CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 17 mars 2026

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display:inline-block } .s44B8752F { width:177.11pt; display:inline-block }   SECOND SECTION CASE OF SUNGUR v. TÜRKİYE (Application no. 56462/19)   JUDGMENT   Art 3 (substantive and procedural) • Degrading treatment • Spraying of tear gas directly at the applicant by a police officer, from a distance of under one metre, during a demonstration, resulting in a non-serious injury treatable with simple medical care • Use of force not rendered strictly necessary by the applicant’s conduct • Domestic authorities’ failure to afford sufficient redress • Application of criminal-law system in the case resulted in the impunity of the perpetrator, without providing the requisite deterrent effect   Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.   STRASBOURG 17 March 2026       This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.   In the case of Sungur v. Türkiye, The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Arnfinn Bårdsen , President ,   Saadet Yüksel,   Jovan Ilievski,   Péter Paczolay,   Gediminas Sagatys,   Juha Lavapuro,   Hugh Mercer , judges , and Andrea Tamietti, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   56462/19) against the Republic of Türkiye lodged with the Court under Article   34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Turkish national, Ms   Ceyda Sungur (“the applicant”), on 14   October 2019; the decision to give notice to the Turkish Government (“the Government”) of the complaint concerning Article 3 of the Convention and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 10 February 2026, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The case concerns a police officer’s spraying of tear gas directly at the applicant during the Gezi Park events. The applicant complained of a violation of Article   3 of the Convention. THE FACTS 2.     The applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Paris. She was represented by Ms   S.   Doğanoğlu, a lawyer practising in Ankara. 3.     The Government were represented by their Agent at the time, Mr   Hacı   Ali Açıkgül, former Head of the Department of Human Rights of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Türkiye. 4.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. INCIDENT OF 28   MAY 2013 5.     On 28   May 2013 the applicant attended a sit-in protest in Gezi Park in Istanbul. The protest was held in response to plans to replace the park with a shopping centre as part of the redevelopment of nearby Taksim Square. It took place one day after the State authorities had started demolition work in the park. The widespread protest movements that followed were later referred to as “the Gezi Park events” (for more information on the Gezi Park events, see Kavala v.   Turkey , no.   28749/18, §§   15-22, 10   December 2019). 6.     During the security forces’ intervention in the sit-in protest, a police officer sprayed the applicant with tear gas at very close range, aiming directly at her head. The officer continued moving towards her and spraying the gas even as she turned away. The photographs of the incident were circulated widely in the media, and the applicant, who was wearing a red dress at the time, came to be known as “the woman in red”, one of the symbols of the Gezi Park events. ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS AGAINST THE POLICE OFFICER 7.     On 3   June 2013, upon an order from the Ministry of the Interior, the Directorate General of Security assigned a number of inspectors to investigate any deficiencies in the use of force by security forces. In a report dated 22   August 2013, which covered several incidents, the inspectors identified the police officer concerned as F.Z. They noted that he had unnecessarily and unlawfully sprayed tear gas on the applicant and those around her, and had also kicked some individuals. 8 .     Subsequently, a preliminary investigation and a disciplinary investigation were initiated against F.Z. The preliminary-investigation report of 19   September 2013 concluded that it had been established from the video footage that F.Z. had used tear gas unnecessarily on the applicant – who had not shown any resistance to the police   – several times at a distance of less than one metre. He had then continued to move about, spraying other demonstrators with the gas. He had therefore acted in breach of the Directive on the use of tear-gas weapons and munitions ( Göz Yaşartıcı Gaz Silahları ve Mühimmatları Kullanım Talimatı ). His actions had also prompted a public reaction, thereby causing an escalation of the Gezi Park events. The disciplinary-investigation report of the same date reached the same conclusions. 9.     Following the preliminary investigation, the Governorship of Istanbul authorised the opening of criminal proceedings against F.Z. on 24   September 2013, pursuant to Law no.   4483 on the prosecution of civil servants and public officials. 10 .     On 17   December 2013, in line with the conclusions of the disciplinary investigation, the Istanbul Governorship’s Police Disciplinary Committee imposed a disciplinary sanction on F.Z. for committing prohibited acts both on and off duty. The Committee stated that, although the sanction corresponding to the act in question was a reprimand, it had decided to impose a lighter sanction on F.Z., namely a warning, in view of his clean employment record. CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE POLICE OFFICER 11.     On an unspecified date the Istanbul Public Prosecutor’s Office initiated a criminal investigation against F.Z. As part of that investigation, F.Z. gave his statement to the Istanbul public prosecutor as a suspect on 12   December 2013. He stated that at the time of the incident in question, he had been working as a police officer in the Rapid Response Force ( çevik kuvvet ) and had been on active duty during the Gezi Park events. Although he had used tear gas as part of his duties, he had noted after watching the relevant video footage that he was not the officer using tear gas on the woman who had come to be known as “the woman in red”. He maintained that he had not used tear gas at close range on anyone and denied all claims against him. 12.     On 15   November 2013 the Istanbul public prosecutor asked the applicant to give her statement about the incident. As she did not respond, in two letters of 4   December and 26   December 2013 the prosecutor instructed the security forces to bring her in. On 2   January 2014 the applicant gave her statement to the public prosecutor. She stated that on the day of the incident she had gone to Gezi Park   – which was very close to the university where she worked as a research assistant on urban planning   – to support her friends and to join the peaceful protest against the State authorities’ plans for the park. The police had started to use tear gas on the protestors without any prior warning, as a result of which the protestors had started fleeing and she had fallen on the ground. When she had got up, a police officer had sprayed tear gas directly at her, at a distance of half a metre, and had continued to do so after she had turned her back to protect herself. She had heard another officer instigating the act by telling him to start spraying. She had had difficulty breathing and had felt her face burning, but she had been in a state of shock over the incident that she did not have the presence of mind to go to a medical institution. 13.     On 9   January 2014 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment, accusing F.Z. of abuse of duty under Article   257 §   1 of the Criminal Code. Referring to the expert’s report on the video footage, the public prosecutor concluded that F.Z. had sprayed tear gas at very close range, aiming directly at the applicant, and had continued to do so after she had turned her back, despite the fact that she had not displayed any unusual behaviour. 14.     On 13   May 2014, at the first hearing before the Istanbul Magistrate’s Court, the applicant repeated the statements she had made to the public prosecutor and added that the person instructing F.Z. to spray tear gas on her was his superior. She had experienced pain in the hour that followed the incident but had not had any other health complaints subsequently. She nevertheless requested to be referred to the Forensic Medicine Institute to obtain a medical report. The Magistrate’s Court accepted her request and ordered that a medical report be issued in relation to her tear-gas exposure. 15.     During the subsequent hearings, the Istanbul Criminal Court of First Instance   – to which the case had been transferred   – heard oral evidence from F.Z. and three commanding officers involved in the events of 28   May 2013. The court also examined two experts’ reports on the video footage of the incident. F.Z., in his testimony to the court, stated that on the day of the incident some of the protestors had thrown stones at the police officers and kicked them and that he had used tear gas on the orders of one of his superiors, namely R.E. The difficult working conditions and the pain caused to him by the strap of the tear-gas launcher on account of an existing shoulder injury had made it difficult for him to make a sound decision in the moment. When he had used the gas on the protestors, the launcher had malfunctioned and the applicant had been exposed to the gas for a few seconds as she had suddenly got up from the ground. He also stated that the discrepancy between his statements to the public prosecutor and his testimony before the trial court was due to his initial inability to recognise himself in the video footage. 16.     One of the commanding officers, R.E., who was the Deputy Chief of the Istanbul Directorate of Security at the time, denied having ordered the use of tear gas and maintained that, although he could not remember the details, he could see from the footage that the situation did not require the use of such a measure. One of the other two commanding officers, M.Z.B., noted that some of the protestors had been trying to cross through the police barricade to reach the construction equipment and that R.E. had instructed the police teams to spray tear gas. A third officer, M.K., who was F.Z.’s direct supervisor, stated that he had not ordered the use of tear gas and had not seen F.Z. performing that act. 17.     During the hearings in September and December 2014, the applicant stated that, although the Criminal Court had referred her to the Forensic Medicine Institute, she had not been notified of a letter sent by that organisation and could not therefore go for an examination. Moreover, the Institute had asked her for a preliminary report which did not exist. She made no claims of a permanent injury and asked the trial court to revoke its preliminary decision to refer her for a medical examination. Her request was rejected by the trial court. Nevertheless, no medical reports were obtained during the proceedings. 18 .     By a judgment of 10   June 2015, the Criminal Court stated that the police could only use force when absolutely necessary, for instance in the event of resistance or in response to an attack, and that officers could be held criminally liable for arbitrary use of force. In that regard, tear gas could only be used to the extent required, and the fact that a demonstration was not held lawfully did not necessitate the use of force, especially in the absence of violence. In the circumstances of the case, F.Z. had sprayed tear gas without warning, aiming at the applicant’s face at a distance of less than one metre, and had continued to do so after the applicant had turned her back, in breach of the Directive on the use of tear-gas weapons and munitions. The applicant had been subjected to that act despite the fact that she had not displayed any unreasonable behaviour before or during the incident. F.Z.’s claims regarding his superiors’ orders to use the gas, his shoulder pain and the alleged violent behaviour of some of the protestors could not be considered sufficient to absolve him of liability. F.Z. had exceeded the authorised limits of the use of force and had caused the applicant to sustain an injury which could be treated with simple medical care and had left no physical marks. 19 .     The Criminal Court therefore found F.Z. guilty of intentionally causing bodily harm by exceeding his authority to use force in relation to his acts towards the applicant, and sentenced him to ten months’ imprisonment under Article   86 §   2 of the Criminal Code (Law no.   5237). It pointed out that it had imposed a sentence which was harsher than the minimum sanction provided for by law because he had committed the offence using tear gas, which was classified as a weapon by the Court of Cassation, and had abused his authority as a public official. The trial court also found him guilty of abuse of duty for his acts against other protestors and sentenced him to another ten months’ imprisonment. However, taking into account F.Z’s good behaviour during the trial and in the absence of any previous conviction, it concluded that it was unlikely that he would commit any further offence. It accordingly ordered the suspension of the pronouncement of the judgment, under Article   231 §   5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Law no.   5271), on the condition that he did not commit any other intentional offence for a period of five years. 20.     The Criminal Court further decided to impose a specific measure on F.Z., under Article   231 §   8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, with the aim of assisting his rehabilitation and providing redress to the applicant. In that regard, it ordered F.Z. to plant 300   trees in an area indicated by the forest authority and to tend to those trees for a period of six months. 21 .     Lastly, the trial court decided to lodge a criminal complaint with the Istanbul public prosecutor’s office against F.Z.’s superiors for abuse of duty. The court stated that the superiors had failed to use their authority as required, resulting in confusion and disorder regarding the use of tear gas. 22.     The applicant lodged an objection to that decision, challenging the Criminal Court’s suspension of the pronouncement of the judgment against F.Z. In her opinion, the court’s decision resulted in F.Z.’s impunity and an appearance of tolerance by the authorities to the unlawful use of force in question, in violation of the prohibition of ill-treatment. 23.     On 9   July 2015 the Istanbul Assize Court rejected the applicant’s objection, finding that the Criminal Court’s decision was in accordance with the law. 24.     On 2   May 2016 the Bakırköy Directorate of Conditional Release found that F.Z. had fulfilled the conditions of the measure imposed on him and had planted and tended to 300   trees. Subsequently, his probation file was closed. CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST OTHER OFFICERS 25.     On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Istanbul public prosecutor’s office against the President of the Republic, the Minister of the Interior, the Governor of Istanbul and the Istanbul Director General of Security. She also requested the opening of criminal proceedings against the chief of the Rapid Response Force and the officials who had given the instruction to use tear gas during the incident. 26.     The Istanbul public prosecutor started an investigation into the applicant’s complaints. On 25   June 2014 he decided not to proceed with the complaint against the President and the Minister of the Interior, because they could only be investigated at the request of Parliament. The public prosecutor also decided not to prosecute the Governor and Director General of Security, as the applicant had failed to provide evidence of how they had contributed to F.Z.’s act. However, the investigation into F.Z.’s superiors went ahead. 27.     Following the complaint lodged by the Istanbul Criminal Court against F.Z.’s superiors R.E., M.Z.B. and M.K. (see paragraph   21 above), the public prosecutor initiated a fresh investigation, which it subsequently joined to the existing one. 28.     On 23   November 2015 the public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Istanbul Criminal Court against commanding officers R.E. and M.Z.B., accusing them of abuse of duty and use of force in excess of the authorised limits, on account of their instruction to F.Z. to use tear gas. The prosecutor decided not to prosecute M.K., finding that there was not sufficient evidence to conclude that he had given any instructions to F.Z. during the incident. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 29.     On 18   August 2015 the applicant lodged an individual application with the Constitutional Court, complaining of a violation of the prohibition of inhuman treatment. She stated that she had been exposed to tear gas at very close range –   which posed a risk to her life and physical well-being   – despite the fact that she had not been engaging in any violent acts. Although the Criminal Court had established that the use of force had been unlawful, suspending the pronouncement of the judgment and ordering the police officer to plant 300   trees did not have a deterrent effect. Referring to the Court’s case-law, she argued that the trial court’s decision resulted in impunity. 30 .     By a judgment of 3   April 2019 (no. 2015/14363), the Constitutional Court found the application admissible. It stated that the application was not manifestly ill ‑ founded because, although there was no medical report, the trial court had considered the video footage and photographs of the incident as evidence for the offence of intentional bodily harm. The application was not inadmissible on any other grounds either. 31 .     Regarding the substantive aspect, the Constitutional Court, reiterating the principles established in both the Court’s and its own case-law, stated that any use of force, when not strictly necessary, would violate the prohibition of ill-treatment. It considered that, in the present case, in the absence of any finding that the applicant had physically assaulted the police officers or acted in an aggressive manner, the use of tear gas had been clearly unnecessary. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court sought to determine whether the contested act had been proportionate. It noted that, although medical reports were an important factor in determining proportionality, the applicant had failed to obtain one after the incident and had opposed the Criminal Court’s attempts to obtain one for her during the criminal proceedings against F.Z. She had also failed to file a criminal complaint after the incident, and the public prosecutor had to make considerable efforts to take her statement. Accordingly, the Constitutional Court noted that it was not able to reach a conclusion regarding the proportionality of the act, due to the applicant’s lack of diligence in pursuing her complaint. 32 .     As to the procedural aspect, the Constitutional Court stated that the State had a positive obligation to impose sanctions that were proportionate to the acts concerned and to provide the victim with appropriate redress. After listing the various steps taken by the public prosecutor and the Criminal Court, it assessed whether the punishment imposed on F.Z. had been proportionate to the act in question and had had a deterrent effect. The pronouncement of a judgment could be suspended on the condition that the suspect’s behaviour convinced the domestic court that he or she would not reoffend. In cases where ill-treatment by security forces had been established, both the Court and the Constitutional Court had previously found that decisions to suspend the pronouncement of the judgment were not sufficiently deterrent. For that reason, the likelihood that the suspect would reoffend had to be assessed diligently and in a manner that prioritised the deterrent effect of the punishment. 33 .     However, the Constitutional Court noted that suspending the pronouncement of the judgment could not, in itself, be considered to render the punishment wholly ineffective. In determining whether the punishment had been proportionate, it took into account the nature, the duration and the severity of the act   – factors that had been established by the video footage in the present case   – and the effect the act had had on the victim’s health. Despite the applicant’s failure to pursue her complaint effectively, the judicial authorities had initiated an investigation promptly and of their own motion, had tried to collect all relevant evidence, and had imposed a sentence on F.Z. By imposing a sentence which had been harsher than the minimum sanction provided for by law, the authorities had demonstrated that they did not tolerate such acts. There was nothing to show that F.Z. had not complied with the measure requiring him to plant and tend to trees. He had also received the disciplinary sanction of a warning for the act in question. The punishment had been deterrent and proportionate to the contested act. All in all, the judicial proceedings regarding the ill ‑ treatment resulting from the unnecessary use of force had been carried out, and the police officer in question had received a proportionate sanction, thus remedying the harm caused to the applicant. 34.     The Constitutional Court concluded therefore that there had been no violation of Article   17 of the Constitution pertaining to the prohibition of ill-treatment, under either its substantive or its procedural aspect. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS 35 .     On 25   May 2023 the Istanbul Criminal Court found that F.Z. had not committed an intentional offence within the five years following its decision of 10   June 2015 (see paragraph   19 above), and accordingly cancelled that decision entirely. 36 .     In the criminal proceedings against F.Z.’s superiors, on 26   May 2023 the Istanbul Criminal Court acquitted M.Z.B. of the charges against him, finding that there was no credible evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt that he had instructed F.Z. to use tear gas during the incident in question. At the relevant time, the proceedings against R.E. were still pending as he could not be brought before the trial court. 37 .     By a decision of 15   December 2023, the Criminal Court discontinued the proceedings against R.E., because the statutory time-limit of eight years for the offences of abuse of duty and use of force in excess of the authorised limits had elapsed. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW 38.     The relevant domestic law in respect of the use of force by the police and the Rapid Response Force, as well as the use of tear-gas weapons and munitions, has been summarised in Abdullah Yaşa and Others v.   Turkey (no.   44827/08, §§   23-28, 16   July 2013) and Geylani and Others v.   Türkiye (no.   10443/12, §§   43-44, 12   September 2023). 39.     In particular, under section   16 of Law no.   2559 on the Duties and Powers of the Police, when faced with resistance in the performance of their duties, the police may use force for the purpose of, and to the extent necessary for, breaking down such resistance. The use of force means recourse to physical and material force and weaponry in order to immobilise those resisting the police, in a gradual manner depending on the nature and degree of resistance. The term “material force” is defined as including, inter alia , handcuffs, truncheons, pressurised water and tear gas. A warning is required before using force; however, depending on the nature and degree of resistance, it may also be possible to use force without any warning. The police determine the equipment and the degree of force to be used. Where the action is taken against a group, that determination is made by the supervisor of the intervening unit (ibid., §   43). 40.     The relevant sections of the Directive on the use of tear-gas weapons and munitions, which was issued in February 2008, read as follows: “(2)     Instructions for the use of tear-gas weapons and munitions (i)     Tear-gas weapons and munitions must not be used for purposes other than those specified in the rules or before the necessary measures (such as ensuring the presence of medical personnel) have been taken; (ii)     Prior to the use of tear gas, the crowd must be audibly warned that in the event of non-dispersal, use will be made of such gas; (iii)     The gas shall be used in accordance with tactics and dosages determined by the head of the tear-gas intervention team following an assessment of the situation by the latter; (iv)     Units which lack suitably trained personnel may not apply for tear-gas supplies; (v)     In order to increase the effectiveness of the tear-gas canisters, regard must be had to wind direction and speed, and also to air temperature and other meteorological factors; (vi)     Tear-gas dosage may be increased in a gradual manner in proportion to the characteristics and degree of resistance of the crowd or individual [in question]; (vii)     No tear-gas projectile may be launched directly at a human body; (viii)     The upper and lower lids of the gas filters ... may not be opened and filters may not be placed on the gasmasks unless so ordered; (ix)     Gas sprays may be used in a gradual manner in proportion to the degree of resistance; they should not be used from a distance of under 1   metre; (x)     Tear gas must never be used against persons who have ceased to put up resistance or show aggression; (xi)     Personnel called upon to use munitions [of this type] shall be instructed in their use and informed of the warnings issued by their manufacturers.” 41.     Article   86 of the Criminal Code (Law no.   5237), in so far as relevant, reads as follows: “(1)     Any person who intentionally causes another person physical pain or who impairs another person’s health or ability to see or hear shall be sentenced to a penalty of imprisonment for a term of one to three years. (2)     Where the effect of intentional harm to a person is minor and can be treated by simple medical care, a penalty of imprisonment for a term of four months to one year or a judicial fine shall be imposed following a complaint by the victim ...” 42.     Article   231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Law no.   5271), in so far as relevant at the time, read: “(5)     If the accused has been ordered to pay a fine or sentenced to imprisonment for a period of less than two years, the court may decide to suspend the pronouncement of the judgment   ... The suspension of the pronouncement of the judgment means that the judgment shall not bear any legal consequences for the accused. (6)     A decision to suspend the pronouncement of a judgment may be issued provided that: (a)     the accused has never been found guilty of an intentional offence; (b)     the court is convinced, taking into account the personal traits of the accused and his behaviour during the proceedings, that there is little risk of any further offence being committed; [and] (c)     the damage caused to the victim or to society is redressed by way of restitution or compensation. The pronouncement of the judgment may be suspended only if the accused does not object to it. ... (8)     If the pronouncement of the judgment is suspended, the accused shall be kept under supervision for the following five years. ... During that period ... a probationary obligation may be [imposed on] the accused ... ... (10)     If the accused does not commit another intentional offence and abides by the obligations of the supervision order, the judgment [whose] pronouncement has been suspended shall be cancelled and the case discontinued. (11)     If the accused commits another intentional offence or acts in violation of the obligations of the supervision order within the supervision period, the court shall pronounce the sentence. Nevertheless, the court may evaluate the situation of the accused ... and may decide that   ... up to half of the total sentence shall not be executed. If the conditions so permit, the court may also suspend the execution of [any] imprisonment or commute it to other optional measures. (12)     An objection to the decision to suspend the pronouncement of the judgment may be lodged.” 43 .     The relevant parts of the Police Disciplinary Regulations at the time read as follows: Article   2 – Disciplinary sanctions “... (1)     A warning is a written notification to a civil servant that he or she needs to act more carefully in his or her duties. (2)     A reprimand is a written notification to a civil servant that he or she is considered at fault in his or her duties or behaviour. ...” Article   3 – Warning “Behaviours and actions that warrant the sanction of a warning are as follows: (1)     keeping weapons, equipment, clothing and attire dirty, and not paying attention to the cleanliness of the workplace; (2)     failing to shave one’s beard on a daily basis in the absence of a compelling reason.” Article   4 – Reprimand “Behaviours and actions that warrant the sanction of a reprimand are as follows: (1)     engaging in prohibited behaviours or actions either on or off duty; ...” Article   15 – Imposition of a lighter sanction “A sanction one degree lighter than that indicated in these Regulations may be imposed on civil servants who had a history of good services and a clean employment record prior to the decision.” RELEVANT PRACTICE OF THE DOMESTIC COURTS Decisions of the administrative courts regarding compensation claims arising from unnecessary use of force 44 .     The Government referred to sixteen separate administrative court judgments concerning injuries sustained by the claimants during the police intervention as part of the Gezi Park events. In all of those judgments, the administrative courts had awarded the claimants compensation in respect of pecuniary and/or non ‑ pecuniary damage. In doing so, they had found a causal link between the injuries in question and the force used by the security forces, which they had considered either unnecessary or wholly disproportionate. They had concluded that the security forces’ acts had constituted a fault on the part of the authorities in the provision of a public service (“service fault” – hizmet kusuru ), which had required the payment of compensation. Relevant case-law of the Constitutional Court 45 .     The applicant referred to three judgments delivered by the Constitutional Court in 2019 and 2020 concerning allegations of ill ‑ treatment by the security forces during the Gezi Park events. In those judgments, the Constitutional Court stated that the remedy to be used in cases concerning allegations of wilful ill-treatment by State agents was the criminal remedy. 46 .     In the case of Ender Ergün (no.   2016/1849), the applicant complained of a violation of the prohibition of ill-treatment on account of the injuries caused to him both by the security forces’ use of plastic bullets and by a third person, and argued that the security forces had used unnecessary force and had intentionally refrained from preventing attacks by third persons. The public prosecutor had decided not to prosecute the police officers in question and the Istanbul Administrative Court had dismissed the applicant’s action for a full remedy. In finding a violation of both the substantive and procedural aspects of the prohibition of ill ‑ treatment, the Constitutional Court stated that, when an individual had an arguable claim that he or she had been subjected to ill-treatment by a State official, the State had a positive obligation to initiate a criminal investigation which would allow for the identification and punishment of those responsible. 47.     In the case of Davut Yıldız (no.   2017/39073), which concerned a severe injury to the applicant allegedly caused by a tear-gas grenade and the effectiveness of the ensuing criminal investigation and administrative proceedings, the Constitutional Court found a violation of the procedural aspect of the prohibition of ill-treatment. In assessing the admissibility of the case, the Constitutional Court noted that the remedy to be used in cases concerning ill-treatment on account of the use of force by the security forces was the criminal remedy, because it was the only remedy in which evidence could be gathered to identify those responsible and punish them if necessary. An action for a full remedy before the administrative courts could only be considered a secondary remedy to obtain compensation for damage arising from the incident in question. 48 .     In its inadmissibility decision in the case of Ahmet   Cihan (no.   2017/23740), in which the applicant had lodged an individual application with the Constitutional Court following the end of the proceedings before the Istanbul Administrative Court in 2017, the Constitutional Court rejected his complaint regarding certain State officials as being out of time, finding that he should have lodged his application within thirty days of the end of the criminal investigation against those officials in 2014. It stated that in cases concerning ill-treatment, on account of the use of force by State agents, the only effective remedy was the criminal remedy. An action for a full remedy was not effective in that context. THE LAW         ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE   3 OF THE CONVENTION 49.     The applicant complained that she had been subjected to ill ‑ treatment as a result of an unnecessary use of force and that the State authorities’ failure to punish those responsible had resulted in impunity. She relied on Articles   3 and 13 of the Convention. The Court considers that the applicant’s complaints should be examined only from the standpoint of Article   3 of the Convention, which reads: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” Admissibility Exhaustion of domestic remedies (a)    Compensatory remedy before the administrative courts (i)       The parties’ submissions 50.     The Government argued that the applicant had not exhausted the available domestic remedies, because she had failed to bring an action for a full remedy and to seek compensation before the administrative courts. They pointed out that they were aware of the Court’s case-law indicating that the domestic remedy to be used with regard to complaints of ill ‑ treatment was, in principle, a criminal investigation. However, in the circumstances of the present case, an action for a full remedy before the administrative courts was the remedy to be used. This was because such an action also allowed for a finding of a service fault, through an assessment of the adequacy of the regulatory framework and of the training and supervision of public officials. In the present case, the domestic judicial authorities had found that, in addition to F.Z., his superiors might also have been responsible for the incident, because they had caused disorder by their failure to use their authority as required. Accordingly, the administrative courts would have been better suited to assess the officers’ failures in their duties and to provide appropriate compensation to the applicant. In that regard, the Government presented several administrative court judgments, in which claimants complaining of the bodily harm caused to them during the Gezi Park events had been awarded compensation in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage (see paragraph   44 above). 51.     The applicant referred to the Court’s case-law, according to which the obligations of the State under Article   3 could not be satisfied merely by awarding damages. She maintained that she was not required to embark on an attempt to obtain compensatory redress. Moreover, she argued that the administrative court judgments submitted by the Government did not show that that remedy could be regarded as effective per   se . Lastly, she submitted several decisions given by the Constitutional Court, which found that the criminal remedy was the only effective remedy in cases regarding allegations of ill ‑ treatment (see paragraphs 45-48 above). (ii)     The Court’s assessment 52.     The Court reiterates that, when domestic courts have examined the substance of an applicant’s complaint and reached a decision which has not subsequently been overturned by a higher court on procedural grounds, the applicant cannot be said to have failed to exhaust domestic remedies (see Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v.   Switzerland (no.   2) [GC], no.   32772/02, §§   43-45, ECHR   2009, in which the Federal Court ruled on the merits of the case despite the fact that the applicant barely satisfied the requirements for an application for review; Voggenreiter v.   Germany (dec.), no.   47169/99, 28   November 2002, in which the appellate court examined the merits of an appeal even though it considered it inadmissible; and Vladimir Romanov v.   Russia , no.   41461/02, §   52, 24   July 2008, with further references, in which the competent authority examined the substance of the claim in spite of the applicant’s failure to observe the forms prescribed by law). 53.     This principle is all the more applicable in the present case, since the Constitutional Court not only examined the applicant’s complaint on the merits, finding no violation of the prohibition of ill-treatment, but also clearly assessed the admissibility conditions and stated that her individual application was not inadmissible on any grounds, thereby ruling out any failure by the applicant to exhaust domestic remedies (see paragraph   30 above). The Court notes that the approach adopted by the Constitutional Court in the present case was in line with its case-law, according to which, in cases regarding allegations of ill ‑ treatment by State officials, the appropriate remedy is a criminal one, while an action for a full remedy was either ineffective or merely of a secondary nature in that context (see paragraphs   46-48 above as regards the Constitutional Court’s case-law; see also, Karayiğit v.   Turkey   (dec.), no.   63181/00, 5 October 2004, with regard to the Court’s own case-law). 54.     In that regard, the Court also reiterates that in cases of wilful ill-treatment the breach of Article   3 cannot be remedied only by an award of compensation to the victim. This is so because, if the authorities could confine their reaction to incidents of wilful ill-treatment by State agents to the mere payment of compensation, while not doing enough to prosecute and punish those responsible, it would be possible in some cases for agents of the State to abuse the rights of those within their control with virtual impunity, and the general legal prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, despite its fundamental importance, would be ineffective in practice ( see Gäfgen v.   Germany [GC], no.   22978/05, §§   116 and 119, ECHR   2010, and Jeronovičs v.   Latvia [GC], no.   44898/10, §   105, 5   July 2016). 55.     The Court has previously held that a civil action is not capable, without the benefit of the conclusions of a criminal investigation, of making any findings as to the identity of the perpetrators, much less of establishing their responsibility. Awarding damages in civil proceedings could only complement by way of redress the results of a thorough and effective investigation capable of leading to the punishment of those responsible (see Đurđević v.   Croatia , no.   52442/09, §§   65-67, ECHR   2011 (extracts), and Cestaro v. Italy , no. 6884/11, § 231, 7 April 2015). 56.     In the present case, it is not in dispute between the parties that the criminal remedy was used. The force used on the applicant by the police was assessed in two separate sets of criminal proceedings: one against the main perpetrator, F.Z., who was eventually found guilty of intentional bodily harm; and the other against his superiors, who had been accused of abuse of duty and use of force in excess of the authorised limits. 57.     The Government submitted that, in the circumstances of the present case, the administrative courts could have examined whether there had been a service fault through an assessment of the adequacy of the regulatory framework and of the training and supervision of public officials, and could have established the officers’ failures in their duties, which would have provided the applicant with an opportunity to obtain compensation. In that regard, the Court takes account of the administrative courts’ decisions to award compensation in respect of pecuniary and non ‑ pecuniary damage to people affected by unlawful use of force during the Gezi Park events (see paragraph   44 above), and accepts that it was open to the applicant to bring an action for a full