CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 10 janvier 2017

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sA6BC7FA7 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:right } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s8229ABDD { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s68C46B95 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s3F59B822 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-transform:uppercase } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic }   Communicated on 10 January 2017   THIRD SECTION Application no. 51283/14 Galina Petrovna VALYUSHCHENKO against Russia lodged on 22 June 2014 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The application concerns removal of the applicant’s son’s organs after his death for the purpose of transplantation, in the absence of the applicant’s explicit consent. QUESTIONS tO THE PARTIES 1.     Did the applicant express orally her objection to the removal of her son’s organs for the purpose of transplantation, as alleged by her? If so, the Government are invited to comment on the questions below in the light of that circumstance.   On the assumption that the applicant did not expressly object to the removal of her son’s organs for the purpose of transplantation,   2.     Did that removal of the applicant’s son’s organs without his prior consent or that of the applicant constitute an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for her private and/or family life, within the meaning of Article   8   §   1 of the Convention (see Petrova v. Latvia , no.   4605/05, § 89, 24 June 2014, and Elberte v. Latvia , no. 61243/08, § 107, ECHR 2015)?   If so,   (a)     Was that interference “in accordance with the law”? In particular, what was the legal basis for that interference? Did the relevant Russian legislation, as in force at the material time, meet the requirements of clarity and foreseeability? In particular, were there disagreements among the competent authorities as to the scope and interpretation of Russian legislation on organ transplantation (see Elberte , cited above, § 113)? Also, was any system of informing the general public about that legislation, and/or regulation in that area, in place, in accordance with the Russian Constitutional Court’s decision no. 459-O of 4 December 2003? Did the relevant Russian legislation as in force at the time provide sufficient protection against arbitrariness?   (b)     Did that interference pursue a legitimate aim?   (c)     Was that interference “necessary”, within the meaning of Article   8   §   2 of the Convention?   3.     Was there any system in place of informing relatives of those deceased whose organs had been removed for the purpose of transplantation of that fact? Was the applicant duly notified of the removal of her son’s organs? If not, was her right to respect for her private and/or family right, within the meaning of Article 8   §   1 of the Convention respected?