CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 10 avril 2017

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sA6BC7FA7 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:right } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s8229ABDD { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s68C46B95 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s3F59B822 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-transform:uppercase } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sD3B63DAD { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s9296A950 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s39A7D870 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid }     Communicated on 10 April 2017   FOURTH SECTION Application no. 21786/15 Péter LAKATOS against Hungary lodged on 24 April 2015 STATEMENT OF FACTS The applicant, Mr Péter Lakatos, is a Hungarian national, who was born in 1986 and lives in Gyál. He is represented before the Court by Mr   G.T.   Takács, a lawyer practising in Budapest. On 26 February 2011 the Pest Central District Court remanded the applicant in custody under Article 129 § 2 (b) and (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure on suspicion of aggravated murder within the meaning of Article 166 § 1 of the Criminal Code. It summarized the suspicion against him, referred to the police reports, the autopsy report, the victim’s medical documents, examinations of various exhibits and the witness testimonies and concluded that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had poisoned the victim on 8 April 2010. The court found it established that there was a need for the applicant’s detention because otherwise he would temper with evidence by exerting pressure on the witnesses, as evidenced by his previous conduct of threatening them. It also held that the applicant’s “unclear” financial situation and the severity of the punishment demonstrated the risk of the applicant’s absconding. The court gave no consideration to the request of the applicant’s lawyer to place the applicant in house arrest. The appeal against this decision was dismissed on 3 March 2011. On 21 March 2011 the Buda Central District Court extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 26 May 2011. It noted again that because of the severity of the punishment and the fact that the applicant had neither a permanent address nor a regular income, there were grounds to believe that the applicant would abscond. The court held that there was a risk of his interfering with the investigation if he were to threaten the witnesses or destroy physical evidence. The applicant appealed, arguing that the conditions for pre-trial detention had not been fulfilled because there was no risk of his absconding or influencing witnesses. He argued that his settled personal circumstances, that is, the fact that he lived with his common-law wife and two children, his parents, and his brother’s family, and the fact that he had no criminal record excluded the risk of his absconding. He further submitted that he had been cooperative with the investigation authorities. Alternatively, the applicant requested his release and that he be placed under house arrest. The first-instance decision was upheld on appeal by the Budapest Regional Court on 15 April 2011, with the reasoning that the interest of the public in the applicant’s detention was more important than his interest in the respect of his right to liberty. On 23 May 2011 the Buda Central District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 26 August 2011. The court maintained its previous reasons justifying the need for his detention. It emphasized that there was a risk of absconding owing the severity of the punishment, the fact that the applicant had no declared employment and had not been reachable at his permanent address. It added that if released the applicant might influence the witnesses or destroy evidence. On 22 June 2011 the Budapest Regional Court upheld this decision. On 24 August 2011 the Budapest District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 26 November 2011 under Article 129 § 2 (b) (risk of absconding) and (c) (risk of collusion) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As regards the risk of absconding, the court found that although the applicant had not been reachable at his permanent address and only had temporary jobs, his temporary residence had been known and he had no criminal record. However, given the seriousness of the potential punishment and his “unstable” financial circumstances, his presence at the proceedings could only be ensured through the most restrictive measure. As regards the risk of collusion, the court dismissed the argument of the applicant’s lawyer that the prosecution authorities should have questioned all the witnesses at that stage of the proceedings. It held that although the majority of the witnesses had been heard, their further question could have been still necessary. On 26 August 2011 the Budapest Regional Court upheld the lower court’s decision under Article 129 § 2 (b) and (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Subsequently, the applicant’s pre-trial detention was extended at a number of occasions. In particular, on 24 February 2012 the Budapest High Court held that the unclarified financial situation of the applicant and the seriousness of the crime substantiated the risk of absconding. It also found, without further reasoning, that there were grounds to believe that at that stage of the proceedings the applicant would influence the witnesses. In his appeal the applicant argued that the investigation authorities carried out no procedural measures, the proceedings were unreasonable lengthy and that he had constantly been reachable at this temporary residence. On 8 March 2012 the Budapest Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. On 25 April 2012 the applicant’s pre-trial detention was extended by the Budapest High Court until 26 June 2012. The court maintained that the detention was still necessary because of the risk of the applicant’s absconding pursuant to Article   129 § 2 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It considered that the applicant had no “financial or existential” bounds, counterbalancing the risk of him escaping an eventual serious punishment. Although he had family ties, an under-aged child and a relative who gave assurances to provide for him if released, given the seriousness of the charges, the gravity of the punishment and his unstable financial circumstances, there was a real risk that he absconded. However, the court did not find that the risk of collusion (Article   129 § 2 (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure) was substantiated, since there was no way to influence any of the investigative measures the prosecution had relied on. It also considered that although there was likelihood that during the two years following the commitment of the crime the acquaintances and relatives of the applicant had tried to influence witnesses, there was no reliable information that this had actually taken place and a hypothetical risk of further attempts to do so could not substantiate the risk of collusion. This decision was upheld on appeal on 7 May 2012. On 22 June 2012 the applicant’s pre-trial detention was extended until 26   August 2012. The court agreed with the applicant’s contestation that his unsettled personal circumstances could not be relied on after the passing of a lengthy period of time following his arrest to justify his detention. It nonetheless held that in the absence of any financial bounds, his family ties could not counterbalance the risk of his absconding. This decision was upheld on appeal by the Budapest Court of Appeal on 28 June 2012. The Budapest High Court extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention on 21   August 2012, reiterating the same arguments as before. The second-instance court upheld the decision on 24 August 2012. On 4 October 2012 the detention was extended until 26 November 2012. On 24 October 2012 the applicant’s pre-trial detention was extended again for a month under Article   129 § 2 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, the Budapest High Court expressed doubts whether there was enough evidence to conclude that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the crime. It considered that, irrespective of the seriousness of the charges, the risk of his absconding appeared to diminish, since he was raising two under-aged children and had no criminal record. On appeal the Budapest Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance judgment but extended the applicant’s detention for two months. On 21 December 2012, the applicant’s detention was extended; the Budapest High Court again referred to the fact that at the time of his arrest, the applicant was unreachable at his permanent address and lived from temporary jobs, which substantiated the risk of absconding. The decision was upheld on appeal on 10 January 2013. On 22 February 2013 the Budapest High Court released the applicant from pre-trial detention and placed him in house arrest under bail. According to the decision, besides the suspicion against the applicant, the only ground to restrict his liberty was the risk of absconding given the gravity of the offence, and this in itself could not justify his continued pre-trial detention. On appeal, the Budapest Court of Appeal reversed the first ‑ instance decision and placed the applicant in detention on 28   March 2013. It noted that given the seriousness of the offence there was a danger of his absconding, irrespective of his family ties. On 23 April 2013 the Budapest High Court released the applicant from detention with an undertaking not to leave his place of residence. Relying on the Court’s case-law the High Court found that pre-trial detention could only serve as a measure of last resort and the applicant’s continued detention would only serve as an anticipated punishment. The decision was overturned by the Budapest Court of Appeal on 26 April 2016, placing the applicant in detention with the same reasons as before. On 17 June 2013 the Budapest Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office preferred a bill of indictment. On 25 June 2013 the Budapest High Court extended the applicant’s detention until the date of the first-instance court’s judgment, under Article   129 § 2 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of absconding), for essentially the same reasons as before. On 28 January and 18 April 2014 the applicant applied for release, which was dismissed on 18 February and 24 April 2014, respectively. The applicant’s detention was reviewed on 16 July 2014 by the Budapest Court of Appeal. It held that the gravity of the offence, the applicant’s lack of financial resources and of existential bounds, and the fact that he only notified the authorities of his place of residence once placed in detention substantiated the risk of his absconding. This decision was upheld on appeal by the Kúria on the 24 September 2014, endorsing the reasons given by the lower-level court. The Kúria also found that the applicant’s pre-trial detention was both necessary and proportionate and no less restrictive measure was sufficient to ensure the purpose of the criminal proceedings. On 29 October 2014 the applicant was found guilty of aggravated murder and sentenced to eighteen years’ imprisonment by the Budapest High Court. COMPLAINT The applicant complains under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention that his pre-trial detention has been repeatedly extended without the courts taking into account his personal circumstances and applying only formulaic reasoning. Furthermore, his detention extended the reasonable length since the domestic authorities failed to display diligence in the conduct of the proceedings. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Have the repeated extensions of the applicant’s pre-trial detention been in breach of the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, given the rather formulaic reasoning provided by the courts and the apparent lack of consideration of alternative measures?   2.     Does the present case lend itself to the pilot judgment procedure (Article   46 § 1)?   3.     In particular, do the facts of the present application reveal the existence of a structural or systemic problem or other similar dysfunction, which has given rise or may give rise to similar applications (see Rule   61 §§   1 and 2 of the Rules of Court)?