CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 15 avril 2021

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } Published on 3 May 2021   THIRD SECTION Application no. 11674/17 Sokol GAZULLI against Albania lodged on 4 February 2017 communicated on 15 April 2021 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE On 3 July 2015 the Shkodër customs office ordered the applicant to pay a customs duty and a fine, totalling 695,223 Albanian leks (approximately 5,604 euros), for having breached the rules on importing his personal vehicle into the country. On 29 July 2015 the Shkodër customs office ordered the seizure of the applicant’s vehicle and bank account owing to his failure to pay the customs duty and fine. The applicant lodged an administrative complaint against both decisions of the Shkodër customs office with the General Directorate of Customs (GDC). The GDC did not examine the applicant’s complaint on the ground that he should have first paid the customs duty, as required by Article 289 §§ 2 and 3 of the Customs Code. The applicant challenged the administrative decisions before the Shkodër Administrative Court which, on 14 October 2015, decided to declare the applicant’s action outside its jurisdiction for failure to exhaust the administrative remedies. On 17 December 2015 the Supreme Court’s administrative bench upheld the Shkodër Administrative Court’s decision. The applicant complained before the Constitutional Court claiming that Article 289 §§ 2 and 3 of the Customs Code, which required the payment of the customs duty before lodging a civil action with the domestic court, constituted a breach of his right of access to court. On 11 November 2016 the Constitutional Court considered that the applicant’s constitutional appeal was aimed at challenging the constitutionality of a statute in respect of which he did not have locus standing. It therefore declared it inadmissible. The application therefore concerns the applicant’s complaint about an alleged breach of his right of access to court under Article 6 § 1 on account of the domestic courts’ failure to examine his civil action and his complaint about an alleged breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention on account of the seizure of his vehicle and bank account. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Does Article 6 § 1 of the Convention apply to the proceedings in the present case, under its civil or criminal limb (see Ferrazzini v. Italy [GC], no. 44759/98, § 29, ECHR 2001 ‑ VII, and Jussila v. Finland [GC], no.   73053/01, §§ 43-45, ECHR 2006 ‑ XIV)?   2.     If Article 6 of the Convention was applicable, was the applicant’s right of access to court breached by the domestic courts’ failure to examine the merits of his civil action (see, mutatis mutandis , Kreuz v. Poland , no.   28249/95, §§   60-67, ECHR 2001 ‑ VI, and Weissman and Others v.   Romania , no.   63945/00, § 42, ECHR 2006 ‑ VII (extracts))? Is a statutory requirement that a customs duty and fine can be challenged in administrative and/or judicial proceedings only after being paid in full compatible with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention?   3.     Has there been an interference with the applicant’s right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol   No. 1 to the Convention on account of the seizure of his vehicle and bank account (see, for example, Microintelect OOD v. Bulgaria , no.   34129/03, §§   35-37, 4 March 2014, and Benet Czech, spol. s r.o. v.   the   Czech Republic , no. 31555/05, §§ 28-32, 21 October 2010)? If so, was that interference in compliance with the conditions set out in Article   1 of Protocol No.   1 to the Convention, as interpreted in the Court’s jurisprudence (see, for example, Iatridis v. Greece [GC], no. 31107/96, § 58, ECHR   1999 ‑ II, Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy [GC], no. 22774/93, §§ 48-49, ECHR 1999 ‑ V; and East West Alliance Limited v. Ukraine , no. 19336/04, §§   166-217, 23 January 2014)?