CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 10 juin 2015

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sA6BC7FA7 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:right } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s8229ABDD { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s68C46B95 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s3F59B822 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-transform:uppercase } .sA8776625 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s72C8F48C { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36.6pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-15.05pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sF7A86111 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; font-size:10pt } .sA20670C4 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:48.75pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s5243C837 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; font-size:10pt } .s8C6C4B { width:7.65pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .sD3B63DAD { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .s76CF415B { page-break-before:always; clear:both } .s2D57E2E { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; text-transform:uppercase } .s3985515B { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s9FF10068 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt }     Communicated on 10 June 2015   FOURTH SECTION Application no. 29068/10 Andriana NICOLAOU and others against Cyprus lodged on 16 April 2010 STATEMENT OF FACTS 1.     The five applicants are Andriana, Charalambos, Nicos, Andreas and Parthenope-Ariadne Nicolaou. They are the relatives of Athanasios Nicolaou (“the deceased”) who died on 29 September 2005, while he was performing his six months’ mandatory military service in Cyprus. The first and second applicants are his mother and father. They were born in 1948 and 1943 respectively. The remaining applicants are the deceased’s siblings. They were born in 1972, 1980 and 1982. All five applicants are Cypriot nationals. They currently live in Limassol. The deceased himself was also a Cypriot national; he was born in 1979. A.     The circumstances of the case 1.     The deceased’s military service and his death 2.     The applicants and the deceased lived in Australia for a number of years until they decided to return to Cyprus. 3.     Upon the family’s return to Cyprus, the deceased, on 12 July 2005, was drafted into the army to perform six months’ mandatory military service. After receiving a basic training at the Recruits Training Centre (KEN) Limassol, he was assigned to Camp Evmenios Panayiotou, Polemidia, Limassol. 4.     During his military service, the deceased often confided to family members and his priest that the situation at the camp was “unbearable”, explaining that he had been verbally insulted, humiliated and bullied by his fellow soldiers on several occasions. According to the first applicant, Mrs   Nicolaou, her son had asked her to contact his superiors and arrange for his transfer to another unit as he was unhappy with his stay at the camp. He was also keen to secure an early discharge from the army. Although on several occasions his mother urged him to report the alleged incidents of bullying to his commanding officer, the deceased confided that he was afraid to do so in case his comrades turned against him. 5.     On 28 September 2005, the deceased was granted overnight leave. On the morning of 29 September, he failed to report back to his unit. At 4   p.m. that afternoon, his car was found parked on the side of a bridge in Alassa, Limassol and, at 4.20 p.m., his body was found under the bridge by a police officer. 2.     The police investigation 6.     The same day, members of the Lania Police Station along with members of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) visited the scene. A forensic pathologist, Dr P.S., was called to the scene. 7.     An on-scene autopsy was conducted by P.S. in the presence of two police officers, a second forensic pathologist, the deceased’s mother and his brother. Samples and evidence were taken from the scene for further analysis. The scene was also photographed by police officers and the deceased’s car was searched. The body was then transferred to the Limassol General Hospital for further investigation. 8.     On 1 October 2005 an investigation was formally opened. In the course of that investigation the family indicated to the police that, during their own subsequent visits to the scene, they had collected a sample – later found to be the deceased’s blood – which they had found 3.5 metres away from the body. 9.     Between 1 October 2005 and 28 June 2006 the police obtained statements from fifty witnesses. The witnesses included the deceased’s family, his last employer, his priest, military personnel with whom he had served, and passers-by and farmers from the area where his body had been found. Those statements included the following. 10.     Fellow soldiers gave statements describing the deceased as quiet and reserved. Two sergeants, Sergeant P.D and Staff Sergeant M.C., stated that, on two or three occasions, they had seen the deceased upset, concerned and nervous, and that, on at least two occasions, they had seen him crying; however, he had never given any specific explanation to his superiors as to why he was upset. 11.     A statement was taken from Captain P.D., in whose office the deceased worked as a clerk. Captain P.D. stated that while the deceased was disciplined and hard-working, he did not get on well with the colleagues in his unit and he had complained about this a few times to P.D. who   reported this to the deceased’s commanding officer, Lieutenant D.I. P.D also stated that he never suspected there was any sort of problem, though in the last three days before the death, he realised that the deceased was very uneasy and nervous, and that something serious was bothering him. P.D. asked him if he was facing a personal or family issue so that he could help him but, as the deceased would not tell him, P.D. sent him to D.I. 12.     The deceased’s Commanding Officer, Lieutenant D.I., also gave a statement. He recounted that, on 26 September 2005, it came to his attention that someone in the unit (whom he later found out to be a soldier called I.D.) had called the deceased “an Australian”. D.I. stated the deceased was annoyed that he, D.I., had found out about this incident of 26 September and burst into tears. D.I. spoke to I.D alone and was told that the incident was just a joke. When D.I. discussed the incident with the deceased, the deceased had told him that nothing was going on but requested that his colleagues stop calling him ‘Australian’. Lieutenant D.I. then ordered the soldiers in his unit not to call each other names, especially not the new recruits. 13.     Chief of Staff of III Brigade Support at Camp Evmenios Panayiotou, Colonel K.V, also discussed the incident with I.D (his driver) and the deceased. In his statement to the investigation, he recounted that he had asked I.D. for explanation for the incident and, when K.V. realised that this was just a minor misunderstanding, he advised I.D to find the deceased and apologise. K.V. then called the deceased to his office. The deceased told him that the whole incident was his fault because he had not been in a good mood that day. He did however tell K.V. that he could not communicate with the other soldiers because they were younger than him, with different attitudes and a different background. The deceased also wanted early discharge from the army. K.V. told him not to worry: he would be discharged within six months. The deceased then asked whether, given his relationship with the other soldiers in his unit, it was possible to be transferred to another unit. Colonel K.V. told him this would be difficult given that his military service was only for six months and that he should be patient but that, if ever there were a problem, he should come and discuss it with him. 14.     A statement was also taken from Sergeant-Major M.K., who gave evidence that, about a week prior to his death, the deceased had come to his office, and M.K. had seen that he was very confused and upset. M.K. asked him what had happened and the deceased replied that he could not adjust to life in the unit: he was of a different age and background from the other soldiers. The deceased then burst into tears and told M.K. that he could no longer tolerate the situation. He did not mention specific soldiers but spoke of the situation generally. M.K. advised him not to take the situation seriously. M.K. also stated that, on 26-27 September, he noticed that the deceased was deeply concerned and very nervous, and this was very different to the state he had been in on the previous occasion. This led M.K. to believe that something very serious was bothering the deceased and M.K. discussed the situation with his commanding officer. 15.     The deceased’s priest, E.E., also gave a statement in which he recounted that, before his death, the deceased had told him that conditions in the army were unbearable and intolerable. His fellow soldiers would swear at him every day and hit him, inflicting various kinds of violence and acts of humiliation. Although E.E. urged him to complain to his superiors, the deceased was afraid to do so in case his comrades turned on him. 16.     Mrs Nicolaou also gave a statement, which included her evidence that, on 21 September 2005, the deceased had come home very upset and asked her to do something so that he could be transferred to another unit because a new commanding officer was in charge and things had gone from bad to worse. On 27   September   2005 he told her that certain soldiers had thrown papers at him and called him an Australian. He had reported the latter incident to his commanding officer. 17.     During the police investigation, statements were also taken from drivers who had crossed the bridge on the day of death. One driver gave a statement in which he stated that, while driving towards the bridge, he saw a dark coloured saloon car, parked on the left side of the bridge. As he approached, he saw a man moving away from the car and running on the left side of the bridge towards the iron railing. The man then disappeared from his sight. At that the time, he supposed that man’s car had broken down and that he was wandering around the area to find something to fix it. 3.     The military investigation 18 .     A military investigation was also conducted by Major I.G. He belonged to a different regiment from the deceased but, at the time of the deceased’s death, was serving at Camp Evmenios Panayiotou with responsibility for safety. On 30 September 2005, he was appointed by the unit where the deceased was serving to conduct an investigation into the causes of the death and the circumstances under which the deceased had been found dead. During this investigation statements were taken from a total of seven witnesses between 5 May 2006 and 28 June 2006. The results of this investigation have not yet been provided to the Court. 4.     The first post-mortem report by Dr P.S. 19.     On 30 September 2005, a post-mortem examination of the deceased’s body was conducted and, on 16 June 2006, the forensic pathologist, Dr P.S. released his post-mortem report. 20.     P.S. noted that the deceased had been found lying on his back: his clothes were wet and his body was still warm. On that basis, he estimated that the deceased had died within four hours of being found. On the left side of the body was a pair of glasses. On the ground, underneath the deceased’s back, there was a wristwatch the strap of which was cut on one side. 21.     The deceased had 44 mg% alcohol in his blood (i.e. 44 mg/dl). His DNA was also matched to beer cans found at the scene: one can was found in the deceased’s military bag and the other on the bridge near the car. 22 .     P.S. noted that there was no evidence to indicate violent injuries caused by a fight. The report concluded that: “Death was due to subdural and subarachnoid haemorrhage, broken ribs and sternum, ruptured lung with haematothorax, ruptured right kidney, rupture of the mesentery with haemoperitoneum, fatal injuries which can also occur from fall from a height. No signs of criminal activity were found.” 5.     The first inquest 23.     An inquest into the deceased’s death took place. The Coroner took into account P.S.’s report, the statements provided by the police and further evidence provided by the State and the deceased’s family. 24.     On 21 November 2007 the Coroner found that there was no evidence to indicate criminal liability of a third party for the deceased’s death. The cause of death was the injuries sustained from a fall from a height. His finding was thus that the death occurred under conditions resembling suicide. 25.     On 6 December 2011 the President of the Limassol District Court affirmed the correctness, legality and accuracy of the Coroner’s finding and the inquest procedure. 6.     The second opinion produced by Dr O.P. 26.     After the finding of the first inquest, the first applicant, Mrs Nicolaou, asked a private forensic pathologist, Dr O.P., for a second opinion as to the causes of her son’s death. O.P.’s subsequent report, dated 8   February 2008, was based on the police investigation file and an examination of the pictures taken by the police at the scene and at the post ‑ mortem examination. 27.     O.P. considered that the position in which the body had been found lying was of particular interest. Had the fall been accidental or caused by a criminal act, the body would have fallen vertically and nearly parallel to the vertical point of the fall. On the other hand, had it been a voluntary fall, the body would have curved downwards and would have been found in a position more or less away from the point of fall. However, the state forensic pathologist, Dr P.S., had failed to enquire into the position of the body, which had been found three metres away from the point of fall. 28.     O.P. also explained that the fractures the body had sustained could have been caused by repeated fierce strikes, or by blows by a fist or a blunt instrument. He considered that the possibility that the deceased killed himself was completely unrealistic and that the injuries he had sustained had been inflicted intentionally. 29.     O.P. also criticised three aspects of the first post-mortem examination. First, a toxicology analysis of the stomach content had not been conducted, because the vial containing the stomach content had, for unspecified reasons, been unsealed. Second, the results of the examination of the blood and vitreous fluid samples were inaccurate since, if the body had been embalmed, or if the body was in sepsis prior to the post-mortem examination, the alcohol indication could be affected. Third, the first post ‑ mortem report had not stated whether the death was the result of a criminal act, suicide or an accident and P.S.’s conclusion that the fatal injuries sustained “can also occur from fall from a height” (see paragraph 22 above), left open the possibility that there might be other causes of death. 30.     O.P also observed that P.S had failed to inquire into the fact that the deceased’s wristwatch was found behind the body, noting also that the watch strap was not in fact cut, but rather was missing a spring. Moreover, the bruising on the deceased’s wrists and thumb were signs that his hands had been held behind his back and that this could have been when the watch spring was lost. 31.     O.P. concluded that the original post-mortem examination was flawed and had reached unjustifiable conclusions. 7.     The family’s legal challenges to the first inquest 32.     Having obtained O.P.’s opinion, the first applicant submitted a request to the Attorney General for the case to be re-opened; however, the request was denied on the grounds that no new evidence arose from the new forensic report. 33.     The first applicant then made an application for certiorari to the Supreme Court on the grounds that the Coroner had exceeded her powers as no evidence had been adduced at the inquest to prove that the death had been a result of suicide. 34.     On 31 December 2008 the Supreme Court quashed the Coroner’s verdict. The Supreme Court considered the English authorities of R   v.   Huntbach, ex parte Lockley [1944] KB 606 and R v. HM Coroner for Devon, ex parte Glover (1985) 149 JP 208 (see paragraphs 61 and 62 below), noting that: (i) for a coroner to reach the conclusion of suicide, there must be evidence that the deceased wanted to kill himself; and (ii) the court will not quash a finding that the deceased killed himself unless no reasonable coroner would have reached that conclusion. 35.     The Supreme Court then observed that, in the present case, the Coroner’s duty was to examine the evidence and establish whether there were facts which indicated the way in which death came about (τον τρόπο με τον οποίο επήλθε ο θάνατος). The Coroner had not stated which parts of the evidence excluded the possibility that death was caused by something other than suicide, for instance, a criminal act or accident. Thus, there was no ground for concluding that the death was a result of suicide and the Coroner also had the option of recording an “open verdict”. 36.     Having quashed the Coroner’s verdict, the court ordered a second inquest before a different coroner. 8.     The second inquest 37.     The second inquest was conducted over eight days between 5   May   2009 and 5 October 2009. a.     The family’s submissions 38.     At the second inquest, the Nicolaou family submitted that the investigation conducted by the police and P.S. was substandard. P.S., while still on-site, had ruled out the possibility of criminal activity and the police, influenced by this conclusion, quickly drew the conclusion that the deceased had killed himself. 39.     The family further submitted that the police had failed to collect DNA samples from the deceased’s car and personal belongings, and that they also delayed in testing the blood samples found three metres from the deceased’s body. 40.     The family also relied on the failure to run tests on the stomach fluid and P.S.’s apparent failure to measure the deceased’s temperature. They also submitted that, at the mortuary, the right foot of the body had been covered by the left foot so as to conceal traumas on it. Finally, the family claimed that further attention ought to be paid to the deceased’s watch and glasses. b.     The evidence at the second inquest 41.     Five witnesses testified at the second inquest: two members of the Lania Police Department (“LPD”), a chemist from the State General Laboratory, P.S. and O.P. 42.     A member of the LPD, testified that no evidence was found to indicate the movements of the deceased prior to his death. The police investigation had been directed towards an ordinary, unnatural death case, since P.S. had ruled out the possibility of criminal activity on-site. For this reason, no DNA tests had been obtained from the deceased’s car. 43.     The chemist from the State General Laboratory explained that the reason for not examining the stomach content was that, according to the laboratory’s methods, the tests for alcohol and drugs had been prioritised. The chemist explained that had the stomach content been tested, this could have established the time of death and whether the body had been moved. She further testified that the alcohol content traces were low and that the deceased was not under the influence of alcohol at the time of his death. 44.     P.S. testified that, taking into consideration the body’s position and the rest of the findings, there was a strong possibility that the deceased had fallen from the bridge. With reference to the glasses and the watch which had been separated from Mr. Nicolaou’s body, there was a strong possibility that the glasses had been separated during the fall and it was possible that the watch had been cut from the strap when the hand bearing it hit the ground. The possibility of the body having been moved to the site from another area could be ruled out owing to the fact that the cadaveric hypostasis had been found at the surface of the deceased’s back; had the body been moved, these indications would have been different. 45.     With reference to the stomach content, he explained that he had requested that toxicological examinations be made but, in any event, since he had already obtained results from the rest of the samples, an analysis on the stomach content would not have added anything new to his investigation. 46.     Finally, had the deceased been hit on the head by a third person, injuries or bruises would have appeared on the soft tissues of the head: such evidence was, however, absent. 47.     O.P. supported the submissions of the family and testified that the injuries born by the deceased were intentional and that the death was the result of pre-meditated crime. O.P was adamant that the injuries found on the deceased’s body were not the result of a fall from a bridge. Had the body fallen from a height of thirty metres, the speed would have been so great that there would have been a variety of external injuries and the bones would have perforated the soft tissues. The assertion that the body fell from a height was not substantiated. c.     The verdict at the second inquest 48.     In his verdict, the second Coroner focused on the testimonies of the two forensic pathologists, P.S. and O.P.: the rest of the evidence was not of such importance as to strengthen or weaken the position of either side. 49.     The second Coroner concluded that there was not enough evidence to satisfy him – to the degree required in such proceedings – that the death of the deceased was a result of suicide or the result of a criminal act. Therefore, on 19 October 2009, the second Coroner gave his verdict in the following terms: “The testimonies, the evidence and generally all the data provided can only lead the court to one safe conclusion and this is my finding namely, that the deceased’s death is the result of injuries caused by falling from a height.” 50.     On 25 November 2009, the Attorney General decided that, having received the verdict of the second Coroner, he was satisfied that no criminal proceedings should be commenced. B.     Relevant domestic law 51.     The Cypriot inquest system is modelled on the inquest system in England and Wales. The relevant provisions of the Cypriot law on inquests, the relevant case-law of the English courts which are applied in Cypriot inquests, and relevant recent developments in the inquest system in England and Wales are as follows. 1.     The Coroners Law 1959 52.     The holding of inquests in Cyprus is governed principally by the Coroners Law 1959 (Cap. 153) as amended by the Coroners (Amendment) Law 2011. The relevant provisions of the 1959 Law are the following. 53.     An inquest has an investigative character and there are no parties involved in the procedure ( Re: the deceased Lefkos Epifaniou (2010) 1   Α.Α.D 1682 page 1691-1692). The coroner has no authority to assign charges or refer the case to a court since, under Article 113 of the Constitution of Cyprus, powers of prosecution are vested solely in the Attorney General ( Republic v. Pandelides (Coroner), ex parte Costas Papadopoulos (1969) 1 C.L.R. 27, at 28). 54.     It is no part of the coroner’s task to assess criminal or civil liability and an inquest cannot take place when criminal proceedings have been or are about to be instituted in respect of the death in question (section 4(ii)) of the 1995 Law). Similarly, if it emerges in the course of an inquest that there are sufficient grounds for instituting criminal proceedings, the inquest must be stayed (section 23(1) of the 1995 Law). 55.     An inquest and the findings of the coroner are subject to control by the Supreme Court through the prerogative orders including certiorari . An order of certiorari may be granted where, inter alia , the coroner fails to observe the rules of natural justice and commits an error of law. In such instances a writ of certiorari can be granted to annul the inquest and findings of the coroner ( Re: the application of Avraam Pittakis (1994) 1   Α.Α.D. 297, at 299-300). 56.     Section 4 of the 1995 Law provides that: “Whenever a Coroner is informed that the body of a deceased person is lying within his jurisdiction and that there is reasonable cause to suspect that such person–   (a) has died either a violent or unnatural death; or   (b) has died a sudden death of which the cause is unknown; ... the Coroner ... shall conduct an inquest on the body as soon as is practicable.” 57.     Section 12 gives the coroner the power, if he or she considers it necessary, to obtain a medical report from a pathologist on a deceased person’s body. Section 13 provides that, when ordered to do so pursuant to section 12, a pathologist or other medical professional approved by the coroner must examine the body with the aim of determining the cause of death and ascertain the circumstances which are connected to the death. He or she must then submit a written report to the coroner setting out, inter alia , his or her findings and conclusions. Section   13 further provides that, once the report is read by the coroner at the inquest, it shall be considered as prima facie evidence of the facts set out therein without further proof. 58.     Section 17 provides that a coroner conducting an inquest is not bound by any rules of evidence which may be used in a civil or criminal procedure. 59.     Section 25 provides that, after any post-mortem examination, and after the hearing oral evidence, the coroner conducting the inquest should give his or her verdict. He or she must provide a written certificate showing: “so far as such particulars have been proved to him, who the deceased was, and how, when and where the deceased came by his death.” 60.     Section 28(1) provides that the certificate should be transmitted to the President of the District Court. Section 28(2) provides that the President of the District Court may examine the record of any inquest for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding or verdict and as to the regularity of the procedure. By section 28(3), when the President of the District Court, is not satisfied as to the correctness, legality or adequateness of any finding or verdict he may, after allowing the Attorney General the opportunity to be heard, exercise any of the powers vested in him by section 30. These are: ordering an inquest, ordering the re-opening of an inquest so that it may hear more evidence, quashing the verdict and substituting another one, quashing any inquest with or without ordering that a new one be held. 2.     R v. Huntbach and R v. Glover 61 .     In R v. Huntbach, ex parte Lockley [1944] KB 60 the coroner had recorded a verdict of suicide although there was no evidence to support such a verdict: suicide could never be presumed (and the presumption was in fact against it). Later authorities have established that the standard of proof for a finding of suicide is “beyond reasonable doubt” rather than the balance of probabilities; anything short of that standard should result in an open verdict being returned: R v. HM Coroner for Northampton, ex parte Walker (1988) 151 JP 773 and R v. HM Coroner for the City of London, ex parte Barber [1975] 1 WLR 1310. 62 .     In R v. HM Coroner for Devon, ex parte Glover (1985) 149 JP 208 the deceased took twelve times the normal doses of certain tablets: she had been depressed but there was no direct evidence that she intended to take her own life. The Divisional Court refused to quash the Coroner’s verdict of suicide since this was a decision to which a reasonable coroner could have come. 3.     Article 2 and the scope of inquests 63 .     Until the entry into force of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, inquests in England and Wales were governed, inter alia , by the Coroners Act 1988, which had re-enacted successive acts on coroners and inquests dating back to the Coroners Act 1887. 64.     Section 11(5) of the 1988 Act defined the traditional scope of the inquest in England and Wales: it re-enacted the definition laid down in section 3(4) of the 1887 Act. 65.     Section 11(5) specified that the inquisition form (the document completed at the conclusion of the inquest) should set out, so far as such particulars have been proved: (i) who the deceased was; and (ii) how, when and where the deceased came by his death. This was supplemented by Rule   36 of the Coroners Rules 1984, which required that proceedings be directed solely to ascertaining: (a) who the deceased was; (b) how, when and where he came by his death. 66.     In R v. H.M. Coroner for North Humberside and Scunthorpe, Ex   parte Jamieson [1995] QB 1 the Court of Appeal ruled that “how” in section 11(5) and Rule 36 meant “by what means”, a question directed to how the deceased came by his death, and not “in what broad circumstances”. While a verdict could properly incorporate a brief, neutral, factual statement, the verdict was to be factual, expressing no judgment or opinion and it was not the jury’s function to prepare detailed factual statements. 67.     On 11 March 2004 the House of Lords decided in R (Middleton) ν.   HM Coroner for West Somerset [2004] 2 A.C. 182 and R. (Sacker) v. HM Coroner for West Yorkshire [2004] 1 W.L.R. 796 that the limited scope of “ Jamieson ” inquests to date was, in some cases, incompatible with the procedural requirements of Article 2. To render the inquest system compatible with Article 2, the House of Lords decided that the “how” (section 11(5)(b)(ii) of the 1988 Act and Rule 36(l)(b) of the Coroners Rules 1984) was henceforth to be interpreted as meaning “by what means and in what circumstances” the deceased came by his death. 68 .     Statutory effect was given to the House of Lords’ rulings in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. Section 5 of that Act, where relevant, provides: “ Matters to be ascertained   (1) The purpose of an investigation under this Part into a person’s death is to ascertain — (a) who the deceased was; . (b) how, when and where the deceased came by his or her death; . ... (2)Where necessary in order to avoid a breach of any Convention rights ... the purpose mentioned in subsection (1)(b) is to be read as including the purpose of ascertaining in what circumstances the deceased came by his or her death...” COMPLAINTS The applicants complain that investigation into the death of the deceased Nicolaou was inadequate. Invoking Article 6, they also complain that the inquest was unfair and failed properly to consider the evidence before it.       QUESTION TO THE PARTIES Having regard to the procedural protection of the right to life (see paragraph   104 of Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986/93, ECHR 2000-VII), was the investigation by the domestic authorities into Athanasios Nicolaou’s death in breach of Article 2 of the Convention?   In their observations the parties are requested to address in particular:   (i)     whether the police investigation covered all crucial matters, including Athanasios Nicolaou’s obvious mental distress over a period of time, his more general psychological and/or psychiatric condition and the treatment he actually received in the light of the statements of his mother and priest;   (ii)     whether the military investigation conducted by Major I.G. into Athanasios Nicolaou’s death was sufficiently independent and impartial ( Sergey Shevchenko v. Ukraine , no. 32478/02, §§ 70 and 71, 4 April 2006; and Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 55721/07, § 172, ECHR 2011); and   (iii)     whether, in considering only the issue of how Athanasios Nicolaou died and not by what means and in what circumstances, the scope of the second inquest was broad enough in scope for the purposes of Article 2 (see, among other authorities, Mosendz v.   Ukraine, no. 52013/08, § 93, 17 January 2013; and R   (Middleton)   v. HM Coroner for West Somerset [2004] 2 AC 182 at paragraph 35).   The Government are also requested to submit a copy of the military investigation file and Major I.G.’s report if one was made.