CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 15 mars 2019

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sA6BC7FA7 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:right } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s8229ABDD { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s68C46B95 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s3F59B822 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-transform:uppercase } .sD3B63DAD { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic }   Communicated on 15 March 2019   THIRD SECTION Application no. 11200/18 Lada Yuryevna RYASNOVA and X against Russia lodged on 2 March 2018 STATEMENT OF FACTS The applicants, Ms Lada Yuryevna Ryasnova and X, are Russian nationals, who were born in 1983 and 2010 respectively and live in Moscow. The applicants are mother and daughter. The first applicant lodged the application on her own behalf and on behalf of her daughter, who is a minor. They are represented before the Court by Mr Y. Georgiades, a lawyer practising in Cyprus. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows. From April 2009 to March 2014 the first applicant was in a relationship with M., a wealthy businessman. They kept their relationship a secret because both the first applicant and M. were married. In 2010 the first applicant gave birth to a daughter, the second applicant. The first applicant’s husband, S., was registered as the second applicant’s father. However, on 4 April 2011 the Dorogomilovskiy District Court of Moscow allowed S.’s claim contesting his paternity of the second applicant. After a DNA test established that S. was not the second applicant’s biological father, the court terminated S.’s parental status in respect of her. According to the applicants, M. never doubted that the second applicant was his daughter, although he never acknowledged his paternity officially. He frequently visited the applicants, supported them financially, and even bought them a flat. In April 2014 M. was murdered. The local Investigations Committee opened a criminal investigation into his murder. On 4 September 2014 the first applicant, acting on behalf of the second applicant, applied to the Zyuzinskiy District Court of Moscow in order to establish M.’s paternity of the second applicant and have her recognised as M.’s heir. She submitted evidence of her relationship with M. and asked for a DNA test. M.’s mother, his widow and his legitimate son N. were cited as co-defendants. In reply to the judge’s request, on 8 April 2015, the Investigations Committee confirmed that M.’s blood sample had been taken in the framework of the criminal investigation into his murder and that it would be stored in the archives until the end of the criminal proceedings. It refused to allow any access to the blood sample for fear that it might be inadvertently lost or destroyed. However, it informed the judge that a DNA test had been performed on that blood sample in the framework of the criminal proceedings and M.’s DNA profile established. That DNA profile was stored in the Forensic Medical Experts Centre of the Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation and could be used for a paternity test. On 9 April 2015 the Zyuzinskiy District Court ordered that the Forensic Medical Experts Centre of the Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation perform a paternity test on the basis of M.’s DNA profile, and also a comparative DNA test between the second applicant and M.’s legitimate son N. On 19 June 2015 the Forensic Medical Experts Centre found that the probability that M. was the second applicant’s biological father was 99,99999999994%. The probability that M. was N.’s biological father was 99,999994%. The probability that the second applicant and N. were half ‑ siblings having the same biological father was 99,77%. On 17 November 2015 the Zyuzinskiy District Court found that the expert opinion of 19 June 2015 was “doubtful” because the investigator had refused to give the court a copy of the expert opinion describing M.’s DNA profile referring to the secret of the investigation; because there was no evidence that the material examined by the experts had been indeed obtained from the criminal case-file and that the parties to the present civil case had been given access to that material; because the experts had not explained how they had analysed M.’s DNA profile; and because there was no evidence that the experts had been warned about criminal liability for a false expert opinion or informed about their rights and obligations. The court therefore ordered that a limited liability company “Molecular Genetics Centre” perform a new paternity test and comparative DNA test between the second applicant and N. By letter of 22 January 2016 the Investigations Committee informed the applicants that a copy of the expert opinion describing M.’s DNA profile could be provided at the judge’s request. On 10 February 2016 the Molecular Genetics Centre found that it could not perform a paternity test because it had no access to M.’s genetic material. The comparative DNA test was performed exclusively on the basis of DNA samples provided by the second applicant and N. The probability that the second applicant and N. were either half-siblings, or uncle and niece, or grand-father and grand-daughter was 98,5%. The probability that the second applicant and M. were either cousins, or a half-uncle and half ‑ niece, or a great-uncle and great-niece was 97,2%. On 15 March 2016 the applicants asked that the Zyuzinskiy District Court request a copy of the expert opinion describing M.’s DNA profile from the Investigations Committee. The Court rejected that request, finding that it was no longer necessary after a second DNA test had been performed by the Molecular Genetics Centre. On 15 March 2016 the Zyuzinskiy District Court rejected the applicants’ claims as unsubstantiated. It found that the evidence of their relationship with M. – such as videos, SMS communications, witness statements and others – were doubtful. The expert opinion of 19 June 2015 could not be taken into account for the reasons stated in the decision of 17 November 2015. The expert opinion of 10 February 2016 could be accepted as evidence but it did not prove that M. was the second applicant’s biological father. On 2 December 2016 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment on appeal, finding that it had been lawful, well reasoned and justified. On 17 February 2017 a judge of the Moscow City Court refused to refer the applicants’ cassation appeal to the Presidium of that court for examination, finding that the applicants’ arguments were limited to a different assessment of evidence and that the Presidium did not have competence to reassess evidence established by final judgments. On 10 October 2017 a judge of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation refused to refer the case to the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court for consideration, finding no significant violations of substantive or procedural law which had influenced the outcome of the proceedings. COMPLAINTS The applicants complain under Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the domestic courts failed to establish M.’s paternity of the second applicant regardless of the results of the DNA test and that as a result the second applicant could not participate in the inheritance of M.’s estate. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Did the refusal to recognise M.’s paternity of the second applicant constitute an interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their private and/or family life, within the meaning of Article 8 § 1 of the Convention? If so, was that interference contrary to Article   8 of the Convention (compare Kalacheva v. Russia , no. 3451/05, 7 May 2009, and Pascaud v.   France , no.   19535/08, 16 June 2011)?   2.     Did the refusal to recognise M.’s paternity of the second applicant amount to an interference with her enjoyment of possessions, within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No.   1, in particular by frustrating her legitimate expectation to participate in the inheritance of M.’s estate? If so, was that interference justified and proportionate (compare Zaieţ v.   Romania , no. 44958/05, 24 March 2015)?