CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITYCOM;ENG — 2 avril 2026

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(“the applicant company”), a commercial company incorporated under Slovenian law, with its registered office in Postojna, Slovenia, and which was represented by Mr   M. Ulčar, a lawyer practising in Ljubljana, Slovenia; the decision to give notice of the application to the Croatian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms   Š. Stažnik; the decision by the Slovenian Government not to exercise their right to intervene in the proceedings (Article   36 § 1 of the Convention); the parties’ observations; Having deliberated, decides as follows: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1.     The application concerns the confiscation of the applicant company’s vehicles in customs proceedings against a third party. Customs proceedings against the A. company 2.     The applicant company is a Slovenian company which had leased   31 of its vehicles to another Slovenian company for a period of one year in 2011 and 2012, which, in turn, leased the vehicles to a Croatian company, the A.   company. 3 .     In 2012 the Croatian customs authorities carried out a customs supervision on the premises of the A. company. They temporarily seized, among others, the 31 vehicles in question on suspicion that the A. company was in breach of customs regulations concerning the import of those vehicles. 4 .     By a decision of 21   December 2012, the Zagreb Customs Office ordered the A. company to pay, within ten days, the customs debt of 1,258,255.23   Croatian kunas (HRK – equivalent to 167,000 euros (EUR)) for having breached customs regulations. 5 .     Following the A. company’s failure to pay, the Zagreb Customs Office, by a decision of 24   January 2013, confiscated the vehicles in order to cover the debt. It relied on section 87 of the Customs Act, which authorised it to confiscate goods and to sell them if the outstanding customs debt was not paid or security for the payment was not provided. The decision became enforceable the following day. 6 .     The appeals lodged by the A. company against the above ‑ mentioned decisions were dismissed by the Ministry of Finance. Administrative proceedings for the return of the vehicles 7 .     According to the applicant company, it was not informed of the customs supervision, the seizure, or the confiscation of its vehicles but found out about it otherwise afterwards. In March 2013 it contacted the customs authorities of its own motion and offered to pay the customs debt in order to secure the return of the vehicles. Following instructions given by the Zagreb Customs Office, it paid the majority of the customs debt – HRK   1,110,168.11 (equivalent to EUR   147,345) – and requested the return of its vehicles. It relied on section 146 of the Administrative Procedure Act, in accordance with which enforcement had to be discontinued if, for example, the obligation had been fulfilled. 8 .     By a decision of 24   May 2013, the Zagreb Customs Office refused to return the vehicles, finding that the customs debt had been extinguished by the confiscation of the vehicles in January 2013, in accordance with section   230 of the Customs Act. It returned the money paid by the applicant company. 9.     That decision was upheld by the Ministry of Finance on 27   August   2013, noting that the issue of ownership of the vehicles was irrelevant to those proceedings, which concerned the relationship between the applicant company and the A. company. 10 .     The applicant company then brought an action for judicial review in the Zagreb Administrative Court, seeking the return of the vehicles, as their bona fide owner, arguing that it had been unaware that the A. company had committed a customs offence by importing them and that it could not have prevented the offence. It stressed that it was not challenging the lawfulness of the decision to confiscate the vehicles (see paragraph 5 above), but argued that, in dismissing its request for the return of the vehicles, the customs authorities had failed to balance the general interest and its property rights, especially in view of the fact that it had offered to pay the customs debt. 11 .     By a judgment of 24   February 2016, the court dismissed the applicant company’s action, noting that the proceedings at issue had not concerned the confiscation of the vehicles, but rather the question of whether, in the framework of those proceedings, the applicant company’s request to provide payment of the customs debt and to secure the return of the vehicles could be granted. Furthermore, it pointed out that the applicant company’s self ‑ standing request to have the vehicles returned was a property claim ( stvarnopravni zahtjev ), which fell outside the scope of the administrative proceedings. 12 .     On 18 May 2016 the High Administrative Court dismissed a subsequent appeal by the applicant company. 13.     On 17 September 2020 the Constitutional Court dismissed a subsequent constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant company. The decision was served on the applicant company’s representative on 26   October   2020. Complaints 14.     Before the Court, the applicant company complained, under Article   6 §   1 of the Convention and Article   1 of Protocol No.   1 thereto, that the Croatian authorities had failed to take into account the fact that it was the bona fide owner of the vehicles, that it had been unaware of the customs proceedings against the A. company, and that the State had kept the vehicles – worth several times more than the amount of the customs debt – rather than accepting its offer to pay the debt. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT Alleged violation of Article   1 of Protocol No.   1 to the Convention 15.     The Government argued that the applicant company had failed to properly exhaust domestic remedies, in that it had not brought a civil action against the State, seeking (i) to regain possession of the vehicles ( rei   vindicatio ) under section 161 of the Ownership and Other Rights In   Rem Act or, if that had no longer been possible, (ii) to obtain compensation as if the vehicles had been expropriated, under section 33 of the same Act. They submitted that the civil courts’ jurisdiction – unlike that of the administrative courts – extended beyond determining the lawfulness of the customs authorities’ decisions. The civil courts were required to carry out a proportionality test and would have therefore taken into account the applicant company’s argument that it had acted in good faith. 16.     The applicant company argued that the possibility of initiating civil proceedings would have had no prospect of success because the civil courts would have been bound by the administrative courts’ decisions finding that the actions of the customs authorities had been fully in line with domestic law. 17.     The Court observes that the applicant company did not challenge the lawfulness of the confiscation (see paragraph 10 above). Instead, once it had learned about it, it sought to avail itself of the possibility under domestic law to mitigate its loss by offering to pay the customs debt in order to secure the return of its vehicles. However, its request was made too late because the customs debt had already been extinguished by the confiscation order of 24   January 2013 which meant that there were no enforcement proceedings left to discontinue (see paragraphs 7-8 above). 18.     The applicant company challenged the customs authorities’ refusal to accept the belated payment and to return the vehicles in the administrative courts, arguing that, although the refusal had been lawful, it had been disproportionate (see paragraph 10 above). The administrative courts dismissed its action for judicial review because the customs authorities could no longer accept the payment of the customs debt, in so far as it had been extinguished. In any event, its request for the return of the vehicles was a property claim, which fell outside the jurisdiction of the administrative authorities (see paragraphs 11-12 above). 19.     In that regard, the Court notes that the Constitutional Court’s case ‑ law relied on by the Government (in particular, decision no.   U-III/36100/2009 of 4   November 2014) suggests that, unlike the administrative courts, the civil courts would be competent to examine the proportionality of the State’s refusal to return the vehicles after the applicant company had, albeit belatedly, offered to pay the customs debt. Moreover, the Zagreb Administrative Court, in its judgment of 24   February 2016 also indirectly referred to that avenue of redress (see paragraph 11 above). 20 .     In these specific circumstances, it cannot be excluded that, had the applicant company initiated a rei vindicatio claim or a compensation claim (in the event that the vehicles had been sold) in the civil courts on the basis of the argument that the State’s refusal to accept the belated payment and to return the vehicles had been disproportionate, such a claim would have had at least some prospect of success. The existence of that remedy being sufficiently certain and not being obviously futile, it was incumbent on the applicant company to exhaust it notwithstanding the existence of mere doubts as to the prospects of its success (see Vučković and Others v.   Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], nos. 17153/11 and 29 others, §§   71 and   74, 25   March 2014). 21.     That being so, and having regard to its case ‑ law (see, for example, Vučković and Others , cited above, § 77), the Court sees no reason that could exempt the applicant company from its obligation under Article   35 §   1 of the Convention to avail itself of that remedy. The Government’s objection regarding the exhaustion of domestic remedies must therefore be upheld. 22 .     It follows that this complaint is inadmissible under Article   35 §   1 of the Convention for non ‑ exhaustion of domestic remedies and must be rejected pursuant to Article   35 §   4. Alleged violation of Article   6 § 1 of the Convention 23.     The applicant company also complained of the lack of access to a court in that it had been unable to secure the return of its vehicles. 24.     The Court notes that, from its findings under Article   1 of Protocol   No.   1 to the Convention above (see paragraphs 20-22 above), it follows that the applicant company did have access to a court, as it had at its disposal a civil action whereby it could have either sought repossession of the vehicles or compensation for their retention, which it considered to be disproportionate. It would appear that in those proceedings the civil courts could have examined the proportionality of the retention of the vehicles after the applicant company had belatedly offered to pay the customs debt. 25.     It follows that this complaint is inadmissible under Article   35 §   3   (a) of the Convention as manifestly ill ‑ founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article   35 §   4. For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Declares the application inadmissible. Done in English and notified in writing on 7 May 2026.     Liv Tigerstedt   Frédéric Krenc   Deputy Registrar   President