CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 26 mars 2026

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SWEDEN (Application no. 32694/23)     JUDGMENT   Art 3 • Expulsion • Deportation of Afghan national of Hazara ethnicity to Afghanistan would entail violation of Art   3 • Serious general security and human rights situation in Afghanistan following the Taliban takeover in 2021 not sufficient to conclude that any removal thereto would necessarily breach Art   3 • Situation of Hazaras, albeit dire, not such as to consider them a group systematically exposed to ill-treatment attaining the level of Art   3 • Existence of individual risk-enhancing factors including applicant’s ethnicity, area of origin to which he would be returned, long stay in Sweden, “westernisation”, and behaviour perceived as transgressing religious and moral norms in Afghanistan • Lack of a cumulative risk assessment in the relevant domestic decisions • Real risk of ill-treatment based on the cumulative effect of the applicant’s personal circumstances in the light of the general human rights situation and that of Hazaras in Afghanistan   Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.   STRASBOURG 26 March 2026   This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.   In the case of D.M. v. Sweden, The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Ivana Jelić , President ,   Erik Wennerström,   Raffaele Sabato,   Davor Derenčinović,   Alain Chablais,   Artūrs Kučs,   Anna Adamska-Gallant , judges , and Ilse Freiwirth, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   32694/23) against the Kingdom of Sweden lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Afghan national, Mr D.M. (“the applicant”), on 16 August 2023; the decision to give notice to the Swedish Government (“the Government”) of the application; the decision not to have the applicant’s name disclosed; the decision to give priority to the application (Rule 41 of the Rules of Court); the decision to indicate an interim measure to the respondent Government under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and the fact that this interim measure has been complied with; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 3 March 2026, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The case concerns the applicant’s removal order from Sweden to Afghanistan following his unsuccessful applications for asylum. He complained that his removal would be in breach of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention and that the domestic proceedings had not complied with the standards required under those Articles, taken alone or in conjunction with Article 13 of the Convention. THE FACTS 2.     The applicant was represented by Mr D. Öberg Loveday, a lawyer practising in Berlin, Germany. 3.     The Government were represented by their Agents, Mr V. Hagstedt and Ms L. Helgeby, both of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 4.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.         Asylum application and initial proceedings 5.     On 16 October 2015 the applicant applied for asylum in Sweden. Two days later the Migration Agency ( Migrationsverket ) held an introductory interview with him in the presence of an interpreter. The applicant stated, inter alia , that he was from Mazar-e Sharif in Afghanistan, where he had lived with his older sister, that his parents were dead, and that he was 16 and a half   years old. His date of birth was registered as 16   April 1999 – he was thus treated as an unaccompanied minor and appointed a legal guardian ( god man för ensamkommande barn ) and a legal representative ( offentligt biträde ). 6.     Since the applicant had previously been registered as an asylum seeker in Germany, proceedings were initiated regarding a possible transfer in accordance with the provisions in the Dublin Regulation (Regulation (EU) No.   604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26   June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third‑country national or a stateless person (recast), OJ 2013, L 180, p. 31). It followed from information provided by the German authorities that in Germany the applicant had been registered under a different name than the one he had given in Sweden and with a different date of birth, namely 1 January 1993. 7.     On 26 April 2016, following an age assessment interview with the applicant and receipt of written submissions from the applicant’s legal representative, the Migration Agency decided to reject the applicant’s asylum application and transfer him to Germany in accordance with the Dublin Regulation. It considered that he had failed to provide an acceptable explanation as to why he had been registered as an adult and under a different name by the German authorities and that his statement during the age assessment interview had also been lacking in other aspects. Moreover, he had declined to undergo a medical age assessment and had no identity documents. In an overall assessment the Migration Agency considered that there were no reasons to question the date of birth which had been registered in Germany and that the applicant had not established as probable ( gjort sannolikt ) that he was a minor. His date of birth was therefore re-registered as 1 January 1993, meaning that he was considered an adult in Sweden. Consequently, and in view of the other circumstances of the case, the Migration Agency found no reasons not to apply the Dublin Regulation. 8.     The applicant appealed against that decision. While his appeal was pending the time-limit for the transfer to Germany expired. The Migration Court quashed the Migration Agency’s decision on that ground and returned the applicant’s asylum application to the Migration Agency for further processing, without adjudicating the dispute about the applicant’s age.       First set of asylum proceedings    The Migration Agency 9.     On 31 January 2017 the Migration Agency held an asylum interview with the applicant. Two supplementary interviews were held on 8 June 2017 and 13 September 2017. The applicant’s State appointed legal representative and interpreters were present during all three interviews. The minutes from the interviews were sent to the applicant’s legal representative for review and the legal representative subsequently made written submissions. 10.     In support of his asylum application the applicant essentially submitted that he would be at risk of being killed in Afghanistan owing to a land dispute and his participation in a demonstration, and that he would be at risk of persecution there because of his conversion to Christianity. 11.     On 26 October 2017 the Migration Agency dismissed the applicant’s request for asylum and ordered his deportation to Afghanistan. 12.     It found, at the outset, that he had not established as probable his identity, including the age he claimed to be. The Migration Agency, among other things, remarked that he had provided the German authorities with a different name and date of birth than the ones he had provided in Sweden and considered that he had not given an acceptable explanation for that. Moreover, he had not been able to provide sufficient information during his age assessment interview and he had declined to undergo a medical age assessment. The Migration Agency considered that he had deliberately tried to mislead the Swedish authorities concerning his identity, which also affected his general credibility. 13.     Nevertheless, it found that he had established as probable that he was an Afghan national, though he had not established any place of residence as probable. The Agency therefore assessed his case in relation to all of Afghanistan. 14 .     As to the applicant’s conversion to Christianity, the Migration Agency noted that he had submitted a certificate showing that he had been baptised on 10 August 2016 and thus did not question that he had been baptised or that he attended church. However, it held that the submitted documents did not show that he had converted based on a genuine conviction. 15.     The Migration Agency assessed the statements he made during the asylum interviews regarding his conversion and his faith as being vague, lacking in detail and inconsistent. It further noted that he had stated that his sister and one other person in his area of origin knew about his conversion and that he had stated that he had spread information about Christianity on Facebook. However, it found that there were reasons to doubt whether anyone in Afghanistan knew about his conversion. Even if two people knew that he had visited a church there was no indication that that information had been spread in Afghanistan. Nor was there any indication that his post on Facebook would be spread in Afghanistan, and it was uncertain that it could even be tied to him since he had not established as probable his identity. The Migration Agency also noted that in Afghanistan he had lived as a Muslim, regularly gone to the mosque and observed Muslim holidays. 16 .     It concluded that he had not submitted a reliable account of having converted based on a genuine religious conviction, or of his intention to live as a Christian in Afghanistan. Nor had he submitted a reliable account of his having been attributed a dissenting religious belief in Afghanistan. He was thus not considered to have established as probable that he risked treatment warranting protection in Afghanistan on those grounds. 17.     As to the land dispute, the Migration Agency noted that the applicant had claimed that the provincial leader had required all Hazaras to pay a sum of money per acre of land that they owned, but that no one had lost their land, and that nothing had happened to the applicant personally on account of that. Furthermore, the information the applicant had provided about his alleged participation in a demonstration had been vague, lacking in detail and inconsistent, and certain statements had been based on speculation and second-hand information. In an overall assessment, the Migration Agency did not consider that the applicant had provided reliable information about being at risk on account of a land dispute or for participating in a demonstration should he return to Afghanistan. 18.     Furthermore, it noted that the applicant was of Hazara origin but that it had not emerged that he had been subjected to discrimination or persecution such that he could be considered a refugee. He had lived in an area mostly inhabited by Hazaras, had attended school and had been able to work. 19.     Lastly, the Migration Agency assessed the general security situation in Afghanistan and noted that in, for example, Kabul, Herat and Balkh (Mazar-e Sharif) there was an ongoing armed conflict. However, the situation in those three provinces was not so serious that everyone risked ill-treatment upon return there and the applicant had not established as probable that he faced any individual risks. There were international airports in Mazar-e Sharif and Kabul, and he could settle in one of those provinces. 20.     For those reasons the applicant was not deemed to be eligible for refugee status or for subsidiary protection. Moreover, the circumstances in his case were not considered to be exceptionally distressing within the meaning of Chapter 5, section 6, of the Aliens Act ( utlänningslagen , 2005:716). Thus, he was not entitled to a residence permit and his deportation was ordered.    The Migration Court 21 .     The applicant appealed against the Migration Agency’s decision to the Luleå Migration Court ( Migrationsdomstolen vid Förvaltningsrätten i   Luleå ). The applicant and the Migration Agency made written submissions and the court held an oral hearing. The applicant essentially reiterated his grounds for asylum and made further submissions about the genuineness of his conversion to Christianity. The Migration Agency contested the appeal but conceded that the applicant had established as probable that Mazar-e Sharif had been his place of residence and that he could not be referred to an internal flight alternative in the event that the court found his submissions concerning the land dispute or conversion to be credible. 22.     On 14 March 2018 the Migration Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. 23 .     The court agreed with the Migration Agency that the applicant had not established his identity as probable, but that he had established as probable that he was from Mazar-e Sharif in Afghanistan. His need for protection was therefore to be assessed in relation to that area. 24.     The court found that the general situation in Mazar-e Sharif was not so serious that it, in itself, entitled the applicant to a residence permit in Sweden. 25.     It further found that although the situation for Hazaras in Afghanistan was difficult, the situation was not such that merely belonging to that group was sufficient for there to be a general need for protection. In view of that, and since the applicant had no individual grounds linked to his being Hazara, he could not be granted a residence permit on that basis. 26.     The court further emphasised that the applicant had given another identity when he had applied for asylum in Germany and had not provided an acceptable explanation for that, which had a negative impact on his general credibility. 27 .     As to the applicant’s conversion to Christianity, the court considered the written evidence provided by the applicant, the testimony of a pastor who had been heard as a witness at the applicant’s request and the applicant’s own statements. The court pointed out that the applicant had converted after having arrived in Sweden and that the question of credibility therefore warranted particular attention. It found that the applicant’s statements regarding his faith and his conversion were vague and general in nature. Parts of them appeared to be recitations of phrases learned by rote and his account was based primarily on social norms and a generally negative attitude towards Islam. In the court’s view it was remarkable that he had been unable to give an account on a deeper level of his choice to convert. He had also been unable to answer knowledge-based questions about Christianity in a satisfactory way. Overall, the applicant had not established as probable that his conversion to Christianity had been based on a genuine religious conviction. Therefore, he had also not established as probable that he intended to live as a Christian upon return. 28.     As to the risk that his conversion to Christianity might have become known in Afghanistan, the court noted that the applicant had stated that he had posted Christian messages on social media and told his sister about his conversion, which had resulted in her husband, who was a very religious man, threatening to kill the applicant for being an apostate. The court found that since the applicant had not established his identity, including the name he was using in Sweden, as probable, his activities on social media under that name did not establish that it was probable that he risked treatment warranting protection on that ground. Moreover, his claims regarding the alleged threat from his sister’s husband were based on hearsay and speculation and there were inconsistencies in his statements about the threat. In view of that, and of the fact that the court did not consider him credible in general, it concluded that he had not established as probable that he was at risk of treatment warranting protection owing to an attributed religious belief. 29.     Regarding the land dispute, the court noted that the applicant had stated that no one had taken the land during the four to five years that he had been away from Afghanistan. Considering that the community leaders had respected his ownership during his time abroad, the court concluded that they could not be considered to pose a threat to him upon return. His claims that his sister’s husband wanted to kill him and take over the land were not considered to be credible. Moreover, the court found that his statements regarding risks he faced owing to his having participated in a demonstration connected to the land dispute were not credible since, inter alia , he had given differing accounts of the demonstration and his involvement in it. 30.     In sum, the court found that the applicant had not established as probable that he had a well-founded fear of persecution in Afghanistan, or that there were substantial grounds to believe that he would risk being subjected to treatment and/or punishment warranting protection. The court also found that there were not any extraordinarily distressing circumstances in his case.    The Migration Court of Appeal 31.     On 17 May 2018 the Migration Court of Appeal ( Migrationsöverdomstolen ) denied the applicant leave to appeal.     Proceedings while the first deportation order was in force 32.     During the period from May 2018 until the end of 2020 the applicant made several requests to be granted a residence permit on the basis of impediments to the enforcement of the deportation order or to be granted a re-examination of his application for asylum, essentially relying on the same grounds as before, as well as on developments in the situation in Afghanistan and his adaptation to Swedish society. Those requests were all refused by the Migration Agency and the decisions upheld on appeal, essentially on the grounds that there were no new circumstances which constituted impediments to enforcement or grounds for granting a re ‑ examination. However, the applicant was granted a temporary residence permit valid from 30   October 2018 to 30 November 2019 for the purpose of studies at upper secondary level, pursuant to the Act on Temporary Restrictions on the Possibility of Obtaining a Residence Permit in Sweden ( lagen om tillfälliga begränsningar av möjligheten att få uppehållstillstånd i Sverige , 2016:752). His requests to extend that permit were subsequently refused. 33.     The applicant then lodged another application for a residence permit or a re-examination, which the Migration Agency refused on 9 July 2021, finding that there were no new circumstances constituting impediments to enforcement of the deportation order or grounds for granting him a re ‑ examination. On 24 August 2021 the Migration Court quashed that decision and referred the case back to the Migration Agency for further processing owing to developments in Afghanistan and a new legal position paper from the Migration Agency, dated 23 July 2021, which imposed a decision-making moratorium in cases concerning Afghanistan owing to the uncertain situation there. Subsequently, in June 2022, the case was struck out by the Migration Agency on the basis that the applicant’s deportation order had expired and was thus no longer in force (Chapter 12, section 22, of the Aliens Act, as in force at the relevant time).    Second set of asylum proceedings    The Migration Agency 34.     On 13 June 2022 the applicant applied afresh for asylum in Sweden. On 5 September 2022, the Migration Agency held an asylum interview with him, in the presence of his new State appointed legal representative and an interpreter. The minutes from the asylum investigation were communicated to the applicant’s legal representative for review. The legal representative subsequently made written submissions. 35.     The applicant reasserted the same grounds for protection as he had in his previous application, namely the land dispute, his participation in a demonstration, his conversion to Christianity and his Hazara ethnicity. In regard to his conversion he submitted, inter alia , that he had continued to attend church regularly, that his faith had deepened and that he had received threats on social media because of the messages he had spread there. He submitted various documents, including statements from members of his congregation, in support of his claims regarding his conversion. He also stated that he had, in any event, turned his back on Islam and that practicing Islam on his return to Afghanistan, as the Taliban would require, would be spiritually and practically impossible for him. In addition, he claimed that he risked being exposed to treatment warranting protection because the Taliban had taken power in Afghanistan and because he had become “westernised” during his time in Sweden. 36.     On 27 March 2023, the Migration Agency dismissed the applicant’s request for asylum and ordered his deportation to Afghanistan. 37 .     In the decision, while listing the evidence in the case, the Migration Agency noted that it had added the following country of origin information on Afghanistan to the case file: European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), Afghanistan – Security Situation, Country of Origin Information Report, August 2022 (pages 21 - 23 and 99-102) and EUAA, Afghanistan – Targeting of Individuals , Country of Origin Information Report, August 2022 (pages 41, 49-54 and 132-37). The Agency also listed several reports and articles which the applicant had added to the case file. 38 .     At the outset, the Migration Agency found that the applicant had still not established as probable his identity, even considering that he had submitted a document from his relatives in Sweden attesting to his identity. However, it found no reason to depart from the previous assessment that he was from Mazar-e Sharif and that his need for protection should be assessed in relation to the conditions there. 39.     Regarding the applicant’s claims related to a land dispute and participation in a demonstration, the Migration Agency found no reason to depart from the assessment made in the first asylum proceedings. 40 .     As to the applicant’s conversion to Christianity, it took note of the written evidence and stated that it found no reason to doubt that he had been baptised or that he participated in activities organised by the church in question. However, the written evidence was not sufficient, by itself, to establish as probable that his faith had deepened or that he had converted out of a genuine conviction. The Migration Agency went on to assess his oral statements in that regard and found that they had been vague, that he had been unable to account for his feelings and reflections regarding his faith and that his reasoning was mainly based on the difference between Afghan and Western society. Noting that a total of five oral interviews had been held with him, during which he had been given the opportunity to account for his religious beliefs, the Migration Agency found no reason to depart from the earlier assessment. It therefore concluded that he had not provided reliable information about having converted based on a genuine conviction or that he intended to live as a Christian in Afghanistan. 41.     Furthermore, the Migration Agency noted that he had claimed that he had been threatened because he had shared Christian messages and criticism of the Taliban on social media, but had not submitted any written evidence in support of that. Thus, he had not established as probable that he was at risk on account of this. 42 .     As to his claim that he risked persecution on account of his Hazara ethnicity, the Migration Agency noted that he had submitted several news articles concerning the situation of Hazaras in Afghanistan. However, those articles only concerned the general situation of Hazaras. They did not contain anything that could be connected to him personally. Moreover, there was no country information available to it which supported the contention that there was a general need for protection for Hazaras in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the applicant had not claimed to have been subjected to any particular ill ‑ treatment on the basis of his ethnicity. He had therefore not established as probable that he risked treatment warranting protection owing to his Hazara ethnicity. 43 .     As to the risks the applicant claimed he would face in Afghanistan related to his having adopted Western values and a Western way of life, and also the risk that particular political opinions would be ascribed to him on that basis, the Migration Agency considered that there was no available country information to support the idea that every single person who had stayed outside of Afghanistan and been influenced by the Western world risked persecution upon return. Furthermore, there were no concrete circumstances which indicated that the applicant risked being subjected to persecution or treatment warranting protection owing to his stay in Sweden. Moreover, the fact that he, after a relatively long stay in Sweden, had adapted to a Western way of life, was not among the fundamental, immutable characteristics which a person could not be expected to conceal. It was incumbent on him, upon his return, to adapt to the customs and practices of his country of origin. He had therefore not established as probable that he risked being attributed a political opinion upon return. 44.     Accordingly, the Migration Agency concluded that the applicant had not established as probable that he had a well-founded fear of persecution or that there would be a concrete and personal threat to him upon return to Afghanistan. 45 .     As to the general security situation in Afghanistan, the Migration Agency found that there was no indiscriminate violence of such a nature and extent in any province in Afghanistan that anyone, by their mere presence there, risked being exposed to treatment warranting protection. It held that the applicant could return to Afghanistan through the international airport in Kabul and from there make his way to Mazar-e Sharif. That route was considered to be safe. 46 .     In view of the above the Migration Agency concluded that the applicant was not a refugee or eligible for subsidiary protection. Moreover, the circumstances in his case were not considered to be exceptionally or particularly distressing within the meaning of Chapter 5, section 6, of the Aliens Act. In reaching the latter conclusion the Agency had regard, inter alia , to applicant’s state of health, his adaptation to Sweden and the situation in his home country, and found that even in a cumulative assessment he could not be granted a residence permit pursuant to that provision. Consequently, he was not entitled to a residence permit and his deportation was ordered.    The Migration Court 47.     The applicant appealed against the Migration Agency’s decision. He reiterated his arguments and emphasised, among other things, the risks he faced as a Hazara. He referred in that connection to additional country information, including the EUAA’s Country Guidance: Afghanistan , January 2023. He also emphasised the genuineness of his conversion, that he had lived as an actively practising Christian for many years and that he faced risks as an apostate and someone who had turned his back on Islam. He stated, inter alia , that he was not a Muslim, that he had views on Islam which were considered heretical, that he had not performed any Muslim rituals for many years and lacked knowledge of Muslim prayers and practices, and that the Taliban were fanatical extremists who demanded things that had never been a part of his life. He also, in regard to his “westernisation”, submitted, among other things, that he had adapted to Swedish society, that he had a Swedish education in the care sector, that he spoke Dari with a slight Swedish accent, dressed in a Western style and was cleanshaven. 48.     The applicant’s appeal was heard by the Stockholm Migration Court ( Migrationsdomstolen vid Förvaltningsrätten i Stockholm ), which held an oral hearing but refused the applicant’s request that it hear a pastor and members of his congregation as witnesses, instead permitting the applicant to submit written statements from them. 49.     On 29 May 2023 the court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. 50 .     It, at the outset, found that the case had been investigated to the extent required, and that there were no deficiencies in the proceedings before the Migration Agency which warranted returning the case to it, as had been requested by the applicant. The court also agreed with the Migration Agency’s assessment regarding the applicant’s identity and place of origin. His case was therefore assessed based on the conditions in Mazar ‑ e Sharif in Afghanistan. It further found that the general situation in Afghanistan and in the applicant’s home province was not so serious that it, in and of itself, conferred a right to a residence permit based on protection needs. Therefore, his individual grounds had to be assessed. 51.     Regarding the applicant’s argument that he was in need of protection owing to a land dispute and his participation in a demonstration, the Migration Court found no reason to depart from the previous assessments. Thus, it concluded that he did not risk treatment warranting protection on those grounds. 52 .     As to the applicant’s conversion to Christianity, the court noted that that had been assessed previously and that the Luleå Migration Court at that time had found that the applicant had not established as probable that he had converted out of a genuine and personal religious conviction and that it had also not been established as probable that he risked being attributed Christian faith in Afghanistan. The court took note of the certificates and other documents that the applicant had submitted and stated that it did not doubt that he was baptised or that he was perceived as Christian by those who had written the certificates. However, that could not, on its own, establish as probable that his activities were based on a genuine and personal religious conviction. Having regard to the applicant’s statements at the oral hearing, the court found that his account of his conversion lacked personal considerations and deeper reflections. He had not been able to give a detailed account of his inner process of conversion and his description of Islam was so lacking in nuance that he appeared more to be critical of Afghan society than to have a genuine Christian conviction. His account of his Christian faith was also lacking in detail and of a general nature, and he had been unable to say when Pentecost falls. Considering that he claimed to have been active in the Pentecostal Church for seven years he could be expected to have acquired more knowledge and a deeper faith. Furthermore, he had stated that he could not live as a Christian in Afghanistan since there were no churches or congregations there. That indicated that his engagement in the Church was based on an appreciation of the community of the Church rather than a genuine Christian conviction. Having regard to the above, and the other facts of the case, the court concluded that the applicant had not established as probable that he had apostatised from Islam or converted to Christianity based on a personal and genuine conviction. 53 .     The court went on to assess whether he risked being attributed the status of an apostate or a Christian convert upon return to Afghanistan. It noted that he was born and raised in Afghanistan and that he had not established as probable that he had apostatised from Islam or converted to Christianity based on a personal and genuine conviction. It was therefore not reliably established that upon his return he would be unable to behave in accordance with Muslim customs or that he would express opinions about Islam which would be considered heretical. Nor were there any other concrete circumstances which would support the contention that upon his return he would be attributed the status of an apostate or a Christian convert. Thus, there was nothing to support the conclusion that he risked treatment warranting protection on those grounds. Moreover, there was no indication that he needed protection owing to his being, or being perceived to be, a Shia Muslim. 54 .     Regarding the applicant’s claim that he was in need of protection on the basis of his ethnicity and his Western views and adaptation to Swedish society, the Migration Court stated that, according to the available country information, neither Hazaras nor persons perceived as “westernised” generally risked being subjected to treatment warranting protection upon return to Afghanistan. It further found that the applicant had not shown that he personally risked treatment warranting protection on these grounds. 55.     Lastly, the court agreed with the Migration Agency’s assessment that the circumstances of the case were not sufficient to be considered particularly or exceptionally distressing.    The Migration Court of Appeal 56.     On 16 August 2023 the Migration Court of Appeal denied the applicant leave to appeal.      Subsequent proceedings 57.     The applicant subsequently lodged an application with the Migration Agency, submitting that there were impediments to the enforcement of the deportation order . On 4 September 2023 the Migration Agency dismissed that application, essentially referring to the previous assessments and finding that there were no new circumstances which constituted impediments to enforcement or grounds for granting the applicant a re-examination. 58.     On 3 November 2023, further to a request by the applicant, the Court applied Rule 39 of the Rules of Court until further notice. Accordingly, the Migration Agency decided to stay the enforcement of the deportation order. 59.     The applicant subsequently submitted another application to the Migration Agency, referencing impediments to the enforcement of his deportation order. That application was dismissed. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE         Relevant domestic law and practice 60.     The basic provisions applicable in the present case, concerning the right of aliens to enter and remain in Sweden, are laid down in the Aliens Act ( utlänningslagen , 2005:716). 61.     An alien who is considered to be a refugee or a person eligible for subsidiary protection is, with certain exceptions, entitled to a residence permit in Sweden (Chapter 5, section 1, of the Act). The term “refugee” refers to an alien who is outside the country of his or her origin owing to a well ‑ founded fear of being persecuted on grounds of race, nationality, religious or political beliefs, or on grounds of gender, sexual orientation or other membership of a particular social group, and who is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country (Chapter   4, section   1). The term “person eligible for subsidiary protection” refers to an alien who does not qualify as a refugee but is outside the country of his or her origin because there are substantial grounds for believing ( grundad anledning att anta ) that, upon return to his or her country of origin, the alien would be at risk of being punished by the death penalty or subjected to corporal punishment, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or as a civilian would face a serious and personal risk of being harmed by reason of indiscriminate violence in connection with an external or internal armed conflict, and who is unable or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of his or her country of origin. (Chapter   4, section 2). The above applies irrespective of whether the persecution or ill ‑ treatment is at the hands of the authorities of the country or if those authorities cannot be expected to offer effective protection against such acts by private individuals. 62.     Moreover, if a residence permit cannot be granted on any other grounds, a residence permit may be issued in cases where an overall assessment of the alien’s situation reveals such exceptionally distressing ( synnerligen ömmande ) circumstances that he or she should be allowed to stay in Sweden. In making this assessment, particular attention is to be paid to the alien’s state of health, his or her adaptation to Sweden and the situation in his or her country of origin (Chapter 5, section 6). Pursuant to the version of this provision which was in force during the applicant’s second set of asylum proceedings, it was sufficient that the circumstances were particularly distressing ( särskilt ömmande ) if the alien was a child or an adult who had resided in Sweden with a residence permit and during that time had developed special ties to Sweden. 63 .     As regards the enforcement of a deportation or expulsion order, according to a special provision on impediments to enforcement, an alien must not be sent to a country where there are reasonable grounds for believing ( skälig anledning att anta ) that he or she would be in danger of being punished by the death penalty or subjected to corporal punishment, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Chapter 12, section 1). In addition, an alien must not, in principle, be sent to a country where he or she risks persecution (Chapter 12, section 2). 64.     Under certain conditions, an alien may be granted a residence permit even if a deportation or expulsion order has acquired legal force. This is the case when new circumstances have emerged which indicate ( innebär ) that there are impediments to enforcement of the nature referred to in Chapter   12, sections   1 or 2, or where there are medical or other special reasons why the order should not be enforced (Chapter 12, section 18). If a residence permit cannot be granted under those criteria, the Migration Agency may instead decide to re-examine the matter. Such re-examination is to be carried out where it may be assumed ( kan antas ), on the basis of new circumstances relied upon by the alien, that there are lasting impediments to enforcement of the nature referred to in Chapter 12, sections 1 and 2, and that these circumstances could not have been raised previously or the alien shows that he or she has a valid excuse for not having done so. Should the applicable conditions not have been met, the Migration Agency will decide not to grant re-examination (Chapter 12, section 19). 65.     As to the standard of proof in cases concerning requests for asylum, the Migration Court of Appeal has stated that when invoking refugee status or other grounds for protection, the asylum seeker must establish as probable ( göra sannolikt ) that they are in need of international protection. That includes establishing as probable their identity, including their name, age and nationality. However, the Migration Court of Appeal has also stated that the standard of proof cannot be set too high when it comes to claims of risk of persecution, as it is rarely possible to provide complete evidence that clearly demonstrates that such a risk exists. To the extent that the evidence is insufficient, the applicant’s account must therefore be accepted if it appears credible and probable. In this context, the Migration Court of Appeal has also referred to the principle of the “benefit of the doubt” as set out in the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (see, for example, the Migration Court of Appeal’s judgments in MIG 2007:12; MIG 2007:37; MIG 2010:6; MIG 2011:8; and MIG 2014:1).       Relevant European Union law and case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union 66.     Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted, OJ 2011 L 337, p. 9 (“the Qualification Directive”), applicable at the relevant time, regulates refugee status within the European Union legal order and makes provision for granting subsidiary protection status. 67.     Article   2(d) defines a refugee as a third-country national or a stateless person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group, is outside his or her country of origin and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country. 68.     Article   2(f) defines a person eligible for subsidiary protection as a third-country national or a stateless person in respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned would face a real risk of suffering serious harm if returned to his or her country of origin and who is unable, or,