CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 28 mai 2026

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ITALY (Applications nos. 26187/14 and 2 others – see appended list)   JUDGMENT   Art 7 • Nullum crimen sine lege • Nulla poena sine lege • Confiscation of the applicants’ assets, the value of which was deemed equivalent to the overall proceeds of criminal offences committed jointly by them and other co-offenders, on the basis of joint liability • No violation (application nos.   26187/14 and 24511/21) • Confiscation based on the applicants’ joint liability did not amount to a penalty for a third party’s conduct • Personal liability properly established • Clear link established between their conduct and the confiscation of the entire proceeds of crime • Applicants punished for their own conduct and not that of their co-offenders • Violation (application no.   31161/22) • Confiscation not a foreseeable penalty • Lack of legislative provision clearly establishing the principle of joint liability in confiscation orders and consistent case-law clarifying existing provisions • Absence of clear and foreseeable criteria for the determination of the amounts to be confiscated Art 1 P1 • Peaceful enjoyment of possessions • Confiscation orders exceeded the share of the applicants’ criminal proceeds and unrelated to their role in the commission of the crimes or to the gravity of their conduct (application nos.   26187/14 and 24511/21) • Impugned orders disproportionate to their pursued punitive purposes and exceeded what was necessary to pursue the restoration the applicants’ financial situation before the commission of the crimes • Joint liability applied automatically • Unjustifiable shifting of the responsibility of recovering the co-offenders’ shares of the proceeds of crime from domestic authorities to the applicants, imposing an excessive burden • Confiscation order lacked sufficiently clear and foreseeable legal basis (application no.   31161/22)   Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.   STRASBOURG 28 May 2026   This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Petrignani and Others v. Italy, The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Ivana Jelić , President ,   Erik Wennerström,   Gilberto Felici,   Raffaele Sabato,   Frédéric Krenc,   Davor Derenčinović,   Alain Chablais , judges , and Ilse Freiwirth, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the applications (nos.   26187/14, 24511/21 and 31161/22) against the Italian Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by three Italian nationals, whose names are set out in the appended table (“the applicants”), on the various dates also set out in the appended table; the decision to give notice to the Italian Government (“the Government”) of the complaints raised under Article 7 of the Convention and under Article   1 of Protocol No. 1 and to declare the remainder of the applications inadmissible; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 5 May 2026, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The case concerns the confiscation of assets belonging to the applicants the value of which was deemed to be equivalent to the overall proceeds ( profitto ) of offences committed jointly by the applicants and other co-   offenders, on the basis of joint liability. It raises issues under Article   7 of the Convention and under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. THE FACTS 2.     The applicants’ personal details and the names of their representatives are set out in the appendix. 3.     The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr L. D’Ascia, Avvocato dello Stato. 4.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.         Application no. 26187/14 – Petrignani v. Italy 5.     The applicant, an accountant, was accused of having provided support and assistance to the co-defendants and their companies in the commission of a number of tax-related crimes. He was charged with the offences of membership of a criminal organisation under Article 416 of the Italian Criminal Code (CC) and of tax-related crimes under Articles 2 and 8 of Legislative Decree no. 74 of 2000. 6 .     The applicant and the prosecutor agreed to a plea bargain and asked the Turin preliminary investigations judge to order one year and eight months of imprisonment, conditionally suspended. The judge noted that confiscation was mandatory for some of the offences, and asked the parties to address this issue. 7 .     On 13 June 2012 the prosecutor therefore asked the judge to order the confiscation of an amount equivalent to the sum that the applicant had obtained in exchange for his assistance in the commission of the tax offences, which amounted to 12,000 euros (EUR). The applicant did not contest this. He opened a savings account with a EUR 12,000 deposit and made it available for confiscation. 8 .     On 15 October 2012, the Turin preliminary investigations judge applied the penalty requested by the parties and, in addition, ordered the confiscation of an amount equivalent to the proceeds of the crimes, pursuant to section   1   §   143 of Law no. 244 of 2007 and Article 322 ter of the CC. The judge observed that value confiscation had a punitive character and any individual co-offender could be ordered to repay the entire proceeds of the crime on the principle of joint liability. The affected person could then take contribution proceedings ( azione di regresso ) against the others in order to recover that person’s notional share of the proceeds. The judge quantified the proceeds of the tax evasion at EUR   5,047,500 (tax unpaid because of a failure to declare revenue in tax returns submitted on 30 September 2008 and 12 June 2010) and ordered the confiscation of the applicant’s assets up to that value. The judge further stated that the measure should be enforced by confiscating the EUR 12,000 deposited in the above ‑ mentioned savings account. 9.     The applicant appealed to the Court of Cassation, which upheld the confiscation order in a judgment published on 18 September 2013. It confirmed, among other things, that the order was punitive and could be enforced against the applicant for the entire proceeds of the crime on the basis of the principle of joint liability.       Application no. 24511/21 – Carbone v. Italy 10.     The applicant Mr Carbone was accused jointly with others of fraud (under Article 640 of the CC), falsification of documents (under Article   479 of the CC) and failure to carry out repairs (under Article 677 of the CC). As regards in particular the first offence, he was accused of having falsely declared that certain buildings constructed under a contract won after a public tendering process had been built according to the legal requirements and the contractual provisions, and so having induced the public administration to pay the agreed price for the construction contract. The charges related to offences committed before 3 July 2013. 11 .     On an unspecified date, the sum in the applicant’s bank account, which amounted to EUR 44,057.36, was confiscated. The applicant lodged an application with the Taranto preliminary hearing judge seeking the return of that sum. 12 .     The applicant and the prosecutor agreed to a plea bargain and asked the Taranto preliminary hearing judge to order ten months and 20 days of imprisonment, conditionally suspended. 13.     On 31 January 2020, the Taranto preliminary hearing judge made the order requested by the parties. The judge acknowledged the punitive character of value confiscation and referred to the principle of joint liability. He observed that the amount seized from the applicant was lower than the overall proceeds derived from the crime of fraud, which amounted to EUR   725,022.27. The judge therefore dismissed the applicant’s application for the return of the seized assets and ordered them to be confiscated under Article   640 quater of the CC. 14.     The applicant appealed against the confiscation order to the Court of Cassation, which dismissed his appeal on 20 October 2020. The Court of Cassation reiterated that the prevailing purpose of the confiscation order was punitive, and confirmed that it was open to a court to order the confiscation of the overall proceeds of a crime on the basis of the principle of joint liability. As regards the applicant’s argument that joint liability was disproportionate and so in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court of Cassation stated that proportionality had to be assessed with regard to each co-offender’s contribution to the obtaining of the proceeds of the offence and not to what proportion of those proceeds was in their possession.     Application no. 31161/22 – Curci v. Italy 15 .     The applicant, a tax consultant, was accused of having provided support and assistance to a large number of companies in the context of a widespread tax evasion scheme which had been current between 2016 and 2017. He was charged with tax-related crimes pursuant to Articles 3, 4, 8 and 10 quater of Legislative Decree no. 74 of 2000 and of laundering the proceeds of crime pursuant to Article 648 ter.1 of the CC. 16 .     On 15 January 2019 the Milan District Court found that through his professional activities the applicant had participated in the commission of tax crimes by a large number of companies, and that he had obtained financial benefit from those activities, which he had invested. The District Court convicted him of most of the tax-related crimes he had been charged with and of laundering the proceeds of crime and sentenced him to six years of imprisonment and a fine of EUR 24,000. The District Court ordered the confiscation of assets to a value equivalent to that of the proceeds of the tax-related crimes under Article 12 bis of Legislative Decree no. 74 of 2000. Having calculated the value of the overall proceeds of crime obtained by all the co-offenders at EUR 36,431,324.03, the District Court observed that the companies had at their disposal considerably less than that amount and therefore ordered that any remainder should be confiscated from the applicant on the basis of the principle of joint liability. The confiscation of his assets was therefore ordered up to a value of EUR   36,431,324.03. The District Court also justified its conclusions by reference to the applicant’s essential contribution to the commission of the offences, since he had devised and implemented the tax evasion schemes. The confiscation of further amounts was ordered in respect of two charges on which the applicant alone was convicted. 17.     The applicant lodged an appeal in the Milan Court of Appeal which, on 17 December 2020, upheld the previous judgment in his regard. 18.     The applicant appealed to the Court of Cassation which, in a judgment published on 23 March 2022, partially quashed the previous judgment and remitted the case to the Court of Appeal for the determination of the penalty. Nevertheless, it upheld the confiscation order based on the principle of joint liability: pointing out the prevailing punitive purpose of that measure, and reiterating the above-mentioned considerations of the applicant’s essential role in the commission of the crime, the Court of Cassation held that the applicant had substantially contributed to the realisation of those proceeds and therefore had to answer for all of them, regardless of the amount he had obtained individually. The confiscation order therefore became final. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE         RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE    Confiscation 19 .     Article 240 of the CC, which forms part of a chapter dedicated to “preventive orders against property” ( misure di sicurezza patrimoniali ), provides for a direct form of confiscation. The provision reads as follows: “1. In the event of conviction, the judge may order the confiscation of things that were used or were intended to be used in the commission of the offence [in question], and of the things that constitute the product or proceeds of the offence. 2. [The judge] must order the confiscation: 1) of things that constitute consideration ( prezzo ) paid for the offence; 1- bis ) ... 2) of things whose manufacturing, use, harbouring, possession or sale constitutes an offence – even if no conviction has been imposed. ...” 20 .     Article 322 ter of the CC – brought in by Law no. 300 of 2000 and subsequently amended by Law no. 190 of 2012 – requires confiscation in respect of certain crimes. The confiscation must whenever possible be of the direct proceeds of or consideration for the crimes (“direct confiscation”); in the alternative, it must be carried out against assets of equivalent value (“value confiscation” or “confiscation by equivalent means”). The provision currently reads as follows: “1. In the event of conviction or of an [agreement for a] plea bargain at the request of the parties, pursuant to Article 444 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in respect of one of the offences provided by Articles 314 to 320 ..., [the judge] must order the confiscation of the goods constituting the proceeds of or consideration for the offences, unless they belong to a third party who has not taken part in the commission of the offence, or, when this is not possible, the confiscation of goods at the disposal of the offender of a value corresponding to consideration or proceeds. 2. In the event of conviction or of an [agreement for a] plea bargain at the request of the parties pursuant to Article 444 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of the offence provided by Article 321 ..., [the judge] must order the confiscation of the goods constituting the proceeds of the offence, unless they belong to a third party who did not take part in the commission of the offence or, when this is not possible, the confiscation of goods at the disposal of the offender to a value corresponding to those proceeds... 3. In the cases provided in paragraphs 1 and 2, the judge – in the judgment convicting the offender – shall determine the amount of money or identify the goods to be confiscated in so far as they constitute the proceeds of or consideration for the offence or their value corresponds to the proceeds of or consideration for the offence.” 21 .     Article 640 quater of the CC – also introduced by Law no. 300 of 2000 – provides that Article 322 ter of the CC also applies to the offence of aggravated fraud, including fraud against a public entity, provided for by Article   640 § 1, no. 1, of the CC. 22.     Additionally, section 1 § 143 of Law no. 244 of 2007 (the 2008   Finance Act) also applied Article 322 ter of the CC to the tax offences in Legislative Decree no. 74 of 2000. 23 .     Under Legislative Decree no. 158 of 2015, section 1 § 143 of Law   no.   244 of 2007 was replaced by a substantially similar provision, which is now in Article 12 bis of Legislative Decree no. 74 of 2000.    Nature and purpose of the confiscation 24 .     The domestic legal order distinguishes between penalties and security measures. In principle, penalties are aimed at punishing a person for having committed an offence, whereas security measures are aimed at preventing the commission of a further offence. 25.     Unlike Article 240 of the CC (see paragraph 19 above), Article   322 ter and Article 640 quater of the CC do not explicitly state whether the confiscation under those Articles constitutes a penalty or a security measure. 26 .     Until recently, the case-law of both the Constitutional Court and the Court of Cassation held that value confiscation was predominantly afflictive in nature and therefore had to be regarded as punitive. That case-law rested on the one hand on the fact that the assets were not confiscated because they were inherently dangerous and on the other hand on the lack of any link ( nesso di pertinenzialità ) between the confiscated assets and the crime in question. It followed that the main purpose of value confiscation was to restore the previous financial balance by making the offender pay a corresponding sum (see, among other authorities: judgments of the Constitutional Court nos. 97 of 2009, 301 of 2009 and 68 of 2017; judgments of the Court of Cassation nos. 15445 of 2004 and 39173 of 2008; and judgment of the Combined Divisions of the Court of Cassation no.   31617 of 2015). 27 .     The Combined Divisions of the Court of Cassation also said in judgment no. 4145 of 2023 that value confiscation had a dual nature: by imposing on the offender a financial sacrifice that was equal to the proceeds that he or she had realised from the crime, confiscation served both a restorative and a punitive function. However, it stated that the punitive nature of confiscation should prevail over all other functions, because penalties were subject to the stricter rules provided by Article 25 of the Italian Constitution and by Article 7 of the Convention. 28.     However, the most recent case-law called into question this approach, which rested on the different natures of direct confiscation and value confiscation. In judgments nos. 112 of 2019 and 7 of 2025 the Constitutional Court did not draw a distinction between direct confiscation and value confiscation; rather, it stated that confiscation of the “proceeds” deriving from the offence had a purely restorative function, whereas the confiscation of the “product” of an offence or of the assets used in the commission of the crime had a punitive connotation, because it was not limited to restoring the financial situation that had been in place before the commission of the crime but instead deprived the offender of further assets. The recent judgment of the Combined Divisions of the Court of Cassation no. 13783 of 2025 confirmed this approach: it clarified that direct confiscation and value confiscation constituted two ways of enforcing the same order and that they were of the same nature – that is, they constituted a merely restorative measure if they were limited to the proceeds derived from the crime in question but became punitive where their value exceeded that of the proceeds.    Relevant provisions concerning the liability of multiple persons 29 .     Article 110 of the CC reads as follows: “When several persons take part in the commission of the same offence, each of them shall be subject to the penalty prescribed for that offence (...)” 30 .     Article   187, second paragraph, of the CC reads as follows: “Persons who are convicted for the same offence are jointly required to pay compensation for the pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage caused by it” 31 .     Article   2055 of the Civil Code reads as follows: “If a harmful act is attributable to multiple persons, all of them are jointly liable to pay compensation for any damage caused. A person who has paid compensation has the right to seek a contribution order against each of the others, in an amount to be determined on the basis of the gravity of individual fault and of the extent of its consequences. In case of doubt, the individual degrees of fault are presumed to be equal.” 32.     Article   1292 of the Civil Code defines the notion of the joint liability of debtors as the situation when “multiple debtors are all bound to perform the same obligation, so that each of them can be compelled to fulfil the obligation in its entirety, and fulfilment by one releases the others.” 33.     Article   1299 of the Civil Code regulates the right to seek a contribution ( regresso ), providing that a debtor who pays an entire debt for which others were also jointly liable may obtain from any co-debtors the notional shares owed by each of them.    Case-law on joint liability for value confiscation 34 .     The Court of Cassation stated for the first time in judgment no.   15445 of 2004 that where an offence for which a confiscation order could be made was committed by more than one person jointly and the direct confiscation of the proceeds of that offence was not possible, confiscation of a value equivalent to the entire proceeds could be ordered against any of the co ‑ offenders, regardless of the shares actually obtained by any of them. The Court of Cassation relied on a criminal law theory according to which, on the basis of an interpretation of Article 110 of the CC, all co ‑ offenders are criminally liable for the entirety of an offence which is considered to be the result of their joint action (the “teorica monistica” ); according to the Court of Cassation, it followed that the co-offenders should be jointly liable for the penalty, including confiscation. The co-offenders could subsequently seek contribution orders against each other to recover their payments from others’ shares of the proceeds, but that fell outside the sphere of criminal law. 35 .     The principle of joint liability for value confiscation was subsequently reiterated by the Court of Cassation in several cases (see, for instance, judgments nos. 30729 of 2006, 31988 of 2006 or 10838 of 2007). 36 .     Nevertheless, in some cases the Court of Cassation stated that confiscation could be ordered against each co-offender only in respect of his or her share of the proceeds of the crime (see, for instance, judgments nos.   25877 of 2006, 31690 of 2007, or 35120 of 2007). 37 .     In judgment 26654 of 27 March 2008, which was published on 2   July   2008, the Combined Divisions examined the allegedly divergent case-law on the principle of joint liability for value confiscation. Although the Combined Divisions acknowledged that there had been different interpretations, they held that the divergence was merely apparent since even the judgments which opposed the principle of joint liability left open the possibility of seizing an amount equal to the entire proceeds of a crime if the individual shares of co-offenders could not be quantified. 38 .     Following that case, some case-law continued to reiterate the principle of joint liability (see, for instance, the judgments of the Court of Cassation nos.   45389 of 2008, 33409 of 2009, 27072 of 2015, 33755 of 2016, or 26621 of 2018 ). Some judgments explicitly addressed the issue of the proportionality of confiscation orders which were based on the principle of joint liability, stating that they were proportionate given that the offender had participated in the production of the proceeds of the offence rather than because he or she was in actual possession of those proceeds; it was therefore reasonable to expect that every co-offender should be liable for confiscation of his or her assets where the proceeds of an offence could not be recovered from the other co-offenders (see, for instance, the judgments of the Court of Cassation nos. 13562 of 2012, 25560 of 2015, 26621 of 2018, or 19091 of 2020). 39 .     Another part of the case-law, however, interpreted the above ‑ mentioned judgment no. 26654 of 2008 of the Combined Divisions as saying that, at least when it was possible to determine the individual shares of the proceeds, confiscation had to be limited to the specific person’s share (see, for instance, the judgments of the Court of Cassation nos. 10690 of 2009, 33282 of 2012, 20101 of 2015, 6607 of 2021, 4727 of 2021, or 33757 of 2022). 40 .     On 5 March 2024 the sixth division of the Court of Cassation remitted the case to the Combined Divisions on that question, observing that there was an important and longstanding divergence of case-law and that judgment no.   26654 of 2008 had given rise to conflicting interpretations. 41 .     The divergence was addressed by judgment no. 13783 of 2025 of the Combined Divisions, which acknowledged that most case-law since 2004 had relied on the principle of joint liability; nevertheless, from 2006 until recently, a minority of cases had been decided on the opposite principle and had stated that – at least when the individual shares of the proceeds of the offence could be identified – confiscation should be limited to the amount of the individuals’ shares. The Combined Divisions judgment no. 26654 of 2008 had been referred to in both lines of case-law because on the one hand it confirmed the principle of joint liability and on the other it suggested that it could only apply when it was impossible to determine the individual shares of the proceeds of a crime. The Combined Divisions acknowledged the divergence but put an end to it by saying that the principle of joint liability did not apply. They found that in allowing for the confiscation of sums that were unrelated to the proceeds obtained by each offender it led to disproportionate results regardless of whether it was considered punitive or restorative in purpose. They relied on the principle of proportionality, as recognised by European Union Law, by the Court’s case-law and by domestic law. The Combined Divisions therefore concluded that, if there was more than one offender, confiscation must be ordered against each of them only in respect of the shares of the proceeds they had actually obtained; if those shares could not be determined, they should be presumed to be equal.     Other relevant provision 42 .     Article 628 bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure brought in by Legislative Decree No. 150 of 2022 reads as follows: 1. A convicted person or a person subject to a security measure may apply to the Court of Cassation asking it to quash a criminal judgment or conviction against him or her, to order the reopening of the proceedings, or to take any measures necessary to eliminate the harmful consequences arising from a violation of fundamental rights found by the European Court of Human Rights ...”.       International and European Union law 43.     Article   49 § 3 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides that the severity of penalties must not be disproportionate to the relevant criminal offence. 44.     The international and European Union instruments concerning the confiscation of the proceeds of crime or of property of equivalent value have been summarised in Episcopo and Bassani v. Italy , nos. 47284/16 and 84604/17, §§ 39-48, 19 December 2024 and in Tartamella and Others v.   Italy , nos. 26338/19 and 2 others, §§ 60-69, 23 October 2025). 45.     Additionally, Regulation (EU) 2018/1805 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 on the mutual recognition of freezing orders and confiscation orders provides that domestic authorities making confiscation orders must ensure that the principles of necessity and proportionality are respected (Article 1 § 3). The relevant provisions of the Directive on asset recovery and confiscation of 24   April 2024 (2024/1260/EU) authorise Member States to provide that in exceptional circumstances confiscation should not be ordered or executed if that would result in undue hardship for the affected person, on the basis of the circumstances of the individual case. THE LAW Joinder of the applications 46.     Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment. Scope of the case 47.     In his observations in reply to those of the Government, Mr   Petrignani complained that there had been a breach of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention; in his observations, Mr Carbone complained that there was no legal basis for the confiscation of his assets, because domestic law did not allow it where there was a plea bargain resulting in a sentence of less than two years’ imprisonment. 48.     The Court notes that these complaints were declared inadmissible at the stage of communication of the application (see the preamble above) and therefore no longer form part of the present case.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 7 OF THE CONVENTION 49.     The applicants complained that the confiscation of an amount equivalent to the overall proceeds of the offences was in breach of Article   7 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed. ...”    The parties’ arguments      The applicants    Mr Petrignani 50 .     The applicant complained about the confiscation of an amount equivalent to the entire proceeds derived from the crime by all co ‑ offenders. Arguing that value confiscation amounted to a penalty, he acknowledged that the order sought by the prosecutor – namely the confiscation of EUR   12,000, which corresponded to the sums he had actually obtained – had been justified. Nevertheless, the order made against him meant that up to EUR   5,047,500 might be confiscated from him. He argued that confiscating that sum would be unlawful and disproportionate and that it would mean he was being punished for the conduct of his co-offenders. 51 .     In the applicant’s view, his having a right to seek contributions from his co-offenders clearly showed that the order originally covered their share of liability as well. A contribution claim was civil in nature and could not be used as a remedy for the redistribution of criminal liability. The applicant said that joint liability could not have been imposed under Article 110 of the CC but must have been the result of an unjustifiable and illogical transposition of the concept of joint liability from ordinary civil proceedings. 52 .     The applicant also complained that the principle of joint liability had been applied automatically, which did not allow for an assessment of each co-offender’s role in the commission of the offence. In his view, value confiscation – like any penalty – should correspond to an individual’s role in the commission of the crime; in this respect, he referred to certain domestic judgments which had rejected the principle of joint liability (judgments of the Court of Cassation nos. 4902 of 2017 and 4727 of 2021 and the recent judgment of the Combined Divisions of the Court of Cassation no. 13783 of 2025). 53 .     Lastly, he pointed out that in his case it had been clear that he had not obtained any share of the proceeds made by the other co-offenders, since he was not a taxpayer but an accountant; he had only obtained EUR   12,000 in exchange for his professional advice.    Mr Carbone 54 .     The applicant argued that the confiscation – which had amounted to a penalty – was disproportionate in that it included proceeds obtained by co ‑ offenders. He argued that that meant he had had to answer for the conduct of third parties, and that his individual contribution to the commission of the offence had not been taken into account. He pointed out that he had obtained only EUR 27,631.70 whereas EUR 44,057.36 had been confiscated from him .    Mr Curci 55 .     The applicant argued that the confiscation order made against him on the basis of joint liability had amounted to a penalty, since it had affected assets which were not derived – either directly or indirectly – from the commission of the offence. He therefore complained that the measure in question had breached Article 7 of the Convention, since it had not had a foreseeable legal basis. 56.     The applicant pointed out that the relevant domestic provisions (notably, Article 12 bis of Legislative Decree no. 74 of 2000) allowed for the confiscation of assets which either were, or were equivalent to, the proceeds of an offence; but no domestic provision allowed for the confiscation from one co-offender of others’ notional shares of the proceeds of a crime on the basis of the fact that he had carried out a particularly important role in the commission of that crime. The gravity of an individual’s contribution to the commission of a crime could be punished by means of the ordinary criminal penalties. 57.     The applicant further claimed that the confiscation provided for by Article   12 bis of Legislative Decree no. 74 of 2000 served the purpose of countering the unjust enrichment that derives from criminal conduct; it could therefore not constitute a legal basis for a measure that was clearly intended to be punitive, adding a further penalty to the ordinary ones established by the Criminal Code. Categorising the measure as punitive meant that the proceedings were subject to the stricter procedural rules for the criminal process but could not justify extending its scope beyond what was provided for by law. 58 .     In his observations in reply to those of the Government, the applicant argued that the domestic case-law cited by the Government in support of the principle of joint liability had extended the scope of criminal sanctions beyond the wording and scope of the relevant provisions, and therefore could not constitute an adequate legal basis for a confiscation order. He also contested the Government’s reliance on Article 110 of the CC, which only concerned penalties in the stricter meaning adopted by domestic law and did not cover confiscation, as well as their reliance on Articles 1298 and 2055 of the Civil Code, which concerned civil obligations and not criminal penalties. 59.     Confiscation on the basis of joint liability resulted in a penalty that was structurally unforeseeable, as the defendant could not know in advance how much would be confiscated from him. Joint liability meant that any of multiple offenders could be ordered to surrender assets of a value equivalent to the overall proceeds of the crime if the shares of the proceeds received by each offender could not be identified and quantified. The amount of the confiscation order would therefore depend only on whether the authorities could quantify and locate the co-offenders’ shares of proceeds. The amount of the penalty was therefore unrelated to the conduct and culpability of each individual offender. 60 .     Lastly, the applicant argued that the case-law cited by the Government stated that there could be joint liability if the individual shares of the proceeds of an offence could not be identified; however, this could not apply to tax offences, where the shares are always identifiable as they correspond to the tax savings.      The Government 61 .     The Government pointed out in relation to the applicability of Article 7 of the Convention that domestic case-law had recognised the substantially criminal nature of value confiscation (Constitutional Court, judgments nos.   97 of 2009, 301 of 2009 and 68 of 2017; Court of Cassation, judgment no. 39173 of 2008; Court of Cassation, Combined Divisions, judgments nos.   31617 of 2015 and 4145 of 2023). They therefore acknowledged that although it had certain differences from other criminal sanctions, that type of confiscation amounted to a penalty. 62 .     As to the merits of the complaints, the Government argued that the principle of joint liability had a foreseeable legal basis. Referring to judgment no.   26654 of 2008 of the Combined Divisions of the Court of Cassation and judgment no. 33282 of 2012 of the Court of Cassation, they pointed out that at the relevant time (between 2008 and 2017) the principle of joint liability for value confiscation had been clearly established where direct confiscation of the proceeds was not possible and the individual shares of the proceeds could not be precisely quantified. 63 .     The Government observed that judgment no. 26654 of 2008 of the Combined Divisions of the Court of Cassation had clarified that the previous divergence in the case-law was only apparent (see paragraph   37 above); as to the subsequent divergence which had been brought to the attention of the Combined Divisions (see paragraph 40 above), the Government pointed out that the majority had supported the principle of joint liability, which was therefore the most foreseeable outcome. 64 .     The Government further argued that the principle of joint liability did not conflict with the principle of individual criminal liability, as it punished individuals for their complicity in the commission of the offence. They relied mainly on three grounds: Article 110 of the CC, the punitive nature of the measure, and tort law. 65 .     Firstly, the Government referred to Article 110 of the CC as the legal basis for the criminal law theory saying that co-offenders are jointly liable for the entire crime and any penalty (see paragraph 34 above). When read in combination with the provisions dealing with confiscation, therefore, Article   110 of the CC provided a clear legal basis for joint liability. 66 .     Secondly, the Government argued that a measure having a restorative purpose would have to be limited to what each offender received, whereas the predominantly punitive purpose of value confiscation entailed making each participant liable for the entire proceeds of the offence, without prejudice to the subsequent right to seek a contribution. 67 .     Thirdly, joint liability in tort was expressly provided for by article   2055 of the Civil Code. The degree of fault of each defendant was irrelevant to the party claiming damages, and would only come into play if the parties that had been found jointly liable later sought contributions among themselves. 68.     Overall, the Government argued that joint liability for confiscation was a consequence of each offender’s individual liability, as it was not related to whether or not the proceeds were available but was aimed at punishing the offenders’ contribution to the commission of the offence and thus their contribution to the generation of the proceeds overall. 69.     Finally, the Government pointed out that the confiscation order was made in respect of offences for which the applicants had been found liable, and not in respect of third parties’ offences.    The Court’s assessment      Admissibility 70.     As regards the applicability of Article 7, the Government agreed that the confiscation in question amounted to a penalty, especially given the case-   law in force at the relevant time (see paragraph 61 above). In the circumstances, the Court sees no reason to conclude otherwise. 71.     The Court therefore notes that the complaints raised under Article   7 of the Convention are neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article   35 of the Convention and declares them admissible.      Merits    General principles 72.     Article   7 of the Convention is not confined to prohibiting the retrospective application of the criminal law to an accused’s disadvantage. It also embodies, more generally, the principle that only the law can define a crime and prescribe a penalty ( nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege ) (see Kokkinakis v.   Greece , 25   May 1993, §   52, Series   A no.   260 ‑ A). While it prohibits in particular extending the scope of existing offences to acts which previously were not criminal offences, it also lays down the principle that the criminal law must not be extensively construed to an accused’s detriment, for instance by analogy (see Del Río Prada v.   Spain [GC], no.   42750/09, §   78, ECHR   2013, and Advisory opinion on the applicability of statutes of limitation to prosecution, conviction and punishment in respect of an offence constituting, in substance, an act of torture [GC], request no.   P16 ‑ 2021 ‑ 001, Armenian Court of Cassat