CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITYCOM;ENG — 30 avril 2026

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Kirakosyan, Representative of the Republic of Armenia on International Legal Matters, and to declare the remainder of application no.   34321/15 inadmissible; the parties’ observations; the withdrawal of Mr Vahe Grigoryan, the judge elected in respect of Armenia, from sitting in the case (Rule 28 § 3 of the Rules of Court); Having deliberated, decides as follows: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1.     The case concerns an alleged breach of the applicants’ right to freedom of expression, under Article 10 of the Convention, with regard to a court decision obliging them to disclose their journalistic sources. 2.     The applicants are a private company, Start Media Ltd (application no.   34286/15; “the first applicant”), which at the material time ran a web ‑ based media site, and another private company, Hraparak Oratert Ltd, which at the material time published a newspaper, and its journalist, Ms   Simonyan (application no. 34321/15; “the second applicant” and “the third applicant” respectively). 3.     In May 2014 the applicant companies each published an article in the media outlets run by them – the third applicant was the author of the newspaper’s article – implicating a regional police chief in acts of violence against two prominent athletes. 4.     Following those publications, on 30 May 2014 a criminal case was opened in respect of excess of authority by a public official. The investigator dealing with the case requested that the applicant companies disclose their sources, which they both refused to do. 5.     On 26 June 2014 the first-instance court, on an application lodged by the investigator, ordered that the media outlets run by the applicant companies disclose their respective sources, with reference to Articles 14, 41 and 279 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and section 5 § 2 of the Mass Media Act. The court noted that the legitimate aim of such disclosure was the protection of the rights and interests of others, in this case, the two athletes. It held that in the given case, the disclosure of journalistic sources was necessary since the authorities had exhausted all alternative measures to protect the public interest and that the legitimate interest of such disclosure outweighed the public interest in non-disclosure. In particular, the publications concerned an alleged incident between the regional police chief and two well-known athletes and only a comprehensive and objective examination of the criminal case could dissipate any doubts held by the public. 6.     That decision was upheld at higher levels of jurisdiction and the final court decision was served on the applicant companies on 27 December 2014. 7.     On an unspecified date the investigator requested both applicant companies to disclose their respective sources by reference to the final court order of 26   June 2014. 8.     The director of the first applicant company refused the request, pointing out that she had no duty to comply with it. Specifically, the court order in question had not been directed at the applicant company, but at the website outlet run by it, which had no legal personality. 9.     The second applicant company similarly declined the request, stating that, under its regulations, journalistic sources were preserved for only one year; however, more than one year had passed since the publication of the article in question. 10.     On 6 May 2015 the investigator in charge of the case decided to discontinue the criminal proceedings, as no evidence had been obtained substantiating the incident reported in the media outlets. 11.     On 1 April 2015 a criminal case was opened in respect of non ‑ compliance of the first applicant’s director with the final court decision of 26   June 2014. 12.     On 3 July 2015 a restriction on leaving the country was imposed on the director of the first applicant company. On 10 July 2015 she was charged with a criminal offence for her non-compliance with the final court decision of 26   June 2014. 13.     On 24 July 2015 criminal charges against the first applicant company’s director were dropped, essentially on the grounds that it had not been foreseeable for her from the relevant court decision that she had had a duty to comply with it. 14.     On 20 October 2015, on applications lodged by the applicant companies in June and July 2015, the Constitutional Court examined the constitutionality of section 5 § 2 of the Mass Media Act and Articles 14, 41 and 279 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Constitutional Court held that the domestic provisions in question were compatible with the Constitution. However, Articles 14, 41 and 279 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been interpreted inaccurately by the lower courts and were not applicable to the case, whereas section 5 § 2 of the Mass Media Act had been applied with an interpretation which was at variance with its constitutional meaning. In particular, the courts had placed the emphasis chiefly on the necessity of uncovering a grave or a particularly grave offence, without giving due consideration to the question whether the means employed had been proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. However, the public interest in the non-disclosure could be outweighed only where the disclosure was necessary for the protection of human life, the prevention of a grave crime or the ensuring of judicial protection of a person accused of a grave crime. The grounds for ordering the disclosure provided by the courts had thus failed to comply with the principles of legal certainty and proportionality. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT 15.     Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single decision. 16.     The Government argued that the applicants had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies because they had not sought a reopening of the proceedings after the favourable decision of the Constitutional Court. They raised several other objections regarding the admissibility of the case, in particular that the applicants had suffered no significant disadvantage; that the third applicant could not claim to a be a victim of a breach of Article   10; and that, in any event, there had been no interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression because the court order in question had never been enforced. 17.     Firstly, as regards the third applicant, the court’s decision of 26   June 2014 did not impose any obligation on her to disclose her source. Although she asserted that she had participated in the appeal court hearing, she failed to submit any evidence in that respect. Specifically, there is no evidence that she, for instance, requested the appeal court’s permission to take part in the proceedings as a third party (contrast Margulev v. Russia , no. 15449/09, §   36, 8   October 2019, and Khural and Zeynalov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2) , no.   383/12, §§   31-32, 19 January 2023). Nor does her name figure in the relevant decision of the appeal court naming the participants to the proceedings. Similarly, there is nothing in the case file to support her allegation that sources had stopped cooperating with her after the impugned decision of the first-instance court, or that she could not exercise her functions as a journalist because of the fear brought about by the criminal proceedings against the applicant companies. Lastly, she never disclosed her source. Therefore, the Government’s objection as regards the third applicant’s victim status is upheld. 18.     Before turning to the Government’s remaining preliminary objections, the Court must determine whether the applicant companies may still claim to be victims under Article 34 of the Convention, regard being had to the ruling of the Constitutional Court and the decision of the authorities to discontinue the criminal case for which they had been ordered to disclose their respective sources. Even though the Government have not raised an objection in that respect, it is a matter going to the Court’s jurisdiction, which it must examine of its own motion (compare Fedotova and Others v. Russia [GC], nos.   40792/10 and 2 others, § 88, 17 January 2023, with further references, and A and B v. Croatia , no. 7144/15, § 88, 20 June 2019). 19.     The Court refers to its general principles concerning victim status ( see Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], no. 38433/09, §§   81-82, ECHR   2012). 20.     While the Court has previously held that the constitutional remedy is generally not considered a domestic remedy to be exhausted on account of the specificities of the judicial role of the Armenian Constitutional Court (see Volodya Avetisyan v. Armenia , no. 39087/15, § 33, 3 May 2022), in the present case, the Constitutional Court addressed the substance of the applicant companies’ Convention grievances. The Constitutional Court essentially found that the domestic courts had not struck a fair balance between the competing interests when ordering the disclosure of sources. It also noted the absence of a procedure to allow such disclosure under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the domestic courts’ erroneous reliance on it. In the Court’s view, the above-mentioned decision of the Constitutional Court, at least in substance, constituted an acknowledgment of the breach of the applicant companies’ right to freedom of expression. 21.     At the same time, the applicants never disclosed their source and the criminal proceedings, within the framework of which the judicial decision to disclose the source had been ordered, were ultimately discontinued. While the impugned court decision (ordering the disclosure of sources) remained in force, the applicants never attempted to reopen the proceedings after the Constitutional Court’s decision, essentially because of the closure of criminal proceedings which had rendered the decision of the district court redundant (contrast Financial Times Ltd and Others v. the United Kingdom , no.   821/03, §   56, 15 December 2009). Moreover, no punitive measure was applied against the applicants: although criminal proceedings were brought against the director of the first applicant company for failure to comply with the decision of the district court of 26 June 2014, those proceedings lasted for a couple of months and were eventually discontinued. The director of the first applicant company was not placed in detention (compare Metis Yayıncılık Limited Şirketi and Sökmen v. Turkey (dec.), no. 4751/07, §§ 32-33 and   35, 20   June 2017). While the applicants submitted that, following the disclosure order by the courts, sources had stopped cooperating with them, they failed to submit any evidence to support that argument. In the specific circumstances of the present case, the Court is of the view that the decision of the Constitutional Court itself constituted a sufficient and appropriate redress in the absence of compensation. 22.     It follows that the first and second applicants can no longer claim to be the victim of the violation complained of, as required by Article 34 of the Convention. The applications must therefore be rejected in accordance with Article   35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Decides to join the applications; Declares the applications inadmissible. Done in English and notified in writing on 21 May 2026.     Martina Keller   Kateřina Šimáčková   Deputy Registrar   President   Appendix List of cases: No. Application no. Case name Lodged on Applicant Represented by 1. 34286/15 Start Media Ltd v. Armenia 27/06/2015 START MEDIA LTD   Tigran YEGORYAN 2. 34321/15 Hraparak Oratert Ltd and Simonyan v. Armenia 24/06/2015 HRAPARAK ORATERT LTD Susanna SIMONYAN Artak ZEYNALYAN