CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 28 juin 2018

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sA6BC7FA7 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:right } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s8229ABDD { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s68C46B95 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s3F59B822 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-transform:uppercase } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic }   Communicated on 28 June 2018   FIFTH SECTION Application no. 175/11 Sabir KHALILI against Azerbaijan lodged on 6 December 2010 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The application concerns the refusal by the applicant’s former employer, the State-owned Sumgayit “Organic-Synthesis” Plant, to reimburse his expenses for purchasing a special vehicle as a disabled person, which he was allegedly entitled to in accordance with Article 1118.1 of the Civil Code and Decisions nos. 433 and 3 of the Cabinet of the Ministers dated 5 August 1993 and 9 January 2003 respectively. The domestic courts refused to examine the applicant’s claim on the merits finding that it had been res judicata . The applicant disagreed with that finding, arguing that in the previous set of proceedings the courts had dismissed his claim that he should be provided with a special vehicle indicating that, after purchasing the vehicle himself, the applicant could have lodged a new claim for reimbursement. QUESTIONS tO THE PARTIES 1.     Has there been a breach of the applicant’s right of access to court, as guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention? In particular, was the applicant’s claim against the employer res judicata under the domestic law?   2.     Has there been an interference with the applicant’s peaceful enjoyment of his possessions, within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol   No. 1 to the Convention? If so, was that interference in accordance with the conditions provided for by law and did that interference impose an excessive individual burden on the applicant?