CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 3 mars 2026

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text-decoration:underline; color:#0069d6 } .fixListIndent { list-style-position: inside }     FIFTH SECTION DECISION Application no. 79083/17 Artur Volodymyrovych BOYAROV against Ukraine and 3 other applications (see list appended)   The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 3 March 2026 as a Chamber composed of:   Kateřina Šimáčková , President ,   Georgios A. Serghides,   Gilberto Felici,   Andreas Zünd,   Diana Sârcu ,   Mykola Gnatovskyy,   Vahe Grigoryan, judges,   and Victor Soloveytchik, Section Registrar,   Having regard to: the above applications lodged on the various dates indicated in the appended table; the decision to give notice to the Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) of the complaints concerning Articles 6, 8, 10 and 13 of the Convention and to declare the remainder of the applications inadmissible; the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants; the comments submitted by European Information Society Institute, which was granted leave to intervene by the President of the Section under Article   36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 2 of the Rules of Court, Having deliberated, decides as follows: THE FACTS 1.     A list of the applicants is set out in the appendix. 2.     The Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms M. Sokorenko. 3.     The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.    Background information 4.     Yandex LLC is a Russian IT company that provides internet-related products and services and is most known for its web browser and search engine, but it also provides such services as cloud computing, web mapping, online food ordering and shopping, media streaming, and ridesharing. 5 .     VKontakte and Odnoklassniki are Russian social media platforms which are somewhat similar to Facebook in their design and function. In particular, they require users to create a personal account with a list of friends and a newsfeed, and offer the opportunity to join various groups or to follow people. They also provide messaging, music and video hosting and other features. Persons who are not registered cannot see other users’ pages or undertake any action, for example, post comments or write messages. A person who is not registered would be immediately asked to sign in or register. 6.     Mail.ru is an email service which also offers a number of related services such as a virtual postcard service, a mailing list service, a news site, a music service and an online organiser; it also offers a forum, a tourist website, a gaming website, a recruiting service, an alternative email service inbox.ru, and other features. 7.     Currently the last three of the services mentioned above are united under the label of VK (VK Company Limited, after the most popular product, VKontakte). 8.     VKontakte was founded in 2006 by Mr Pavel Durov. In April 2014 he left his position as the company’s CEO and fled Russia. His shares were later eventually transferred to Mr Alisher Usmanov, a Russian “oligarch”. In a social media post published following those events, Mr Durov said that in December 2013 the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation had requested the personal data of people who were members of a Vkontakte group dedicated to the Euromaidan protest movement [1] . He also said that VK had come under the “full control of the Kremlin” [2] . 9.     In December 2021 part of Mr Usmanov’s shares in VK (45 %) were sold to the state-run insurance company Sogaz, which had been founded by the Russian gas company Gazprom. Following that takeover, the VK’s then ‑ CEO Mr Dobrodeev resigned and Mr Vladimir Kiriyenko, the first vice ‑ president of the State-owned company Rostelecom and son of Mr   Sergei   Kiriyenko, the first deputy chief of staff of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, became its managing director. 10.     In February 2022, Mr Vladimir Kiriyenko was sanctioned by the United States Department of the Treasury and added to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List. On 8 March 2022, Mr   Vladimir Kiriyenko was sanctioned by the European Union. The Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/396 of 9 March 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine states as follows: “Vladimir Sergeevich Kiriyenko is the CEO of VK Company Limited. VK Company Limited is a Russian internet company, with a major presence in the Russian speaking segment of internet. VK projects collectively had the largest audience in Russia and captured the most screen time. VK’s sites reach more than 90 % of Russian internet users on a monthly basis and the company is in the top 5 of largest internet companies, based on the number of total pages viewed. It controls and operates the three largest and most popular Russian social networking sites, VKontakte, Odnoklassniki and Moi Mir, as well as the email service and internet portal mail.ru. Vladimir Sergeevich Kiriyenko is therefore involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. The Russian government is increasing its influence over media and social networks. VK Company is controlled by Gazprom Media (a State-owned company which is the major source of income to the Russian Government). Vladimir Sergeevich Kiriyenko therefore supports Vladimir Putin’s aim for greater control over the internet. Vladimir Kiriyenko therefore actively supports, materially or financially, or benefits from Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine. As VK Company is owned by the State-owned Gazprom group, the revenue it generates is an important source of revenue for the Russian Government. Vladimir Kiriyenko is the son of Sergei Kiriyenko, currently First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Office. Sergei Kiriyenko is reported to be Vladimir Putin’s domestic policy curator.” 11 .     In May 2014 the Parliament of the Russian Federation passed amendments to the Federal Law on Information, Information Technology and Information Protection (Law no. 97-ФЗ) [3] which provided, inter alia , that domestic or foreign social media companies had to store six months’ worth of their users’ data and provide a wide range of information to the authorities if they requested it. Should a company fail to comply, it could be barred from operating in the country altogether (for more details as to the amendments and other relevant legislative provisions see Podchasov v. Russia , no.   33696/19, §§ 16-27, 13 February 2024).    The implementation of the impugned restrictive measures in Ukraine      The situation in Ukraine 12.     In the late winter and spring of 2014 parts of Ukrainian territory, particularly the Crimean Peninsula, were effectively occupied by the Russian Federation, and military activity involving the Russian army and its proxies started in the eastern regions of the country (see Ukraine v. Russia (re   Crimea) (dec.) [GC], nos. 20958/14 and 38334/18, 16 December 2020 and Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.) [GC], nos. 8019/16 and 2 others, 30 November 2022). 13.     The conflict continued through the following years. In February 2022 the Russian Federation launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine (for a short description of the situation in Ukraine since 2014 see M.S.L., TOV v. Ukraine , no.   18049/18, §§ 5-11, 16 October 2025).      The implementation of sanctions regime 14.     In mid-2014, following a decision by the National Council for Television and Radiobroadcasting, several Russian television channels were prohibited from broadcasting in Ukraine. More channels were banned in the following years. 15.     In August 2014, in response to aggressive actions by the Russian Federation, the Parliament of Ukraine passed the Law on Sanctions, which provided for the implementation of personal and sectoral sanctions. Its Preamble included, in particular, a reference to “the need for an urgent and effective response to existing and potential threats to the national interests and national security of Ukraine” (see paragraph 68 below). 16.     Following the coming into force in 2014 of the amendments made by Russia’s law No. 97-ФЗ (see paragraph 11 above), the Ukrainian authorities urged Ukrainians not to use Russian social media. In his interview of 16   October 2014, the speaker of the Security Service of Ukraine said: “Russian social media are used to influence our citizens and put pressure on them”. He also reported that the national security services had information that Vkontakte pages had been used to incite Ukrainian servicemen to protest [4] . 17.     On 28 April 2017, the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine (“NSDC”) adopted a decision “On the Application of Personal Special Economic and Other Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)”. That decision imposed sanctions on more than 400 individuals and legal entities in Russia, including mail.ru, Yandex, Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki. Apart from economic measures (such as the blocking of bank accounts) those sanctions also included the termination of the provision of telecommunication services to the entities mentioned. In practice, this meant that Ukrainian internet providers had to restrict all access to the respective Russian websites from Ukraine. 18.     On 15 May 2017 the President of Ukraine signed a Decree implementing the above NSDC decision. The Decree was published in the official media outlets on 17 May 2017. 19.     In the following years those restrictive measures were extended on two occasions and they remain in force until this day. 20.     In their submissions the Government informed the Court that information relating to the Security Service of Ukraine’s proposals to the NSDC about the application of sanctions is restricted. In particular, under section 9 of the Law of Ukraine on Counterintelligence Activities, information on the organisation and results of counterintelligence activities constitutes a state secret and is protected under the Law of Ukraine on State Secrets. 21.     The Government also noted that the material the Security Service of Ukraine had based its sanctions proposals on had been destroyed “in conditions of extreme necessity” related to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the imminent threat of the seizure of documents containing State secret. 22.     Nevertheless, the Government provided analytical material prepared by the Department of Counterintelligence Protection of the State in the Field of Information Security of the Security Service of Ukraine which “reflects generalised data on the reasons and prerequisites” that had led to the submission of proposals to the NSDC for the imposition of the sanctions in question. 23.     The relevant passages read as follows: “... The imposition of sanctions on these legal entities was brought up by the Security Service of Ukraine in a letter to the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine of 24 February 2017 following information about the involvement of the Russian holding company Mail.ru Group, which includes LLC Mail.ru Group, LLC Vkontakti, LLC VKontakte, LLC Mail.ru Ukraine, in activities that create threats to national security, namely, the disclosure of restricted information and violations of the rights and freedoms of Ukrainian citizens. In particular, following the passing by the [Parliament] of the Russian Federation of federal laws [on combating terrorism] and other legislation, the Russian intelligence services have been collecting, storing, using and disseminating restricted information, namely the personal data of Ukrainian citizens and their personal correspondence, on a permanent basis – in violation of Articles 31 and 32 of the Constitution of Ukraine and the Laws of Ukraine on Information and on Personal Data Protection. The subsidiaries of the Russian holding company Mail.ru Group do not ensure the security of that information when it is transmitted via the internet using their services [mail.ru, Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki]. This means that the actions of the Russian holding company Mail.ru Group pose a threat to national security and to Ukraine’s national interests, as defined by the Law of Ukraine on the Fundamentals of the National Security of Ukraine. The imposition of sanctions was based on the available information about the threats to the national security of Ukraine arising out of the operation of the internet services Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki. According to the data available, as of February 2017, 271 million users were registered on VKontakte (...), including 38 million users from Ukraine, and 290 million users were registered on Odnoklassniki (...), including 13 million users from Ukraine. It has also been established that over 870 anti-Ukrainian communities were registered on the social media platforms VKontakte and Odnoklassniki (with a total number of subscribers of about 9.5 million people) which are used to disseminate material which appears to be prohibited [and which fall under the jurisdiction of the security services]. In particular, those would be calls for violent change or the overthrow of the constitutional order and the seizure of state power, for encroachment on the territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine or the creation of a terrorist group or terrorist organisation, and so on. There is also a tendency to use the above-mentioned communities to collect and transmit information on the location and composition of the units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine involved in the anti-terrorist operation in eastern Ukraine. Following the discovery of [the above], the administrations of VKontakte (...) and Odnoklassniki (...) were repeatedly asked to remove negative content and to block its sources, but the management of those social media organisations did nothing by way of response. At the same time, in Ukraine there is no legislation allowing the blocking or deletion of internet services, which makes it impossible to prevent the use of the digital environment for destructive purposes or for actions aimed at discrediting Ukraine at the international level. As a result of only the measures taken in 2016, the Security Service of Ukraine initiated 30 criminal proceedings against the owners and administrators of the above-mentioned social media communities who had spread calls for the overthrow of the constitutional order, for mass disorder and for other illegal actions. 17 people were served with notice of suspicion and 13 court verdicts were delivered on charges of offences [against the State of Ukraine]. When the sanctions were to expire (...) [by operation of] the Decree of the President of Ukraine of 15 May 2017 No. 133/2017, the Security Service of Ukraine proposed their extension (...) for a period of three years. On 14 May 2020, pursuant to the Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 184/2020 of 14 May 2020 (...), the [sanctions were extended]. (...) The reason for extension of sanctions was the reported effectiveness of the ban on Russian social media (...). In particular, the sanctions resulted in a significant reduction in the Ukrainian audience for the services that were banned. The data available show that the number of users of the Ukrainian segment of the social medias VKontakte and Odnoklassniki has decreased by 3.2 and 3.3 times respectively (VKontakte - from 15.9 million to 5 million, Odnoklassniki – from 11.7   million to 3.5   million), which has significantly diminished the target audience for anti ‑ Ukrainian information operations conducted by the Russian intelligence services using these platforms. (...) At the same time, the Russian social media VKontakte and Odnoklassniki continue to be actively used by the Russian intelligence services as an instrument of information warfare against Ukraine. In particular, in 2017-2019, more than 860 incidents of systematic dissemination of destructive content using the social media VKontakte and Odnoklassniki were recorded. After those incidents, the Security Service of Ukraine repeatedly sent requests to the technical support centres of [VKontakte and Odnoklassniki] asking them to remove illegal content that threatened the national interests of Ukraine in the information sphere and to block the sources of its distribution. Those requests were disregarded. (...) The available intelligence material shows that the Russian social networks VKontakte and Odnoklassniki are actively used to disseminate illegal content and to conduct destructive information activities as part of Russia’s information warfare against Ukraine. That assertion is based on the fact that in 2022 alone, the Security Service of Ukraine initiated more than 400 criminal proceedings against individuals who used those Russian social media to carry out illegal information activities. About 200 persons were served with notices of suspicion of committing crimes [against the State of Ukraine], and more than 60 persons were found guilty of those crimes by the courts. According to the Unified Register of Pre-trial Investigations, between 15 July 2014 and 12 December 2024, 630 criminal cases were initiated against persons who used the Russian internet resources [mail.ru, VKontakte and Odnoklassniki] (...).” 24.     In the latter context, the Security Service provided extracts from the Unified Register of Pre-trial Investigations to illustrate the various criminal charges involved, including, inter alia , calling for the overthrow and capture of State power in Ukraine or calling for armed insurgency; disseminating information, most notably to members of the Russian security services, about the location of the Ukrainian military units or military infrastructure; or making statements supporting and glorifying the actions of the Russian military in Ukraine, including the occupation of Ukrainian territory, and so on.      Online petition against the Decree 25.     On 16 May 2017 an online petition (a form of civic participation in decision-making) was registered on the President’s official website, asking for the unblocking of access to Vkontakte. As it gathered more than 25,000   signatures (the minimum required for the issue to be addressed), it was examined by the President and an answer was published. The President’s answer read as follows: “It has been observed that Russian [internet services such as mail.ru, VKontakte and Yandex] are widely used by the Russian intelligence services to spread Russian propaganda and to conduct special information operations against Ukraine and its citizens. In particular, these companies assist the Russian special services by collecting, storing, using and disseminating restricted information – the personal data and personal correspondence of Ukrainian citizens. (...) This is how Ukrainian users of Russian [social media] fall under the control of the Russian intelligence services, which first create the necessary conditions for recruitment and then use our citizens for their own illegal purposes. (...) The content of these internet resources is also aimed at manipulating public consciousness through the dissemination of inaccurate, incomplete and biased information, promoting anti-Ukrainian [protest movements] that are, unfortunately, present in Ukraine, involving [Ukrainians] in subversive activities and mass riots aimed at forcibly changing the constitutional order and overthrowing state power, obstructing Ukraine’s path to joining the European community, and therefore threatening the information security of the state. (...) Mail.ru Group and Yandex are taking active measures to block the activities of Ukrainian advertising companies on the internet, to corner the market in online services, and to take over the information space in general, which would block opportunities for Ukrainian businesses to flourish or to continue to compete in the marketplace. (...) Looking at the priorities of Ukraine’s national interests and taking into account the real threats to Ukraine’s national security and to the stability of its society, the encroachments on Ukraine’s sovereignty and its territorial integrity, the territorial claims of the Russian Federation and the interference with Ukraine’s internal affairs, and also taking into account the intelligence operations and subversive activities of the Russian special services, its encroachments on the rights and freedoms of Ukrainian citizens and its attempts to manipulate public opinion, at this point the application of special economic and restrictive measures to the Russian holding company Mail.ru Group and other Russian internet companies for a period of 3 years is an appropriate legal measure. I would find it impossible to support the electronic petition to lift the blocking of [Vkontakte].”      Application to the Constitutional Court 26 .     On 23 May 2017 forty-nine members of the Ukrainian Parliament filed a constitutional application with the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (“the CCU”) challenging the NSDC’s decision and the 2017 Decree. The applicants argued, inter alia , that the measures envisaged by the legislation affecting the Russian internet companies encroached on freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 34 of the Constitution of Ukraine and also violated Article 15 of the Constitution, which prohibits censorship. They also argued that the disputed measure had no legal basis, as the Law on Sanctions did not provide for the sanction of the termination of the provision of telecommunication services, and that the measure had not been proportionate. The applicants referred to the provisions of a number of international instruments relevant to freedom of expression, including Article   10 of the Convention. 27 .     On 31 May 2018 the CCU declined to hear the application, having found that the applicants had failed to substantiate their arguments but had limited themselves to simple citation of the relevant constitutional provisions.      Other related facts 28.     The sanctions brought in by the 2017 Decree were valid for three years. Over the following years they were extended and broadened on several occasions. All access to Russian websites from the territory of Ukraine is currently restricted.    Facts of application no. 79083/17 29.     The first applicant is a national of Belarus residing in Ukraine; at the time of the events concerned in this case he was 29 years old. 30.     In his application to the Court and his further submissions the applicant alleged that after the Decree came into force, he was prevented from accessing websites and associated services provided by mail.ru, Yandex, Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki. In particular, he alleged that he had been prevented from accessing his Vkontakte page, where he claimed to have 20,000 followers. Apart from being unable to post on his own page, the first applicant had also been unable to post on other pages and especially those belonging to groups which discussed political topics, including those which were critical of the Russian authorities. He was also unable to access entertainment sites such as Odnoklassniki, and also useful services such as email accounts with a personal communications archive. He was also unable to promote his own websites via those blocked services, or use certain features provided by those services (such as widgets by vk.com or web-site traffic checker by metrika.yandex.ua). 31.     In June 2017 the applicant challenged the Decree in the Higher Administrative Court of Ukraine (“the HACU”), sitting as a court of first instance. The President was a respondent in the case and the State Security Service was a third party, on the side of the respondent, without an independent claim. The applicant argued that his inability to access the relevant websites interfered with his freedom of expression as guaranteed by the domestic legislation, including the Constitution of Ukraine, as well as by a number of international instruments. He relied, in particular, on Article 10 of the Convention and claimed that that interference had not been lawful, as there were no provisions of domestic law that would allow the blocking of an entire website. The interference had not pursued a legitimate aim and had been disproportionate, particularly because complete blocking of the websites had made it impossible to access entertainment services (that is, social media) and communication services such as email. 32.     The applicant asked the court to exempt him from paying the court fee (640 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH); approximately 16 euros (EUR) at the time). In support of his request, he provided the court with certificates 1)     from the local branch of the Pension Fund confirming that no social security payments had been made in the applicant’s name and that he was not in receipt of a pension and 2)     from the tax authorities that for the years 2015-2017 there was no information that he had received any income. He also stated that “because of his religious beliefs he could not work, receive any income or borrow money, or have any financial relations with the State”. The HACU ordered the deferral of the payment of the court fees until judgment was given. 33 .     On 3 October 2017 the HACU rejected the applicant’s claims. The court noted at the outset that under Article 6 of the Code of Administrative Procedure a person who considered that his or her rights and interests had been breached by the actions and/or decisions of the State authorities could apply to the administrative courts. At the same time, an effective protection of rights and interests was possible only “if there is a dispute, that is, if the actions and/or decisions of the State authorities being challenged created, changed or terminated rights and duties [between a person and a State body]”. The court further observed, with reference to Article 171 of the Code of Administrative Procedure, that a normative legal act (a regulation) could be challenged only by persons who were, or were likely to be, affected by it. The same applied likewise, in the court’s view, to individual legal acts. 34 .     Turning to the Decree that was being challenged, the HACU observed that it was an individual legal act that had been passed as part of the sanctions regime, and that it was directed at certain legal entities and their relations with the Ukrainian authorities. The court concluded that the Decree had not affected the applicant himself; he had also not obtained standing to challenge the Decree from the entities it did affect. 35.     The HACU undertook further analysis of the applicant’s reference to Article 10 of the Convention and the Court’s case law in the relevant category of cases, in particular in Cengiz and Others v. Turkey (nos. 48226/10 and 14027/11, ECHR 2015 (extracts)). The HACU found that the applicant’s case was not comparable to that case on its facts, in particular as the applicant had not shown that the websites that he wished to have access to were unique in nature. The HACU further cited Ahmet Yıldırım v. Turkey (no. 3111/10, ECHR 2012), noting that in that case “the Court found restrictions on access to the internet acceptable where the content was unlawful, and those restrictions included both the blocking of individual access to the internet and preventing access to a particular website or removing unlawful content”. In that connection it noted that in the applicant’s situation, access to the internet was still possible and it was only that certain websites were inaccessible for certain periods of time. 36.     The HACU further referred to Articles 6 and 7 of the Law on Information, which provided for the restriction of access to information in the interests of, inter alia , national security, territorial integrity or public order. 37 .     The court concluded that: “The prohibition on internet providers giving access to certain websites should not be understood as tantamount to a restriction on the right to information, which presupposes freedom to obtain, use, disseminate, store and protect the information [a person] needs to enjoy his or her rights, freedoms or lawful interests. The Decree that is being challenged here does not restrict [the applicant] in his choice of forms and sources of information. Hindrances that may arise in using the [blocked websites] do not restrict Ukrainians’ rights to access their services, and are motivated exclusively by the need to create negative consequences for the entities concerned [by imposing sanctions on them]. Given the above facts and in view of their content and legal nature, [the HACU] does not find that there have been any violations [of the applicant’s] rights”. 38.     The HACU also ordered the first applicant to pay the court fee. There is no information as to whether the applicant did pay it. 39.     The first applicant applied to the Supreme Court to have the above judgment reviewed; he submitted a request for exemption from the court fee to that court as he had to the HACU. On 2 November 2017, the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s request, and his application was left without action pending his payment of the court fee. The court observed that the documents submitted by the applicant, in particular, the certificate that he was not a pensioner, did not show valid grounds for exemption, as the applicant was 29 and could not have been a pensioner in any event. 40.     As the first applicant had not paid the court fee, on 28 November 2017 the Supreme Court returned his appeal to him.    Facts of application no. 80554/17 41.     The second applicant is a former military officer. He comes from a family of Russian origin and has relatives living in Russia. 42 .     On his application form and in further submissions to the Court the second applicant stated that he had no accounts with Vkontakte or Odnoklassniki and that it would be impossible for him to have any because his “legal activities” meant he could not use a website that was open to the public, but he “receive[d] information from [family and friends] on those [social media sites]”. That was particularly important to him because he had not been to Russia since 2007. After the 2017 Decree, he was no longer able to communicate using those social media and he claimed that his private and family life had been considerably impacted. 43 .     The second applicant has had an account with private bank A. since 2010. He gave the bank his mail.ru. email address. In October 2017 he was contacted by his bank which informed him that communication via the mail.ru address was no longer possible, and he was invited to contact the bank in order to change his contact email address. There is no information as to what the second applicant did following that request. 44.     The second applicant did not challenge the 2017 Decree in the domestic courts. He considered that the existing national case-law showed that a challenge would be ineffective. He referred in that connection to the HACU decisions in cases no. 800/198/17 and no. 800/232/17 in which the others’ cases had been dismissed. 45 .     Case no. 800/198/17 seems to be the first case challenging the 2017 Decree. The HACU gave its judgment dismissing the claimant’s action on 14   June 2017 and the claimant appealed to the Supreme Court. On 7 July 2017 the Supreme Court opened appeal proceedings and on 13 April 2018 it delivered its judgment. It essentially endorsed the HACU’s findings but also said that what must have been challenged was the NSDC’s decision and not the President’s Decree, which only “enacted” that decision. 46.     Case no. 800/232/17 is the first applicant’s case, described above, in which the HACU gave its judgment on 3 October 2017.     Facts of application no. 52246/18 47 .     The third applicant did not say on his application form whether or how he had been using any of the Russian internet resources which were restricted by the 2017 Decree. 48 .     On 19 May 2017, the third applicant challenged the Decree in the HACU as unlawful and an interference with his freedom of expression. In his action he stated that the Decree “violated his rights as an internet user”. 49 .     On 23 May 2017, the HACU refused to open proceedings in the case. It referred to the provisions of Article 2 § 1, Article 6 § 1, paragraph 2 of Article 171 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Procedure of Ukraine and concluded that the third applicant’s claims did not give rise to an administrative claim. In particular, the court concluded that the disputed Decree was an individual legal act with legal consequences for the rights and freedoms of only the persons to whom it was addressed. The Decree did not impose any personal sanctions on the third applicant. The HACU observed however that the third applicant could apply to a civil court under the consumer protection legislation. 50.     The third applicant appealed against that decision to the Supreme Court. He argued, inter alia , that under paragraph 21 of the Resolution of the Plenary HACU no. 2 of 6 March 2008 a person has the right to challenge a regulation if that person has been affected by it or is involved in a legal matter in which that regulation will be applied, and it is incumbent on the claimant to show that. An administrative court cannot however assess that issue when deciding whether to open proceedings in an administrative case, and therefore cannot decline to open proceedings or return an action to the plaintiff particularly if the person claims the proceedings are necessary to protect his or her rights, freedoms or interests. The courts however can eventually find that the regulation being challenged has not affected (or will not affect) the claimant, which would be grounds to reject the action. 51 .     On 7 May 2018, the Supreme Court dismissed the third applicant’s appeal having essentially endorsed the HACU’s reasoning.     Facts of application no. 19640/19 52 .     The fourth applicant is a lawyer and a founder of the Chuhuiv human rights group, a non-governmental organisation working particularly in the field of human rights protection. On his application form and in his further submissions to the Court he said that he had personal accounts with Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki and an email account on the mail.ru domain. He claimed to have been using them for both personal and professional activities. He also said that around one month after the 2017 Decree came into force, domestic internet providers had started blocking access to the websites concerned and that he was no longer able to access them, so he could no longer receive or share information or access his photographs, contacts list, and personal and work-related correspondence. 53.     On 19 May 2017, the fourth applicant challenged the 2017 Decree in the HACU. 54.     He also applied for the interim suspension of the Decree and the related NSDC decision. On 10 October 2017, the suspension application was dismissed because the Code of Administrative Procedure provided that legal acts issued by the Parliament and the President could not be subject to interim suspension. 55 .     On 15 November 2017, the HACU dismissed the fourth applicant’s action for essentially the same reasons as described above in respect of the first applicant (see paragraphs 33-37 above). The fourth applicant appealed to the Supreme Court. 56 .     On 20 December 2018, the Supreme Court dismissed the fourth applicant’s appeal and upheld the HACU’s findings in full. 57.     In 2020 the fourth applicant informed the Court that following the extension of the sanctions for a further three years he had challenged the relevant President’s decree. 58.     On 6 August 2020, the Supreme Court, sitting as a court of first instance, dismissed the fourth applicant’s claim. 59 .     The Supreme Court stated at the outset that despite the 2020 Decree being an individual legal act, the restrictions it set up were an interference with the fourth applicant’s freedom of expression, particularly his right to receive and impart information. 60.     At the same time, the Supreme Court found that the interference had not completely deprived the fourth applicant of his right, having only temporarily restricted his ability to fully enjoy that right and in respect of clearly defined internet services. In that connection it referred to the Court’s case law on freedom of expression, and particularly that that right was not absolute and that restrictions on it were permissible if they complied with the three-part test under Article   10 §   2 of the Convention. 61.     Analysing the legitimacy of the disputed measures, the Supreme Court acknowledged that they had been implemented in accordance with the relevant rules and were necessitated by threats to the national security and territorial integrity of Ukraine. It also observed that the 2020 Decree had not brought in any new restrictions, but only extended those that already existed. The Supreme Court also took into account the fact that the fourth applicant had not been deprived of the opportunity to use other services similar to the restricted ones. The Supreme Court therefore concluded that the disputed interference with the fourth applicant’s freedom of expression had been lawful, had pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of national security and had been proportionate to it. 62 .     The Supreme Court referred to Article 266 of the Code of Administrative Procedure (as amended), which was similar in its wording to Article 171-1 of the previous version of the Code except for its section 3, which provided that if there were an administrative challenge to the legality of, inter alia , the acts of President, the courts must apply the rules specified in the article dealing with the procedure for challenging regulations created by the executive and other public authorities (see paragraph 67 below). 63.     On 4 November 2020, the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court dismissed the fourth applicant’s appeal against the Supreme Court’s decision of 6 August 2020. 64 .     With his submissions of 2020, the fourth applicant provided screenshots of his pages in Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki and of his email account on mail.ru as accessed on 29 March 2019 and 23 May 2020. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK         domestic law    THE CONSTITUTION OF UKRAINE (1996) 65 .     The relevant provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine read as follows: Article 34 “Everyone is guaranteed the right to freedom of thought and speech, and to the free expression of his or her views and beliefs. Everyone has the right to freely collect, store, use and disseminate information by oral, written or other means of his or her choice. The exercise of these rights may be restricted by law in the interests of national security, territorial indivisibility or public order, with the purpose of preventing disturbances or crime, protecting the health of the population or the reputation or rights of other persons, preventing the publication of information received confidentially, or maintaining the authority and impartiality of the justice system.” Article 106 “The President of Ukraine: (...) 18)     presides over the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine; (...) The President of Ukraine may issue decrees and orders on the basis and in pursuance of the Constitution and the laws of Ukraine, and they will be binding within the territory of Ukraine.” Article 107 “The National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine is a coordinating body under the authority of the President of Ukraine on issues of national security and defence. The National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine co-ordinates and controls the activities of the executive authorities in the field of national security and defence. (...) Decisions of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine shall be put into effect by the decrees of the President of Ukraine. The jurisdiction and powers of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine shall be determined by law.”    THE CODE OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE OF UKRAINE 66 .     The relevant provisions of the Code, as in force at the material time, read as follows: Article 2. Purpose of administrative proceedings “1.     The purpose of administrative proceedings is to protect the rights, freedoms and interests of individuals and the rights and interests of legal entities from violations by public authorities, local self-government bodies, their officials and employees, and other public entities in the exercise of their legal administrative functions, including their exercise of delegated powers, through fair, impartial and timely consideration of administrative cases.” Article 6. The Right to Judicial Protection “1.     Every person shall have the right to apply to the administrative court in accordance with the procedure set out in this Code, if he or she believes that his or her rights, freedoms or interests have been violated by a decision, action or omission of a public entity. ... 4.     No one may be deprived of the right to have his or her case considered by an administrative court within its jurisdiction as established by this Code.” Article 171. Specific Issues in Appeals against Regulatory Acts of Executive Bodies, the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Local Self-Government Bodies and Other Public Authorities “1.     The rules of this article apply to the consideration of administrative cases concerning: 1)     the legality (excluding matters of constitutionality) of resolutions and orders of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and resolutions of the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea; 2)     the legality and compliance with the superior rules of law of regulations made by Ministries and other central executive bodies, of the Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, of local state administrations and local self-government bodies, and other public entities. 2.     The right to appeal against a regulation shall be available to persons affected by it, and to persons who are involved in legal matters in which that regulation will be applied.” 3.     In the event of the commencement of proceedings in an administrative case to challenge a regulation, the court shall oblige the respondent to publish an announcement to that effect in the media outlet in which that act