CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 5 mars 2026

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UKRAINE (No. 2) (Application no. 5694/19)       JUDGMENT   Art 5 § 1 • Deprivation of liberty • Unlawful detention of person with mental disorder in State-run social care institution as not accompanied by sufficient guarantees against arbitrariness • Absence of formal decision and judicial authorisation Art 5 § 4 • Lack of legal procedure for applicant to take court proceedings reviewing lawfulness of deprivation of liberty Art 5 § 5 • Right to compensation not ensured   Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.   STRASBOURG 5 March 2026     This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Kaganovskyy v. Ukraine (no. 2), The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Kateřina Šimáčková , President ,   María Elósegui,   Georgios A. Serghides,   Gilberto Felici,   Mykola Gnatovskyy,   Vahe Grigoryan,   Sébastien Biancheri , judges ,   and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   5694/19) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article   34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Ukrainian national, Mr   Volodymyr   Volodymyrovych   Kaganovskyy (“the applicant”), on 26   December 2018; the decision to give notice of part of the complaints to the Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 3 February 2026, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The case concerns the applicant’s alleged detention in a State-run social care institution, as well as the absence of an effective mechanism to initiate court proceedings to review that detention and obtain compensation. The applicant relied mainly on Article 5 §§ 1, 4 and 5 of the Convention. THE FACTS 2.     The applicant was born in 1958. He was represented by Mr   M.   Tarakhkalo, a lawyer from the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union (“the UHHRU”) practising in Kyiv. The applicant passed away on 25   December 2019. 3.     The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms M. Sokorenko, from the Ministry of Justice. 4.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. 5.     The applicant had a long history of psychiatric conditions, including paranoid schizophrenia. In connection with his mental illness, in 1986 he was granted disability status. According to available medical documentation, his mental health deteriorated over time, leading to repeated hospitalisations and loss of employment, family, and accommodation. The applicant abused alcohol and engaged in irresponsible financial behaviour, including taking out loans and gambling with them. Reportedly, in May 2012 he attempted suicide in a metro station. 6 .     In June 2012 the applicant underwent a psychiatric assessment, on the basis of which on 11 September 2012 a district court in Kyiv found that he was unable to comprehend and control his actions. The applicant was declared legally incapable. 7.     A legal guardian was assigned to the applicant from August 2013 onwards: initially his father, and subsequently (from May 2015) his brother.         the applicant’s stay at the social care home 8.     On 6 August 2014, on the basis of a written request by his guardian and a referral from the Kyiv City Department of Social Policy, the applicant was admitted to the Kyiv Psychoneurological Residential Institution ( Київський психоневрологічний інтернат ,   “the KPRI”), a State ‑ run social care home. 9.     According to the available information, although he was never asked to formally consent to his admission to the KPRI, the applicant did not object to it. He lived in a residential block of the institution, enjoyed freedom of movement on the premises and was authorised by the management to periodically leave. Although he needed permission to leave the grounds, the applicant initially considered that his stay at the KPRI was voluntary (see Kaganovskyy v. Ukraine , no. 2809/18, §§   18 and 80, 15 September 2022). 10 .     The KPRI management described the applicant as tense, ambivalent, anxious and “senseless” (“ безглуздий ”) in his speech and actions, negativistic, and at times aggressive towards others. Reportedly, he showed no critical awareness of his state of health or his behaviour, “stubbornly maintained” that he had never suffered from any mental disorder and claimed that his relatives had sold his apartment without his consent. He also suffered from disrupted sleep and on one occasion he threw his dentures and other personal belongings out of the window. According to the information provided, throughout the applicant’s stay in the institution he was periodically given unspecified “maintenance therapy”. 11 .     In 2016, while he was still living at the KPRI, the applicant considered that his mental condition had improved and requested that his guardian and the guardianship authorities take steps to restore his legal capacity. As he received no reply to his request, in February 2017, assisted by lawyers from the UHHRU, he personally applied to a domestic court, seeking the restoration of his legal capacity. In submissions which he made during the proceedings to restore his capacity, the applicant asserted that his mental condition had significantly improved, that he was again able to control his actions and that the previous decision declaring him legally incapable (see paragraph 6 above) was no longer justified. He also argued that he could not commission his own psychiatric assessment and that his legal guardian was unwilling to assist him in regaining his legal capacity. 12.     According to the applicant, on or around 1 April 2017, soon after the launch of the proceedings to restore his capacity, the KPRI staff informed him that he was prohibited from leaving the institution’s premises. The applicant claimed that that prohibition had been imposed at the request of his legal guardian with the intention of preventing him from attending court hearings in the proceedings to restore his capacity. 13 .     On 23   June   2017 the applicant’s guardian, who at that time was his brother, wrote to the KPRI management, instructing them to prohibit the applicant from leaving the KPRI’s premises on the basis of a deterioration in his health. 14 .     Between 27 June and 6 July 2017 the applicant was held in the KPRI enhanced (intensive) supervision unit (for more details and the Court’s findings in respect of that period, see Kaganovskyy , cited above, §§ 13-22 and   87). After the applicant was moved back to the residential block of the KPRI, the prohibition on his leaving the KPRI’s premises continued. 15 .     On 7 October 2017 the applicant’s guardian wrote to the institution’s management again, instructing them to prohibit the applicant from receiving any visitors, “including UHHRU lawyers”, unless he was also present. He also reiterated his previous instruction (see paragraph 13 above) that the applicant should be prohibited from leaving the institution. 16 .     On 16 November 2017 two UHHRU lawyers visited the applicant at the KPRI with a view to taking him to a court hearing in the proceedings to restore his capacity. Video evidence submitted by the applicant demonstrates that during a conversation with the lawyers on that day, the KPRI director, Mr S., confirmed that the applicant was not permitted to leave the institution’s premises. In that regard, the director specifically referred to the written instructions from the applicant’s guardian (see paragraphs 13 and 15 above) and the alleged absence of legal grounds allowing him to override those instructions. In another video recorded on the same day, while speaking to the UHHRU lawyers through the fence of the KPRI, the applicant complained that he was not allowed to leave the institution’s premises, expressed his wish to undergo an independent psychiatric assessment to prove that his mental state had improved, and informed the lawyers about pressure from his legal guardian to abandon the proceedings to restore his capacity. 17.     According to the applicant, the ban on his leaving the institution was in place until approximately 27   June   2018, when the KPRI management informed him that he was allowed to leave the institution three times a week. From around 15 July 2018 he was allowed to leave the institution every day for three hours. 18 .     In the meantime, after the applicant’s request to restore his legal capacity had been reconsidered several times, for reasons including the domestic courts’ initial denial of his right to launch civil proceedings without his guardian’s approval (for a more detailed description of the relevant judicial proceedings, see Kaganovskyy , cited above, §§   33-41), on 28   May 2019 a district court in Kyiv ordered that the applicant should undergo an inpatient psychiatric assessment with a view to establishing his ability to comprehend and control his actions. There is no information as to whether that assessment was ever carried out. 19.     On 25 December 2019 the applicant died in the KPRI. 20.     On 17 March 2021 the civil proceedings to restore his capacity were terminated owing to the applicant’s death.       the applicant’s complaints to the authorities    Criminal complaint 21 .     On 13 October 2017 UHHRU lawyers submitted a report of a crime to the police in which they complained, among other things, of the applicant’s ongoing unlawful deprivation of liberty by the KPRI management, which had begun on or around 1   April 2017. They stated that the applicant was being forced to stay on the institution’s premises and could not maintain contact with the outside world or attend church. 22 .     The relevant criminal investigation was launched by the Obolonskyi district police department in Kyiv on 12   December   2017. During that investigation, the police obtained a written statement from the KPRI management in which they confirmed that the applicant’s guardian had prohibited the institution from arranging meetings between the applicant and third parties unless the guardian was also present. The institution’s management also indicated that during the applicant’s stay at the KPRI his state of health had not improved. In that connection, they referred to the results of his 2016 psychiatric assessment, a copy of which was not provided to the investigator. No information relating to the applicant’s allegations of unlawful deprivation of liberty appears to have been provided. There is also no information as to whether the police ever questioned the applicant, his guardian or the KPRI management during the criminal investigation. The current status of the investigation is unknown.    Complaints made in the context of the proceedings to restore the applicant’s capacity 23 .     In the context of the proceedings to restore his capacity, the applicant repeatedly raised the issue of the prohibition on his leaving the KPRI. In particular, in a letter which he sent to the Kyiv City Court of Appeal on 18   December 2017, the applicant informed the relevant judges that he wished to regain his legal capacity in order to leave the KPRI, meet a life partner and find a job, and at that moment he could not do so because the KPRI management had unlawfully prohibited him from leaving. Similar arguments were made before the Supreme Court, which in its decision of 15 August 2018 referred to the applicant’s argument that the hearings before the Kyiv City Court of Appeal had taken place in his absence because the KPRI management had not allowed him to leave the institution’s premises.    Formal requests to the KPRI 24 .     On 7 and 29 August 2018 the applicant’s lawyers submitted requests to the KPRI, seeking written confirmation of the prohibition on his leaving the institution. They also requested that the KPRI indicate the legal basis for such a measure and, if the allegations in question were unfounded, provide them with photocopies of the relevant entry ‑ exit log records. 25 .     By letters dated 16 August and 7 September 2018, both requests were denied on the grounds that the KPRI did not recognise that the UHHRU lawyers had legal authority to act on behalf of the applicant and seek the requested information. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK and practice         domestic law    The Psychiatric Assistance Act (2000) 26.     The Psychiatric Assistance Act distinguishes between the hospitalisation of persons with mental disorders in psychiatric hospitals and the admission of persons with mental disorders to psychoneurological social care institutions. While hospitalisation in psychiatric hospitals may be on a voluntary or compulsory basis, admission to social care institutions is always considered a voluntary measure and domestic courts are not involved in that process at any point. 27 .     Sections 14, 16 and 17 establish that persons suffering from a mental disorder can be hospitalised in psychiatric hospitals on a compulsory basis if they can only receive the appropriate medical treatment as an inpatient in a mental health facility and if, as a result of a serious mental disorder, they have committed or expressed real intent to commit acts which are directly dangerous to themselves or to others, or if they are unable to deal with their basic needs. Such persons should have been assessed by a panel of psychiatrists within the previous 24   hours, and the mental health facility in question should have applied to a court for an order for compulsory hospitalisation. Such persons may lodge an individual application with a court every three months with a view to verifying that there are grounds justifying their compulsory psychiatric detention. 28 .     The admission of persons with mental disorders to psychoneurological social care institutions is regulated by section 23. In particular, such persons may be admitted on the basis of an application lodged on their own initiative (if they have legal capacity) or on the initiative of their legal guardian, supplemented by a report of a medical panel including a psychiatrist (if they have been deprived of legal capacity). According to section 24, the grounds for discharging persons from such institutions are (i)   a   request by the person concerned, together with a report by a panel of psychiatrists confirming that person’s ability to live independently; (ii)   a   request by the person’s legal guardian; or (iii) a court decision finding the placement of the person in such an institution to be unlawful. 29 .     Section 23 also obliges the management of such institutions to ensure that residents are assessed at least once a year by a medical panel (which should include, among other people, a psychiatrist) with a view to determining whether their continued residence in such institutions is necessary and whether decisions declaring them legally incapable should be reconsidered. 30.     In addition, section   25 provides such persons with the right to communicate privately with others (including their lawyers), to maintain the confidentiality of their correspondence, to access media, to engage in leisure and creative activities, to practise religious activities and follow religious customs, to contact the management of the institution, and to receive pension and other social payments. In the interest of protecting the health and security of both the persons concerned and others, a psychiatrist or a panel of psychiatrists may restrict their right to receive visitors privately, to purchase and use everyday items, and to spend time alone. Any decision to restrict those rights must be documented in medical records and can be challenged in court.    Rulings of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine of 1 June 2016 and 20 December 2018 31 .     In two rulings (nos.   2-рп/2016 and 13-р/2018) concerning the hospitalisation in psychiatric hospitals of persons lacking legal capacity who were unable to consent to such a measure, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine found that such persons could be hospitalised in that manner only on the basis of court orders. The then applicable provisions of the Psychiatric Assistance Act – which permitted such hospitalisation solely on the basis of either a psychiatrist’s decision issued at the request of a legal guardian or a decision of the guardianship authorities – were found to be incompatible with the Constitution. In particular, in its ruling of 1 June 2016, the Constitutional Court held as follows: “The hospitalisation of a person lacking legal capacity in a psychiatric institution ... entails the long-term provision of psychiatric care in an inpatient setting. A person lacking legal capacity ... is required to remain in the institution at all times, without the possibility of leaving the premises voluntarily, and is subject to constant supervision by the medical staff. ... The procedure established in [the Psychiatric Assistance Act] for the hospitalisation of persons lacking legal capacity in a psychiatric institution ... does not provide for any judicial control over such hospitalisation, because the legislature effectively considered it voluntary, even though [the person concerned] is hospitalised without giving informed consent. ... [Such hospitalisation] must therefore be in accordance with the constitutional guarantees for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms ... and solely on the basis of a court order ...”    The 2016 Model regulations 32.     The Model regulations on psychoneurological residential institutions were adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers on 14   December   2016. Their general provisions concerning the operation of such institutions and the admission of patients have been summarised in Kaganovskyy (cited above, §§   54-58). 33.     Regulation 26 provides that legally incapacitated patients may leave such institutions for a period of up to six months during a calendar year, on the basis of a written application submitted by their guardians and/or their relatives or other persons intending to host them temporarily. In the event that a patient leaves an institution without authorisation, the administration shall take measures to search for him or her. 34 .     Regulation 71 provides that the director and staff of such institutions bear personal liability for preserving the life and health of their residents, for respecting their rights, and for preventing discrimination against them.       relevant domestic reports and other material    Reports of the Ukrainian Ombudsperson 35 .     In her 2018 annual report, the Ombudsperson noted a systemic failure by the management of psychoneurological residential institutions in Ukraine to initiate proceedings to restore the legal capacity of their residents. Although some residents were capable of living independently in the community, mandatory medical assessments aimed at determining the appropriateness of their continued stay in such institutions were not carried out. The report also highlighted that once patients were declared legally incapable, the administration gained “virtually total” control over them. Such control, in the Ombudsperson’s view, deprived legally incapacitated individuals of the opportunity to leave an institution or be transferred to a more appropriate facility. 36 .     In the 2024 report prepared following the Ombudsperson’s monitoring visit to the KPRI, it was noted that the institution’s premises were fenced and that residents were allowed to visit nearby shops and the church on their own. The 2025 report concerning a similar psychoneurological institution in the Zakarpattya Region stated that the premises of that facility were also fenced and included an entry-exit checkpoint, and that residents were permitted to leave the institution when accompanied by staff and upon obtaining authorisation.    Report by the Kharkiv Institute of Social Studies, a non ‑ governmental organisation 37 .     In the 2023 report “The rights of people with disabilities staying in inpatient facilities during the war: study results”, it was noted that some patients of psychoneurological institutions were allowed to leave the premises on their own. However, the procedure for such leave varied and depended on a patient’s legal capacity, his or her behaviour and the established restrictions. In some institutions, patients could go out on their own, while in others they could do so only with permission or accompanied by staff; in some places, free movement was not allowed even on the institution’s premises. The rules for leaving the premises often depended on the personal discretion of an institution’s administration and staff.    Other publicly available material 38 .     In 2016 the applicant was interviewed by journalists from Hromadske Radio. The ensuing media article, which was published on 14   August 2016 and entitled “How can a legally incapacitated person restore his (or her) rights?” (“ Як людині, яку визнали недієздатною, поновити свої права? ”) [1] , stated as follows: “[The applicant] considers that the decision to declare him legally incapacitated is absolutely unlawful. He currently lives in a social care institution, although he could be living freely, registered with a psychiatrist and taking very mild sedatives, as he did before. He receives a decent military pension, and with this money he could live in a hostel and work as a real-estate agent, just as he did for the previous 11   years. In his free time, he plays chess, plays music on the piano, and reads detective novels. Unfortunately, the conditions in the institution are not very satisfactory: although the food is plentiful, its quality is poor. Moreover, being confined in a closed space with a large number of unstable individuals has led [the applicant] to fall into a depression. He also complains that he is prescribed very strong medication, which makes him sleep all day. ‘Over the many years of my illness, I have learned to control myself,’ [the applicant] says. ‘If I’m not feeling well, I can take mild medication for a week, and I immediately feel better. But in the [KPRI], they give me such strong drugs that even half a tablet is enough to keep me in bed all day.’ Without the doctors’ permission, he cannot even go outside”.     relevant international law and material    European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) 39 .     The standards of the CPT concerning the stay of legally incapacitated individuals in social care establishments, as summarised in a 2020 factsheet entitled “Persons deprived of their liberty in social care establishments” (CPT/Inf(2020)41), in so far as relevant, require: “... [I]nvoluntary placement and stay of residents in social care establishments (including situations in which the restrictions imposed amount to de facto deprivation of liberty) should be regulated by law and accompanied by appropriate safeguards. In particular, placement must be made in the light of an objective medical assessment, including of a psychiatric nature. Further, all residents who are involuntarily placed in a social care establishment (including situations in which the restrictions imposed amount to de facto deprivation of liberty), whether or not they have a legal guardian, must enjoy an effective right to bring proceedings to have the lawfulness of their placement and stay decided speedily and reviewed regularly by a court and, in this context, must be given the opportunity to be heard in person by the judge and to be represented by a lawyer”. As to the persons who have been voluntarily admitted to such establishments, the CPT indicated as follows (footnotes omitted): “... [I]f it is considered that a given resident, who has been voluntarily admitted and who expresses a wish to leave the establishment, still requires care to be provided in the establishment, then the involuntary placement procedure provided by the law should be fully applied. In the absence of involuntary placement procedures, a clear and comprehensive legal framework should be put in place which allows residents who have been admitted voluntarily to challenge the imposition of any subsequent restrictions amounting to deprivation of liberty before a court as set out above”. 40 .     The CPT addressed the issue of the rights of patients of psychoneurological institutions in Ukraine during its periodic country visits in 2002 and 2017, as well as during its ad hoc visit in 2019. In a report (CPT/Inf (2020) 1) issued following its visit to Ukraine from 2 to 11   April 2019, the CPT noted that despite its recommendations to amend the domestic legal framework so that residents of psychoneurological institutions who lacked legal capacity could apply to a court to terminate their placement in such institutions, and to ensure either that the need for the continued placement of such persons was automatically reviewed by a court at regular intervals or that the residents themselves could request a judicial review at reasonable intervals, the legal framework had not changed. As to annual reviews by medical panels (see paragraph 29 above), the CPT highlighted that such reviews in the establishments that it had visited were performed in a perfunctory manner, were poorly documented and contained unclear or no conclusions. As to the right to leave the premises of an institution, the CPT noted as follows: “It is to be added that in the three ‘internats’ the delegation met many residents (especially on closed wards) who stated spontaneously and insistently that they did not wish to stay there; in Velykorybalske in particular, the impression was that a very large proportion of residents were de facto deprived of their liberty, without benefiting from any legal safeguards. The CPT calls upon the Ukrainian authorities to ensure that residents in the three ‘internats’ visited ... benefit from the legal safeguards offered by the [Psychiatric Assistance Act]”. It was also observed that in all three of the institutions in question, the management had told the CPT delegation that any patients who absconded would be searched for and, once found, brought back to the establishment by the police.    Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 41 .     In a briefing note of 1   February   2022 entitled “The human rights situation of persons with intellectual and psychosocial disabilities in Ukraine”, which was prepared by the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) on the basis of 47 monitoring visits to long-term care facilities for persons with intellectual and psychosocial disabilities between October   2020 and October   2021, the following findings were made (footnotes omitted): “3. The exact number of persons with intellectual and psychosocial disabilities in Ukraine is unknown. According to the Government of Ukraine, as of 1 January 2020, there were 40,327 persons deprived of legal agency ... At that time, 14,596 persons with removed legal agency resided in long-term care institutions in Ukraine. ... 50. All the long-term care facilities and psychiatric hospitals visited by HRMMU violated the right to liberty of persons with intellectual and psychosocial disabilities by imposing restrictions on freedom of movement, either inside the institution or in relation to outside visits. Such restrictions were even imposed on legally-capable persons ... 51. The arbitrary denial of the right of all or some of the residents with intellectual and psychosocial disabilities to leave the facilities, even during the day, is one of the major concerns observed by HRMMU. Decisions to allow residents to leave the facilities for a few hours during the daytime, after their written application, were often made by psychiatrists based on the mental conditions of the residents. While in some facilities only persons with legal agency were allowed to leave the facilities during the day, in other facilities, all residents, including those with full legal agency, were denied the right to go outside. 42 facilities allowed residents to go outside accompanied by staff members, usually in groups. Such groups mostly left the facility to visit specific places in the community – such as shops, churches or public institutions. The possibility to leave the facilities in a group was strictly dependent on the availability of accompanying staff ... ... 53. Directors of long-term care facilities could not explain to HRMMU the legal grounds for the restrictions of the right to liberty they imposed, including in relation to persons with removed legal agency, but referred to their personal duty to protect the life and health of the residents, which is provided in the legislation. Most of them also referred to the lack of staff responsible for supervising the residents (mostly, orderlies) as an excuse for restrictions on free movement inside the facility and to leave the facilities ...” THE LAW I.   Preliminary remarks 42.     The Court observes that in its previous judgment in Kaganovskyy v.   Ukraine (no. 2809/18, 15   September   2022) it examined the applicant’s confinement in the KPRI enhanced (intensive) supervision unit in the period between 27 June and 6 July 2017. In respect of that specific period, the Court found that the applicant’s confinement had amounted to a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article   5   §   1 of the Convention and had not been lawful (ibid., §§ 87 and 104). It further found violations of Article   5 §§   4 and 5 of the Convention regarding the same period. The question of whether the applicant’s stay in the KPRI outside that period and outside the enhanced (intensive) supervision unit had constituted a deprivation of liberty fell outside the scope of the case since, as the Court noted in its judgment (ibid., §§ 73 and   74), the applicant had submitted complaints about another period only after the Government had been given notice of the case and had submitted a separate application in that regard. 43.     In that separate application, the present case, the applicant complained about his stay at the KPRI immediately before and after his confinement in the enhanced supervision unit – that is, according to him, from approximately 1   April to 26   June 2017, and from 7 July 2017 to approximately 27 June 2018. Those separate complaints form the subject matter of the present case. THE GOVERNMENT’S OBJECTION REGARDING CONTINUED EXAMINATION AFTER THE APPLICANT’S DEATH    The parties’ submissions 44.     The Government argued that since the applicant had died and there were no heirs or close relatives willing to pursue his case, the UHHRU did not have locus standi . They also indicated that there was no sufficiently close link between the applicant and the UHHRU, and that the subject matter of the present case did not raise any serious questions of general interest which could warrant its continued examination. Referring to the Court’s reasoning in Krotov v. Ukraine ((dec.)   [Committee], no.   30289/17, §§   11-15, 5   September 2024), the Government argued that the present application should be struck out of the Court’s list of cases. 45.     The UHHRU disagreed. It reiterated the arguments it had made in Kaganovskyy (cited above, §   66) and additionally indicated that the prohibition on residents of social care institutions leaving those establishments remained a systemic problem in Ukraine. In the UHHRU’s view, that problem transcended the applicant’s individual situation and concerned all individuals residing in similar establishments in Ukraine. It also submitted that the problem of prohibitions on leaving social care institutions in Ukraine had not always received adequate attention in the Ombudsperson’s reports.    The Court’s assessment 46.     The Court reiterates that it has struck out applications where the applicant died in the course of the proceedings and no heir or close relative expressed a wish to pursue the application (see Hirsi Jamaa and Others v.   Italy   [GC], no.   27765/09, §   57, ECHR   2012, with further references). Nevertheless, as the Court pointed out in Malhous v.   the   Czech Republic   ((dec.) [GC], no.   33071/96, ECHR 2000-XII), human rights cases before the Court generally also have a moral dimension, which must be taken into account when considering whether the examination of an application after the applicant’s death should be continued. This is especially true if the main issue raised by the case transcends the person and the interests of the applicant. 47.     The Court refers to its conclusion in Kaganovskyy (cited above, §§   71 ‑ 72) that the case concerned issues that transcended the application and involved a question of general interest. Given the vulnerability of persons residing in psychoneurological institutions and the fact that the relevant domestic law had not been changed, the Court found that respect for human rights required it to continue the examination of the case. 48.     Those findings are equally pertinent to the present case. As the relevant domestic and international reports demonstrate (see paragraphs   35 ‑ 37 and 40 ‑ 41 above), the issue which lies at the heart of the case – the lack of appropriate safeguards for persons with mental disorders staying in psychoneurological institutions – concerns not only the late applicant, but also a large number of vulnerable individuals who reside in such establishments across Ukraine (see paragraph 41 above). There is also no indication that there have been any significant changes in the relevant domestic legal framework (see paragraph 40 above) that could make the above ‑ mentioned issue less relevant. 49.     In these circumstances, the Court finds that it is not necessary to examine the   locus standi   of the UHHRU in the proceedings before it,   as respect for human rights, as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto, requires it to continue the examination of the application in accordance with Article 37 §   1   in fine   of the Convention.     alleged violations of article 5 §§ 1, 4 and 5 of the convention 50.     Relying on Article 5 §§ 1, 4 and 5 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention, the applicant complained about the prohibition on his leaving the KPRI’s premises between approximately 1   April and 26 June 2017, and between 7 July 2017 and approximately 27   June 2018. He also complained that under domestic law, he could not challenge the lawfulness of that prohibition in court and obtain compensation for it. 51.     As the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of a case (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos.   37685/10 and   22768/12, §§   114 and 126, 20 March 2018), the Court considers that the applicant’s complaints should be examined solely under Article 5 §§ 1, 4 and   5 of the Convention (see, for example, Mihailovs v. Latvia , no.   35939/10, §   101, 22 January 2013), which read as follows: “1.     Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (e)     the lawful detention of persons ... of unsound mind ... 4.     Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5.     Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.”    Admissibility      Whether the applicant was deprived of his liberty within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention    The parties’ submissions 52.     The applicant maintained that during the relevant period he had been deprived of his liberty against his will. He stated that his initial placement and stay at the KPRI had been voluntary and that he had been permitted to leave the premises with authorisation from the management. However, after approximately 1 April 2017 he had no longer been allowed to go out, and from that moment on he had considered himself deprived of his liberty. The applicant further indicated that the decision to lock him up on the KPRI’s premises had been taken by the institution’s staff informally, without any legal proceedings or medical justification, and with the sole purpose of obstructing his efforts to have his legal capacity restored. That prohibition, in the applicant’s view, had rendered his otherwise voluntary stay at the KPRI tantamount to de facto detention. 53.     As to the accuracy of the indicated start and end date of the alleged detention, 1 April 2017 and 27 June 2018 respectively, the applicant submitted that those were approximate dates as the relevant decisions of the KPRI staff had been communicated to him only verbally without any written order or entry in his medical file. His lawyers’ formal requests to confirm the alleged dates and establish the grounds for the imposed restrictions had been dismissed by the KPRI management without proper justification (see paragraphs   24-25 above). In support of his assertions, the applicant relied, inter alia , on (i) the letters from his legal guardian to the KPRI (see paragraphs 13 and 15 above) in which the guardian had explicitly instructed the administration to prohibit the applicant from leaving the premises; (ii) the video footage of his unsuccessful attempt to leave the institution with his lawyers in order to take part in the proceedings to restore his capacity (see paragraph 16 above); and (iii) his submissions to domestic courts in which he had complained about his detention at the KPRI and expressed his wish to leave (see paragraph   23 above). 54 .     The Government disagreed. They submitted that the applicant had initially been placed in the KPRI on the basis of the decision of his guardian. His subsequent stay there had been voluntary and – with the exception of the period when he had been confined in the enhanced supervision unit between 27 June and 6 July 2017, which had already been examined by the Court in Kaganovskyy – had not amounted to a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 § 1. The Government also made reference to the nature of the KPRI, which was a residential care institution rather than a psychiatric hospital, and submitted that the applicant had not raised the issue of his alleged detention at domestic level. 55 .     Referring to the Court’s criteria in Storck v. Germany (no.   61603/00, ECHR 2005-V), the Government further maintained that objectively, the applicant had not been under the constant supervision of the KPRI personnel, that the institution had not been locked, that he had enjoyed freedom of movement and that he had been able to maintain social contact with the outside world. In particular, he had been “permitted to leave for rehabilitation and social purposes”, to have access to court hearings, and to speak to his lawyers and journalists. Subjectively, in their view, the applicant had been “undecided” as to whether he wished to stay at the KPRI or not. However, neither the applicant nor his representatives had lodged any formal complaints about his alleged deprivation of liberty during that period.    The Court’s assessment 56.     The Court would start by observing that although the applicant’s stay at the KPRI had been requested by his guardian, a private individual, it was implemented by a State-run institution – the KPRI. Accordingly, the responsibility of the authorities for the situation complained of was engaged. 57.     The Court has previously considered cases involving the placement and stay of mentally incapacitated individuals in social care institutions, finding that such measures may constitute a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article   5   §   1 of the Convention (see, for example,   Stanev v.   Bulgaria   [GC], no.   36760/06, §   132, ECHR   2012; D.D.   v.   Lithuania , no.   13469/06, § 152, 14 February 2012; Mihailovs , cited above, §§ 131-37; and Červenka v. the Czech Republic , no. 62507/12, §§ 103-04, 13   October 2016). It reiterates that the notion of deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 does not only comprise the objective element of a person’s confinement in a particular restricted space for a length of time which is more than negligible. A person can only be considered to have been deprived of his or her liberty if, as an additional subjective element, he or she has not validly consented to the confinement in question (see Storck , cited above, § 74). 58.     In the present case it is undisputed that the applicant’s stay in the KPRI was uninterrupted from the date of his admission on 6 August 2014 until his death on 25   December   2019. He was placed there at the request of his guardian and remained legally incapacitated during his stay. As such, on the basis of the relevant provisions of the Psychiatric Assistance Act (see paragraph   28 above), at no point during his stay at th