CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITYCOM;ENG — 30 avril 2026

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s2EF17D91 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sA43C3626 { width:28.35pt; font-family:Arial; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sD6845F38 { font-family:Arial; color:#0072bc } .s3AAE10DF { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s3CA22BA { font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .sB711C2B8 { width:34.45pt; text-indent:0pt; font-family:Arial; display:inline-block } .s9F46BEC9 { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt } .s2D9C6089 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s84651E4E { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:3pt; text-align:justify } .s7CB9076 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sC986E16F { font-family:Arial; color:#ffffff } .sB4BC8881 { width:33.89pt; font-family:Arial; display:inline-block } .s5CE24FBA { width:136.43pt; font-family:Arial; display:inline-block } .sF993D337 { width:25.88pt; font-family:Arial; display:inline-block } .sF78227B2 { width:156.43pt; font-family:Arial; display:inline-block }     FIFTH SECTION DECISION Application no. 1508/24 Manuela NOGALES DE LA MORENA against Spain   The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 30   April   2026 as a Committee composed of:   Kateřina Šimáčková , President ,   María Elósegui,   Gilberto Felici , judges , and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   1508/24) against the Kingdom of Spain lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 4 January 2024 by a Spanish national, Ms Manuela Nogales de La Morena (“the applicant”), who was born in 1951, lives in Colmenar Viejo and was represented by Mr   V.   Lafont Benzal, a lawyer practising in Madrid; the decision to give notice of the application to the Spanish Government (“the Government”), represented by José Antonio Jurado Ripoll, Co‑Agent; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated, decides as follows: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1.     The application concerns the applicant’s complaint under Article   1 of Protocol No.   1 to the Convention about the refusal to reverse the expropriation of plots of land in the Tres Cantos area of Madrid, which had belonged to her late parents and had been expropriated from them in 1970s. 2 .     The plots of land were subject to an urgent urban development plan ( Plan de Actuación Urbanística de Reforma Interior , “the ACTUR”), approved in 1971 by the Council of Ministers’ Decree 1321/1971 issued in compliance with Royal Legislative Decree 7/1970 (see paragraph   16 below) in respect of the Tres Cantos area. The ACTUR allowed for the expropriation of land to create integrated urban areas comprising housing, infrastructure and public spaces (as specified in the initial General Urban Development Plan of Tres Cantos, “the GDUP”). It was part of a project to build a new town to address Madrid’s housing shortage. That new town was planned to consist of two zones, one to the east and one to the west of a main road. 3.     The applicant’s parents owned plots of land in Sectors 2E and 3B of the East and West Zones, respectively. In the West Zone, 11,120 homes were planned. Pursuant to the expropriation order of 29   November 1971, the authorities expropriated about 149,572 m² of their land (later measured as 149,045 m²). The applicant’s parents received compensation for the land. They did not dispute the expropriation, or the amount paid to them. 4 .     The expropriated area was later integrated into planning framework for Tres Cantos through a series of successive plans. In 1971, a draft project plan for the new town was adopted, and between 1973 and 1980 several partial plans followed. The proposal for housing in Sector 3B of the West Zone obtained only initial approval in 1979 and never received a final approval. 5 .     Problems with earlier partial plans led to the approval of a unitary plan for the entire ACTUR Tres Cantos area in 1986 (“the 1986 GDUP”). It remained applicable until 2003 and distinguished between intensive facilities (mainly built-up spaces) and extensive facilities (predominantly open spaces). The 1986 GDUP reclassified Sector 3B as urban land, reduced residential density and designated much of the area as public open space; Sector   2E was designated as non-buildable space. 6 .     With the creation of the municipality in 1991 and the approval of the current GDUP in 2003, the land’s definitive zoning was set. Under the current 2003   GDUP, the expropriated land remained classified as urban land, located in Homogeneous Areas 6.2, 6.5 and 6.6 (West and East Zones). Areas 6.5 and 6.6 (including Sector 3B) in the West Zone were classified as open urban park. Area 6.2 (including Sector 2E) was designated for community sports facilities, with the objective to ensure the land’s viable use for sports. 7.     In 2018 the applicant, acting on behalf of an inheritance community ( comunidad hereditarian) composed of her two siblings and her, lodged a request with the Tres Cantos Town Council for the reversion of her late parents’ expropriated land, referring to section 54(1) of the Expropriation Act (see paragraph   15 below). 8.     As no reply was received within the statutory period, in 2019 she filed an appeal before the first-instance administrative court no.   32 of Madrid challenging the tacit refusal and claiming reversion. She argued that the causa expropiandi (legal justification for expropriation) was never fulfilled because no development had occurred on the expropriated land. She referred to the modification of the initial plans (see paragraphs   4-6 above), the topographical engineering expert report dated 2019 specifying the location and limits of her late parents’ properties, and a 2001 judgment of a Madrid court granting reversion in respect of an unrelated plot in Sector 3B. She argued that housing had been built only in the eastern area, whilst the Western Zone, including Sector 3B, has remained undeveloped rural land for over 50 years, and that physical condition of the Sectors 2E and 3B had remained unchanged since 1971. As the partial plan for housing construction in Sector 3B had never received a final approval (see paragraph   4 above), the authorities had failed to implement the initial ACTUR. The works carried out in the area were so minor and insignificant that they could not be considered as having transformed the land into an urban park. 9.     The first-instance court disallowed her action as time-barred. 10 .     Pursuant to the applicant’s appeal, on 21 December 2021 the High Court of Justice of Madrid quashed the lower court’s ruling and examined the merits of the request. The appellate court dismissed the claim for reversion, finding that the purpose of the expropriation had been met. In response to the applicant’s reference to the domestic judgment dated 2001 granting reversion, the appellate court cited another judgment of the same court refusing reversion of the land in the area; and applied the case-law of the Supreme Court (judgment of 25   September 2007, case no. STS 6054/2007 concerning reversion of land affected by the ACTUR) reiterating the settled approach that the assessment of whether the cause of expropriation had been met had to be made in relation to the overall urban development purpose of the project as a whole, rather than that of individual plots. The appellate court found that the successive urban‑planning measures over decades had transformed the land into the present‑day town of Tres Cantos. Relying on the municipal architect’s report, the court noted that a fully functioning urban area connected to Madrid had been created. It was equipped with housing, infrastructure, industries, parks, health centres, sports areas, and other public services. The appellate court emphasised that the Legislative Decree 7/1970 did not limit the causa expropriandi to the construction of housing but required the creation of integrated urban units including public facilities, green areas and services necessary for a town or neighbourhood. The initial project had been divided into two zones, to the east and to the west of the road. Regarding the West Zone (where, as the court acknowledged, no housing had been built), the court held that it had formed part of the city’s “urban land”, serving as parks, sports areas and other general systems supporting residential zones; and that the land in sector 2E of the East Zone was designated for community sports facilities (as per ordinances based on the current GDUP). Referring to reports by municipal council engineers, the court ruled that the improvement of natural paths, the demolition of unauthorised buildings, the construction of a bridge over a stream and the creation of a public car park and cycle lane constituted sufficient fulfilment of the expropriation cause. The municipality had therefore demonstrated the transformation of the land and the development of the area envisaged by the ACTUR. 11.       The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, arguing that the expropriated land had never been urbanised and still formed part of the general system of open public spaces, meaning the causa expropiandi had not been fulfilled. The 2007 Supreme Court’s case law cited by the appellate court regarding the fulfilment of the expropriation purpose could not apply where the land had never been physically transformed or incorporated into the urban fabric, but merely designated as open space. 12.     The applicant’s appeal on points of law and her further action for annulment were declared inadmissible on the Supreme Court on 19   October 2022 and 24   December 2022 respectively. On 5   September 2023 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s amparo appeal, based on the allegations of the breach of the rights to equality and effective judicial protection, inadmissible, for lack of constitutional relevance. 13.     According to the technical engineering expert report of 27   December 2023 prepared on the applicant’s request, the site’s physical condition remained unchanged from the 1971 ACTUR approval, it had remained a rural and disconnected area without integration or direct urban-road access, had no lighting and contained no paved interior roads, only unpaved tracks and livestock paths. 14.     Focusing mainly of her late parents’ former land in Sector 3B, the applicant complained under Article 1 of Protocol No.1 that her right to obtain the reversion had been unlawfully and unjustifiably refused. Relevant domestic law and practice 15 .     Under section 54 of the Compulsory Expropriation Act (1954), if the public work or service that justified the expropriation is not carried out, or if the public purpose later disappears, the former owner or heirs have the right to recover the property. 16 .     According to the preamble to Royal Legislative Decree no. 7/1970 on urgent urban development, the goal of the expropriation was to respond to the growing social demand for housing in major cities by way of creating integrated urban areas with mixed‑income housing. These areas should provide neighbourhoods with public facilities, services, and space for productive activities that generated employment. Under Article   1 of the Decree, The Council of Ministers could designate areas of action around Madrid and Barcelona, which were intended for urbanization, housing construction, productive activities, and the installation of public buildings and services. Under Article   3 of the Decree, the delimitation entailed the declaration of the project as being of public utility and social interest and set out the need for compulsory expropriation of the affected properties. 17 .     According to Article 29.1(e) of Royal Decree no.   2159/1978 of 23   June 1978 approving Planning Regulations under the Land Regime and Urban Planning Act, urban land should include open spaces and green areas intended for public parks and gardens, as well as public sports and recreation areas, and areas for future development (expansion areas), in an adequate proportion to the needs of the population and its socio-economic characteristics. 18 .     According to Constitutional Court judgment no.   141/2014 of 11   September 2014 (concerning review of a provision of the Consolidated Land Use Act of 2008 on reversion), the right of reversion is inextricably linked to the fulfilment of the cause of the expropriation. Reversion is not granted in urban‑development expropriations where the underlying public purpose (carrying out the urban plan) remains intact, even if later planning changes alter the specific use originally foreseen for the land. As long as the broader planning objective stands, the expropriation’s purpose has not failed. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT 19.     According to the Government, the applicant had failed to comply with the four-month time-limit because an amparo appeal procedure could not be used to seek constitutional protection of property rights, and the final domestic decision was therefore given by the Supreme Court in 2022. She had not exhausted domestic remedies, as she had neither sought compensation nor initiated patrimonial liability proceedings against the State. In any event, she lacked a “legitimate expectation”, as the causa expropiandi had been fulfilled, and the conditions for reversion were not met (the Government referred to the domestic court’s findings and technical reports from local authorities). The applicant’s Convention rights had not been violated at either the expropriation stage or when she requested reversion, since the public purpose had been achieved and no excessive burden had been imposed on her. 20.     The applicant argued that she had acted in good faith in exhausting domestic remedies, while only one domestic court had examined the merits of her claim. In her amparo appeal based on her right to effective judicial protection, she sought an order from the Constitutional Court directing the Supreme Court to admit and examine her case. She could not have sought compensation directly without first pursuing reversion proceedings. The purpose of the expropriation had not been fulfilled (she referred to Motais de Narbonne v. France , no. 48161/99, 2 July 2002), as the authorities had never developed the West Zone or integrated it into the new town. No new town had been built there, no urbanisation works had been carried out, and development had instead taken place to the north. Years after the expropriation, the authorities had reclassified the area as a park rather than a residential zone. The limited work carried out there had been too minor to transform the rough landscape into an urban park. 21.     The Court does not need to examine the objections pertaining to the alleged failure to comply with the four-month time-limit and to exhaust the domestic remedies, as the application is in any event inadmissible as follows. 22.     Any interference by a public authority with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions can only be justified if it serves a legitimate public interest. Because of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the national authorities are in principle better placed to decide what is “in the public interest”, and the margin of appreciation available to the legislature in implementing social and economic policies is a wide one, and the Court will respect the legislature’s judgment as to what is “in the public interest” unless that judgment is manifestly without reasonable foundation (see   Béláné Nagy v.   Hungary [GC], no. 53080/13, §   113, 13 December 2016; James and Others v.   the United Kingdom , 21 February 1986, § 46, Series A no. 98; and Domenech Aradilla and Rodríguez González v. Spain , nos. 32667/19 and 30807/20, §   86, 19 January 2023). Although the Convention does not impose such an obligation, national authorities can provide in the domestic law for a right to restitution of expropriated property and to attach to it the conditions they deem appropriate. Such a right may, in certain circumstances, constitute a property interest protected by the Convention (see Çiftçiler Joint Stock Company and Göksun v. Turkey (dec.), nos. 62323/09 and 64965/09, §§   80-81, 24   November 2020; see further, for an overview of cases concerning allegations that expropriated property had not been used for the public purpose underlying the expropriation, Özkazanç and Others v.   Türkiye (dec.), §   67, 11   June 2024, with further references). No “legitimate expectation” can be said to arise where there is a dispute as to the correct interpretation and application of domestic law and the applicant’s submissions are subsequently rejected by the national courts (see Kopecký v. Slovakia [GC], no.   44912/98, §   50, ECHR 2004-IX). 23.     In the present case, the land was expropriated from the applicant’s late parents for the purpose of creating integrated urban areas comprising housing, infrastructure and public spaces (see paragraph   2 above). The expropriation was not disputed by the applicant’s parents at that stage. Subsequent successive plans progressively oriented the impugned land toward open-space, recreational, environmental, and sports uses (see paragraphs   4-6 above). Domestic regulations require urban land to include public green areas, parks, and recreational or sports spaces proportionate to community needs (see paragraph   17 above). 24.     The Court considers that the situation of the applicant’s parents’ former land should not be examined in isolation, but rather in the context of all the other plots of land that were expropriated for the same purpose (see Özkazanç and Others (dec.), cited above, §   67). The domestic court took the same approach, also based on established domestic case law, when applying the provisions on the right of reversion (see paragraph   10 above; see further, for the case-law of the Constitutional Court, paragraph 18 above). The Court concurs with the appellate court’s view that, although housing had not been built on the plots, the expropriation objective had been achieved in relation to the impugned plots, as they had been assigned for use as part of the city’s urban land, which included parks, sports areas, and other facilities supporting residential zones. There is no reason to depart from the domestic court’s conclusion that the impugned land had been transformed in line with the ACTUR decree, and the criteria for granting reversion had not been met. These findings, based on expert assessments, are not arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable (see Sağlık İnşaat Turizm Sanayi Taahhüt ve Ticaret Ltd. Şti. v.   Turkey (dec.), no 55549/11, 7 April 2015). Therefore, it was not demonstrated that the applicant’s late parents’ former land which had been expropriated in the public interest was subsequently not used, or that the authorities acquired the land without a real intention of achieving its development objectives within a reasonable timeframe (see, by way of contrast, Motais de Narbonne , cited above, §   21-23; Keçecioğlu and Others v.   Turkey , no 37546/02, §§ 23-29, 8 April 2008; Karaman v.   Turkey , no.   6489/03, §   32, 15 January 2008, and Beneficio Cappella Paolini v. San Marino , no. 40786/98, §   33, ECHR 2004-VIII). 25.     Accordingly, the applicant could not legitimately expect the return of the disputed land, since the expropriated land had been allocated by the authorities to a public purpose within the meaning of Article   1 of Protocol   No.   1 to the Convention and, as demonstrated in the domestic proceedings, that purpose had been achieved (see Kısaer and Others v.   Turkey (dec.), no 56840/08, §§ 55-73, 12 May 2020, with further references). 26.     Therefore, the applicant did not have a claim which could be regarded as a “possession” within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 1 of Protocol No.   1 (see Özkazanç and Others (dec.), cited above, §§   72-74; and Bilici v. Turkey (dec.), no. 49025/06, §§ 30-31, 5 December 2017). 27.     It follows that the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention. For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Declares the application inadmissible. Done in English and notified in writing on 21 May 2026.     Martina Keller   Kateřina Šimáčková   Deputy Registrar   President