CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 6 février 2019

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sA6BC7FA7 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:right } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s8229ABDD { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s68C46B95 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s3F59B822 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-transform:uppercase }   Communicated on 6 February 2019   FIFTH SECTION Application no. 22323/16 Ilkin RUSTAMZADE against Azerbaijan lodged on 15 April 2016 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The application concerns the criminal conviction of a civil society activist for hooliganism, illegal possession of weapons and mass disorder. The applicant claims that the criminal case against him was fabricated and that he was convicted because of his social activism. QUESTIONS tO THE PARTIES 1.     Did the applicant have a fair hearing in the determination of the criminal charges against him, in accordance with Article   6 §   1 of the Convention? In particular, did the domestic courts establish the existence of all the elements of the criminal offences of which the applicant was convicted and provide reasons for their decisions? Was the applicant’s conviction based on unlawfully obtained evidence? Was the applicant able to obtain the attendance of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him, as required by Article   6 § 3   (d) of the Convention?   2.     Did the act of which the applicant was convicted constitute a criminal offence under national law at the time when it was committed, as envisaged by Article   7 of the Convention? In particular, were the performance, organisation, preparation or video recording of “Harlem Shake” dance and its subsequent uploading to YouTube considered a criminal offence under national law?   3.     Has there been an interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression within the meaning of Article 10 § 1 of the Convention as a result of his criminal conviction? In particular, did his criminal conviction for hooliganism amount to an interference with the exercise of his freedom of expression? If so, was that interference prescribed by law and necessary in terms of Article 10 § 2?   4.     Were the restrictions imposed by the State in the present case, purportedly pursuant to Articles 6 and 10 of the Convention, applied for a purpose other than those envisaged by those provisions, contrary to Article   18 of the Convention?