CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 3 avril 2019

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padding-right:5.03pt; padding-left:5.03pt; vertical-align:top } .s4F2EDFF { border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-left-style:solid; border-left-width:0.75pt; padding-right:5.03pt; padding-left:5.03pt; vertical-align:top } .s90A93616 { width:27.66pt; display:inline-block } .s7BAB4759 { width:16.33pt; display:inline-block } .s5B9812EB { width:22.1pt; display:inline-block } .sDCF83AE9 { width:12.33pt; display:inline-block } .s29D3E7E9 { width:12.39pt; display:inline-block } .s16704555 { width:22.74pt; display:inline-block } .s3FB5CE8C { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-36pt; font-size:10pt } .s5490EF62 { width:22.1pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block }   Communicated on 3 April 2019   THIRD SECTION Applications nos. 25714/16 and 56328/18 Sharlene AYLEY and Others against Russia and ANGLINE and Others against Russia lodged on 6 May 2016 and 23 November 2018 respectively STATEMENT OF FACTS A.     The circumstances of the case 1.     The most essential facts of the case, as stated by the applicants or as laid down in documents submitted (see appendix II) or referred to by them, may be summarised as follows. 1.     The applicants 2.     The applicants are relatives of persons who were on Malaysia Airlines commercial flight MH17, destroyed over the territory of Eastern Ukraine on 17 July 2014. All persons on board died. 3.     A list of all applicants, their dates of birth and the dates on which they introduced their applications before the Court appears in appendix I. The information in appendix I is based on the paper application forms and the list of applicants submitted by their lawyers in an electronic format. The applicants have declared that they are nationals of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Vietnam. 4.     Some of the applicants have indicated, in their applications forms or documents submitted by them, the name of their relative who died on flight MH17 and the relevant level of kinship. 5.     The applicants in application no. 25714/16 are represented by Mr   J.   Skinner. The applicants in application no. 56328/18 are represented by Mr   S.V. Mewa. 2.     The general situation in Eastern Ukraine in July 2014 6.     In the beginning of 2014 Russian military forces made several incursions into Ukrainian territory. An incursion in the Crimea region, initially denied but later acknowledged by the Russian authorities, was followed by their declaration that that region had become part of Russia. 7.     In the eastern regions of Ukraine, on its border with Russia, protests against the central authorities in Kiyv escalated into an armed separatist insurgency, to which Russia supplied military aid, including military equipment and personnel. In June and July 2014 parts of eastern Ukraine were under the control of self-proclaimed pro-Russian separatist entities. According to the applicants, these entities were either under the control of the authorities of the Russian Federation or operated in very close cooperation with them. 8.     In July 2014 there was intensive fighting between the Ukrainian army and separatist forces. 3.     The downing of flight MH17 and the first international reactions 9.     Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur took off on 17 July 2014 on schedule and was carried out by a passenger Boeing   777-200 aircraft with registration marks 9M-MRD. There were 283 passengers and 15 crew members on board. 10.     At 15:20 Central European Time, the aircraft, when flying over eastern Ukraine, was hit and disintegrated in the air. The wreckage fell down on several sites near the villages of Hrabove, Rozsypne and Petropavlivka in Eastern Ukraine. Six wreckage sites were identified, spread over 50 square kilometres overall. 11.     All 298 persons on board lost their lives. Their remains were later flown to the Netherlands and identified there by an international team of forensic specialists. 12.     On the same day, 17 July 2014, the Trilateral Contact Group of senior representatives of Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the OSCE, formed earlier that year in relation to the armed conflict in the region, issued a press release which stated: “In view of the terrible crash of a Malaysian airliner in the region of Donetsk and in order to agree on a number of urgent practical measures, the Group held a video conference with representatives of separatist groups in Donetsk. The representatives of separatist groups in Donetsk committed to the following: 1.     as a matter of priority, they shall close off the site of the catastrophe and allow local authorities to start preparations for the recovery of bodies; 2.     they shall provide safe access and security guarantees to the national investigation commission, including international investigators, in the area under their control; 3.     they shall provide safe access and security guarantees to OSCE monitors; 4.     they shall cooperate with the relevant authorities of Ukraine on all practical questions arising in the course of the recovery and investigation works.” 13.     On 21 July 2014 the United Nations Security Council adopted unanimously Resolution 2166 which, in its operative part, stated, inter alia : “[The Security Council] ... 3.     Supports efforts to establish a full, thorough and independent international investigation into the incident in accordance with international civil aviation guidelines; 4.     Recognizes the efforts under way by Ukraine, working in coordination with ICAO and other international experts and organizations, including representatives of States of Occurrence, Registry, Operator, Design and Manufacture, as well as States who have lost nationals on MH17, to institute an international investigation of the incident, and calls on all States to provide any requested assistance to civil and criminal investigations related to this incident; 5.     Expresses grave concern at reports of insufficient and limited access to the crash site; 6.     Demands that the armed groups in control of the crash site and the surrounding area refrain from any actions that may compromise the integrity of the crash site, including by refraining from destroying, moving, or disturbing wreckage, equipment, debris, personal belongings, or remains, and immediately provide safe, secure, full and unrestricted access to the site and surrounding area for the appropriate investigation authorities, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission and representatives of other relevant international organisations according to ICAO and other established procedures; ... 9.     Calls on all States and actors in the region to cooperate fully in relation to the international investigation of the incident, including with respect to immediate and unrestricted access to the crash site as referred to in paragraph 6; 10.     Welcomes in this regard the statement on 17 July 2014 by the Trilateral Contact Group of senior representatives of Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the OSCE and demands that the commitments outlined in that statement be implemented in full; 11.     Demands , that all those responsible for the incident be held to account and that all States cooperate fully with efforts to establish accountability; ...” 4.     Investigations, official positions expressed by Governments and other proceedings (a)     The investigation that resulted in the final report of the Dutch Safety Board, published in October 2015 (i)     Organisation and handling of the investigation 14.     On an unspecified date the Ukrainian authorities opened an investigation into the accident and, soon thereafter, requested the Netherlands, the State with the largest number of nationals on board the aeroplane, to take over. With the agreement of the Dutch authorities, on 23   July 2014 Ukraine delegated the investigation to the Netherlands. As from that date, the Netherlands became the State conducting the investigation into the causes of the crash in accordance with the provisions of Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (hereinafter “the Chicago Convention”). 15.     The Dutch Safety Board, an independent administrative body in the Netherlands which operates independently from the Dutch Government, conducted the investigation. 16.     It combined the investigation delegated from the Ukrainian authorities with its own investigation, initiated separately on 18 July 2014, into the decision-making related to flying over the conflict zone in the eastern part of Ukraine. 17.     In accordance with Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention, the purpose of the investigation was “to establish the causes of the crash and the factors that contributed” with a prevention objective and “not to apportion blame or liability”. 18.     While the investigation was conducted by the Dutch Safety Board, the following States participated and appointed accredited representatives: Ukraine, as the State of occurrence, Malaysia, as the State of the operator and of registry, the United States of America, as the State of design and manufacture of the aeroplane, the United Kingdom, as the State of design and manufacture of the engines, as well as Australia and the Russian Federation, as States that provided information on request. Other countries which lost citizens on flight MH 17 were invited to view evidence and comment on the draft report. 19.     Air accident investigators from Ukraine and Malaysia, police officers from Australia and journalists, escorted by representatives of the OSCE, visited the crash area in the days following the crash. The wreckage was photographed extensively and showed the locations mostly undisturbed. The information gathered was shared with the Dutch Safety Board. 20.     Investigators acting for the international investigation led by the Dutch Safety Board visited the crash site for the first time in November 2014, there having been no earlier possibility due to safety concerns related to the armed conflict in the area. They recovered the majority of the wreckage. Additional visits, during which more wreckage parts were recovered, took place in March and April/May 2015. The investigators recorded the locations where each piece of wreckage was found. Some wreckage pieces were collected by local residents and handed over to the Dutch Safety Board with the consequence that the location where they fell was unknown. Other pieces found on the ground had obviously been moved before they were found. Part of the wreckage was never recovered, including pieces that were identified as having been in the wreckage area shortly after the crash but were not found during the recovery missions. 21.     During the recovery of the wreckage, a number of parts that did not originate from the plane were found in the wreckage area. The parts that were suspected to be related to a surface-to-air missile were transported to the Netherlands in the same way as the aeroplane wreckage. 22.     A wreckage reconstruction, an analysis of the high-energy objects found and blast damage simulations were also performed, among others, during the investigation. 23.     Following a preliminary report published on 9 September 2014, the Board published its final report in October 2015. 24.     The latter report stated that there had been “constructive cooperation between the States involved in the investigation: the Netherlands, Ukraine, Malaysia, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and the Russian Federation” and that “the representatives of these States, who were members of the international investigation team, had access to the investigation information and were able to study and verify it.” (ii)     The final report of October 2015 25.     The most relevant findings in the report are listed below: -     the aircraft had been in an airworthy condition on departure from Amsterdam; -     at the relevant time both Ukraine and the Russian Federation had restricted access to parts of their airspace up to flight level 320 (meaning up to an altitude of approximately 9,750 metres); -     while over Ukraine, including at the time of the last contact, the aircraft was flying at flight level 330 (at an altitude of approximately 10,050   metres); -     no distress messages from flight MH17 were received by air traffic control; -     the replay of the communications recorded on the cockpit voice recorder demonstrated no indication of anything unusual and the recording ended abruptly, twenty milliseconds after two sound peaks heard on the tape; -       the data from the flight data recorder demonstrated that the aircraft was flying at 33,000 feet (approximately 10,050 metres) with a groundspeed of approximately 914 km per hour, that no technical malfunction or warnings were recorded and that the recording stopped abruptly; -     there was no in-flight fire before the break-up of the aeroplane; fires erupted at two wreckage sites after the crash; -     three other commercial aeroplanes were in the same area at the time of the last contact, the closest of them being at a distance of 33 km; radar data from Ukraine did not show any other radar targets in the vicinity; -     a video of the radar screen received from the Russian Federation showed, during two intervals of 20 and 40 seconds, a second radar target close to the target labelled MH17; this was considered to be aeroplane debris having sufficient reflection to be detected as primary target, a finding consistent with the wind direction and final position of the wreckage; it was not possible to verify the video as the Russian Federation, despite requests, did not send raw radar data to the investigators but only a video of the radar screen; -     due to factors such as detection sensitivity levels of the radars and their system filtering modalities (intended to remove phenomena from a radar screen that are detected but are not required to be displayed), it was very unlikely that the air traffic control primary radar systems in the area could detect and display a missile moving at high speed; -     wreckage parts from what appeared to have been a 9M38 series surface-to-air missile were found in the area; -     the autopsies demonstrated that the captain, the first officer from team A and the purser sustained multiple fatal injuries associated with the impact of metal fragments moving at high velocity; -     over 500 small fragments were recovered from bodies and the aeroplane wreckage; the composition, shape and other characteristics of many of these fragments showed that they were high-energy objects that had deformed on impact with the aeroplane at very high velocity; some of the fragments were in the shape of a bow-tie; -     some of the aeroplane wreckage parts and one of the missile parts showed traces of explosive residues; -     paint samples taken from missile parts found in the wreckage area matched those found on foreign objects extracted from the aeroplane; -     the investigation considered in detail and excluded the following possible causes of the damage and break-up of the aeroplane: lightning, meteor strike, space debris, explosion inside the aircraft or in the tank or engines; -     the evidence pointed to damage by a large number of high-energy objects, well over 800, that perforated the aeroplane from the outside, on the left hand and upper side of the cockpit; there was also evidence of the effects of a detonation blast, such as blast deposits and direct pressure; -     the investigation considered in detail and excluded, as possible weapon systems that may have caused the damage found on the aeroplane, the following weapons: air-to-air gun/canon (which could not result in more than several dozen bullets penetrating the aircraft given the altitude and speed of flight MH 17 and could not produce fragments as those found in bodies and wreckage); air-to-air missile (damage pattern not matching and no air-to-air missiles used in the region having the distinctly formed bow-tie shaped fragments in their warhead); portable shoulder-launched surface-to-air missile (unable to reach the altitude MH17 was flying at). -     there was only one source of damage and the aeroplane was not struck by more than one weapon; -     a large surface-to-air missile with fragmentation warhead was able to engage an aeroplane of the size and speed of a Boeing 777 at its cruising altitude; missile warheads of this type contained fragments of different shapes; -     bow-tie and cube-shaped fragments were only found in the 9N314M warhead, which can be fitted to the 9M38M1 missile; -     the Buk surface-to-air missile system was present in the region and was the only weapon with warheads containing pre-formed fragments in the shape of a bow-tie; this system could reach targets up to an altitude of 80,000 feet (approximately 24,400 metres); -     the analysis of all information in the investigation led to conclude that the aeroplane had been struck by a 9N314M warhead as carried on a 9M38-series missile and launched by a Buk surface-to-air missile system; -     the studies, including simulation exercises, conducted with the aim of verifying that the damage observed could originate from such a warhead and establishing the missile’s possible flight path from the ground to detonation resulted in findings that a 70kg warhead best matched the damage observed on the wreckage and that the area from which the possible flight paths could have commenced was an area of about 320 square kilometres in the east of Ukraine. (iii)     Requests for corrections to the draft final report and the replies of the Dutch Safety Board 26.     Appendix V to the report lists proposals for corrections to the initial text of the draft final report which were made by representatives of the countries participating in the international investigation on unspecified dates prior to the publication of the final report. The final report took account of the corrections requested when they were granted. 27.     The Russian Federation and Ukraine, among others, made a number of proposals. Some of those are listed below. 28.     The Russian Federation proposed, inter alia , that the report should state that there “existed other scenarios that could lead to in-flight break-up of the aircraft” but the Dutch Safety Board refused, noting that all other scenarios had beeen considered, analysed and excluded. 29.     The Russian Federation also disagreed with the conclusion of the Dutch Safety Board that the Russian Federation had failed to submit raw radar data in violation of Annexes 11 and 14 to the Chicago Convention, maintaining that Annex 14 did not require that raw data must be saved. The Dutch Safety Board consulted the International Civil Aviation Organisation (“ICAO”) which concurred with the Dutch position. 30.     Ukraine requested a sentence to be included to the effect that access to the crash site could not be provided immediately because the area was controlled by “illegal armed groups”. This was refused by the Dutch Safety Board as it had to remain politically neutral. 31.     The Russian Federation requested information on the steel grade used in the discovered high-energy objects in order to link those to possible types of warhead. The Dutch Safety Board considered that studying the detailed chemical composition of the steel was not relevant because high-energy objects are usually made from low-grade metal (unalloyed steel) originating from different batches, different sources, different manufacturing locations and over different periods, which made it impossible to match the fragments found with reference material from an intact warhead. 32.     The Russian Federation proposed to include text that according to satellite pictures from the Russian Ministry of Defence a Ukrainian Buk M1 battery had been identified in the area of Zaroshchenskoye on 17 July 2014. The Dutch Safety Board stated that while this was relevant to the criminal investigation, its report did not deal with the location of weapons system in the area but only with identifying the cause of the crash. 33.     The Russian Federation criticised the report for having limited its consideration of air-to-air rockets to those used by Russia and Ukraine and insisted that the damage on MH17 could have resulted from an air-to-air rocket. The Dutch Safety Board replied that there was no evidence of weapons from other parts of the world being in the inventory of any party acting in the region. It also stated that the damage pattern observed on the wreckage could not be reproduced when a 40 kg warhead, typical of an air-to-air weapon, was simulated. The conclusion that the weapon used was not an air-to-air rocket had been duly justified. (b)     The criminal investigation conducted by the Joint Investigation Team (“the JIT”) 34 .     On an unspecified date a team of police officers and public prosecutors from Australia, Belgium, Malaysia, the Netherlands and Ukraine, under the coordination of prosecutors from the Netherlands, started a criminal investigation into the downing of flight MH17. Its purpose was to establish the facts, identify those responsible for the crash and collect evidence which could be used in court. 35.     This investigation was separate from that conducted by the Dutch Safety Board and ran in parallel. It is still pending. 36.     On 28 September 2016, the JIT presented the first results of its criminal investigation. The main conclusion of the JIT was that flight MH17 had been shot down by a BUK missile from the 9M38 series, which had been fired from an agricultural field in the area of Pervomaiskyi. At that time this area had been controlled by pro-Russian separatists. The missile from the 9M38 series had been fired by a BUK TELAR brought in from the territory of the Russian Federation and returned to the Russian Federation after use. 37.     In May 2018 the JIT presented additional results. The JIT concluded that the BUK TELAR that shot down flight MH17 had come from a unit of the Russian Federation’s armed forces - the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade or the 53rd Brigade from Kursk in the Russian Federation. At the presentation of May 2018 the JIT showed a venturi and a casing that had been found in Eastern Ukraine and asked for information about the numbers on these parts and the unit to which the missile (of which the venturi and the casing were part of) was supplied to. It also called for witnesses to come forward. 38.     During its investigation, in 2014, 2016, 2017 and 2018, the JIT requested information and legal assistance from the Russian authorities. It appears that the Russian authorities replied for the first time in 2018. In its public statements the JIT affirmed that it had never received a reply to its request specifically related to the numbers found on rocket parts. The JIT also stated that information publicly presented by the Russian Ministry of Defence was factually incorrect on several points, including the alleged presence of a fighter jet near the MH17 on radar images as presented at that Ministry’s press conference in July 2014. (c)     Declarations by the Governments of the Netherlands and Australia 39.     On the basis of the conclusions reached by the JIT, in May 2018 the Governments of the Netherlands and Australia declared that they considered the Russian Federation responsible for the downing of flight MH17. (d)     Official declarations of Government officials from the Russian Federation. 40.     The Government of the Russian Federation have repeatedly denied any responsibility for the downing of flight MH17. They have also confirmed that no investigations are ongoing in Russia into the cause of the downing, that Russia is opposed to a special international tribunal for the MH17 case and that no Russian suspect will be extradited in that connection. 41.     In October 2018 the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs made a statement affirming, inter alia , that the Russian authorities fully cooperated with the investigations, welcomed Dutch specialists and prosecutors in Moscow, made secret technical and factory data available to the investigation, transferred the results of a full-scale test, carried out by the producer of BUK missiles and provided raw radar images of the time of the tragedy. The Ministry further affirmed that it had provided irrefutable data and evidence of Ukraine’s involvement in the MH17 disaster, including regarding the question who owned the BUK missile concerned. It criticised the Netherlands authorities that they ignored valuable information and worked on a predetermined version of events based on the view that Russia was responsible. (e)     Proceedings before the ICJ 42 .     On 16 January 2017 Ukraine instituted proceedings against the Russian Federation in the International Court of Justice (“the ICJ”) with regard to alleged violations of, inter alia , the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Ukraine requested the ICJ to establish, inter alia , that the Russian Federation had violated its obligations under that convention by supplying funds, weapons and training to illegal armed groups that engage in acts of terrorism in Ukraine and that the Russian Federation bears international responsibility, by virtue of its sponsorship of terrorism and failure to prevent the financing of terrorism, for the acts of terrorism committed by its proxies in Ukraine, including the shoot-down of Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17. These proceedings are pending. 5.     Other factual allegations and material submitted by the applicants 43.     The applicants submitted, inter alia , numerous reports and publications by expert groups, media outlets, non-governmental organisations and individuals. This material covers topics such as, inter alia , the origins and development of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, the Russian policies and involvement in this conflict, weapons systems used by belligerents in the region, witness accounts concerning the presence of Russian military personnel in the area, the presence and movement of a BUK missile system from Russia into Ukraine and back to Russia at the relevant period of July 2017, names and possible roles of Russian military personnel and pro-Russian separatists allegedly involved in the handling and firing of the missile that downed flight MH17. 44.     On the basis of the material submitted by them, the applicants made, inter alia , the following additional allegations on the facts. 45.     By mid-June 2014 the pro-Russian forces in Eastern Ukraine were not progressing well militarily. In early July 2014, separatist commanders, including Igor Strelkov, sent memos to the Russian authorities and to the President of the Russian Federation raising concern over growing risks to Russian interests in the ground war. These risks stemmed to a certain extent from Ukrainian military aircraft attacking separatist positions. In clear connection to these developments, there was movement of heavy armaments across the eastern Russian-Ukrainian border in June 2014. 46.     Many Ukrainian military aircraft, including larger ones such as AN30 and IL76, were shot down in Eastern Ukraine during May and June 2014. 47.     Between 22 June and 25 July 2014 military units of the armed forces of the Russian Federation conducted training exercises near the eastern Ukrainian border and close to a border crossing known as “the Stripe” and held by pro-Russian separatists. 48.     Just before 17 July 2014, Russian media allegedly controlled by the authorities, including NTV and Rossiya 24, broadcast reports of Russian BUK missile convoys on roads in and around the cities of Torez and Snezhnoye in the Donetsk region of Eastern Ukraine. 49.     There exists strong evidence, including eyewitnesses, photographs, geolocated photographs, video films, matching vehicle identification numbers and characteristics of the transport vehicle, allegedly demonstrating that a Russian BUK missile system with four missiles from the 53 rd missile brigade of the Russian army moved on 15 and 16 July 2014 into Eastern Ukraine from Russia and, after the attack on MH17 on 17 July, moved back in the direction of the Russian border. The photographic and video material of the trip back to Russia showed that one out of the four BUK missiles was missing. B.     Relevant international law 1.     The Convention on International Civil Aviation (the Chicago Convention). 50.     The Chicago Convention was signed on 7 December 1944. Almost all members of the United Nations Organisation, including, inter alia , Malaysia, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, are parties thereto. The Convention has been revised eight times (in 1959, 1963, 1969, 1975, 1980, 1997, 2000 and 2006). 51.     The Convention provides for rules related to civil aviation and also for the creation of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (“ICAO”), its powers and governing bodies. ICAO has become a specialized agency of the United Nations Organisation charged with coordinating and regulating international air travel. 52.     Articles 1 and 2 provide as follows: Article 1 Sovereignty “The contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.” Article 2 Territory “For the purposes of this Convention the territory of a State shall be deemed to be the land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or mandate of such State.” 53.     Article 90 provides for the adoption of annexes to the Chicago Convention by ICAO’s Council (which consists of thirty-six contracting States including the States of chief importance in air transport, those making the largest contribution to the provision of facilities for civil air navigation and other States to ensure representation of the major geographical areas).   After adoption by the Council, the annexes are communicated to the contracting States and become effective unless a majority of those States disapproves. 54.     There are currently nineteen annexes containing standards and recommended practices. Annex 11 concerns air traffic services, including obligations on recording and communicating radar data. Annex 13 concerns the investigation of aircraft accidents and incidents. Annex 14 concerns aerodromes. 2.     The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against The Safety of Civil Aviation (the Montreal Convention). 55.     The Montreal Convention of 1971, to which parties are almost all members of the United Nations Organisation, including, inter alia , Malaysia, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, provides insofar as relevant: Article 1 “1.     Any person commits an offence if he unlawfully and intentionally: ... (b) destroys an aircraft in service ... 2.     Any person also commits an offence if he: ... (b)     is an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to commit any such offence ...” Article 5 “1. Each Contracting State shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences in the following cases: (a) when the offence is committed in the territory of that State; (b) when the offence is committed against or on board an aircraft registered in that State; ... 2.     Each Contracting State shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences mentioned in Article 1, paragraph 1 (a), (b) and (c), and in Article 1, paragraph 2, in so far as that paragraph relates to those offences, in the case where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him pursuant to Article 8 to any of the States mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article. 3.     This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law.” Article 11 “1. Contracting States shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal proceedings brought in respect of the offences. The law of the State requested shall apply in all cases. ...” COMPLAINTS 56.     The applicants in application no. 25714/16 complain under Article 2 of the Convention that the Russian Federation is responsible for the downing of flight MH17 and the death of their relatives on board, either directly or through the acts of Russian separatists under their control. They further complain under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention that the Russian Federation failed to discharge its obligation to conduct an investigation into the death of their relatives and bring the perpetrators to justice. The Russian Federation also failed to cooperate with the investigations led by the Dutch Safety Board and the Joint investigation team in the Netherlands. 57.     The applicants in application no. 56328/18 complain as follows: (1)     Invoking Article 2 of the Convention, that there has been a substantive violation of that provision in that the Russian Federation was responsible for the downing of flight MH 17 through its army officers or other officials or by virtue of its control over and support for the Russian separatists’ forces, as well as because it had effective control and exercised some governmental power over the relevant part of the territory of Eastern Ukraine. In particular, it is alleged that, while knowing or being obviously in a position to know that civilian aircraft flew over the relevant area and could be reached by a missile fired from a BUK launching facility, the Russian Federation moved its BUK launch facility to the territory of Ukraine and was responsible for one of the following scenarios: (a) was actively involved in the decision to fire the BUK missile at the airplane; or (b) despite the presence of its military during the firing of the missile did not prevent the firing of the missile; or (c) made the BUK launching facility and missile available to the separatists’ forces without controlling its use; or (d) did not keep the BUK missile and launch facility under its control; (2)     Invoking Article 2 of the Convention, that there has been a procedural violation of that provision in that the Russian Federation (i) did not adequately cooperate with the investigation conducted by international fact-finding committees, (ii) provided incorrect information to the JIT and (iii) failed to conduct an independent, adequate, prompt and reliable investigation; (3)     Invoking Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the Convention that, by failing to cooperate in the international investigations and to conduct an adequate investigation in Russia, as well as by failing to provide information that could clarify who was responsible for the killing of the applicants’ close relatives, the Russian Federation directly caused the applicants to suffer anguish and a heavy burden, amounting to ill-treatment, and breached their right to respect for their family life; (4)     Invoking Articles 2, 3, 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention, that the Russian Federation, by failing to cooperate in the international investigations and to conduct an adequate investigation in Russia, deprived the applicants of their right to an effective remedy and compensation. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Can the applicants claim to be the victims of the alleged violations of the Convention? The applicants who have not indicated the name of their relative who died on board of MH17 and the level of kinship should do so.   2.     Do the alleged violations of the Convention and its Protocols fall within the “jurisdiction” of the Russian Federation within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention? In particular, did the Russian Federation exercise “authority and/or effective control” over the relevant eastern regions of Ukraine at the time of the downing of flight MH17, through their armed forces or a subordinate local administration or in collaboration with local armed forces? In this respect, what was the extent of the military and logistic Russian presence in July 2014? In addition, were agents of the Russian State involved, directly or indirectly, in the downing of flight MH17?   3.     Have the applicants complied with the requirements of Article 35 §   1 of the Convention?   4.     Has there been a violation of Article 2 in that the respondent State was allegedly responsible for the death of the applicants’ close relatives?   5.     Having regard to the procedural protection of the right to life (see paragraph   104 of Salman v.   Turkey [GC], no.   21986/93, ECHR 2000-VII), has there been a breach of Article   2 of the Convention in relation to the alleged failure of the respondent State to investigate the downing of flight MH17 and their alleged failure to cooperate with the relevant international investigations?   6.     Have the applicants been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment in breach of Article   3 of the Convention in that the authorities of the respondent State, by allegedly failing to investigate and cooperate with the relevant international investigations, caused them to suffer anguish and distress because of the lack of clarity as to the identity of those responsible for the death of their close relat