of Agency officers under cover ( прикриването на служители на агенцията ) and their work, featured under conditions and in a way laid down in regulations for the application of the Act”. C.    Informers recruited by the Agency 50.     The Agency may use informers ( сътрудници ), who must be protected in the course of or in connection with their collaboration (section   23(1) and   (3)(2) of the 2007 Act). Their identities, personal data and work must be kept secret (section 23(3)(3)). Information about them may only be passed to the courts or the prosecuting authorities in connection with a specific criminal case, in keeping with the requirements of the Protection of Classified Information Act 2002 – and only after the informers in question have agreed to that (section 23(4)). The Agency may also withhold information about informers to protect its intelligence-gather