CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 11 janvier 2017

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sA6BC7FA7 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:right } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s8229ABDD { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s68C46B95 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s3F59B822 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-transform:uppercase } .sA8776625 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sD3B63DAD { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .s76CF415B { page-break-before:always; clear:both }   Communicated on 11 January 2017   FOURTH SECTION Application no. 72475/10 Nana TKHELIDZE against Georgia lodged on 25 November 2010 STATEMENT OF FACTS 1.     The applicant, Ms Nana Tkhelidze, is a Georgian national who was born in 1961 and currently resides in Tbilisi. She is represented before the Court by Ms L. Aptsiauri, a lawyer practising in Tbilisi. A.     The circumstances of the case 2.     The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows. 3.     By a judgment of 25 October 2010 the Tbilisi City Court found the applicant guilty of three counts of trading in influence (Article 339(1) of the Criminal Code of Georgia). 4.     According to the judgment, the applicant, who at the material time was working as a defence lawyer, had a friendly relationship with a lawyer, Mr D.J. The latter knew that the applicant had good contacts within a particular prosecutor’s office and approached the applicant with a request to use, in return for payment, her influence and connections with a then district prosecutor, Mr M.A., who was in charge of the criminal case against one of Mr D.J.’s clients, to reach a favourable plea bargain. The applicant agreed. Later she informed Mr D.J. that she had reached a favourable plea bargain for his client with Mr M.A. Mr D.J. paid the applicant the sum they had agreed. On two other occasions Mr D.J. again asked the applicant for similar assistance in return for payment, this time following the advice of a then prosecutor, Mr L.B., who was in charge of criminal cases against two of Mr   D.J.’s clients. In particular, Mr D.J. asked Mr L.B. for favourable plea bargains for his clients. The latter stated that it had been his supervisor – a then district prosecutor, Mr G.M., who had made the ultimate decisions and advised Mr D.J. to approach the applicant, who had been a very good acquaintance of Mr G.M. The applicant had agreed and subsequently plea bargains had been reached with the two clients of Mr D.J. and the latter had paid solid sums to the applicant in respect of each client separately. 5.     The first-instance court relied on the testimony of Mr D.J. in finding the applicant guilty; classified case files obtained through operative-investigative activities and the testimony of one of Mr D.J.’s clients, who, albeit without making any incriminatory statement against the applicant, confirmed that he had been aware of the ongoing negotiations concerning his plea bargain and had been given a so-called operative sum by his lawyer to that end. 6.     During a hearing before the first-instance court the applicant lodged an application to call as witnesses the persons mentioned in Mr D.J.’s testimony, particularly the district prosecutors Mr M.A. and Mr G.M and the prosecutor Mr L.B., who in the meantime had been convicted of bribery. The applicant stated that these persons could have given details of their relationship and of the alleged influence on them. The court rejected the application without giving any reasons. During the proceedings the applicant left the courtroom in protest, requesting that the judge deliver a judgment in her absence. On 25 October 2010 she was found guilty on all the charges. 7.     The applicant appealed against her conviction. On 30 December 2010 the Tbilisi Court of Appeal, dispensing with an oral hearing, delivered a decision fully upholding the applicant’s conviction imposed on her on 25   October 2010. Concerning the application to have witnesses called, the court stated that it could not decide on this particular point as the interim decision of the first-instance court in this connection had not been appealed against by the applicant in accordance with the law. 8.     On 11 May 2011 the Supreme Court of Georgia dismissed as inadmissible an appeal on points of law by the applicant. B.     Relevant domestic law 9.     Under Article 525 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure, a final decision of a district (city) court, except a judgment, can be appealed against by lodging an interlocutory appeal. A decision (ruling) which has been delivered during a hearing and is not final can be appealed against together with a judgment. COMPLAINTS 10.     The applicant complains under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention that the domestic courts deprived her of an opportunity to defend her case, by refusing to examine several witnesses on her behalf. Moreover, the Tbilisi Court of Appeal conducted the appeal proceedings without an oral hearing.   QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Did the applicant have a fair hearing in the determination of the criminal charges against her, in accordance with Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention? In particular:   1.1.     Was the failure of the domestic courts to examine Mr M.A., Mr   G.M., and Mr L.B. in court in breach of Article 6 § 3 (d) taken in conjunction with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention?   1.2.     In this connection, was the applicant required under domestic legislation to appeal against the refusal of the Tbilisi City Court to examine witnesses on her behalf by lodging an interlocutory appeal?   1.3.     Was there a violation of the applicant’s right to a fair trial under Article   6 §   1 of the Convention on account of the appellate court’s refusal to hold an oral hearing?