CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 5 juin 2020

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sE94AE824 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-28.35pt; text-align:justify } Communicated on 5 June 2020 Published on 22 June 2020   FIRST SECTION Application no. 51391/19 Helena WIEGANDOVÁ against the Czech Republic lodged on 26 September 2019 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The application concerns the applicant’s inability to terminate judicially a free personal legal affirmative easement over her property, which had been created by the property restitution legislation of 1992, that is to say before the Czech Republic was considered a Party to the Convention (as from 18   March 1992). QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Is the applicant’s complaint compatible ratione temporis with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a)?   2.     If the application is admissible ratione temporis , did the dismissal of the applicant’s claim for termination of the easement interfere with her right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions, within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No.   1 to the Convention?   3.     If there has been an interference with the applicant’s peaceful enjoyment of her possessions, was it in the public interest, and in accordance with the conditions provided for by law, within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No.   1 of the Convention?   4.     If so, was a “fair balance” struck between the demands of the general interest and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights? In particular, did that interference impose an excessive individual burden on the applicant (see, for example, Immobiliare Saffi v.   Italy [GC], no. 22774/93, § 59 ECHR 1999 ‑ V)?