CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 5 avril 2013

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s523616E0 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s3E839E41 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:30pt; text-align:center } .s58ABC179 { margin-top:30pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s2D57E2E { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; text-transform:uppercase } .s3B3A5DE9 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:36pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sA838CCBC { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:30pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s4B4B41EE { font-family:Arial; font-size:12pt } .s90647315 { margin-top:30pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:24pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s25BD2B45 { margin-top:24pt; margin-left:36.6pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-15.05pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s984A15CA { margin-top:6pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sD5DF731 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sC702907E { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36.6pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-15.05pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sB6F98828 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36.6pt; margin-bottom:18pt; text-indent:-15.05pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s360DA689 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:48.75pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s1913A4C6 { margin-top:6pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s8378218E { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:48.75pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s471F7CE { margin-top:6pt; margin-bottom:36pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s967D43C6 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s9296A950 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sD6E2332A { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt } FIRST SECTION Application no. 32504/11 Kamuran KAPLAN and others against Norway lodged on 25 May 2011 STATEMENT OF FACTS   1.     The applicants are (1) Mr Kamran and (2) his wife Mrs   Naime   Kaplan, who were born respectively in 1966 and 1976, and their three children Azat, Cemsit and Rojin Kaplan who were born respectively in 1993, 1994 and 2005. They are all Turkish nationals. The first applicant currently lives in Turkey and the second to fifth applicants live in Stavanger, Norway. They are represented by Mr B. Endresen, a lawyer practicing in the same city . The circumstances of the case 1.     Factual background 2.     The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows. 3.     The first applicant, a mechanics and a professional driver, is of Kurdish ethnic origin coming from south-east Turkey. He was not a member of any political party but like many other members of his family sympathised with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party). During the violent conflicts between Turkish authorities and Kurdish people in 1992 and 1993 he lived in the City of Sirnak. The first applicant stated that he had assisted the PKK and that because of several occurrences he felt persecuted by Turkish authorities. Fearing for his life he found it necessary to flee in March 1993. 4.     The second applicant, Mrs Naime Kaplan, and the third applicant, Azat, continued to live with the first applicant’s parents in Sirnak. After the latter’s house was set fire to, the second and third applicants spent a period as refugees in Iraq. 5.     Over a period of more than a year and a half, the first applicant sojourned at several locations in Turkey. He had some contact with his wife and son and applied for visa to visit Denmark, where his older brother had obtained asylum (in 1988). Only the first applicant obtained a visa. His wife and son went back to Sirnak, where she gave birth to the couple’s second son, Cemsit, in August 1995 (the fourth applicant). 6.     The first applicant arrived in Denmark in February 1995, where he applied for asylum unsuccessfully. He then stayed in several European countries and returned to Denmark where he applied for asylum in September 1998. 7.     On 23 October 1998 he applied for asylum in Norway. The Directorate of Immigration rejected the application on 30 September 1999. His appeal to the Ministry of Justice was rejected by a decision of 21 January 2000, according to which he was under a duty to leave the country and measures were to be taken to implement this decision. 2.     The first applicant’s criminal conviction and follow-up by the immigration authorities 8.     On 7 December 1999 the Sunnhordaland District Court convicted the first applicant on charges of assault and sentenced him to 90 days’ imprisonment, of which 60 days were suspended. The judgment was transmitted to the Directorate of Immigration for consideration of whether there was a ground for ordering his expulsion. 9.     On 5 May 2000 the Ministry of Justice refused to revise its earlier rejection (of 21 January 2000) of the first applicant’s asylum application and asked the Stavanger Police to implement the decision. The latter contained no mention of the judgment of 7 December 1999. The applicant did not leave the country and the authorities took no specific measures to deport him until he received a warning to this effect in October 2006. 3.     Attempts to establish family life in Norway and diverging decisions regarding the first applicant and the remainder of the family 10.     The second applicant arrived in Norway with the couple’s two sons and applied for asylum on 24 May 2003, which the Directorate of Immigration rejected on 30 December 2003. The Immigration Appeals Board upheld the rejection on 25 February 2005, stating that unless they left the country voluntarily, the expulsion was to be forcibly implemented, if possible in coordination with that of the husband. 11.     On 4 August 2005 a daughter of the couple, Rojin, was born (the fifth applicant). 12.     Pending amendments to the Immigration Regulations, the Directorate of Immigration decided on 19 September 2006 to stay the implementation of the decision of 25 February 2005 regarding the wife and the sons but in a separate decision, referring inter alia to his conviction of 1999, rejected the first applicant’s request to stay the implementation of the refusal of 5 may 2000 to grant him asylum. 13.     The first applicant was on 1 November 2006 arrested and detained for two weeks with a view to deportation. On 2 November 2006 the Directorate of Immigration decided, under section 29 of the Immigration Act 1988, to order his deportation and to prohibit his re-entry in Norway for an indefinite duration. This was because of his criminal conviction and of his long illegal stay and work in Norway. On appeal, the decision was upheld by the Immigration Appeals Board on 2 March 2007. 14.     In the meantime, on 1 November 2006, the first applicant requested the Oslo City Court to issue an order that he be granted a residence- and work permit and an interlocutory injunction to stay his deportation pending the outcome of the judicial proceedings. 15.     Following a request by the first applicant to the Immigration Appeals Board, the latter granted him on 8 November 2006 a stay of implementation of his deportation until the City Court had decided on his request for an interim measure to stay his deportation. 16.     On 5 July 2007 the Immigration Appeals Board rejected a request to revise its earlier rejection (of 25 February 2005) finding no reason to grant the wife and the children a residence permit on humanitarian grounds. 17.     In an appeal of 18 December 2007 the applicants’ lawyer challenged the lawfulness of the decision of 5 July 2007 on the ground that Rojin had been diagnosed as suffering from child autism and had special needs. 18.     In the light of this information the parties agreed before the City Court that the immigration authorities should consider the matter anew for all the family members. 19.     After having decided on 3 January 2008 not to implement the expulsion with respect to the wife and the children, the Immigration Appeals Board on 28 February 2008 decided (with two votes to one) to alter its decision of 7 July 2007 and granted the second applicant, with the children, a residence- and work-permit under section 8(2) of the Immigration Act 1988 (according to which such a permit could be granted if warranted by weighty humanitarian considerations or particular links to the country). The majority attached decisive weight to the new information concerning the daughter’s health together with the length of the children’s residence in Norway (four years and nine months in the case of the sons). It also had regard to more recent practice of the Board. The permit was granted for a period of one year and could on certain conditions be renewed, constitute a ground for settlement permit and for family reunification. A prerequisite for the permit was that the wife continued to live in Norway. 20.     On 7 April 2008 the Board altered its decision of 2 March 2007 prohibiting the first applicant to return to Norway indefinitely so as to limit the prohibition to five years. A decisive consideration for this change was that his spouse and children had been granted a residence permit. The Board observed that as a starting point the first applicant’s expulsion would mean that the family would be split. However, the right of the other family ‑ members to reside in Norway did not imply any corresponding duty to do so. The whole family originated from Turkey, where the older children had been born and lived during their childhood. Their family life could in principle be secured either by the whole family moving to Turkey or through the visits of the wife and children of the husband in Turkey. His expulsion was of limited duration and at the expiry of the period it would be possible to apply for a residence permit on family reunification ground. Whether such a permit would be granted would depend on future circumstances. However, an expulsion for five years did not imply a permanent splitting of the family. 21.     The Board had particular regard to the daughter’s situation, which was followed up and was to be the subject of measures in Norway, and to the scarcity and low quality of public assistance in Turkey to children suffering from handicaps and other types of illnesses affecting their functional capacities, where assistance to children suffering from autism and their parents was provided primarily by private institutions. Bearing in mind especially the daughter’s interests, the Board had understanding for the fact that the family as a whole did not prefer to return to Turkey. 4.     Judicial appeals by the first applicant (a)     The City Court 22.     In the light of the above, the City Court discontinued, by decisions of 23 April and 20 November 2008, the proceedings in so far as the spouse and the children were concerned. In so far as the first applicant was concerned, the City Court found for the Immigration Appeals Board and rejected his request for an interlocutory injunction to stay his deportation, by a judgment and a decision of 23 April 2009. (b)     The High Court 23.     On 10 July 2009 the Borgarting High Court rejected the first applicant’s appeal against the City Court’s decision not to grant an interlocutory injunction, as did the Supreme Court on 1 September 2009. 24.     On the other hand, the High Court, by a judgment of 1 March 2010, quashed the Immigration Appeals Board’s decision of 7 April 2008 as being unlawful. 25.     The High Court had no doubt, nor was it disputed, that the objective conditions set out in section 29(1)(a) and (c) of the 1988 Immigration Act for ordering the first applicant’s deportation had been fulfilled; the only question was whether the measure would be proportionate as required by section 29(2). In this regard, the High Court observed that his conviction in 1999 for having caused physical injury to a third party with a knife was serious, even though there had been mitigating circumstances and the sentence (90 days of which 60 were suspended) had been relatively short. General considerations of crime prevention suggested that one ought to react to violence of this character. 26.     However, the expulsion of a convicted person ought to be effected as soon as possible after the criminal judgment had become enforceable. The fact that more than six years had elapsed before concrete measures had been taken to expel him, which could hardly be due to anything else than a lack of coordination on the part of the immigration authorities, weakened the significance of the judgment. 27.     On the other hand, the fact that the first applicant for a number of years had stayed and worked unlawfully in Norway was particularly serious and was not altered by the authorities’ passiveness. The Board had not incorrectly assessed his attachment to Norway and lack of legitimate expectations of being able to stay there. The fact that his spouse and children had been granted a residence permit would not hinder his expulsion, as this would not in the circumstances be a disproportionate measure vis-à-vis him. Another question was whether his four and half year daughter Rojin with her special care needs ought to be viewed as such extraordinary circumstances as could warrant his being able to stay in Norway. 28.     On the evidence the High Court found that Rojin’s chronic and very serious degree of child autism and need for follow-up would affect the other family members strongly in the years to come and entail a burden on them far beyond the normal level. Her functional incapacity meant that she would always be dependent on her parents’ resources. Her mother was exhausted and had a marginal level of functioning. It was the father who activated Rojin on a daily basis and she was particularly attached to him. Should he be deported it was likely that the disturbance to her development would be aggravated and would cause a further burden to the mother, to the brothers and to others who assumed responsibilities for her. 29.     The High Court concluded that the first applicant’s expulsion would expose Rojin to an extraordinary burden that would not be justified by general considerations of crime prevention or immigration policy and would constitute a disproportionate measure. In this context the High Court had regard to the importance of the fact that the residence permit to the mother and the children had so far been limited to one year at a time. 30.     The High Court upheld the City Court’s findings that the first applicant had not made it sufficiently probable that he upon return to Turkey would risk such persecution as could justify granting him a refugee status or would otherwise face a real danger of loss of life or exposure to inhuman treatment. 31.     Finally, the High Court dismissed the claim for a residence- and work permit from the courts. (c)     The Supreme Court 32.     The State appealed to the Supreme Court challenging the High Court’s proportionality assessment under section 29(2) of the 1988 Immigration Act. 33.     In its judgment of 26 November 2010 ( Norsk Retstidende p. 1430) the Supreme Court found it established that the first applicant had committed serious violations of the Immigration Act 1988 which of their own clearly constituted a sufficient ground for expulsion. An additional ground were the offences he had committed under Article 229, cf. Article 232, of the Penal Code and, albeit of lesser importance, under the Road Traffic Act. The Immigration Appeals Board had in its decision of 7 April 2008 pointed out that immigration policy considerations then ought to militate strongly in favour of upholding the expulsion order. Also the background – his unlawful stays in other European countries with unsuccessful asylum applications, including once under a false name – was a factor that to some extent went in the same direction. 34.     The Supreme Court further observed that the first applicant lacked a legal basis for residing in Norway and therefore ought to leave the country in any event. What the likely outcome could be of an application for residence permit in the current situation could not enter into the consideration of the case. The disputed decision entailed the consequence for him that he would be expelled from the country for a period of five years and he could not apply for a residence- or work permit during this period. Norway’s participation in the Schengen cooperation meant as a rule that an expulsion from Norway also implied a prohibition to enter the entire Schengen Area. In the case of a foreigner, whose unlawful residence had been so extensive and so long and who had been criminally convicted of violence, it could not be said that an expulsion in such circumstances would constitute an extraordinary burden. 35.     The interests pertaining to his wife and his two eldest children could hardly speak in favour of making a different assessment than that which applied to the first applicant. They had for many years lived on their own in Turkey. That the first applicant in the event of an expulsion could not come for visit for a period of five years was a normal consequence of expulsion and did not constitute an extraordinary burden. The family life could be maintained by his wife and children travelling to Turkey for shorter or longer periods. 36.     The Supreme Court also noted that, whilst the High Court had relied on the consideration that Rojin was suffering from a chronic and serious degree of child autism, the first applicant had submitted a medical statement of 27 October 2010 from which it appeared that her current diagnosis was “unspecified far-reaching developmental disturbance”. The expulsion applied for a period of five years during which the first applicant would not have the opportunity to help his daughter upon visits in the country. As already mentioned, the family contact would instead be maintained through visits in Turkey. Nor in this respect could there be a question of any extraordinary burden. 37.     The Supreme Court, having regard the Court’s case-law, notably Darren Omoregie and Others v. Norway (no. 265/07, §§ 57 and 66, 31 July 2008) and the criteria of “exceptional circumstances” and “insurmountable obstacles” relied on there, concluded that the first applicant’s expulsion would not give rise to a violation of Article 8. His expulsion would not constitute a disproportionate measure vis-à-vis the other family members. 5.     Deportation of the first applicant 38.     On 16 July 2011 the first applicant was deported to Turkey. COMPLAINT 39.     The applicants initially complained that the first applicant’s expulsion to Turkey would give rise to a violation of Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the Convention. Subsequently, after his deportation, they decided to pursue their compliant under Article 8 only. They maintained that the Supreme Court’s judgment of 26 November 2010 entailed a violation of this Article, not only with regard to the father, but also vis-à-vis his wife and not least his three children, especially the youngest one – the daughter suffering from psychiatric problems within the spectrum of autism illnesses. The children, in particular the daughter, could not accompany him to Turkey. QUESTION TO THE PARTIES and request   1.     Having regard to the Court’s case-law in this area, was the imposition of the first applicant’s expulsion to Turkey with a prohibition to re-enter Norway for five years, as decided by the Immigration Appeals Board on 7   April 2008 and upheld by the Supreme Court on 26 November 2010, “necessary” within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention? In other words, was it supported by relevant and sufficient reasons and was it proportionate to any legitimate aim pursued?   In this connection, what weight, if any, should be attached to one or more of the following factors:   (a)     The lapse of time between the first applicant’s criminal conviction in 1999 and the immigration authorities’ decisions of October/November 2006 relying on this circumstance as a ground for ordering his deportation with a prohibition on re-entry;   (b)     The Immigration Appeals Board’s decision of 28 February 2008 granting his wife and three children a residence permit of a renewable duration of one year;   (c)   The Board’s decision of 7 April 2008 maintaining the decision to expel the father but limiting the prohibition on re-entry to five years?   2.     The Government are requested to supply English translations of the passages setting out, in so far as relevant for the question above, the reasoning of the Immigration Appeals Board in its decisions of 28 February and 7 April 2008, respectively, and those of the High Court and the Supreme Court, in their judgments of 1 March and 26 November 2010, respectively.