CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 12 mars 2018

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sA6BC7FA7 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:right } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s8229ABDD { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s68C46B95 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s3F59B822 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-transform:uppercase } .sA8776625 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s72C8F48C { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36.6pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-15.05pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sA20670C4 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:48.75pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .sF7A86111 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; font-size:10pt } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .s550CD9ED { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:55.95pt; margin-bottom:6pt; padding-left:8.4pt; font-family:serif; font-size:10pt } .sD3B63DAD { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt }   Communicated on 12 March 2018   FIRST SECTION Application no. 50718/16 L.V. against the United Kingdom lodged on 22 August 2016 STATEMENT OF FACTS The applicant, L.V., is a British national who was born in 1963 and lives in Rhyl, Wales. She is represented before the Court by Mr J.H.C. Wilson of Switalskis Solicitors, a lawyer practising in Leeds. A.     The circumstances of the case The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows. 1.     The factual background The applicant has a long history of mental health problems for which she has spent several periods in hospital, both voluntarily and under the Mental Health Act 1983 (“MHA”). She has been diagnosed with an “emotionally unstable personality disorder”, which is characterised by a tendency to act impulsively, to conflict with others, and to behave in a self-destructive manner. In addition, in 2004 she was left with significant acquired brain injury and limited mobility after absconding from a residential psychiatric unit and jumping from a bridge over a motorway. The applicant has been convicted of numerous criminal offences, including two previous convictions for arson in 1980 and 1981, a number of assaults, an offence of causing grievous bodily harm with intent, and possession of an offensive weapon. 2.     The applicant’s conviction and sentencing On 14 May 2008 the applicant was convicted of arson with intent to endanger property. At the time of sentencing, a report by a consultant forensic psychiatrist indicated that she suffered from a borderline personality disorder which manifested itself in disturbed and impulsive behaviour, repeated and serious self-harming, aggressive outbursts and low mood. She also had some degree of brain damage due to her injury in 2004. However, as the psychiatrist did not believe that she suffered from problems of a nature or degree that would benefit from hospital admission, it was not open to the judge to make a Hospital Order under section 37 MHA. Nevertheless, having regard to the fact that the applicant had been convicted of arson on two previous occasions, the judge was satisfied that she was dangerous. He therefore handed down an indeterminate sentence, with a minimum term of eighteen months imprisonment. 3.     The review by the Parole Board The minimum term of the applicant’s sentence expired in September   2009 and on 4 June 2010 a panel of the Parole Board considered her case. The evidence before the panel included that of a consultant forensic psychiatrist, who indicated that she should be assessed at a brain injury unit. The panel concluded that she should not be released because she continued to pose a very high risk. A letter dated 8 June 2010 notified the applicant of this decision and stated that her next review would commence in November 2011, with a hearing in May 2012. 4.     The applicant’s transfer to hospital On 20 July 2010 the Secretary of State for Justice directed that the applicant be transferred to hospital under section 47 MHA. A further direction was made under section 49 MHA restricting her discharge. The applicant was transferred to the National Brain Injury Unit at St   Andrew’s Hospital, Northumberland, on 27 July 2010 to undergo psychological work primarily targeted at her brain injury. Her time at the hospital was troubled, with a number of acts of self-harming and numerous acts of aggression – mostly verbal, but also including physical assaults. 5.     Review of the applicant’s detention When patients are transferred to hospital under section 47 MHA, they must first apply to the First-Tier Tribunal (Health, Education and Social Care Chamber) (Mental Health) (“the Tribunal”) for a notification to the Secretary of State that, if subject to a restriction order rather than a restriction direction (in other words, if they had been given a Hospital Order with restrictions at the point of sentencing, rather than subsequently being transferred to hospital from prison with a restriction direction), they would have been entitled to be discharged. If the Secretary of State does not discharge a patient, the matter falls to the Parole Board to consider release. (a)     The Tribunal On 24 May 2011 the applicant applied to the Tribunal for a review of the extent to which her detention was in accordance with the MHA. The first hearing before the Tribunal took place on 1 August 2011, but was adjourned so that a report could be obtained from an independent expert. At a second review on 12 December 2011 there was medical evidence before the Tribunal indicating that the applicant was making significant progress. It was therefore believed that she “would greatly benefit from having her personality disorder addressed in an environment where she could be safely managed and adequate support can be given to facilitate her gradual reintegration back into the community.” Recent discussions had identified non-clinical establishments in Wales which were qualified to provide her with twenty-four hour support and management of the potential risks she presented to herself and others. The applicant’s clinical team supported her transfer to a non-clinical establishment. The Tribunal considered that while the applicant continued to present a diminishing risk to her own health and safety and to the safety of others, this did not necessarily require her to remain in hospital. The Tribunal therefore indicated that it would have ordered her conditional discharge, had suitable arrangements been made for that discharge, if she had been subject to a restriction order rather than a restriction direction. It recommended that she remain in hospital if not discharged, but found that she should be moved from St Andrews to a non-clinical establishment. (b)     The Secretary of State The applicant’s case was referred to the Secretary of State for Justice, who was obliged by section 74(2) MHA to notify the Tribunal of his decision within ninety days. However, it was his policy (as set out in Chapter 10 of the Mental Health Casework Section Casework Manual) never to agree to a conditional discharge in such cases. Consequently, the applicant’s case had to be referred to the Parole Board. The Ministry of Justice received the Tribunal’s conclusions on 19   December 2011. On receiving the case, the Public Protection Casework Section (“PPCS”) began to operate a policy known as the Generic Parole Process (“GPP”). According to that policy, a dossier had to be sent to the Parole Board within twenty-six weeks, ending on the start of the month in which the hearing was to take place. The PPCS therefore set a timetable for an oral hearing before the Parole Board in August 2012. In order to comply with this timetable, a target was set for completion of a report by the Offender Manager by 28 March 2012, and submission of the dossier to the Parole Board by 4 April 2012. The GPP was not the correct policy; it has since been accepted that the PPCS should have applied a policy set out in Chapter 15 of Prison Service Order 4700 (otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Manual, and hereafter referred to as “PSO 4700”), which had come into effect in April   2010 but of which the PPCS were not aware. The PSO 4700 envisaged a reduced timetable which aimed for an oral hearing within thirteen weeks. In the end, the oral review hearing took place on 12 March 2013. Although the report from the Offender Manager was sent to the PPCS on 29   March 2012 (and the dossier was completed on the same day), on 4   April   2012 a single panel member of the Parole Board issued case management directions requesting that the Offender Manager provide a short addendum report by 30 April. However, these directions were not transmitted to the PPCS or the Offender Manager until 23 April. A new target date was set for 4 May but the addendum report was only submitted on 27 June 2012. On 26 March 2012 the applicant had commenced judicial review proceedings on the basis that the delay in listing the Parole Board hearing was in breach of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. Leave was refused on 27   March 2012. Following receipt of the addendum report by the Offender Manager, the legal advisor at the Parole Board dealing with the judicial review contacted the applicant’s solicitor to inform them that she was thinking of putting the case before a panel of the Parole Board, and to ask if they wished to consider the report and/or take instructions first. However, as the solicitor dealing with the matter was away, on 5 July the Parole Board notified the firm that the case would not be put to the panel until they had seen and taken instructions from the applicant. On 5 July 2012 the applicant was moved to Plas Coch, a residential hospital in Wales. On 9 July 2012 permission to apply for judicial review was refused at a renewed hearing, since the delay was not, at that stage, unreasonable. The judge nevertheless indicated that the hearing should take place by the end of September, but expressed hope that it would be expedited. On 8 August the applicant’s solicitor indicated that no further representations were to be made on her behalf. Further directions were issued by a single member of the Parole Board on 17 August 2012 requiring a report from the responsible clinician at Plas   Coch by 31 October. The directions also indicated that the oral hearing had been deferred for three months and that the case would not be put forward for an exact hearing date until all the directions were complied with. These directions were sent to the parties on 5 September 2012. At the same time availability of witnesses was sought for December 2012, January   2013 and February 2013. The report of the responsible clinician at Plas Coch was provided on 19   November 2012. In that report, he envisaged a gradual increase in unescorted leave and recommended that the panel give more time to see how unescorted community leave progressed. On 21 January 2013 the Parole Board fixed the hearing for 12 March 2013. On 27 February, the Offender Manager’s report was sent to the Parole Board. The report indicated that the risks had not sufficiently reduced to enable the applicant to be managed in the community. The responsible clinician at Plas Coch submitted an addendum report on 1 March 2013 in which he recommended a further three to six months to test unescorted visits. He indicated that the programme of testing the applicant on unescorted leave had been delayed by her having absconded twice in January. Another consultant forensic psychiatrist produced a report in or around the same time, which indicated that the applicant still posed a high risk of future fire-setting. At the hearing on 21 March 2013 the applicant’s solicitor did not seek her release but instead invited an adjournment of six months. However, the Parole Board declined to adjourn the hearing. Instead, it found that the applicant still posed a significant risk of fire-setting and declined to direct her release. She was informed that her next review would commence in March 2014, the process leading to a hearing would take twenty-six weeks and the hearing would have a target date of September 2014. (c)     The Mental Health Review Tribunal for Wales In 2013 the applicant applied to the Mental Health Review Tribunal for Wales (the Welsh equivalent of the Tribunal). On 24 February it found that she was coping well with stressful situations and long periods of unescorted leave, and that recall to prison would be entirely inappropriate. 6.     Judicial review proceedings (a)     The Administrative Court On 23 July 2013 the Court of Appeal granted the applicant permission to bring judicial review proceedings. The hearing took place on 18 and 19   March 2014. In light of existing domestic authorities, counsel for the applicant accepted that he could not argue as a matter of principle that the system by which the applicant’s release was considered by two successive bodies was in conflict with her rights under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. However, he argued that on the facts of the case a hearing before a single body would have been both practical and appropriate; or, in the alternative, that if there were to be two hearings before two bodies, there was a legal obligation – which was not complied with – to ensure expedition through the overall process. The Administrative Court dismissed the application for judicial review on 15 May 2014. At the outset, it disagreed with the applicant’s assertion that the Tribunal and the Parole Board were essentially deciding the same issue. First of all, it noted that there was a clear difference of approach to be taken to an offender made the subject of a Hospital Order and an offender, such as the applicant, who was transferred to hospital. Secondly, it was clear from the sentencing remarks of the judge in this case and the approach of the Parole Board that the risks were not solely associated with the applicant’s mental disorder; on the contrary, there was held to be risk associated both with her mental disorder and beyond it (including wider considerations about her background and previous offending). As a consequence, this was not a case where consideration of the risks arising from the applicant’s mental disorder left little more to be addressed; and, as at December 2011, a lot more work was required to be done before the applicant could be discharged from the secure mental hospital. The court accepted that there had been delay, occasioned, in particular, by the application by the PPCS of the incorrect policy. It noted, however, that even if the correct policy had been followed, and a hearing scheduled in or around April 2012, it seemed “strongly likely” that the applicant would not, by then, have been transferred to Plas Coch; and, consequently, that the hearing would have been adjourned to await scrutiny of her progress. The court considered the suggestion that the application of the correct policy (with its accelerated timetable) would have accelerated her date of transfer to Plas Coch to be “speculative”. Moreover, although the applicant complained that during the period between the Tribunal decision and the submission of the dossier to the Parole Board no judicial body was in active control of her case, the court found this point to be theoretical rather than an argument of substance. First, the applicant could have made a direct application to the Parole Board at any time. Secondly, from the point when the Tribunal’s decision reached the Ministry, it was always contemplated that further judicial proceedings would follow and a timetable was set for that. Thirdly, it was almost universally the case that judicial bodies depend on others to progress a case. Finally, and in any event, none of this was likely to have made any difference to the eventual outcome for the applicant. With regard to the period after March 2012, the court found that while there were “multiple causes of short delays”, the critical fact was that the applicant was only moved to Plas Coch on 5 July 2012, and on any sensible view of the case a period of observation and assessment there would have been necessary before the applicant could have achieved discharge. Finally, with regard to the period after the applicant was transferred to Plas Coch, the court found that there was no delay that could be attributed to either the Secretary of State for Justice or the Parole Board. While it noted that there had been some delay from 17 August to 5 September, it was not unwarranted in view of the complexity of the case. (b)     The Court of Appeal The applicant appealed against the decision of the Administrative Court. She contended that the process under which the application for review had to be considered by both the Tribunal and the Parole Board was a breach of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. This civil appeal was heard at the same time as a criminal appeal against sentence by the applicant and five other appellants who had also been given an indeterminate sentence rather than a Hospital Order but were subsequently transferred to hospital under section   47 MHA. These appellants sought to have their release and the terms of release determined by the Tribunal under the MHA (with care after release being provided by health services) rather than the Parole Board (with the regime after release being superintended by the applicable licence regime and supervised by the Probation Service). In a judgment handed down on 5 February 2015 the Court of Appeal found that the Convention did not require that the issues be determined by one single judicial body and, as such, the current regime was not incompatible with Article 5 § 4. In particular, it noted that a prisoner in the applicant’s situation would normally have been given an indeterminate or long sentence of imprisonment, rather than a Hospital Order, because the court concluded that it was most appropriate having regard to all the circumstances, including the elements of culpability that merited punishment. There were therefore two issues to be determined in deciding whether the prisoner could be released: whether the mental disorder or the need to treat the prisoner for her or the public’s protection required continued detention under the MHA; and whether, mental disorder apart, the protection of the public required the prisoner’s detention under section   28 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997. Given that each test met a different concern and related to a different basis for detention under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, the court saw no basis on which it could be said that a State was not entitled to establish differently constituted judicial bodies to determine the distinct issues which arose. Although there was almost invariably an interrelationship between the risks arising out of the mental disorder and those otherwise arising, the risks were different. That being said, the court identified a number of wider issues which Parliament might wish to take into account in reconsidering the present regime, including: the information and evidence that the Tribunal and the Parole Board receive will substantially overlap; as it is often difficult to distinguish between the effect of a mental disorder and other factors, a judicial body, such as the Tribunal and the Parole Board, will in practice require all the relevant information; as it is difficult to determine the appropriate disposal at the date of sentence, it would be much better if there was one single judicial body which could decide – at the time release was being considered – the terms of release and the appropriate regime for supervision in the community; and finally, it might well provide a greater degree of public confidence, particularly from victims, if there was a single body presided over by a judge which was bound to take into account all the factors relevant to release, the conditions of release, and the regime after release. With regard to speediness, it fell to be considered by reference to the overall process of determining the lawfulness of the detention. However, the obligation to make a speedy determination could not be realised without active case management by the Parole Board, and the court identified two aspects in which it was disabled from complying with these obligations. First, active case management did not begin until the dossier of evidence was provided to it (as opposed to when the case was referred to it); and it had no specific statutory powers to enforce its case management directions. In respect of the speediness of the proceedings in the applicant’s case, the court found it necessary to consider the overall time taken to determine the lawfulness of her detention. In doing so, it made the following criticisms: as it was the Secretary of State’s policy never to make a conditional discharge, it was clear that the case would have to be referred to the Parole Board as soon as the Tribunal decision was made; upon referral, the single member of the Parole Board had a sufficiency of material (in the Tribunal decision and the board’s own earlier decision) to make detailed directions; these directions, which could have been made within fourteen days of referral (rather than in April 2012) would have provided for the timely preparation of the report by the Offender Manager; and the Parole Board should have monitored compliance with its directions with considerably greater diligence. Were it not for these failings, the court considered that the thirteen-week timetable could have been achieved. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal agreed with the Administrative Court that it was clear that no decision could have been made to release the applicant until there had been a proper period of assessment at a hospital such as Plas Coch. As no criticism was or could be made of the period of time that elapsed before her transfer therein July 2012, and there was no delay in conducting the subsequent assessment, the court found that on the facts of the case there had been no breach of Article 5 § 4 as a speedy determination could not in fact have been made more quickly than it was. The applicant’s criminal appeal was also dismissed as the Court of Appeal considered that, taking account of the nature of her mental disorder, her culpability for the offence, the need for punishment and the risk to the public, her original sentence had been appropriate. Finally, the Court of Appeal refused the application for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court. Permission was subsequently refused by the Supreme Court on 25 February 2016. B.     Relevant domestic law and practice 1.     The sentencing of offenders suffering from mental disorders Where an offender who is to be sentenced suffers from a mental disorder the court has a number of alternatives. (a)     A Hospital Order under section 37 MHA with or without a restriction under section 41 Pursuant to section 37, a Hospital Order may be made where a court is satisfied, on the written or oral evidence of two registered medical practitioners, that the offender is suffering from a mental disorder of a nature or degree which makes it appropriate for him to be detained in a hospital for medical treatment; and the court is of the opinion, having regard to all the circumstances, including the nature of the offence and the character and antecedents of the offender, and to the other available methods of dealing with him, that the most suitable method of disposing of the case is by means of an order under this section. Where a Hospital Order is made by the Crown Court, and it appears to the court, having regard to the nature of the offence, the antecedents of the offender and the risk of his committing further offences if set at large, that it is necessary for the protection of the public from serious harm so to do, it may, pursuant to section 41, make a restriction order preventing discharge from hospital without the approval of the Ministry of Justice or a Tribunal, and discharge may be subject to certain conditions. If an order is made under section 37/41 MHA, the offender is entitled to a review under section 70 at defined periodic intervals (within six to twelve months after admission and thereafter every twelve months). After an application for a review, the release of the offender, either unconditionally or conditionally, is determined by the First-Tier Tribunal (Health, Education and Social Care Chamber) (Mental Health) (“the Tribunal”). Pursuant to sections 72 and 73 MHA, the Tribunal must direct an absolute discharge: if it is not satisfied that the offender is suffering from a mental disorder of a nature or degree which makes it appropriate for him to be liable to be detained in a hospital for medical treatment, that it is necessary for the health or safety of the patient or for the protection of other persons that he should receive treatment, or that appropriate treatment is available for him; and it is satisfied that it is not appropriate for the person to remain liable to be recalled to hospital for further treatment. Where the first condition is met, but the second is not, then the Tribunal must direct a conditional discharge. (b)     A determinate or indeterminate sentence of imprisonment and direction for admission to hospital under section 45A MHA Section 45A MHA gives the court power, where it is considering making a Hospital Order under section 37, to impose a sentence of imprisonment but direct that, instead of being removed to and detained in a prison, the offender be removed to and detained in such hospital as may be specified in the direction; and direct that the offender be subject to the special restrictions set out in section 41. (c)     An interim order under section 38 MHA The court can, if satisfied on the written or oral evidence of two doctors that the offender is suffering from a mental disorder and that the disorder is such that it may be appropriate for a Hospital Order to be made, authorise his admission to a hospital under an interim hospital order. Under section   38(5) such an order can only be made for a period up to twelve weeks but can be renewed for further periods of not more than twenty-eight days up to a total period of twelve months. (d)     A determinate or indeterminate sentence allowing the Secretary of State to exercise his powers of transfer to a hospital under section 47 with or without a limitation order under section 49 Under section 47 MHA the Secretary of State can transfer to hospital a person sentenced to imprisonment if satisfied by reports from at least two registered medical practitioners that the prisoner is suffering from a mental disorder; the mental disorder makes it appropriate for the prisoner to be detained in hospital for medical treatment; and appropriate medical treatment is available. This power is exercised by means of a transfer direction and is by the express terms of section 47 to have the same effect as a Hospital Order made under section 37. In addition, under section 49 MHA the order transferring the prisoner to hospital can be made subject to a restriction direction which has the same effect as a restriction order under section 41 MHA. If a prisoner is sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment and then transferred under section 47/49 MHA to a hospital, his continued detention is governed by section 74 MHA. If the offender applies to the Tribunal (as he entitled to do every twelve months), then the Tribunal must inform the Secretary of State whether, in its view, the offender ought to be absolutely or conditionally discharged from the hospital under the tests set out in sections 72 and 73 MHA (see above). If its view is that the offender should be conditionally discharged then it may recommend that, if he is not discharged, then he should continue to be detained in hospital. If the Secretary of State is notified that the offender would be entitled to be absolutely or conditionally discharged, then he or she has ninety days within which to notify the Tribunal that the offender can be discharged; if   the Secretary of State gives no such notification, then the offender is returned to prison unless the Tribunal has made a recommendation that he should continue to be detained in hospital. If the prisoner remains in hospital or is returned to prison, the question of the prisoner’s release is then determined by the Parole Board applying the provisions of section 28 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997. In accordance with these provisions, release can only be directed if the Parole Board is satisfied that it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public that the prisoner should be confined. Pursuant to section 28(7) of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 an offender is entitled to a review by the Parole Board at any time after the expiry of the minimum term and thereafter every two years after a previous determination by the Parole Board. 2.     Prison Service Order 4700 (otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Manual, and hereafter referred to as “PSO 4700”) Chapter 15 of PSO 4700, as amended, deals with prisoners in the Claimant’s position as follows: “ 15.18 Preparation of Parole Board dossier following discharge recommendation In cases where the lifer/IPP is tariff expired/about to become tariff expired and MHCS has informed PPCS the Tribunal has recently recommended that the prisoner is ready for conditional discharge but if not discharged s/he should remain in hospital, PPCS must arrange for the case to be referred to the Parole Board for listing for a hearing under section 28 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997, as soon as possible, to consider suitability for release direct from hospital. 15.19 MHCS should provide PPCS with the papers considered by the Tribunal which, along with its decision and reasons, should be attached in the ‘Relevant Papers’ section. The RC report should normally provide a summary of progress in hospital. 15.20 The Tribunal papers will normally include a: statement by the Secretary of State setting out the circumstances of the offence, the events leading to admission to hospital and observations on the patient’s suitability for discharge. list of previous convictions clinical reports, and a social work report. 15.21 PPCS will commission a report from the Offender Manager (IPP)/Home Probation Officer (Lifers), who has 28 days in which to complete and return the report. PPCS will also prepare the skeleton dossier for the Parole Board review and will send it together with the Offender Manager (IPP)/Home Probation Officer (Lifers) report, to the RC at the hospital within 7 days of receiving the Report. PPCS will also forward a copy of the dossier to the Parole Board. It is the responsibility of the RC/hospital managers to ensure that the dossier is disclosed to the lifer/IPP and that s/he submits any representations to the Parole Board within 28 days. 15.22 In cases where an Offender Manager/HPO has not been allocated to the case, PPCS will contact the Probation Area involved at the time of the sentencing to request that a Supervising Probation Officer be allocated to the case. In cases of difficulty, the NOMS Offender Management and Assessment Unit must be contacted for assistance. 15.23 Consideration by the Parole Board Cases where the prisoner is detained in hospital and a Tribunal recommendation for discharge has recently been received are normally considered at an oral hearing by the Parole Board using a reduced timetable of 13 weeks. The oral hearing will take place at the hospital in which the prisoner is being detained.” 3.     Relevant domestic case-law In the case of R(P) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department Mr   Justice Stanley Burnton, as he then was, found that the applicant’s submission that the Convention required there to be a single tribunal “if correct, results in an unnecessary, unreasonable and impractical interpretation of Article 5.4. It is evident that the Member States might sensibly create different and differently qualified ‘courts’ to determine the lawfulness of detention under different heads of Article 5.1. The effect of [the applicant’s] submissions would be to render it at least difficult for Member States to have the various grounds for detention considered by specialist courts. I do not think that the Convention should be given such an unreasonable interpretation. Provided there is no undue delay in the review of the lawfulness of detention, or other infringement of a Convention right, there is no reason to require that the same court (whether nominally one court or a panel that sits as more than one court) determine each head of detention.” He went on to note: “If separate hearings by tribunals and DLP’s [Discretionary Lifer Panels, one of a number of Parole Board panels] necessarily result in a failure by the State to provide the speedy decision of the review of the lawfulness of detention that is required by Article 5.4, then such hearings are incompatible with the Convention right, and other provision must be made. However, it is only if breach of the Convention right is inevitable that there is incompatibility.” Having considered the domestic regime, he concluded that: “in my judgment there is no necessary breach of the requirement of a speedy hearing caused by the provision of successive hearings by a mental health review tribunal and (if that results in discharge from MHA detention) a DLP. Whether, in individual cases, there is delay such that Article 5.4 is not complied with is to be determined on their particular facts .” COMPLAINT The applicant complains under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention that she did not have a speedy review of the legality of her detention. In particular, she contends that her right to a speedy review was violated both by delays on the part of the Public Protection Casework Section and the Parole Board, and from the unnecessary two-stage Tribunal/Parole Board process. QUESTION TO THE PARTIES Was the review of the applicant’s detention which commenced on 24   May 2011 and concluded on 21 March 2013 conducted “speedily” within the meaning of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention?