CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 21 mars 2016

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sA6BC7FA7 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s8229ABDD { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s68C46B95 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s3F59B822 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-transform:uppercase } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } Communicated on 21 March 2016   FIFTH SECTION Application no. 50001/12 Patrick BREYER and Jonas BREYER against Germany lodged on 27 July 2012 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The application concerns the legal obligation of telecommunication providers to store personal details of all their customers, in particular even of customers where such details are not necessary for billing purposes or other contractual reasons. The applicants’ constitutional complaint against several sections of the Telecommunications Act ( Telekommunikations-gesetz ), in its version of 2004 and 2007, was in regards to Section 111 rejected by the Federal Constitutional Court (1 BvR 1299/05, 24   January 2012, decision served on 28 February 2012). The applicants complain under Articles 8 and 10 that their personal data, as users of pre-paid (“pay as you go”) mobile phone SIM cards, is stored by their respective service provider, due to the legal obligation provided by Section 111 of the Telecommunications Act ( Telekommunikationsgesetz ). Consequently they submit that they are not able to communicate anonymously via mobile phone. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Has there been an interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their private life or correspondence, within the meaning of Article 8 § 1 of the Convention?   If so, was that interference in accordance with the law and necessary in terms of Article 8 § 2?   2.     Has there been an interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression, within the meaning of Article 10 § 1 of the Convention?   If so, was that interference prescribed by law and necessary in terms of Article 10 § 2?