CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 15 septembre 2016

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sA6BC7FA7 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:right } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s8229ABDD { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s68C46B95 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s3F59B822 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-transform:uppercase } .sA8776625 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sD3B63DAD { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic }   Communicated on 15 September 2016   SECOND SECTION Application no. 32349/16 Dušan VUJNOVIĆ against Croatia lodged on 2 June 2016 STATEMENT OF FACTS The applicant, Mr Dušan Vujnović, is a Croatian national who was born in 1963 and lives in Zagreb. He is represented before the Court by Ms   S.   Čanković, a lawyer practising in Zagreb. The circumstances of the case The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows. The applicant’s parents, A.V. and M.V., were killed in 1993. Criminal proceedings were instituted in 2001 against a general of the Croatian Army, R.A., before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereinafter “the ICTY”), on charges of war crimes against the civilian population, which included the killing of the applicant’s parents. R.A. was acquitted. It appears that in 2010 a further set of criminal proceedings was instituted in Croatia against T.M., a key figure in the Croatian police during the war in Croatia, on charges of war crimes against the civilian population, including the killing of the applicant’s parents. He was convicted in 2016. In the meantime, in 2006 the applicant brought a civil action seeking damages from the State in connection with the killing of his parents. The claim was dismissed on the grounds that the claim had become statutorily barred; this was because the applicant must have learned about the death of his parents in 2001 when the indictment was brought against R.A. before the ICTY. The applicant’s father was declared to have been dead since 10   September 1993 by a decision of the Zagreb Civil Court of 16 December 2011, and the applicant’s mother since 9 September 1993 by a decision of the same court of 18   December 2012. COMPLAINTS The applicant complains under the procedural aspect of Article 2 of the Convention that there has been no effective investigation into the deaths of his parents in order to identify the direct perpetrators. He also complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the civil proceedings for damages, arguing that the practice of the Supreme Court as to the manner of calculating the statutory limitation period is inconsistent, and that the manner in which it was applied in his case deprived him of his right of access to court.     QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1. Did the applicant comply with the six-month rule as regards his complaint under the procedural aspect of Article 2 of the Convention?   2.     Having regard to the procedural protection of the right to life (see paragraph 104 of Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986/93, ECHR 2000-VII), has there been an investigation in the present case by the domestic authorities, in accordance with the requirements under Article 2 of the Convention?   3.     Has there been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in the following respects:   (a) Has there been a disproportionate restriction on the applicant’s right of access to court because the national courts dismissed his claim for damages on the grounds that the statutory limitation period had expired?   (b) Has the principle of legal certainty been respected as regards the decision of the Supreme Court that the applicant’s claim for damages had become statutorily barred? In particular, are there “profound and long-standing differences” in the case-law of the Supreme Court on that issue (in view of the Supreme Court’s judgments nos. Rev-471/06 of 27 September 2006; Rev- 270/06-2 of 10 October 2007; Rev-1518/10-2 of 7 December 2011; and Rev-1668/10-2 of 14 July 2015)? If so, does the domestic law provide for machinery for overcoming these inconsistencies, and if so has that machinery been applied and to what effect?