CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 13 novembre 2018

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sA6BC7FA7 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:right } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s8229ABDD { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s68C46B95 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s3F59B822 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-transform:uppercase } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt }   Communicated on 13 November 2018   FOURTH SECTION Application no. 45315/18 Vitomir GROS against Slovenia lodged on 21 September 2018 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The present case concerns the right of access to court and an alleged interference with the applicant’s right to property on the grounds of a municipal ordinance issued in 2004 when the land at issue was still a subject of the denationalisation proceedings. In 2008 and 2011, respectively, the denationalisation request was granted and the land at issue was returned in natura to the applicant, one of the legal successors of the previous owners. On 19 July 2016 the administrative authorities annulled the above denationalisation decisions in so far as they concerned the part of the land classified as a public road by the municipal ordinance. The applicant lodged a petition for the review of the constitutionality and legality of the said ordinance by which a part of his land had been classified as a public road, but the petition was rejected by the Constitutional Court on the grounds that he had failed to comply with the subjective one year time-limit – that is a one year time-limit which runs from the moment the affected party has learned of the “adverse consequences” of the impugned act. In particular, the Constitutional Court considered that the applicant had failed to show that he could not have learned of the ordinance’s “adverse consequences” earlier.   The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that by refusing to consider his petition for the review of the constitutionality and legality on the merits, the Constitutional Court denied him access to court. The applicant further complains of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 because his land was nationalised on the basis of an unlawful municipal ordinance of which he had been unaware until 2016.   QUESTIONS tO THE PARTIES   1.     Is Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 applicable in the present case?   2.     If so, has there been an interference with the applicant’s peaceful enjoyment of possessions, within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol   No.   1? Has this interference been lawful and proportionate (see Iatridis v.   Greece [GC], no. 31107/96, §   58, ECHR 1999 ‑ II)?   3.     Did the applicant have a fair hearing in accordance with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in the proceedings before the Constitutional Court? In particular, having regard to the documents submitted by the applicant together with his petition for the review of the constitutionality and legality and to the reasoning of the Constitutional Court, did that court’s decision amount to an excessive restriction on the applicant’s right of access to court (see Blumberga v. Latvia, no. 70930/01, § 78, 14 October 2008; De Geouffre de la Pradelle v. France , 16 December 1992, § 34, Series   A no.   253 ‑ B; and Neshev v. Bulgaria , no. 40897/98, §§ 37 and 38, 28   October 2004). Furthermore, when did the applicant have a reasonable possibility to learn of the Ordinance of 31 January 2004 by which the roads running over the land at issue were classified as public roads (see Neshev , cited above, §   38)?